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ABSTRACT 
                    This thesis stems from  academic research following my MPhil in 1992. It  
presents a portfolio of fourteen selected papers offering insights on major issues 
affecting the accountancy-related areas of external auditing (EA) and corporate 
governance (CG) in the small state of Malta.                                                                                 
          The commentary (Chapter 1) presents a background to the development of 
the portfolio and overviews the theoretical framework and methodology. It then 
introduces each paper, underlining common sub-themes. The contributions of the 
papers to knowledge are then indicated by (i) overviewing the development of each 
sub-theme contributing to the academic discourses in EA and CG, and (ii)  laying 
out the relevance to the wider debates relating to small state literature. The 
commentary concludes by looking at the follow-up research agenda and the 
beckoning future. Chapters 2 to 15 then reproduce fourteen papers – an 
introductory paper  and  thirteen others in two  parts. The introductory paper 
includes most  major small state sub-themes recurring in different ways in the 
subsequent papers: issues relating to close relationships and independence, 
discipline, resistance to change, regulation, secrecy, small business units and other 
small state issues. The following first part includes seven papers on Maltese 
external auditing in owner-managed companies, auditor changes, auditor 
perceptions, qualified opinions, first-time auditor selection, fee development and 
dysfunctional audit behaviour. The  second part then comprises six papers on 
Maltese CG including  the CG statement, internal audit benchmarking, conflicts of 
interest in co-operatives, the board/management relationship, a CG index, and 
small shareholder participation in the AGM.                                                                                                 
                   The portfolio contributes to literature notably by its original highlighting of the 
significance  of the above-mentioned sub-themes on various aspects of  EA and 
CG  in a small state.  Furthermore, the portfolio impacts Maltese EA and CG 
practices, particularly by emphasising the need to go beyond the adoption of 
imported regulatory frameworks. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
Commentary 
1.  Introduction 
I submit fourteen papers to be considered for a Ph.D by the graduate publication 
route. The main contributions  of this portfolio is that it gives new insights on major  
issues affecting the accountancy-related areas of external auditing (EA) and 
corporate governance (CG) within  a small state context.                                                                       
Fourteen papers are presented – an introductory paper and thirteen others in two 
subsequent parts (see Table 1). It may be noted  that the early papers are mostly 
descriptive as they set the scene for the innovative area of research of EA and CG 
within a small state context while the later papers contain  the stronger analytical 
contributions.  
   The introductory paper (see Commentary Section 5.1) covers most of the 
major small state sub-themes which recur in the later papers dealing with Maltese 
EA and CG topics.                
 The first part (see Commentary Section 5.2) includes seven papers 
comprising studies on Maltese EA in owner-managed companies, auditor change 
decisions, auditor perceptions, qualified audit opinions, first-time auditor selection, 
audit fee development as well as on organisational culture, audit personnel 
characteristics and dysfunctional audit behaviour.                 
 The second part (see Commentary Section 5.3) then includes six papers 
comprising studies on  Maltese CG including the implications of introducing the CG 
statement, internal audit benchmarking, conflicts of interest in co-operatives, the 
board/management relationship in listed companies, a CG index, and the 
participation of the small shareholder in the Annual General Meeting (AGM).                                                                                                  
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 This commentary is structured as follows. The next Section starts with a 
summary of my career history that gives the background to development of the 
papers within this portfolio. This is followed by Section 3, which lays out the 
theoretical framework. Next, Section 4 overviews the major research methodology 
and limitations of the papers.  Section 5 then follows, introducing each of the 
papers in the portfolio, their small state sub-theme interlinks as well as my own 
contribution to the papers. The contribution to knowledge of the portfolio of papers 
is then overviewed in Section 6 while the following Section 7 describes the follow-
up research studies. Finally, Section 8 gives the concluding remarks. 
 
2.  Career history and its link with the portfolio papers  
After completing the first parts of the ACCA examinations, I started work as an 
accounting officer in a manufacturing business (1973/1975), after which I  joined 
the Central Bank of Malta as an internal auditor (1975/1978), spent a spell  as a 
project financial manager in a national airline group (1978/1980), this being 
followed by a position of financial accountant (1980/82) and Head of Administration 
(1982/83) at a leading  Maltese telecom company.  I furthered my studies in 1982, 
qualifying both as both as a UK (ACCA) and Maltese (Certified Public Accountant 
or CPA) accountant.          
 In 1983, I joined the University of Malta (UM) as a lecturer on its new 
professional accountancy degree.  In 1989, the UM   sponsored me for a part-time 
MPhil degree at the University of Loughborough, tying up a senior lectureship to its  
completion, which I effected  in 1992. Given the commitments of my young family 
and employer reluctance to extend sponsorship, I did not consider upgrading this 
work to a Ph.D, a decision I later came to regret. Nonetheless, the MPhil 
experience led in 1992 to my first refereed article   (Baldacchino,1992b [INTRO-1]), 
raising a number of small state issues  recurring in the later articles and selected 
for  this portfolio.                                                                              
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 In 1993, I  also became  involved in part-time consultancy and directorships, 
providing services relating to co-operative governance and financing  and  public 
sector auditing  (1993/1996), a Central Bank of Malta directorship (1996-1998)  
which also required acting as Bank Governor when necessary,  and chairing Board 
sub-committees related to  the restructuring of the financial reporting and internal 
auditing systems and to the introduction of  the first audit committee. In 1999, I was 
elected to the Board of a small employee foundation, followed in 2002/2006 by a 
directorship of Maltacom plc, a major listed group with a number of small 
subsidiaries, and as Chairman of its Audit Committee. This varied experience mix 
led  to the co-publication, mostly with different colleagues or postgraduate 
students, of refereed papers on the predicament in the small state of Malta of the 
statutory audit of owner-managed companies (Tabone and Baldacchino, 2003 
[AUD-1]), of factors contributing to auditor change decisions (Magri and 
Baldacchino, 2004 [AUD-2], of jurors' and self-perceptions of the statutory auditors 
(Desira and Baldacchino, 2005 [AUD-3], and of qualified audit opinions (Farrugia 
and Baldacchino, 2005 [AUD-4])  A further  study on benchmarking in Maltese 
internal audit units (Balzan and Baldacchino, 2007 [CG-2]) originated at this stage  
from the issues in benchmarking faced at the Maltacom internal audit unit. 
Furthermore, the insights gained on audit committees  led  to a paper discussing 
the implications on the CG of Maltese listed companies of a  recent European 
regulation introducing the CG statement (Baldacchino, 2007 [CG-1]).                                                                                                       
 In 2006, I became Rector's Adviser in Financial Affairs at the University of 
Malta  being primarily involved in the financial directorship of  the University's 
companies. Since 2008, I have also been academic Head of the Department of 
Accountancy, which  role involved me, inter alia, in the upgrade of the professional 
course to a Masters. As Head, I also represent the University in the Maltese 
accountancy regulatory body (currently I am also its Chairman), this being the 
national body regulating CPA warrants, overseeing auditor activity and quality 
assurance, proposing new accountancy legislation, and maintaining the necessary 
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dialogue both locally with the Maltese profession and in Brussels with the  other EU 
regulators in the Committee of European Auditing Oversight Bodies (CEAOB). 
These further experiences prompted more research studies including an 
examination of the factors influencing first-time external audit selection in Malta 
(Baldacchino and Cardona, 2011 [AUD-5], and an analysis of the conflicts of 
interest in Maltese co-operatives (Baldacchino and Bugeja, 2012 [CG-3]).  When 
published, this paper on conflicts of interest had particular local impact on 
regulation regarding the monitoring of the funding of Maltese co-operatives. The 
Government took steps in line with the Co-operative Societies Act 2001  to monitor 
closely all the finances of the Maltese co-operative institution, the  Central 
Cooperative Fund by the appointment of a Monitoring Board thereon. This Board, 
of which I was a member, continued to function until new regulations – the Central 
Co-operative Regulations (2016) – came into force. The publication of this and 
related papers on co-operatives also contributed to the Award of Pioneer in 
Maltese Co-operatives at the Co-operatives Europe General Assembly held in 
Malta in April, 2017.  Further papers followed on the analysis and development of 
audit fees (Baldacchino and Borg, 2014 [AUD-6]), the CG relationship between the 
Board  and Management in listed companies (Bezzina et al, 2014 [CG-4]), the 
applicability of a CG index  in such companies (Baldacchino et al, 2015 [CG-5]),  
the participation of the small shareholder in the AGM  (Baldacchino et al. 2016a 
[CG-6]) and organisational culture, personnel characteristics and dysfunctional 
audit behaviour (Baldacchino et al., 2016d [AUD-7]).  
 Refereed papers in this portfolio are those published by 31 December 2016,  
and exclude others which, although also focusing  on Malta,  are  either unrelated 
to private sector auditing or CG e.g. Baldacchino et al. (2016c), Zammit and 
Baldacchino (2012) and Baldacchino and Camilleri (2014), or are deemed even 
less relevant than other published papers, e.g. Azzopardi and Baldacchino (2009),   
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Baldacchino et al. (2014a),  Baldacchino et al. (2014b), Baldacchino et al. (2016b) . 
Various publications in professional  journals are also omitted.                
Table 1 lists the portfolio papers, including each title and year of publication, 
author/s, journal/book where published, volume and page numbers as well as other 
remarks where relevant. 
 
3.  Auditing, corporate governance and small state networking:     
.     the theoretical framework 
This Section presents the theoretical framework for the portfolio of papers. It starts 
by showing the link between EA and CG. The Section then defines the small state 
and its major characteristics, this being followed by delving into the applicability of 
the social networking model in such a state. Reference is then made to the 
significance of such small state networking to the application of EA and CG in 
Malta as indicated by the recurrence of a number of sub-themes in the papers. 
3.1  External auditing, corporate governance and their commonalities   
In a definition adapted from the Committee on Basic Auditing Concepts (1973:8), 
Porter et al. (2014) define EA  as  "a systematic process of objectively gathering 
and evaluating evidence relating to assertions  about economic actions and events 
in which the individual or organisation making the assertions has been engaged to 
ascertain the  degree  of  correspondence  between  those  assertions  and  
established  criteria,  and communicating the results to users  of the reports  in 
which the assertions are made" (p.3). EA (external or statutory auditing) is carried 
out for parties external to the auditee and is regulated by company law.  The 
external auditor's roles include protecting the interest of the shareholders by 
providing reasonable assurance  on the company reports being issued, promoting 
accountability, conducting continuous risk assessments, and maintaining strong 
relationships with regulators (Harlow, 2016). Furthermore, s/he communicates with 
various organs in the client company, including the Board, the audit committee and  
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TABLE 1: THE PORTFOLIO OF PAPERS 
INTRODUCTORY PAPER 
INTRO-1: Baldacchino, P.J. (1992b). Problems of   the   Accountancy   Profession   in   a 
                 Microstate: A Maltese Viewpoint, Bank of Valletta Review,6 (Autumn)): 29-34.                                                                            
                                                                                                                                                      
PART 1: EXTERNAL AUDITING PAPERS            
AUD-1: Tabone, N and Baldacchino P.J. (2003). The Statutory Audit of  Owner-Managed  
             Companies in Malta. Managerial Auditing Journal, 18(5): 387-398.                                                                                                                          
AUD-2: Magri, J. and Baldacchino P.J. (2004). Factors Contributing  to  Auditor   Change 
             Decisions in Malta. Managerial Auditing Journal, 19(7): 956-968.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
AUD-3: Desira, J. and Baldacchino, P.J. (2005).  Jurors'  and   Self-Perceptions   of   the  
            Statutory Auditors in Malta. Managerial Auditing Journal, 20(7): 691-706.                                                       
AUD-4: Farrugia K. and Baldacchino, P.J. (2005).  Qualified  Audit   Opinions   in   Malta.   
            Managerial Auditing Journal, 20(8): 823-844.                                                                                                                                                              
AUD-5: Baldacchino, P.J. and Cardona, C. (2011). Factors Influencing First-time External 
            Audit Selection in Malta. The IUP   Journal   of   Accounting   Research   and   Audit  
            Practices, X(2): 45-69.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
AUD-6: Baldacchino, P.J. and Borg, J. (2014). An Analysis of the  Development  of  Audit  
             Fees in Malta. The IUP Journal of Accounting Research and Audit  Practices,  April   
             X111 (2): 27-52.                                                                                                                              
AUD-7: Baldacchino, P.J., Tabone, N., Agius, J. and Bezzina, F. (2016d).     Impact    of  
             Organisational Culture and Audit Personnel Characteristics on Dysfunctional  Audit   
             Behaviour. The IUP Journal of Accounting Research and Audit Practices, XV (3):34 
             -63.  (Earlier version at the European Accounting Association Conference, Glasgow  
             28-30 April, 2015).                                                                                                                                                         
 
PART 2: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PAPERS 
CG-1:   Baldacchino, P.J. (2007). An EU-Inspired Corporate  Governance    Statement   for  
 Maltese Listed Companies: Boon or Scourge?   In: Civil   Society   Report  Business 
             Ethics and Religious Values in  the   European   Union   and   Malta –  for   a   Moral 
 Playing Field. Xuereb, P.G. (ed). European Documentation  and   Research   Centre,   
 University of Malta, Malta: 161-167.                                                                                                                                                    
CG-2:   Balzan, L. and Baldacchino, P.J. (2007). Benchmarking in  Maltese  Internal  Audit   
             Units. Benchmarking - An International Journal, 14(6): 750-767.                                                                       
CG-3:   Baldacchino, P.J. and Bugeja, J. (2012).    Conflicts    of     Interest      in     Maltese 
             Co-operatives and their Financial Implications. Bank of Valletta Review, 46 (Autumn): 
             1-16. (Particular Impact in Malta. See Commentary Section 2)                                                                                                      
CG-4:   Bezzina, F., Baldacchino, P.J. and Azzopardi, J.R. (2014).       The         Corporate  
             Governance Relationship between the  Board  and  Management  in  Maltese  Listed  
             Companies. In Rethinking Corporate Governance. Tipurić, D., Raguž, V. and Podrug, 
             N. (eds). Pearson, UK:  1-15.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
CG-5:   Baldacchino, P.J., Baldacchino, J., Bezzina, F. and Tipurić, D. (2015). Assessing 
             the Applicability of a Corporate Governance Index in Maltese Listed Entities. 
             International Journal of Transitions and Innovation Systems, 4 (1/2): 43-60.                                                                                 
CG-6:   Baldacchino, P.J., Camilleri, A., Cutajar, I., Grima, S. and   Bezzina, F.    (2016a).  
            The Participation of the Small Shareholder in the Annual General Meeting.   European  
           Journal of Economics and Management, 3(2):7-28. 
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the internal auditors (Karagiorgos et al., 2010). EA  in Malta is regulated by the 
Companies Act 1995 (originally  mostly  imported  from  the  UK),  backed   by   the 
Accountancy Profession Act, 1979 which, as also is the case with other EU states, 
follows European Union  directives.  
 The established definition of CG in the Cadbury Report is  "the system by 
which organisations are directed and controlled" (Cadbury,1992, Section 2.5). CG 
is also described by the Australian Institute of Company Directors, 2016 as "a 
broad-ranging term which, amongst other things, encompasses the rules, 
relationships, policies, systems and processes whereby authority within 
organisations is exercised and maintained" (p.1). The practice of good CG keeps 
the organization's management accountable to the stakeholders and this retains 
management ethically diligent and effective (Pandya, 2013).  The CG  of Maltese 
listed companies  is basically guided by a similar regulatory framework to that of 
EA, involving the same Companies Act 1995 yet backed up by the Listing Rules 
(Listing Authority, 2017) and the Code, that is the comply-or-explain Code of Good 
Corporate Governance for Listed Entities (MFSA, 2017) .     
 CG and EA are clearly highly interrelated. Notably, the principal-agent, or 
finance, model  of CG, which is the dominant academic one, recognizes that 
"monitoring and bonding expenditures paid out to align the behaviour of the 
manager-agents with the interests of owner-principals...provide innovations in 
corporate governance" (Keasey et al., 1997, p.3). One such expenditure is EA, a 
"basic institution" in this model, working together with other institutions such as a 
board accountable to shareholders. CG and EA are therefore so strongly 
interlinked because they are both part of the same accountability process in the 
interest of the corporate entity: CG is meant to hold the board of directors and its 
management accountable, in the first instance, to the shareholders. 
Complementarily, EA is meant to render credibility to such accountability by having 
the auditor examine the annual financial statements provided by the directors and  
management and also report thereon to the  shareholders. However, such auditing 
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work is effected independently of the directors and management, who remain 
primarily responsible for showing a true and fair view in the financial statements.  
3.2  The small state and its characteristics  
The World Bank (2016) defines small states as "countries with a population below 
1.5 million" (p.1), noting that more than one-fourth its members fall within this 
definition. On its part, the Commonwealth Secretariat (2017a) defines 31 of its  53 
member states as small also using  a similar population benchmark of "around 1.5 
million people or less" (p.1), but including  five large states that share similar 
characteristics. Although diverse in size, state of economic development and 
location, such countries are characterized by major challenges which may  be 
summarised as follows:                                                        
 –  limited human and institutional capacity (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2014). 
 –  an investment scenario which lacks readily available information (Secretariat, 
2017b) and which often needs to improve in order to ensure the appropriate 
regulations, a level playing field, and adequate infrastructure (World Bank, 2016). 
– economic limitations such as vulnerability to external economic shocks including 
fluctuations in world trade (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2014) as well as  high 
transport costs owing to remoteness and insularity, and..dependence on strategic 
imports (such as fuel) and a narrow range of exports (Commonwealth Secretariat, 
2017b). 
 DeBattista (2016) also refers to this small state predicament  within the  
European Union, claiming that  small states such as Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, 
Luxembourg, Lithuania,  Slovenia and Malta face some "challenges that other EU 
members may not share, including administrative and logistical limitations, possible 
diseconomies of scale  and  geo-strategic  concerns" (p.40).   Notably,  despite  the  
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limitations, the World Bank (2017) classifies both Malta and Estonia, together with 
three other small oil-rich states in the far East,  as having advantages lacking in 
other small states. These include high incomes, making the most of their specific 
combinations of fossil fuels, strategic location on the crossroads of trade, a highly 
educated workforce, strong legal systems, and well-developed financial sectors.   
 Most small state literature is dedicated to the implications of the challenges 
identified above  in the fields of national governance (e.g. Baldacchino, 2009), 
education (e.g. Mayo (2013) or economics (e.g. Briguglio, 2016).  Yet, beyond the 
papers in this portfolio, no known published studies to date have linked such small 
state challenges  to EA and CG. This submission is aimed at filling the gap in this 
connection. Taking the case of Malta, it presents the small state sub-themes of 
published articles in these related areas. Malta is the smallest member of the 
European Union, an ex-British colony consisting of three islands in the middle of 
the Mediterranean Sea with a population of around 400,000 and occupying a small  
area of 316 sq kilometres. 
3.3  Social networking within a small state 
A working definition of social networking (amended from Merriam-Webster, 
2017) is the activity of creating and maintaining personal and business 
connections. The expression has become increasingly popular with the advent of 
the social media, although this is not being used in this context here. In the 
literature (e.g. Kadushin, 2012 and Scott, 2012), the social networking model  is 
typically represented by a sociogram, or a  set of "nodes" or points (the individuals) 
and a mapping or description by lines of the relations between them  (see Figure 
1). The application of this model is relevant within the context of a geographically 
small state like Malta.  In particular, within such a state, propinquity (or proximity) is 
naturally present with residents being located so near to each other. Furthermore, 
in such a country, homophily thrives strongly in both its forms as distinguished by 
Lazarsfeld and Merton (1954), that is status-homophily and value-homophily: 
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indeed, most residents also have common attributes  of an ascribed status (such 
as Maltese nationality, white race)  and/or an acquired one (such as  Catholic 
religion) as well as of value or homogeneity such as norms and attitudes.  The 
prevalence of both propinquity and homophily, as Kadushin (2012, pp.18/19) also  
points out,  renders the "nodes" or persons,  much  more likely to be connected to 
one another.  
 In his alternative view of networking, Boissevain (1974) argues against 
adopting such a structural-functional model laying out a "system of enduring 
groups composed of statuses and roles supported by a set of values and related 
sanctions" (p.4). He maintains that rather than the network being a matter of one's 
status and/or values, individuals build up such a network of relations, allies, and 
"friends of friends",  to their own advantage – a network which each individual 
constructs and tries to manipulate but also through which each is manipulated.   
Alliances with allies may be shifting, informal and temporary and are meant  for the 
individual goals to be achieved. 
 Nonetheless, even taking into account both perspectives, it is much more 
likely in such a small state for the "nodes" to be closely connected and for the 
network to be evidently shorter because of the perennial presence of propinquity. 
In other words, with reference to the sociogram in Figure 1 below (amended from 
Boissevain, 1974), A may be able to connect with anyone needed in the state (B-F) 
as these are all confined within the first-order zone, i.e. in possible direct contact. 
Furthermore, if not all so reached, there may be only a few Individuals (G to J) in 
the second-order zone, i.e. reachable in two steps as friends of friends,  and there 
are rarely, if ever, any individuals in any zone beyond. 
   Clearly, within such a state, it may be more commonly possible to establish 
close relationships with almost anybody, whether or not homophily and/or manifest 
manipulations are also at work.  As stated by Burgoon et al. (2002), "physical 
proximity promotes psychological closeness", this "creating a sense of mutuality, of 
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connection, common ground and shared understandings" (p.662). Furthermore, 
proximity may raise other issues such as resistance to change and role conflicts. 
This may be  because  of  group  structural cohesion  (White and Harary, 2001 and  
 
Moody and White, 2003), wherein   social network participants, particularly in small 
groups, may  tend to resist any disruption to their status quo,  even informally 
demanding the loyalty of each other over that given to the formal organisation. 
Therefore, for progress to be achieved, those in charge of CG need to look for and 
find ways to create and support healthier networks (Cross et al., 2002).      
 
3.4  External auditing and corporate governance within a small state
 network                                                                                           
 Such small state networking as referred to above has a notable bearing on EA and  
 
Figure 1   Network Relationships in a Simple Sociogram 
 
                            
                                                              B                    G         H  
                                                                    C                                                       
                                                                             D               I            
                                    A                                                                                                   
                                                                      E                         J  
                                                                   F  
                                                     1st order zone     2nd order zone      nth order zone 
 Key to terms: 
A/J  Nodes representing Individuals                                                                                                                                                                                                       
1st  Order Zone= Set of Nodes directly linked to Node (or Individual) A, i.e. friends  
2nd...nth  Order Zones = Sets of Nodes only indirectly linked to Node (or Individual) A ,i.e. friends of 
friends   
                                                                             (Amended from Boissevain,1974, p.26) 
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CG in Malta, and this becomes unequivocal with the recurrence of a number of  
sub-themes in the papers in the portfolio.                                                               
3.4.1 Sub-theme interlinks in the papers                                                       . 
Despite several years since the publication of Baldacchino (1992b), the first paper 
in the portfolio, a number of sub-themes, which were mostly identified for the first 
time in that paper (see Commentary Section 5.1), recurred in the subsequent 13 
studies published since 2003, this indicating a high degree of homogeneity.  Such 
sub-theme interlinks include issues relating to close relationships and 
independence, discipline,  resistance to change, regulation, secrecy, small 
business units,  as well as  other small state issues. These will be explored in detail 
throughout Commentary Section 5, which, as already stated, will introduce each of 
the papers in the portfolio. 
3.4.2 The relevance of small state networking                                                           .                                                               
The relevance of social networking to the application of EA and CG within a small 
state like Malta does indeed become evident in the above stated sub-themes.  For 
example, as amplified in the articles themselves, it is difficult for an auditor to be 
independent with clients who are easily traceable as friends or friends of friends. 
For similar reasons, given also the smallness of the institutions and commercial 
entities, appropriate EA and CG regulation cannot be imposed so easily as in 
larger countries, and undisclosed but informal alliances commonly tend to oppose 
change and even render much more difficult the maintenance of professional 
secrecy. Furthermore, non-compliance with the Code without adequate explanation 
will not necessarily lead to any form of discipline.  
 Further to the stated references to the small state sub-themes in introducing 
the papers in Commentary Section 5, the contribution to knowledge of the papers 
in the portfolio will then be overviewed in Commentary Section 6. 
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4.  Research methodology and limitations       
In studying the application of EA and CG within a small state network, the 14 
papers employ pragmatism as their paradigm foundation. As stated by Robson 
(2011) a feature of this approach  is that it "rejects the traditional dualisms and 
generally prefers more moderate and commonsense versions of philosophical 
dualisms based on how well they work in solving problems" (p.28). Thus the 
choices between one position and the others delved into by ontology (such as 
objectivism v subjectivism), and epistemology (such as positivism vs interpretivism) 
are considered "somewhat unrealistic in practice" (Saunders et al. 2007,p.110).   
On this basis, a deductive approach followed by an inductive one was most 
commonly adopted in the papers, with  the mixing of quantitative and qualitative 
elements through the collection and an analysis  of  both self-administered 
questionnaires or documentation and one-to-one face-to-face interviewing or even 
personal experiences.  Such a mixed methods approach enabled  triangulation by 
the corroboration of both types of findings. As also stated by Creswell and Clark 
(2011), such a design offsets the strengths and weaknesses of both its quantitative 
and qualitative strands. Additionally, the time horizon was commonly cross-
sectional, with a combined fixed-emergent continuum. 
 Yet, as might be expected in a pragmatic approach with varying objectives 
and research questions, while six papers adhered to the above multi-strategy 
design,  other papers varied in their specific design.  Two (INTR0-1 and CG-1) 
were exploratory discussion ones and excluded empirical testing.  Another two  
(AUD-3, AUD-5) employed only quantitative data collected by questionnaires, 
while, given the small size of the population, two further papers (CG-2,CG-3) 
collected only qualitative data, employing face-to-face semi-structured interviewing. 
Additionally, two reversed  (CG-5 and CG-6) the data collection order, starting with 
the interviewing and then moving on to a questionnaire and/or document analysis.      
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 The results of the various studies are subject to the limitations encountered 
in their scope and conduct. Among such limitations listed in the individual papers, a 
number tended to have  limited response rates, and therefore despite employing 
quantitative data analysis, the results may not be totally representative of the 
population. Furthermore, in considering the applicability of the findings and 
implications of the various studies based in Malta to other small states, one needs 
to take into account the various limitations emanating from the particular economic, 
political and legal contexts of each state. 
 
5.  The Ph.D portfolio of papers, sub-theme inter-links and own     
...... contribution 
This Section introduces each of the fourteen papers in the portfolio with a focus on 
the interlinks of each paper with small state sub-themes. As stated in the 
introduction, most such sub-themes are clearly specified in the first introductory 
paper (see next sub-section 5.1). Against this background, Sub-sections 5.2 and 
5.3 then analyse the sub-theme interlinks of papers in the respective areas. In 
each section, papers are introduced in chronological order.   
5.1  The introductory paper   
My first paper (Baldacchino, 1992b [INTRO-1] , which is reproduced in Chapter 2, 
raised a number of accountancy  "microstate" issues, which to my knowledge were 
unexplored at the time, and of which I had become first aware during my MPhil 
research on the auditor/management relationship in Malta (Baldacchino, 1992a). 
The MPhil thesis itself had not focused on such issues, but mostly on the 
communication barriers in such a relationship, a topic itself later being the subject 
of a working paper (Baldacchino and Higson, 1993). 
 Such issues or sub-themes related to the small state of Malta, and included 
those regarding close relationships and independence (CRI), disciplinary 
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weaknesses  (DI), the small business units (SU), as well as secrecy/confidentiality 
issues (SI) for  auditors in an environment where many had to "go to great pains to 
keep information secret or at least unclear" (Ch 2, Section 6). In addition, there 
were other small state ones (O) such as the few users.  The significance of this 
early paper – a first version of which had been presented to the International 
Conference on Small States held in Malta in 1991– was that it was the first known 
publication to point out most  of  the sub-themes related to small state EA and CG, 
which sub-themes kept clearly recurring in my  later publications. Such recurrence, 
as well as the emergence of two others – resistance to change (RC) and regulatory 
issues (RI) – in the portfolio of articles is overviewed in Table 2, which also 
includes my estimated percentage contribution to each paper. The latter involved 
most stages  of  the  research,  but  reaching  its  peak  in  the  discussions  
emanating  from  the findings, conclusions, recommendations as well as the write-
up itself. 
5.2  Part 1: The external auditing papers 
Tabone and Baldacchino (2003) [AUD-1] is reproduced in Chapter 3 on the 
statutory audit of owner-managed companies in Malta. This paper took up 
elements of the smallness of units (SU) sub-theme in  detail, while implications 
were also raised with respect to other sub-themes - disclosure issues, resistance to 
change and regulatory issues. Despite EA being a bulwark of CG, its relevance  in 
owner-managed and  predominantly  small  companies  had  already  long  been 
 questioned in the literature (e.g. English, 1978). This 2003 mixed 
methodology article, based on questionnaire and interview responses from  both  
Maltese  auditors  and  owner-managers,  examined such relevance in Malta and 
that of any possible alternatives to this requirement. It indicated that, beyond the 
claimed relevance,  as  in  larger countries, of such audit to outside third parties, or 
for the sake of financial statement reliability or even owing  to  the  ever-increasing  
business complexity, there was  the  perception,  particularly  by  statutory  auditors  
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TABLE 2: 
THE PORTFOLIO OF PAPERS AND THEIR SUB-THEME 
INTERLINKS 
 
SUB-THEME 
 
PAPER 
TOPIC 
 
INTRODUCTORY 
 
CRI 
 
DI 
     
RC 
   
RI 
 
SI 
 
 
 
SU 
 
 
 
 O 
 
 
                      
     REF           BALDACCHINO                                           
                    CONTRIBUTION 
                              TO  PAPER 
Microstate Issues 
in Accountancy 
 
    X   
 
X   
   
     X   
 
X   
 
X   
 INTRO-1                
(1992b)                100% 
PART1: 
EXTERNAL 
AUDITING 
 
CRI 
 
 
DI 
 
 
RC 
 
  RI 
 
   SI 
 
 
SU 
 
 
O 
 
 
Audit in Owner-
Mged Companies   
 
 
 
   
 
   X   
  
 X    
          
  X 
 
 
 AUD-1                 
 (2003)                     50% 
Auditor Change 
Decisions  
 
    X 
    
    X 
 
   X 
  AUD-2                    
 (2004)                     50% 
 Auditor  
Perceptions 
                       
    X 
   AUD-3                    
 (2005)                     50% 
Qualified Audit 
Opinions 
  
   X 
                                    
XX 
        
   X 
  AUD-4                   
(2005)                      50% 
First-time Auditor 
Selection 
  
   X 
                           AUD-5                    
(2011)                      50% 
 Audit Fee 
Development 
     
   X 
                  
X 
AUD-6                   
(2014)                      50%    
 Dysfunctional 
 Audit Behaviour 
        
 X    
           
   X 
 
 
 AUD-7                  
(2016d)                    25% 
PART 2: 
CORP GOV  
 
CRI 
 
DI 
 
RC 
 
RI 
 
SI 
 
SU 
 
O 
 
Corp Governance 
Statement 
    
   X   
    CG-1                     
(2007)                    100% 
Internal Audit 
Benchmarking 
   
   X 
     
    X 
  
X 
CG-2                        
(2007)                      50% 
Conflicts of Int 
In Co-operatives 
 
   X 
   
  X 
   
X 
CG-3                       
(2012)                      50% 
Board & Mangmt 
Relationship 
   
   X    
 
 X 
     
  X 
   
    X    
      CG- 4                     
(2014)                      33% 
Corp Governance  
     Index 
 
   X    
  
 X    
 
  X    
 
    X    
  
X    
CG-5                      
(2015)                      40% 
Small 
Shareholder 
In AGM 
   
  X   
    
 X   
             
 CG- 6                          
(2016a)                     25% 
CRI = close relationships and independence issues, DI = disciplinary 
issues,  RC= resistance to change issues RI = regulatory issues, SI =  
secrecy issues, SU =  small business unit issues ,  O = Other small state 
issues 
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– but  also  by   owner-managers  themselves – of  the  audit's  positive relevance 
to "impose financial discipline" on owner-management and staff  (Ch 3, Section 
4.1,Table 1 and Section 6) (SU) . This supported an earlier finding by Baldacchino 
(1992a, p.106). 
Furthermore, the article  indicated that Maltese  auditors  were  "sceptical" [Ch 3, 
Section 6] about  any  other  such   alternatives  being appropriate, although  
owner-managers  themselves  were  more open to changes in this regard. Yet, the 
effectiveness of the imposition of this type of audit of "discipline on management 
and staff" could be questioned - and can still be today - if the profession itself 
continued  to  lack  discipline, as  more  clearly  indicated in  a  later  paper in the 
portfolio by  Farrugia and Baldacchino (2005) [AUD-4]. Resistance to change (RC) 
was also being implied, this beckoning towards the survival of this type of audit, 
despite the fact that Maltese  accounting  regulation  and  practices  traditionally  
followed  those  of  the  United Kingdom, where this had been abolished (RI). It is 
no therefore surprise that this type of audit in fact still survives to date, such 
resistance as yet needing to be dealt with. 
 In their EA paper on factors contributing to auditor change decisions 
reproduced in Chapter 4 , Magri and Baldacchino (2004) [AUD-2]  claimed that EA 
bears  "magnified responsibilities towards the Maltese community"  as, owing to its 
smallness, Malta is "heavily characterized by close interveaving  personal 
relationships" [Ch 4, Section 1] (CRI), which lead to business  transactions often 
being carried out among people who already know each other and therefore, to 
confidentiality being "even more difficult to maintain than in larger  countries". This 
is also in line with the "secrecy dilemma" (SI) of the introductory paper. The paper 
[Ch 4, Section 1] adds that the independent attitude (CRI) finds "tougher barriers in 
such close-knit communities" where a predominant characteristic remains  the 
"strength of the behavioural relations between parties". The paper solidifies such 
arguments by its analysis of factors contributing to client-initiated auditor changes 
in Malta. A mail questionnaire was responded to by 97 companies, such response 
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being supplemented by semi-structured interviews with 15 representatives of 
companies changing their auditors. In contrast to foreign findings, results indicated 
(CRI) that the factors that would induce most auditor changes are behavioural, 
rather than economic, foremost among which were the working relationship with 
the auditor deteriorating substantially and the auditor rarely being accessible.  
 As for the working relationship (CRI), "most likely, it is the fostering of a 
sound relationship with top company management which makes the major 
difference" (Ch 4 , Section 5). As for auditor accessibility, auditors "are expected to 
be responsive to queries without delay and to be available to provide their advice 
on the operations of the company which may concern matters apart from those 
relating to the statutory audit." (Ch 4, Section 5). Furthermore, auditor-client 
relationships (CRI) were at a more personal level in the case of small companies, 
while more at a firm/corporate level with large companies; thus, in the latter case, a 
personal change in the audit engagement partner did not effectively jeopardize the 
relationship. It also emerged that small companies (SU) were probably more willing 
to replace an auditor with a reputable image with one having a decent fee level, 
this implying that in the case of small companies the audit fee level may override 
quality considerations.               
 The purpose of the paper by Desira and Baldacchino (2005) [AUD-3], 
reproduced in Chapter 5, was to determine any divergencies in juror/external 
auditor perceptions and whether any particular issues relating to such divergencies 
emerged from Malta. For the purpose of the study, jurors were taken to be those   
members of the public with the potential to be called to serve as jury. Divergencies 
mainly related to the auditor's perceived responsibilities for various issues. These 
included jurors attributing responsibility to auditors for fraud prevention and 
detection, maintenance of company accounting records, the security of company 
control structure, and absolute assurance of no misstatements in financial 
statements. While auditors were aware of the lack of transparency (SI) of their own 
procedures, the public seemed under the erroneous impression that they 
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communicated enough about the work they performed. Remarkably, such 
prevailing secrecy seemed beneficial to the auditors themselves, as, in contrast to 
elsewhere in the literature, they were held in a very positive light in Malta by jurors. 
Notably such a secretive attitude could ultimately boomerang given, as  Pany 
(1992) was quoted, "jurors' importance in determining the outcome of any litigation 
against auditors" (Ch 5, Section 2.4). Interestingly, however, litigation in Maltese 
Courts, at the time practically inexistent, is as yet to date at a relatively low level: 
the full price of secrecy, if ever to be paid, has been slow to come within this 
smallness context.            
 Farrugia and Baldacchino, (2005) [AUD-4] on qualified audit opinions  used 
a mixed methodology, carrying out both an analysis of auditor's reports and semi-
structured interviews with auditors. A major point made by them was the high 
occurrence of the limitation-on-scope qualifications (65.5% of qualifications), a type 
also often recurring for more than three years. In itself, this was not surprising 
given "the smaller-sized company scenario" (Ch 6, Section 4.9) (SU) in a small 
state. However, most such qualifications were issued by sole practitioners and 
were deficient by existing standards because they were not specific, this indicating 
that a number were outdated on standards (DI). Further  professional deficiencies 
related to going concern and disagreement-with-management qualifications, the 
relative infrequency of the latter type by smaller audit firms and sole practitioners 
raising questions about their independence (Ch 6, Section 4.9) (CRI), although this 
was consistent with UK findings (Abulizz et al., 1990). The prevailing higher 
qualification rate among smaller, private exempt companies (Ch 6, Section 
4.1,Table 1) also extended the debate previously referred to in the introductory 
paper as to "whether such (small)  companies should be exempted from the full 
scope  audit" (Ch 6, Section 5) (SU). This paper also confirmed the continued 
existence of the weak  professional disciplinary machinery raised in the 
introductory paper (DI). It is also to be noted that a recent paper by Baldacchino et 
al. (2014b) also confirmed that most of these findings persist. 
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 The paper by Baldacchino and Cardona (2011) [AUD-5], reproduced in 
Chapter 7, followed up the AUD-2 study with one on factors influencing first-time 
external audit selection. It involved an analysis of various factors –  behavioural, 
economic and others. Findings were based on a mailed questionnaire responded 
to by 33 auditors and 68 company representatives.  
 While the two types of respondents tended to place highly positively 
correlated rankings on both behavioural and economic factors in such selection, 
overall (CRI) both tended to give  behavioural factors more priority than economic 
and other ones. Foremost among such behavioural factors was that  of having  
auditors available when needed (accessibility) and of  establishing a long-term 
relationship with the auditor, this  pointing to similarities  to factors pointed out  
earlier in Paper AUD-2. Notably, the economic factors of quality of service and of 
the work proposed by the auditor meeting the client's expectations were also 
ranked highly by both groups as influencing auditor selection.  Yet, interestingly, 
the audit fee was ranked and also considered less important for selection by 
companies than by auditors.  
 It was further noted that where client companies were located on the even 
smaller sister island of Gozo, they considered as significantly more important (than 
where client companies were located in Malta) the following three factors for 
external auditor selection (i) that the auditor does not perform the audit of the client 
competitor(s); (ii) the proximity of the auditor's office(s) to the client's office  (iii) that 
the auditor provides tax services. Therefore, one implication is that the extra 
smallness (CRI) of the sister island  was probably  rendering clients less amenable  
to accepting the engagement of a common local auditor, as this could easily have 
independence conflict of interest implications. Besides company location, the 
relative importance of factors  influencing first-time auditor selection were also 
found to vary significantly  with other client characteristics such as the type of audit  
firm selected by respondent's company, whether or not respondent company 
intended to list on the stock exchange or formed part of a group of companies.   
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 The paper by Baldacchino and Borg (2014) [AUD-6], reproduced in Chapter 
8,  analysed  the factors influencing audit fees in Malta, building up on a preceding 
study by Baldacchino et al. (2014a). It assessed how audit fees reacted to 
movements in their determinants in the years 2004/2011, the trends exhibited in 
the period and the relevance, if any, of the general financial crisis and other events 
on the Maltese audit market. It employed a mixed methods approach, employing 
changes analysis on fee data from a sample of 110 active Maltese companies over 
the 8-year period 2004-2011, this being supplemented by 10 interviews with audit 
partners from Big Four and other audit firms. Within this imperfect audit market, 
audit fees increased significantly over the period. However, they did not seem to 
respond instantaneously to the forces of demand and supply. Furthermore, 
auditors seemed unable to institute price changes for audit engagements in 
response to variations in determinants such as auditee characteristics including 
client size (Ch 8, Section 4.1.2). Such delayed or non-responses could lead to 
diminished EA efforts, this possibly compromising audit quality  (Ch 8, Section 
4.1.2 ). This  became even more apparent by the effects on the audit fees of the 
crisis, wherein while raising their fee levels, auditors appeared not to have been 
willing do so in line with the required extra input,  probably taking into account the 
economic pinch felt by their clients: this might have led to auditors being tempted to 
cut corners by curtailing  the required extra audit effort in times of crisis, and there 
might therefore also have been independence (CRI) implications  in the auditors 
helping to "salvage"  any sinking ship  by  such sharing of "economic pain" (Ch 8, 
Section 4.3.1).  
 Additionally, the paper confirmed two fee-related Maltese-specific factors 
which had first been identified in the preceding Baldacchino et al.(2014a) study. 
With respect to companies with foreign ownership, these were confirmed as having 
higher audit fees  than those of their local counterparts. In contrast, companies with 
government involvement had lower fees than those privately owned.  Furthermore, 
in the case of the foreign-owned companies fees were found to be changing more 
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than those of their Maltese-owned private counterparts, which, on their part, were 
changing more than those  with government involvement. While private companies 
had a relatively higher fee level,  this  was   even more so  in  the  case  of  foreign-
owned ones (CRI). The paper attributes this to client companies which are not 
government-controlled attaching "a value to the relationship and  sense of mutual 
trust" (Ch 8, Section 4.1.3)  with their auditors, and not being ready to change their 
auditors for less expensive ones, an attitude which is clearly not so forthcoming  in 
the  case of government-controlled companies.  Given the smallness of the country 
(CRI), auditors and private  clients were being  extra careful prior to effecting  (for 
auditors) or rejecting (for clients) audit fee changes, even where this could scarcely 
be justified  from an economic perspective. However, the paper also indicated the 
different reality in the case of companies with  government  involvement (O), where 
it was mostly a cheap fee that could buy the desired prestige of a large, public 
sector audit. 
 Baldacchino et al. (2016d) [AUD-7], reproduced in Chapter 9,  examined the 
extent to which organizational culture and  personnel characteristics in Maltese 
audit firms impact on dysfunctional audit behaviour (DAB), particularly on under-
reporting of time (URT) and audit quality reduction (AQR) acts such as premature 
sign-off (PMSO). The work employed a mixed methodology, with a survey on 252 
audit personnel followed by semi-structured interviews with eight audit partners 
representing the Big Four and other smaller audit firms. One issue of discipline 
(D1) was that the majority of audit personnel (74.5%) acknowledged that URT is 
unethical, yet 83.2% of such respondents were still somewhat engaged in it. While 
such high level of engagement is comparable to findings elsewhere (e.g. 88% in 
Malaysia as per Nor, 2011) it was indicative of personnel  "going against their own 
ethical beliefs" (Ch 9, Section 6.2). One predictor of such URT, and indeed also 
PMSO,  was found to be the perceived reinforcement of superiors, such as by 
ostensibly forsaking disciplinary measures for the sake of attaining  their budgets. 
A second predictor was that of superiors themselves engaging in DAB: in this 
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connection, only 41.3% (Ch 9, Section 6.3) of respondents stated that their 
superiors had never engaged in PMSO, an incidence also comparable  to other 
studies elsewhere (e.g. 40% in Ireland as per Otley and Pierce, 1996). As for 
personnel characteristics, individual audit experience predicted lower DAB, while 
having an external locus of control predicted a higher DAB. While audit firm type 
was found to be only a suppressor variable helping to explain better the variability 
in DAB acceptance, the indications were that having to audit all small companies 
(SU), such as owner-managed ones, in Malta, increased the proneness, 
particularly by audit personnel in smaller audit firms,  to "take shortcuts and justify 
resorting to AQR acts" (Ch 9, Section 6.6). There was even a claim by a non-Big 
Four audit firm  that such audit clients "were too small and did not really need to be 
audited" and that, after all, the audit was "something we know nobody wants" (Ch 
9, Section 5.1).  Furthermore, such companies were associated with "low audit 
fees" and "routine and uninteresting engagements"(Ch 9,Section 6.6) and their 
smaller audit firms probably had lower internal support mechanisms.               
 Part 1 has overviewed seven papers related to EA. Part 2 will now overview 
the remaining six papers on CG. 
5.3  Part 2: The corporate governance papers  
In the first paper in this part,  Baldacchino (2007) [CG-1], which is reproduced  in 
Chapter 10, took the case of new EU regulation regarding the Corporate 
Governance Statement (CGS) and  queried such and similar regulation in the 
European Union, and therefore including Malta, in its attempt at registering 
progress in CG. The paper questioned this increasing type of regulation (RI) which 
continued to prioritize information disclosure, rather than the appropriateness of  
those in charge of  the CG process. Such priorities possibly needed reshuffling, 
with more  consideration being given to, say, the minimum qualifications required 
of directors, what was to render them  fit and proper in  non-financial companies, 
whether they were to be required to take  proper induction courses for new 
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directorships upon engagement, or the wisdom of the director tenure being an 
annual one. In itself, the proposed CGS, requiring new disclosures yet without 
specified benchmarks, was not a scourge, but not a boon either. The paper 
concluded that such and similar regulation could have had little impact and was 
mostly futile. What was definitely more useful was to insist in the first place that 
companies engage directors of an appropriate calibre. For more relevance, 
particularly within the Maltese context, (RI) a different type of European CG 
regulation was sorely needed: one where the emphasis would be on the quality 
rather than the quantity of regulation.   
 Balzan and Baldacchino (2007) [CG-2], reproduced in Chapter 11, dealt with 
benchmarking in Maltese internal auditing, a bastion of sound CG. Semi-structured 
interviewing revealed a weakness in benchmarking awareness among internal 
audit executives  and also  cultural barriers in the implementation of this process. 
Such barriers included a lack of awareness of the ethical dimension, a lack of 
benchmarking partners and network and an incompatible organizational culture. As 
for the ethical dimension, the quest for secrecy (SI) played a particular role: audit 
executives "are concerned that benchmarking will reveal confidential information to 
competitors" (Ch 11, Section 5.3). They still needed to agree to a Code of Conduct 
ensuring no breach of confidentiality. As for benchmarking partners and network, 
the smallness (O)  of the country again became relevant - one could seldom  find  
Maltese  same-industry or even same-scale networking partners, although similar 
scale and industry might not be so essential (Iacobucci and Nordheim, 2000). On 
the other hand, benchmarking with international partners could also present 
problems of comparability owing to, say, differences in the environment in which 
they operated including the state of market competition. As for the incompatibility of 
the organizational culture, there was commonly a general complacency, 
particularly government-owned organizations, resisting the need to accept change 
(RC) before seeking to improve. Furthermore, top management support was as yet 
rarely forthcoming in this respect.  
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 Baldacchino and Bugeja (2012) [CG-3], reproduced in Chapter 12, dealt 
with behavioural issues, specifically conflicts of interest (COIs), in the CG of 
another type of corporate entity – the co-operative. A COI "arises when the 
personal or professional interests of one who is authorised to take decisions have 
the potential to be at odds with corporate and societal values" (Ch 12, Section 3, 
amended from Brown, 2008).  The analysis was based on semi-structured 
interviewing with nine representatives of the three co-operative institutions and 22 
co-operative representatives at management or committee of management level. 
Most respondents stressed the need for a general Code of Ethics for co-
operatives. This could include requirements for the prior full disclosure of potential 
COIs and principles for decisive action on such disclosures (RI).  More COI 
awareness was called for at both the institutional and individual levels. As for the 
institutional level, restructuring could start with the clarification and distinction of the 
roles of each of the regulatory, financing and operational institutions, as well as 
with the introduction of more relevant appointment or election systems. 
Furthermore, the prevalence of hat-changing  –  having too many same persons as 
members in two of the institutions – was an inevitable source of conflicts of 
interest. Country smallness placed a strain on the number of experts available (O), 
but the independence of each institution had to be safeguarded. Furthermore, 
institutional restructuring could include the  introduction of internal auditing. At the 
individual co-operative level, the existing skill gaps at the director or committee of 
management level needed to be closed, such as by the removal of the restrictive 
legal requirement of co-operative membership  for election to such committee (RI). 
One could work towards the congruence of members and the interests of the 
company. One way towards helping to achieve this is to carry out a re-assessment 
of the statutory ineligibility of members to have prior-year surpluses distributed, a 
restriction as yet commonly inhibiting the possibility of  retaining surpluses as a 
future source of finance. Finally, COIs may not necessarily involve direct pecuniary 
gain yet still ultimately have even wider implications such as undermining faith in 
those in governance and their reputation. Therefore, doing away with them is doing 
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away with "a clear symptom of inadequate corporate governance" (Ch 12, Section 
10) (CRI). As already stated in Section 2 of this Commentary, this paper had 
particular impact in Malta. 
 Two crucial parties in CG are the Board of  Directors and Management. The 
book chapter by Bezzina et al. (2014) [CG-4], reproduced in Chapter 13,  
evaluated the general level of adherence of both parties to the Code, assessed the 
role of  the CEO and Management vis-a-vis that of the Board and  investigated the 
locus of corporate control and its impact on CG. Data was mostly collected from 
the Annual Reports of 20 companies with equity listed on the Malta Stock 
Exchange (MSE)  as at December 31, 2010, with the authors also drawing  upon 
their personal experiences in top management and/or director roles within a 
number of such companies. 
  A number of weaknesses were found in the CG of Maltese listed 
companies. These included common cases of non-compliance to the Code (RI), 
including a lack of performance evaluation of the Board, insufficient attention to 
shareholder communication (e.g. few having a shareholder relations officer) and 
corporate social responsibility,  and long  tenures  of directors, the latter raising 
doubts on their claimed independence (CRI). The common non-disclosure of the 
aggregate emoluments of senior executives as required by the Code also pointed 
to an undue tendency towards secrecy, this being  corroborated by the fact  that, 
despite the Code being on a "comply or explain" basis, non-compliance was rarely  
supported by valid or sufficient explanations (SI). Furthermore, the indications were 
that there was "no particular regulatory or auditing supervision" on issues of non-
compliance - regulatory discipline seeming as yet deficient (DI). 
  As for the role of the CEO and management   vis-a-vis that of the Board of 
Directors, most CEOs were significant shareholders in their company or did 
"previously work for a major shareholder" (Ch 13, Section 4.2) this indicating 
possible  management  influence and close relationships at  Board level which 
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could also  effectively  forestall the  separation of ownership and control (CRI). In 
the smaller listed companies "the combination of a small board, no Executive 
Committee and a dominant CEO is bound to raise serious CG issues". Such CEO's 
were "at the same time Executive Directors, significant shareholders as well as 
technical experts which the business did not afford to do without, this rendering 
them with unfettered powers of discretion in the  company" (Ch 13, Section 4.2). 
On the other hand, in the larger listed companies, where an Executive Committee 
commonly existed, few Board meetings were held during the year and the danger 
was that the Board would be "reduced to mere formality." (Chapter 13, Section 
4.2). As I stated in a related conference presentation, one could here also tend to 
question who the real boss is (Baldacchino, 2013).  
  As for the locus of control and its impact on CG, most companies were 
found to have a high concentration of ownership, with one major shareholder 
having either a 51% shareholding or one between 30% and 50%. Related to this, 
around one-third of directors were being appointed directly by such shareholders 
rather than elected at the AGMs. Therefore, such powerful shareholders  
"dominated most boards and management teams" (Ch 13, Section 4.3), such direct 
links rendering CG even more difficult, particularly in ensuring the effective 
protection and exercise of the rights of the remaining dispersed small shareholders 
on any material decisions. Furthermore, this was also being possibly exacerbated 
by the manipulation in their interest of voting proxies at the Annual General 
Meetings (AGMs).  Such close inter-party links, clearly much more easily possible 
in a small country, were probably being instrumental in degrading the level of CG 
(CRI).      
 As its objectives, Baldacchino et al (2015) [CG-5], which is reproduced in 
Chapter 14, included assessing the needs and attitudes in Maltese Listed Entities 
(MLEs) towards the Corporate Governance Index (CGI), determining the entity that 
may be responsible for the provision and assessment of such CGI, ascertaining the 
construction of a CGI index for MLE's as well as testing such constructed CGI on 
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two MLEs, assessing its impact, benefits and limitations. The methodology 
consisted of semi-structured interviews with seven financial analysts and 13 MLE's, 
followed by an analysis of their Annual Reports for the three-year period 2011–
2013 and a CGI survey sent to such MLEs, this leading to the testing of the CGI 
model constructed for this purpose on two MLE's. 
  Findings indicated that although they "agreed" in principle to the introduction 
of the CGI, most MLE representatives did not see going for more disclosures as a 
priority, even in this way (SI). In fact, they "foresaw no added benefit" in such 
reporting (Ch 14, Section 4.1), and indicated that they might be "adhering to the 
Code simply because they are forced to do so" (Ch 14, Section 4.1) by the listing 
rules. They presented various reasons for their resistance (RC) in practice to the 
CGI, this including that no standard CGI could be suitable to all companies and 
that the MSE as an institution was too small (O) for the construction of an adequate 
CGI standard for companies in varying industries. They also pointed out the need 
for simpler financial statements and  competition issues. On the other hand, 
financial analysts found a proper CGI as an "indication of better accountability and 
transparency", helping to address the "several CG defaults of MLEs, including the 
"lack of transparency" or secrecy (SI) of Board members, a "lack of communication 
on board meeting outcomes" and  "conflicts of interest" (Ch 14, Section 4.1).   
 As for the CGI provider and assessor, respondents opted for the local MSE 
regulator, the Malta Financial Services Authority (MFSA), emphasizing that, subject 
to CGI provision and assessment being segregated in such authority, the MFSA 
would probably be stronger, have fewer possibilities of conflicts of interest (CRI) 
and probably more CG expertise within the Maltese context in comparison to 
foreign credit-rating agencies. 
  Respondents also preferred a CGI based on an international model like the 
OECD Code rather than the local Code so as to minimize the number of 
unaddressed issues (RI). However, they considered index modifications would still 
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be necessary, these possibly being "costly and confusing" to the Maltese market. 
The CG areas and attributes were selected by respondents. The four governance 
areas selected and weighted were board structure, transparency and disclosure, 
audit committee and process, and shareholder rights. Two other areas – director 
remuneration and ownership structure  –  were excluded as being least important, 
possibly owing to the greater difficulty in benchmarking remuneration policies and 
to the lack of shareholder activism in a small state (O). Furthermore, the original 
attributes were rated and only the top 65% of them were retained. The indications 
were that CGI criteria and methodology depended on the market size (O), the 
market need for this information and the scope of the CGI itself.  
 Most respondents were also after a compulsory CGI so as to overcome any 
initial resistance towards MLE adoption (RI). This was because "given their small-
island state culture, businesses have a strong tendency to resist change at 
initiation stage" (Ch 14, Section 4.7.2) –  in fact stronger at such stage than at later 
stages, or what was called a "cold-hot phenomenon" (RC) in Baldacchino (2011). 
In testing the constructed CGI, it became clear that the sub-indices in each 
governance area were relevant for the appropriate interpretation of the overall 
index.  
 Among its recommendations, the paper still opted for the adoption of the 
MFSA Code as a basis for the CGI in order to ensure the overcoming of such initial 
resistance and for the CGI to become easily acceptable (RC).       
 The Annual General Meeting (AGM) is an essential part of a company's CG 
system as it "provides the opportunity to shareholders to exercise their ownership 
rights, including that of directing any questions to the Board" (Association of British 
Insurers, 2013, p.13). 
  Baldacchino et al. (2016a) [CG-6], reproduced in Chapter 15,   examined 
the actual level of small shareholder (SS) participation in the AGM, assessing how 
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this reflects upon the CG of listed entities. It focused on SS attendance, voting and 
proposals (excluding those of institutional and majority shareholders), improving 
SS participation and the significance of such AGM proceedings to listed company 
CG. Empirical mixed methodology research was carried out in a Maltese listed 
company (MLC) setting by means of semi-structured interviews with seventeen 
MLC secretaries, five stockbrokers, an online questionnaire responded by fifty-four 
small shareholders in different MLC's, as well as the analysis of company notices 
and documentation relating to the AGM. Results indicated that SS participation 
was weak. Attendance was poor, and was often spurred both by legitimate factors 
such as information on current financial performance and by questionable ones 
such as refreshments served and venue. Shareholders seemed uncomfortable in 
asking management formal questions and even in voting by show of hands, and 
therefore opted for informal interaction with management and for voting by poll, the 
latter often rendering attendance fruitless and even unnecessary by permitting 
proxies. Much of this shareholder attitude was probably aggravated by the greater 
possibility of close relationships (CRI) existing in a small country, where, 
"shareholders and directors are more likely to know each other" (Ch 15, Section 
5.1.2). As for proposals, these could induce management’s later action despite 
seldom, if ever, being approved, but their submission was rare and mostly 
considered frivolous, commonly hampered by a lack of financial knowledge. For 
the sake of better direction and control, and, in particular, for more transparency 
and accountability, the AGM had to be less stage-managed, as well as more 
interactive and engaging towards such shareholder. This called for more 
management commitment towards change (RC), particularly towards more 
investor education and guidance and also for MLCs to exploit more technology 
such as by increased AGM webcasting and the introduction of electronic voting. 
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6.  Contribution to knowledge of the published papers 
This Section now brings together the major theoretical insights provided by each of 
the seven recurring sub-themes referred to earlier in Table 2 involving issues 
relating to close relationships and independence, discipline, resistance to change, 
regulation, secrecy, small business units and other small state issues. It overviews 
the development of each sub-theme over time, thus contributing to the academic 
discourse in EA and CG. The Section then goes into how the papers contribute in 
terms of the wider debates relating to small state literature.  
6.1 Development of the sub-themes over time  
6.1.1 Close relationships and independence                                               .                 
With respect to close relationships and independence, insofar as they relate to EA, 
Paper INTRO-1 first referred to professional COIs arising in Malta which were not 
specifically covered by the then current Code of Ethics (Malta Institute of 
Accountants, 1992). Such COIs could result from auditors and their clients coming 
from the same, small community and having a higher chance of their being 
connected or friends.  Paper AUD-2 later pointed out that in the EA literature (e.g. 
Beattie and Fearnley,1995; Bedingfield and Loeb,1974; Woo and Koh, 2001)          
– economic factors, in particular the audit fee – are most commonly cited  as a 
main reason for changing auditors. In contrast, the paper found that, in the Maltese 
environment of kinship and proximity, behavioural factors such as the auditor/client 
working relationship and auditor accessibility commonly override economic ones. 
This was having possible independence implications, particularly in auditing 
smaller companies, where the "personal" factor of clients with their auditors was 
most relevant. The dominance of similar behavioural factors was also echoed in 
Paper AUD-5 on first-time auditor selection in Malta, although, in that context, 
literature in larger countries on whether economic or behavioural factors really 
dominate (e.g. Addams and Davis,1994; Glass Lewis & Co, 2006) is inconsistent. 
Paper AUD-5 also pointed out one specific issue of extra smallness: in the case of 
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the smaller sister island of Gozo, it was even more important for clients to avoid the 
possible COIs in EA arising when engaging one of the few audit firms having an 
office there as these might also be involved with competing clients. Additionally, in 
consistence with UK findings by Abulizz et al. (1990), Paper AUD-4 found that Big 
Four firms were more likely than smaller ones or sole practitioners to issue 
disagreement-with-management audit report qualifications, this implying that 
smaller firms and sole practitioners were facing particular independence issues in 
this type of qualification. Finally, Paper AUD-6 confirmed the possible adverse 
independence implications – also pointed out earlier in the USA by Magee and 
Tseng (1990) – of auditors agreeing to audit fee restrictions: auditors could be 
doing so in order to share the economic pain of the client during a recession. Yet, 
in Malta, similar fee restrictions appeared to be more in companies with 
Government involvement than in other Maltese-owned companies, and particularly 
more than in foreign-owned companies. 
  As for close relationships and independence as they relate to CG,  Paper 
CG-3 noted a lack of awareness about the deeper meaning of what constitutes a 
COI in the CG of Maltese co-operatives and their institutions. Analysing such COIs, 
the paper found that – as also argued elsewhere by Olear (2008) and Brown 
(2008) – these presented risks which, unless dealt with, could go beyond financial 
penalties and remedies to undermining faith in those in CG and their reputation.  
Additionally, Paper CG-4 referred to the assessment of managerialism elsewhere 
by Herman (1981) and Hofstetter (2005), who argued that  the effective control and 
corporate power of large companies lies with managers. The paper found that most 
Maltese CEOs had significant shareholdings in their listed companies or previous 
links with major shareholders. This indicated close personal inter-links between the 
CEOs, shareholders and directors. Such powerful inter-links could therefore be 
effectively forestalling the separation of ownership and control and thus degrading 
the level of CG.  In addition, the long tenures of directors in a number of Maltese 
listed companies were also raising doubts on their claimed independence. Paper 
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CG-5 also claimed, in line with IOSCO, 2004, that one  would best do away with 
CGIs being provided and assessed by commercial rating agencies to avoid COIs 
and  build up CG expertise. Instead, the Paper therefore proposed the government 
company regulator as the appropriate institution to act as CGI provider and 
assessor in Malta, provided that the two roles would be appropriately segregated. 
Finally, Paper CG-6 found that a specific close relationship issue in the small state 
of Malta was that shareholders felt uncomfortable in exercising their voting and 
related rights because they were more likely to know the directors personally. In 
comparison, whether or not shareholder voting at European AGMs in larger 
European states serves the purpose assigned to it by corporate law has been a 
moot issue in the literature (Lafarre, 2014).  
6.1.2 Disciplinary issues                                                                                         . 
As for the effectiveness  of discipline, with respect to EA, a barrier indicated by 
INTRO-1 was that the main financial users were refraining, on client confidentiality 
grounds, from complaining to the profession's regulator, this corroborating an 
earlier similar local claim by Casapinta, 1987. Further disciplinary defaults were 
exemplified in Paper AUD-4 by the high amount of faulty audit reports being issued 
by smaller audit firms in comparison to  larger ones - a practice tallying with the 
comments  by  Audit Report (2002a) on the UK situation.  Additionally, Paper AUD-
7 pointed to several audit firm personnel  commonly engaging in URT, in doing so 
often going against their own ethical beliefs: an antithesis of discipline, also found  
in the literature elsewhere (Nor, 2011; Svanberg  and Ohman, 2013) .  
 As for the effectiveness of discipline, with respect to CG, Paper CG-4 
indicated that, in contrast to what was expected in the EU following the Green 
Paper (COM, 2011),  there was scarce, if any, supervision and follow-up to non-
compliance to the Code and explanations  for such non-compliance by listed 
companies.  Clearly, it was not just a matter of a lack of clarity of rules but also that 
of implementing them within the small state context.  
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6.1.3 Resistance to change                                                                                   . 
As for attitudes towards change, with respect to EA, the indications are that, given 
the small state culture, auditors imply, if not openly display, a stronger tendency to 
resist the initiation of change. In this context, Paper AUD-1 found auditor 
scepticism towards the proposed alternatives to the statutory small audit - an 
attitude still probably  contributing to the survival of a type of audit  long questioned 
elsewhere in the literature (e.g. English, 1978; Jones, 1985) and even abolished  in 
several European states including the UK. 
  Similarly, as for attitudes to change with respect to CG, Paper CG-2 found   
complacency working against the introduction of benchmarking in Maltese internal 
audit units, particularly in government-owned entities – this resulting in companies 
doing away with a  tool found elsewhere to have accelerated and managed change 
(Cook,1995). Furthermore, Paper CG-5 found that, in contrast to larger state 
literature extolling the introduction of a CGI (e.g. Grimminger and Di Benedetta, 
2013; Sarkar et al., 2012), listed entities foresaw no added benefit in introducing it: 
even their adherence to the Code was declared  a matter of simply being forced to 
do so by the Listing Rules. For such resistance to be overcome – particularly at 
initiation – the CGI had to be based on a Code which was to be locally adapted.  
Additionally, in line with Baldacchino (2011), which had claimed that, within their 
small-island culture, Maltese businesses, have a stronger tendency to resist 
change at initiation stage and less later, the Paper further found that, for the 
successful introduction of a CGI, this was best rendered compulsory. Furthermore, 
Paper CG-6 implied that in the AGM of listed companies there were other bouts of 
resistance owing to insufficient management and Board of Director commitment 
towards small shareholder interaction and engagement, despite improvements in 
this regard elsewhere (e.g. Ertimur et al., 2010).  
6.1.4 Regulatory issues                                                                                         . 
As for the state of EA regulation, AUD-1 pointed out that, while the traditional 
regulatory framework in Malta was the UK one, then current changes were 
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influenced more by EU regulatory requirements. Therefore, the fact that the 
abolition of the statutory small audit is only a state option and not a requirement in 
the EU may help further explain why - as already stated, in contrast to the long 
questioning in the literature and the situation in several other European countries -  
this type of audit  did survive to date. This situation persists despite, as shown in 
Paper AUD-1, client owner-managers having been more open to revisiting this 
requirement than their auditors. 
  As for CG regulation, long outstanding regulatory framework  measures are 
similarly called for.  Paper CG-1 argued that, despite investor need for quality in 
CG standards (McKinsey, 2004), EU regulatory requirements did not seem to focus 
sufficiently on the more relevant matters in a small state such as the 
appropriateness of those in charge of the CG process. The paper also questioned  
the sufficiency of the comply-or-explain basis of compliance with the Code, 
suggesting  that it may be better to require by law both Code compliance and 
reporting thereon  as in EA. Similarly, Paper CG-3 found that, while Campbell and 
Houghton (2005) emphasised that ethical behaviour goes beyond legal and 
professional rules, the CG of Maltese co-operatives could be clearly improved by a 
more appropriate regulatory framework which would be less restrictive but would 
include a general code of ethics. Additionally, as already referred above as a 
resistance-to-change issue, Paper CG-5 preferred the adoption of compulsory  
regulation in introducing CGI to counteract initial resistance. Furthermore, while 
literature (e.g. Standard and Poor's, 2004 versus Khancel, 2007) differed as to 
whether or not it was better for a CGI  to be based on the respective national code 
or an international one,  if one were to  base a CGI on an international code, the 
Paper indicated, as stated earlier, that such a code would clearly first need to be 
adapted, such adaptations taking into account the Maltese market expectations.  
On its part, Paper CG-4 pointed out common cases of non-compliance to the 
Code, this  confirming, again in line with Baldacchino (2011), the particular need in 
this small state environment for important regulation  to become compulsory.    
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6.1.5 Secrecy issues                                                                                              .   
As for the tendency towards secrecy, with respect to EA, INTRO-1 pointed out the 
increased emphasis on secrecy in this small state, with both auditors and their 
clients going to great pains to overcome the difficulty of keeping information secret 
or at least unclear in an environment where business transactions are often carried 
out by persons who already know each other. Furthermore, Paper AUD-2 indicated 
that, unlike literature findings related to larger countries referred to earlier, in such 
a context, the predominance of the personal working relationships in auditor-
change decisions over economic considerations was implying that such increased 
emphasis on secrecy was even more important.  Additionally, Paper AUD-3 found 
that Maltese auditors were aware of their lack of transparency but found it possibly 
beneficial, helping them to continue being perceived favourably by jurors. Yet, as 
stated by Pany (1992), in view of the importance of jurors in litigation cases against 
US auditors, this may ultimately change with an increase in such cases. 
Interestingly, these are still relatively few to date.  
 As for the tendency towards secrecy, with respect to CG, Paper CG-2 found 
company concerns in such a small environment towards confidentiality breaches 
by competitors: this was hampering the introduction of internal audit benchmarking, 
putting into question  both the awareness  and relevance of ethical codes used 
elsewhere in Europe such as the European Benchmarking Code of Conduct 
(EFQM, 2001). Additionally, Paper CG-4 found that, despite MLEs being expected 
to  "comply-or-explain" adherence to the Code, listed companies were rarely 
justifying non-compliance with valid or sufficient explanations, this further indicating 
their tendency against transparency and raising further serious doubts as to 
whether a Code not enforced by law could be effective in Malta. Furthermore, 
Paper CG-5 found that, on their part, and, contrary to the views of outside parties 
such as financial analysts, most listed entities gave no priority to having  more 
disclosures and commonly seemed to accept these only if and when compelled to 
do so. This extended to listed entities the original  Paper INTRO-1  argument about 
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auditors that their position "is not  exactly that of a champion of the public interest" 
(Chapter 2, Section 6).  Within this small state, there seems as yet to be little, if 
any, price being paid by either party for retaining secrecy.        
6.1.6 Small business units                                                                                       .                                                                                                 
As for small business units, this sub-theme was limited to the EA part of the 
papers. Paper INTRO-1 pointed out, in line with Francalanza (1988), that such 
units with their particular internal control problems were predominant within such a 
small country.  In line with previous literature in Malta and the UK (Baldacchino, 
1992a; Keasey and Watson, 1993), Paper AUD-1 found that the audits of small 
owner-managed companies  were  perceived by auditors and their clients as 
having a positive influence on management and staff, besides also having 
relevance to outside third parties. Additionally, Paper AUD-2 found that, besides 
various other factors identified elsewhere in the literature as contributing to auditor-
change decisions (Beattie and Fearnley, 1995; Woo and Koh, 2001), a further 
characteristic in the case of small companies was that in client retention the audit 
fee level may override quality considerations such as auditor reputation. 
Furthermore, Paper AUD-4 contrasted the higher qualification rate in the smaller-
sized company scenario in Malta with the rates in other studies elsewhere (Soltani, 
2000; Ball et al., 1979; Chan and Walter, 1996) which focused only on public and 
listed companies. In addition, Paper AUD-7 found that audit staff seemed even 
more prone to take shortcuts and justify resorting in AQR acts in such audits, such 
findings confirming an earlier study by  Willett and Page, 1996  in the UK. 
6.1.7 Other small state issues                                                                               . 
As for other issues, insofar as these relate to EA, in 1992 Paper INTR0-1 argued 
that in Malta, unlike in larger countries, user pressures to improve audit quality was 
probably wanting, with the then current studies (Galea St John, 1990 and Magri, 
1991) indicating  that  audit reporting was adding little or no credibility particularly 
to small company financial statements in the eyes of their main users, the banks 
and the Inland Revenue Department. However, audit-derived credibility seemed to 
Chapter 1                                                                                                                                        Commentary 
38 
have somewhat improved over the years, because, as already stated (Section 
6.1.6), Paper AUD-1 in 2003 found that the small statutory audit was being 
perceived as relevant to outside third parties. In addition, Paper AUD-6 confirmed 
the audit fee deficiencies, noted earlier by Baldacchino et al. (2014a), in large 
companies with  government involvement, where the desired prestige of a sizeable 
public sector audit was often best being bought out by a cheap fee. 
 As for other issues, insofar as these relate to CG, these involved other 
issues emanating from the smallness of the state of Malta. Paper CG-2 pointed out 
that despite the evident need emphasised in the literature (Camp,1989; 
McNamee,1995) for relevant benchmarking partners, these were are rarely, if at 
all, available in Malta, this rendering  difficult the attainment of  meaningful inter-
company comparisons. Furthermore, Paper CG-3 referred to limitations in the 
number of experts available and the resulting lack of independence of the 
institutions, with the common prevalence of hat-changing, a practice also raised 
earlier in Baldacchino (2011) and  a common source of COIs.  Finally, Paper CG-5 
referred to the size limitations of the MSE, which were inhibiting possible progress 
such as the application of  an adequate CGI standard.  
6.2  Paper relevance to the wider small state literature 
Evidently,  the major small state characteristics listed in Sub-section 3.2  - in 
particular the limited human and institutional capacity, the lack of readily available 
information, and the need to ensure the appropriate regulations - do contribute to 
the specific issues overviewed in the preceding Sub-section, among which: the 
independence and size limitations of  EA/CG institutions and the defaults in their 
disciplinary follow-ups; the increased corporate pressures towards non-disclosure; 
a regulatory framework with long outstanding measures and in need of adaptation 
of its imported elements and the additional difficulties of business units which, 
although small and disputably auditable, are still statutorily audited.   
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 Additionally, the preceding Sub-section  has shown how - as referred to 
earlier in small state networking (Sub-sections 3.3 and 3.4) - this specific 
environment  impinges further on the exercise of EA and CG, with particular 
significance of, inter alia, behavioural issues such as working relationships with 
clients; the heavy resistance towards initiating change; the increased professional 
COIs threatening professional independence and related issues such as the 
possibly adverse effects of engaging in large companies with government 
involvement.  
 Interestingly, most of the above small state sub-theme insights are probably 
also relevant to related business disciplines such as banking and investment 
services, insurance, and business management. Sub-theme relevance may also 
probably be extended to economics, national governance, and education, these 
being  the major existing fields in small state literature, as stated already in Section 
3.2.  Insofar as these insights are relevant, professional education in each of the  
fields  will probably have to cater for the resulting implications, such as for the need 
to ensure that, beyond the traditional core competence skills, students are highly 
drilled in communication competencies and related soft skills. In this connection, it 
is hoped that this portfolio prompts separate studies  by researchers in these fields. 
 
7.  Follow-up research  
As already stated, the papers included in the portfolio are  a selection of my papers 
published by December, 2016. In 2017, in addition to some co-authored papers 
related to Maltese accountancy but not directly related to the papers in the portfolio 
(Baldacchino et al., 2017a; Baldacchino et al, 2017e; Baldacchino et al., 2017f),  
the following  research studies have  been published or are in progress:     
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 - A paper (Baldacchino et al., 2017c) following up  Papers AUD-2 and AUD-5, 
This further analyzes  the two major behavioural factors in client-initiated auditor 
changes referred to in the two portfolio papers. 
- Two papers following up Paper CG-3 on co-operatives. These are: 
 A paper (Baldacchino et al. 2017b) assessing incentive and 
monitoring schemes in the CG of Maltese co-operatives. This is a 
revised version of a paper which I presented at the 5th OFEL Annual 
Conference, Dubrovnik in April, 2017. 
 A paper (Baldacchino et al. 2017d) which analyses the alternatives in 
updating the Maltese co-operative regulatory framework. This paper 
is expected to have particular impact in addition to that of Paper CG3 
on the Maltese co-operative movement.  
- Furthermore, current papers in progress involve: 
 an examination of the role of the Nomination Committee within 
Maltese listed companies.  
 the accountancy-related regulatory framework of Maltese voluntary 
organisations. 
-   Additionally, following up on Papers CG-4, 5 and  6, two further research 
studies, are planned to be initiated in 2018: 
 the influence of family relationships in the CG of Maltese public 
interest 
 cases of non-compliance to the Maltese CG Code.    
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8.  Concluding remarks 
Since the early nineteen eighties, Malta has invested heavily in the accountancy 
profession, particularly by the provision of publicly sponsored professional 
accountancy and related business courses at its national University. These efforts 
have been targeted at rendering the upcoming generations of accountants and 
auditors and those in charge of CG a core part of the "highly educated workforce" 
described by the World Bank (2017) as already referred to in Commentary Section 
3.2.  
 On my own part, as past member and current Chairman of the Maltese 
Accountancy Board, I have been contributing to the development of the profession  
by my continued influence on the oversight and regulation of Maltese accountants 
and auditors, ensuring appropriate investigative and disciplinary measures in  
addition to  the regular inspections of auditing practices. My varied non-executive 
director experiences were also useful in this respect.         
 Furthermore, and as already referred to briefly in Commentary Section 2, in 
my capacity as Head of the Department of Accountancy, University of Malta, I have 
been chiefly responsible in the past decade for the continuous reform of the 
education of University-related professional accountants. This involved, inter alia, 
upgrading the professional course to postgraduate level, introducing additional 
study units (e.g. risk management, financial services law) beyond the  traditional 
core ones, as well as launching a number of accounting electives. Such reforms 
have been aimed at ensuring that graduate accountants – who once they pass 
their University course do not have to sit for more examinations in order to obtain 
their  Maltese CPA warrants – have more versatility and responsiveness to the 
increasing demands of the flourishing Maltese financial centre. Simultaneously, 
emphasis has been placed on the publication of  refereed research papers by the 
Department of Accountancy, mostly on my part. Such papers, a selection of which 
is in this portfolio, have also been found relevant in the teaching of advanced EA 
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and CG in professional and Continuing Professional Education courses run by the 
Department. Furthermore, many papers, such as those referred to in Commentary 
Section 7, have already given  rise to  further research studies while a number 
have also been well cited. In addition, as already described in Commentary Section 
2, other papers (such as Paper CG-3) have to date also had their own particular 
practical impact in Malta.   
 Beyond the practical recommendations in the papers themselves,  I urge the 
main players interested in the profession, which besides  the Accountancy Board 
include  the audit firms, the Malta Institute of Accountants,  and those in charge of 
CG in the larger companies to continue, together with the Department of 
Accountancy, University of Malta, to seek the optimal ways of tackling the 
complexities and drawbacks of EA and CG by business professionals practising 
within the context of Malta and similar small states. A major step to be 
recommended in this direction is the setting up of a Research Foundation in small 
state accountancy, aimed at bringing together representatives of  the interested 
parties to ensure optimal progress by mutual dialogue and the pooling of 
resources.  
 Finally, sustained educational investment, stronger legal systems and well-
developed financial sectors will all have their significant part to play in Malta's 
future development. On my part, I look forward to continuing, in the foreseeable 
future, to advance to the interested parties further practical recommendations to be 
derived particularly from the ongoing empirical studies referred to in Commentary 
Section 7 and beyond. In my view, the recipe for professional success remains a 
balanced mix of theory and practice.  
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The Maltese accountancy profession has the bulk of its current accounting 
practices and regulatory framework modelled on the British ones, and this is 
probably also the case of professions in several other ex-colonies. Because of this, 
Maltese accountancy leaders seem sufficiently aware of many of the issues being 
debated at the moment in the United Kingdom. Yet, as far as is known, the 
profession has not to date focused its attention on other issues which may be even 
more relevant than the above: those arising from the very smallness of this island-
state. This paper therefore selects and exposes some of the latter issues. 
Hopefully, these will also be of interest to other microstates. 
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1.  Introduction                                                                                     .                                                                                                           
This paper gives a brief look at some of the effects of a microstate environment on 
a particular profession, namely accountancy, in Malta. 
 The Maltese accountancy profession has the bulk of its current accounting 
practices and regulatory framework modelled on the British ones, and this is 
probably also the case of professions in several other ex-colonies. Because of this, 
Maltese accountancy leaders seem sufficiently aware of many of the issues being 
debated at the moment in the United Kingdom. 
        Yet, as far as is known, the profession has not to date focused its attention 
on other issues which may be even more relevant than the above: those arising 
from the very smallness of this island-state, with a population of around 350 
thousand and a current accountancy profession of 486 warrant holders (Malta 
Government Gazette, 1992). 
        This paper therefore selects and exposes some of the latter issues. 
Hopefully, these will also be of interest to other microstates and their study, which, 
as Hein (1989) put it "may require in many ways an entirely different approach to 
problems of social, environmental, political and economic management" (p.18). 
 
2.  Close relationships                                                                 . 
External auditing is a main service provided by the accountancy profession, and, 
as is the case in all other countries, the accountancy profession enjoys a monopoly 
in providing it to local companies. However, in a microstate, the problem is that 
auditors and their clients come from the same, small community, and that there is a 
much higher chance of their being related. Anyone who knows that I am auditing 
my mother-in-law's limited liability company will probably hardly trust me in giving 
an independent view - and whether or not I remain on good terms with her! 
Chapter 2  Introductory Paper                      Problems of the Accountancy Profession in a Microstate: 
                                                                                                   A Maltese Viewpoint  [INTRO -1] 
   
57 
  Maltese law does, in fact, prohibit such close relationships for public and 
private companies. However, contrary to what many take for granted, it does not 
do this for the bulk of companies, the private exempt ones, which, as at 31 
December, 1989, were 87 per cent of all registered companies required to have an 
audit (Registrar of Partnerships,1989).  
 Indeed auditors have recently been required by a new Institute Code of 
Ethics "to ensure that an independent approach to any assignment is not 
endangered as a consequence of any personal or family relationship" (Malta 
Institute of Accountants, 1992, Para 8.6). Yet, it may be very difficult for users to be 
aware of the possible conflicts of interest, where, for example, an auditor is giving 
his opinion on the accounts of a close relative bearing a different surname. 
 Moreover, concerning the wider question of friends, it is a fact that living in a 
micro island-state you do come to know and associate with most people in your 
particular sphere of life. Therefore, it is far easier and more common to find 
someone with whom you play squash or tennis outside office hours coming to audit 
your work. Questions arise, like: How far are personal and professional 
relationships to mix in practice? Where will a line be drawn - that is, at what point 
will it be unsuitable for your friend to accept or continue a professional 
engagement? Approaching such cases seems for practitioners more a matter of 
exercising professional integrity and trust than one of having and abiding with 
detailed regulations. 
 While such problems may interest the seventeen Maltese audit firms, they 
become particularly challenging for many of the sixty-one local sole audit 
practitioners (Accountancy Board, 1990). They cannot pass on the audit to another 
partner in their firm and their client portfolio is not that varied to enable them to 
resign without drastic effects on their personal incomes. 
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3. The small size of business units                                           .                                                        
Another characteristic of this microstate is that most of the local business units are 
small in size (Briguglio, 1992). For example, as at 31 December, 1989, about 75% 
of the 8,800 registered companies had a share capital of less than Lm5,000 
(Registrar of Commercial Partnerships, 1989). Available statistics also show that 
the vast majority of private sector firms in Malta employ less than 10 persons 
(Annual Abstract of Statistics). As stated by Francalanza (1988), it is perhaps to be 
expected that, in such a small country, most of the local business units would tend 
to be small. 
 The problem of the accountancy profession is that, in small concerns, it is 
much more difficult to check that financial statements give a true and fair view.  In 
small concerns, the employees are few, a single manager often dominates them 
and such a manager is more often than not the owner of the enterprise. As a result, 
nobody from outside the company can check what the management is really doing, 
as it is in full control of the situation. Therefore traditional auditing techniques like 
examining mark-ups and ratios of the income and expenditure items can fail to 
reveal omissions from the records such as cash purchases and cash sales. Given 
the large size of the local black economy, auditors' concern is more 
understandable. 
 
4. Few users and trust in the accounting product                         .                                
In such a small country users found in larger economies like the United Kingdom, 
such as, for example, creditors, employees and investment analysts do not seem 
powerful or interested enough to make regular use of audited financial statements. 
The users who are really important appear to be the banks and the Inland Revenue 
Department. 
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 However, while both the latter users require audited financial statements for 
their own purposes, they have both amply shown that they do not place   full trust 
in the audit report. For example, in 1987, 24 out of 25 interviewed managers of one 
of the main local banks stated that in their opinion small company audited accounts 
were primarily produced "for the Inland Revenue", implying that such accounts 
often understated profit for tax purposes and therefore did not really portray a true 
and fair position (Saliba, 1987). A plausible reason for this situation was that 
probably, at least until the 1989 revision of the highest tax bracket from 60% to 
35%, taxation seemed excessive. So one might say, at least up to then, that the 
tax law seemed contrary to a consensus of behaviour, and as De Bono, 1985 aptly 
put it, "where a law is contrary to a consensus of behaviour then it tends to lose its 
moral base." 
 In other words, in 1987 fiscal morality was probably low. However, the point 
is that there is as yet no definite evidence that fiscal morality has indeed improved, 
or that tax evaders will not continue to try their luck despite the mentioned tax 
upheaval. 
 This gives further support to research carried out in late 1990 by two 
accountancy students, Galea St John and Magri, where nine out of fifteen bankers 
showed their cynicism on the audit report of small companies, which, in their view, 
added little or no credibility at all to the financial statements (Galea St John, 1990 
and Magri, 1991). One may therefore conclude that banks are still diffident of the 
audited accounts of many such companies. 
 The same scepticism as regards the audit report is also evident among tax 
assessors. Three out of a sample of five company assessors, also interviewed in 
the above-mentioned related studies, believed that little or no credibility is added to 
the accounts by the audit report. It seems that a clear audit report will often not by 
itself reduce the chance of a tax investigation. 
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5.  Discipline and the catch 22 situation                                       . 
Both banks and the Inland Revenue would surely like more reliably audited 
financial reports. Ironically, however, both are barred by their statutory 
requirements of secrecy from lodging complaints against offending accountants 
and auditors. For both it looks a question of heads you win, tails I lose. 
 The local Institute of Accountants, on the other hand, claims that "without 
such channels of information, the Institute's investigative and disciplinary 
machinery is blunted" (Casapinta, 1987, p.16). 
 The Institute's efforts to ensure its members behave in accordance with a 
code of ethics is probably its most difficult function as it depends on complaints 
against members usually by other members. To make matters worse, as stated by 
Bonello (1987), a Maltese partner in one of the "Big Six" international audit firms: 
"the perception of members as to what constitutes unprofessionalism has more 
leeway in Malta than, perhaps, in countries with a less young profession" (p.3). 
 The ethical rules of larger countries in a more advanced phase of 
accounting development, such as the U.K. and the U.S.A. are probably not 
therefore to be adopted wholesale. In the same vein, as stated by Darmanin 
(1990), even the adoption of international standards may not be a right step in 
accounting development, as the problem may be rooted in the attitudes inherent in 
the profession within the country itself. 
 
6.  The secrecy dilemma                                                                       . 
In such a small country, many go to great pains to keep information secret or at 
least unclear. For example, all private exempt companies - as mentioned above 
87% of all local companies in 1989 - do not lodge accounts at all at the Registrar of 
Partnerships, and therefore the public has no information at all on their 
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performance. One may therefore ask what price these companies are paying for 
the privilege of having limited liability. 
 In addition, local auditors cannot normally divulge information to the public 
authorities of the commission of irregularities unless specifically required by law. 
Therefore, as long as accounts show a true and fair picture of the company's 
financial situation, no sensible auditor will release information on, say, 
infringements of the Exchange Control Act or evasion of customs duty. His position 
is not exactly that of a champion of the public interest. 
 
 7.  Concluding note                                                                             . 
This paper has delved into some of the main problems of the accountancy 
profession in a developing microstate. Hopefully, it will generate thought and 
discussion on the extent to which similar issues recur in other similar small states. 
Common issues, after all, may call for common solutions. 
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The Statutory Audit of Owner-managed Companies in Malta 
Tabone, N., and Baldacchino, P.J. 
University of Malta, Malta 
 
 
 
Historically, as a former British colony, Malta has had its accounting and auditing 
practices highly influenced by UK regulation. However, in the last decade, 
departures have steadily been occurring from a UK-based regulatory framework to 
one increasingly influenced both by international standards and European Union 
requirements. One such departure relates to the retention of the statutory audit 
requirement for all Maltese companies, despite its earlier abolishment for small 
companies in the UK. This study evaluates the relevance of a mandatory annual 
statutory audit requirement for owner-managed companies as perceived by two 
interest groups: the owner-manager and the auditor. It also considers possible 
alternatives to such a requirement. Results indicate that for Maltese owner-
managed companies, the statutory audit fulfils two important roles: it bears 
relevance to outside third parties, and it has a positive effect on the owner-
manager and staff. 
 
 
Keywords: audit, company law, Malta, small firms, auditors 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Malta and the UK share a number of common ties: historical milestones, language, 
business contacts, international relations and tourist influxes. These close links 
also extend to accounting and auditing practices. For many years, Malta has had 
its accounting and auditing practices highly influenced by UK regulation. However, 
in the last decade, Malta has sought to establish itself as a hub of financial services 
in the Mediterranean region and a series of financial services legislation has been 
enacted with the objective of supporting Malta's evolving role within the 
international sphere. Departures have steadily been occurring from a UK-based 
regulatory framework to one increasingly influenced both by international standards 
and European Union requirements. One such departure relates to the retention of 
the statutory audit requirement for all Maltese companies, despite its earlier 
abolishment for small companies in the UK. 
 
 Malta is a tiny island in the middle of the Mediterranean Sea, 60 miles to the 
south of Sicily. It has a population of 390,000 and its economy is principally based 
on the manufacture of commodities for export, tourism and the provision of 
financial services. The number of Maltese registered companies marginally 
exceeds 30,000, yet only about half of them may be considered to be active 
companies. A predominant characteristic in the corporate governance structure of 
these companies is that the directors are also the ultimate beneficial owners of the 
company. Ownership and control are typically vested in the same persons and 
consequently these companies are referred to as "owner-managed companies" 
(De Gabriele, 2001; Doublet, 1999; Mangion, 2001). At present, the Maltese 
Companies Act 1995 imposes a statutory audit requirement for the financial 
statements of all companies, irrespective of their size, capital structure or business 
activity. The statutory audit is to be conducted by an independent auditor in 
accordance with International Standards on Auditing. However, in the budget 
speech for 2002, the Minister of Finance indicated that audit exemptions for small 
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companies would be introduced in company legislation with the objective of 
reducing compliance costs for such companies.   
 
 The purpose of this study is to survey local owner-managers and auditors 
on the relevance of a mandatory annual statutory audit requirement for owner-
managed companies and on possible alternatives to such a requirement. Where 
the ultimate beneficial owners are also the directors of a company, a statutory audit 
would seem superfluous as far as its main purpose - shareholder protection - is 
concerned. Shareholders, having an intimate knowledge of the business affairs 
and having access to all information on a daily basis, would be in a position to 
know the true financial state of affairs of the company as a consequence of the 
decisions taken in their capacity as directors. The prevalence of owner-managed 
companies in Malta makes a study on the relevance of the statutory audit 
requirement a relevant issue to investigate. 
 
Our findings indicate that in the context of owner-managed companies, the 
statutory audit fulfils two important roles. First, it is relevant to outside third parties 
who have no direct ownership interest in the company but who nonetheless 
contribute to the viability of the enterprise. Second, it has a positive effect on the 
owner-manager and staff. 
  
The rest of this paper is divided into four main sections. The first section 
summarizes the relevant literature on the relevance of the statutory audit for 
owner-managed companies. The second section discusses the methodology used 
in the study. The third section presents the results and implications. Finally, the 
concluding section summarises the findings and presents the limitations of the 
study. 
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2.  Literature review 
2.1 Economic size, ownership-management and audit relevance            .            
The conventional focus when evaluating the need for a statutory audit requirement 
is the economic size of the company. In company legislation, quantitative criteria 
based on turnover, net assets and/or number of employees are often used to 
distinguish between "small" and "large" companies. The criteria adopted 
understandably differ from one country to another, mainly because operational 
definitions are linked to the specific level of development of the country and to the 
particular purpose for which the definition is formulated. In the UK, a company is 
exempted from a statutory audit requirement if it qualifies as a small company in 
accordance with the UK Companies Act 1985, its turnover does not exceed £1 
million and its balance sheet total for that year does not exceed £1.4 million. In 
Malta, at present, there are no audit exemption thresholds. The financial 
statements of all companies are subject to a full scope audit conducted in 
accordance with International Standards on Auditing. However, the Maltese 
Companies Act 1995 limits the disclosure requirements for small companies, 
allowing them to file an abridged set of financial statements at the Registry of 
Companies. In the imminent future, audit exemptions for private companies are to 
be introduced in the Maltese company legislative framework and such exemptions 
are to be based on the economic size of the companies.  
A classification based on economic size is, however, rather too limiting in 
scope. A study on the need for a mandatory annual statutory audit requirement for 
all companies must necessarily consider other indicators, primarily the ownership-
management structure of the companies.  
 
The concept of ownership-management is more stable over time and less 
sensitive to economic pressures and other external influences than that of 
economic size. It focuses on the two main organs concerned with the statutory 
audit of financial statements: the board of directors, which is responsible for the 
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preparation of a set of financial statements which give a true and fair view of the 
company's state of affairs, and the shareholders, who are the primary stakeholder 
group for whom the statutory audit is legally intended. This concept is used in this 
study to evaluate the relevance of a statutory audit requirement from the 
perspectives of the owner-manager and the auditor.  
 
This study defines an owner-managed company as a limited liability 
company incorporated under the Maltese Companies Act 1995 where the ultimate 
beneficial owners are de facto controlling the company in their capacity as 
directors. This definition is not meant to be a rigid legalistic definition. The objective 
of this definition is to encapsulate all companies whose ultimate beneficial owners 
are, in substance, controlling the company. The definition therefore also covers 
situations where a shareholder or a group of shareholders are directors of a 
company and own the vast majority of the shares, with their spouses and/or 
descendants holding the few remaining shares.  
 
2.2 The auditing function in owner-managed companies 
According to Andersen et al (1993, as cited in Koh and Woo, 2001), in line with the 
agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), information asymmetry and the 
demand for monitoring are among the reasons for undertaking external audits. 
Where there is a separation of ownership and control, the principal is willing to 
incur a financial cost to monitor the activities of the agent. The agent is responsible 
for producing most of the financial information required by the principal. This 
information is seen to be of doubtful objectivity in view of the presence of natural or 
deliberate bias caused by the existence of a conflict of interest (Kent and Sherer, 
1983). It is therefore in the principal's interest to have the truth and fairness of the 
financial statements testified by an independent auditor. In addition, the agent may 
view the audit as a device to assert the quality of the information provided to the 
principal. Within the context of a limited liability company, the information provided 
by the agent is not exclusively used by the principal - other stakeholders may also 
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place reliance on this information. The auditor is therefore seen as fulfilling an 
insurance role. The auditor's independent opinion adds credibility to the financial 
statements prepared by the agent and it provides third parties with reasonable 
assurance on the truth and fairness of the financial statements. The auditor may 
also fulfil a behavioural role, acting as an influence on the directors, management 
and staff. The auditor may assist the directors in maintaining a company's reporting 
standards and grant the directors access to financial expertise to improve their 
existing systems and controls.  
 
However, with respect to owner-managed companies, the applicability of 
some of these roles appears to be questionable. In an owner-managed company, 
ownership and management of the company's assets are vested in the same 
persons. Thus, the question arises as to whether a mandatory annual statutory 
audit requirement is justified in such circumstances, where the auditor is merely 
reporting information already known to the same person acting in a different role.  
 
English (1978, p. 5) questions the raison d'être of the statutory audit for 
owner- managed companies by arguing that where shareholders are also directors, 
the statutory audit only serves "to tell Mr and Mrs A (as shareholders) that they, Mr 
and Mrs A (as directors) have not misled or cheated them". A similar argument is 
used by the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia, which argues that the 
statutory audit may be a time-consuming, unnecessary and onerous expense for 
many "mum and dad" type companies which have very few shareholders. As these 
shareholders would not only own the company but also manage it, the benefits of 
an audit are questionable since shareholders would essentially be reporting to 
themselves (ICAA, 1995 as cited in Baxter and Pragasam, 1998). English (1978) 
argues that the time spent on the statutory audit could be utilized more fruitfully for 
credibility reviews and future cash flow planning. Jones (1985) puts forward his 
view on the need for the auditing profession to direct its energies into developing 
more relevant business services. A similar line of thought is used by Wills (1999), 
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who argues that whilst the form of the statutory audit essentially remains the same 
from one year to another, the needs of owner-managers vary continuously. Thus, 
the government should no longer prescribe a statutory audit, but allow owner-
managers to choose the assurance service most appropriate to them (Singleton-
Green, 1995).  
 
A counter argument to the above is that the annual audit improves the 
reliability and usefulness of the financial information available to shareholder-
directors (Keasey and Watson, 1993). The lack of specialised accounting expertise 
in owner-managed companies, particularly in view of the ever-increasing 
complexity of business transactions and accounting standards, means that the 
"housekeeping" and "discipline" imposed on the staff and management by the 
annual audit requirement is essential for the provision of reliable and consistent 
financial information (Gunter, 2000; Keasey et al., 1988). Moreover, without the 
statutory audit, the door may be opened wide for unqualified auditors to wreak 
havoc in the books of owner-managed companies (Laine, 1998).  
 
The existence of an accountability relationship must not be limited to the 
principals having an ownership stake in the company. The manner in which a 
company is managed will affect other parties who have no direct ownership interest 
(such as creditors, bankers and tax authorities) but who nonetheless contribute to 
the viability of the organisation. Realism, rather than the provisions of the law, 
dictates that shareholders are not the only group of people to whom the company, 
as managed by the directors, should be accountable (Kent and Sherer, 1983). 
Thus, the concept of accountability, and the use of the statutory audit to enforce it, 
is applicable to all sets of participants associated with a company, and not just to 
the shareholders. Although the statutory audit may not directly address all the 
conflicting objectives of the various stakeholders, it is still perceived as a means of 
ensuring that the financial statements produced are reasonable. The audit function 
may also place constraints, in the interests of stakeholders, upon the actions of the 
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owner- managers, in the knowledge that their financial transactions will be subject 
to scrutiny by an independent third party.  
 
With respect to Maltese companies, Baldacchino (1992) interviewed local 
auditors and managers, and found that both parties mostly perceived the audit 
function as important because of its positive influence on management and staff. In 
small companies, this behavioural role of the auditor was appreciated, but with 
ownership-management and no outside loan financing, audits were in question as 
to their cost-benefit. 
 
2.3  Alternatives to the statutory audit requirement  
Shaw (1978) argues that the only alternative to a mandatory audit is "no audit". A 
similar attitude is adopted by Davison (1980, p. 42) who states that "surely, the 
proper alternative is no audit at all". According to Shaw (1978), if company 
legislation is to be amended, then any changes should be directed at exempting 
companies from an audit requirement rather than introducing a new form of 
assurance service. The adoption of audit deregulation may, however, open the 
floodgates for adverse selection, where the very companies that may benefit most 
from, or mostly need, the statutory audit may opt for an exemption (Langard, 1999, 
as cited in Seow, 2001). Furthermore, audit deregulation may have an impact on 
the auditing profession in the sense that small audit practitioners may no longer be 
in a position to train audit staff, leading to the creation of an oligopoly of audit 
service providers (ACCA, 2000).  
 
 An independent professional review has been suggested as a lighter, less 
costly form of assurance service suitable for owner- managed companies (Stewart, 
2000). A review engagement is different from an audit in the scope of work 
undertaken (Auditing Practices Board, 2000). Still, reviews have been criticised by 
Davison (1980) on the grounds that if the public interest does not require the law to 
impose a full audit on small companies, then there is no justification for imposing a 
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review requirement on such companies. Moreover, a review may not be sufficiently 
distanced from an audit by the users, such that it may further widen the audit 
expectation gap (Page,1991). 
 
 Others have suggested that the statutory audit per se is a valuable exercise 
which only needs to be modified. Hatherley (1992) introduces the concept of 
reporting to "committed" stakeholders - that is, stakeholders who effectively have a 
long-term interest in the company. The body of shareholders would no longer 
remain the addressee of the audit report; instead, the report would be addressed to 
committed stakeholder groups. These may include bankers, creditors, or loan 
providers, who may not be in a position to withdraw facilities without causing that 
company severe financial distress. By reporting to a body of committed 
stakeholders, the auditor in an owner-managed company would no longer be 
working in a vacuum.  
 
3.  Research methodology                                                        
3.1 Research instruments                                                     .                                                                              
A questionnaire containing 29 statements was used in the survey. Respondents 
were asked to indicate on a six-point Likert-scale their position vis-a-vis each 
statement. In the rating scale, respondents could choose from 
strongly/moderately/slightly disagree or agree, represented by numbers 1 to 6. The 
questionnaire was divided into five sections. 
 
  The first section focused on the relevance of the statutory audit for owner-
managed companies. The second section considered the introduction  of audit 
exemptions, while the third section  delved into possible alternatives to the 
mandatory audit requirement. The fourth section covered the overall perspective of 
the respondents. Finally, the last section sought to collect demographic data on the 
respondents. 
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   Respondents were asked to accede to a follow-up interview. The objective 
of these interviews was to enable the respondents to express their views openly 
where debatable issues arose, thus better bringing to light the perceptions of the 
two respondent groups. A semi-structured interview was conducted with the first 
ten respondents from each group who had acceded to the request.      
 
3.2  Sample selection and response rates                                            .                             
A mail survey was carried out amongst a random sample of owner-managers in 
each of 150 owner-managed companies satisfying the definition adopted for the 
purposes of this study, and 150 certified public accountants and auditors (CPAA's). 
The sample of companies was selected from the list of companies available at the 
Registry of Companies while the sample of auditors was selected from the list of 
warrant holders published by the Accountancy Board.  
 By the cut-off date, which was scheduled as five weeks after despatch of the 
questionnaires, 118 valid responses were received: 39 responses from owner -
managers (26 per cent response rate) and 79 responses from auditors (53  per 
cent response rate). The majority of owner-managers (56 per cent) were not 
professionally qualified in any business-related area. Most owner-managers (92 
per cent) indicated that their company was a first-generation company. On the 
other hand, the majority of responses from the auditor respondent group were 
derived from audit partners (54 per cent). The other responses originated from sole 
practitioners (33 per cent) and warrant holders working in industry (13 per cent).   
  
4.  Results and implications 
4.1  Relevance of the statutory audit  
Table 1 presents the mean responses and standard deviations of the two 
respondent groups with respect to the statements focusing on the relevance of the 
statutory audit requirement for owner-managed companies. It also gives the results 
of the Mann-Whitney test for significant differences between the responses of  
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owner-managers and those of auditors. The merits of the statutory audit are 
segregated from its criticisms. The results are presented in descending order, 
based on the average means of the two groups.  
 
The two respondent groups were distinctly in agreement with respect to the 
relevance of the statutory audit to other stakeholders. This was also evident in the 
interview sessions. All the owner-managers interviewed supported this statement. 
One owner-manager described the audited financial statements as the key to 
obtaining bank finance. Another owner-manager suggested that the annual audit 
satisfied bankers and tax authorities that the books of account were maintained to 
a sufficiently high standard. The auditors interviewed were more concerned with 
the added credibility associated with an audited set of financial statements. 
  
Both respondent groups agreed that the statutory audit improved the 
reliability of the financial statements of owner-managed companies. They also 
considered the role of the auditor as important in view of the ever-increasing 
complexity of business transactions and accounting standards. Statistically 
significant differences were, however, noted with respect to these two statements. 
The majority of the owner-managers interviewed were convinced that the financial 
statements prepared by their accountant were reliable, and that their accountant or 
financial controller was adequately versatile with changing accounting standards. 
One owner-manager commented that his auditor never traced any material 
misstatements in the financial statements and that this proved that his financial 
statements were reliable enough. 
 
Both respondent groups perceived the annual audit as imposing a sense of 
financial discipline on the owner-manager and staff. However, there was a 
statistically significant difference in their responses. One of the auditors interviewed 
described the statutory audit as a vital check for owner-managed companies, since 
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Table1      
Relevance of the statutory audit      
 OM Cos CPAAs  
Mean St Dev Mean St dev p-value 
Section 1      
The annual audit is necessary since It is 
relevant to other stakeholders, such as 
creditors, tax authorities and bankers 5.4872 0.6833 5.4557 0.9309 0.7352 
The annual audit is useful  improving the 
reliability of the financial statements of 
owner-managed companies 4.9231 1.1094 5.3418 0.8303 0.0413* 
The role of the auditor is important in 
view of the ever-Increasing complexity 
of business transactions and accounting 
standards 4.9231 1.0854 5.2278 1.1541 0.0393* 
The annual audit imposes discipline on 
the management and staff of owner-
managed companies 4.4103 1.4818 5.0506 1.1536 0.0137* 
The annual audit Is useful in the detection 
of material fraud and error 4.0000 1.4327 4.7342 1.1060 0.0056* 
The auditor may provide better specialist 
advice in other non-audit areas at a 
lower cost than external third party 
consultants 3.9487 1.5381 4.4051 1.1931 0.1604 
The needs of owner-managers change 
from one year to another, but the form 
of the audit essentially stays the same, 
year in, year out 4.4103 1.3518 3.5696 1.4994 0.0058* 
There Is little dialogue between the 
auditor and the owner-manager once 
the annual audit is finalised 4.5897 1.4090 3.3671 1.5457 0.0001* 
The statutory audit merely confirms to 
the owner-manager what he already 
knows about the company 4.2308 1.4772 3.2025 1.5139 0.0010* 
The statutory audit only looks at history; 
it adds nothing new 3.8462 1.5481 3.3165 1.4636 0.0666 
Generally, owner-manager analyses 
carefully report prepared by  auditor 3.6667 1.5275 3.0127 1.4455 0.0291* 
The benefits of an audit could be 
obtained outside the legal-relationship 3.4872 1.2747 2.9620 1.6521 0.0662 
In owner-managed companies, 
shareholders are relatively well 
Informed on the state of affairs of the 
company and so the statutory audit is 
not needed 3.5128 1.6839 2.5063 1.518 0.0016* 
The statutory audit requirement is only a 
means of providing Income for the 
auditing profession 3.5641 1.7136 1.6582 1.1863 0.0000* 
 
Note: * Significantly different between owner-managers and auditors at p < = 0.05 
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such companies were often characterised by the existence of a dominant owner-
manager. 
 
 The most significant difference in the perceptions of the two respondent 
groups concerned the issue of fraud and error. Both respondent groups agreed 
that the statutory audit was useful in the detection of fraud and error resulting in 
material misstatements in the financial statements. However, owner-managers 
expressed a lower level of agreement with the statement than the auditors did.  
 
4.2  Criticisms of the statutory audit                                                           .                                                                      
One statistically significant difference concerned the statement dealing with the 
poor communication between the owner-manager and auditor once the statutory 
audit was finalised. Owner-managers agreed with this statement whilst auditors 
expressed mixed feelings. 
 
 Owner-managers agreed with the statement that the form of the annual 
audit did not change in line with changes and developments in their company. 
They also agreed that for owner-managed companies, the statutory audit only 
confirmed to them what they already knew about the company. Auditors appeared 
to have a neutral opinion with regard to these two statements.  
 
Both respondent groups did not appear to have a definite view on whether 
the statutory audit added anything new. This was also apparent in the interview 
sessions, where six owner-managers argued that the statutory audit was too 
historic and that it was not conducted at the right time. One owner-manager argued 
that it was important to look at the past to budget for the future. Another owner-
manager believed that the audit formalized the past performance of the company 
and that it provided an independent confirmation that one had achieved one's 
targets. On the other hand, the interviewed auditors acknowledged the historical 
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nature of the audit. However, the vast majority believed that the audit was valuable 
to the owner-manager. A common line of thought amongst auditors was that the 
auditor's advice on internal controls, tax planning and other related financial issues 
significantly added value to the owner-manager. Another auditor suggested that in 
owner-managed companies, the audit was very important for those shareholder-
directors who were non-executive directors. As companies entered new 
generations, the complete alignment between ownership and directorship may be 
lost and so the relevance of the statutory audit will increase. In line with this 
argument, auditors disagreed that the statutory audit was not needed in owner-
managed companies simply because ownership and control were vested in the 
same persons. Owner-managers expressed a neutral opinion on this matter.  
 
Auditors believed that the owner-managers did not read and analyse 
carefully the contents of the audit report. Owner-managers appeared to have 
mixed feelings on this issue. Another statement in the questionnaire focused on the 
possibility of obtaining the benefits of the audit outside the legal requirement, and 
therefore without the need for the mandatory provision of the law. Auditors 
disagreed with this statement, while owner-managers were less decided in this 
regard. 
 
A contentious issue related to whether the statutory audit requirement was 
only a means of supporting the large amount of statutorily-mandated revenue for 
the auditing profession. Auditors were strongly in disagreement with this issue, 
while owner-managers expressed a neutral view. This resulted in the highest 
significant difference in this section of the questionnaire.  
 
4.3  No statutory audit  
Table 2 presents the mean responses of the two respondent groups with respect to 
the statements concerned with audit deregulation. The results are presented in 
descending order, based on the average means of the two groups.  
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Both respondent groups agreed that auditors would prefer to retain the 
mandatory annual audit requirement for owner-managed companies, and in this 
respect, no statistically significant difference arose. Statistically significant 
differences were noted in all the other statements set. Both respondent groups 
agreed that, with audit exemption, the companies mostly in need of an audit would 
be the ones to opt for an exemption. One owner-manager was, however, critical of 
this statement, arguing that one should not generalize since there were companies 
which genuinely did not consider the audit to be relevant to their needs. 
 
Owner-managers expressed a neutral view on the financial burden 
associated with the annual audit exercise. On the other hand, auditors did not 
perceive the audit as a significant burden for owner-managed companies. In the in-
depth interviews, owner-managers commented that in a highly competitive 
business environment, the audit fee was a costly overhead and that companies 
would certainly be  thankful  for  any  measures which  reduced compliance costs. 
The majority of the auditors interviewed disagreed with audit exemptions. One 
auditor remarked that, in Malta, the current audit fee levels were very low when 
compared to other countries and were not therefore a significant burden on these 
companies. Another auditor remarked that the introduction of audit exemption 
demanded a professional and mature commercial environment, and that the 
Maltese business environment had still not reached that stage of development. 
Two auditors were in favour of audit exemptions on the grounds that, for owner-
managed companies, an audit exercise was often difficult to undertake in view of 
the inherent internal control limitations and the dominance of the owner-manager.  
  
 Owner-managers expressed a neutral opinion on their preference regarding 
the criteria on which audit exemption should be based. Auditors disagreed with the 
use of ownership-management as a criterion. In the interview sessions, four owner-
managers supported ownership-management exemption on the basis that it was 
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more relevant; four owner-managers were in favour of economic size since it better 
reflected the impact of the company on the whole economy; the other two owner-
managers stated categorically that audit exemptions should not be introduced.  
The majority of  auditors  preferred  economic  size as a  basis for   exemption, 
although three auditors suggested that it should be based on a combination of 
both. 
 
Table 2      
No statutory audit      
 OM Cos CPAAs  
Mean St Dev Mean St dev p-value 
Section 2      
Auditors would prefer to retain the 
mandatory audit requirement for 
owner-managed companies 4.9231 1.4214 4.5949 1.5319 0.2440 
With no statutory audit, the 
companies that mostly need an 
audit may be the ones to opt for an 
exemption 4.1282 1.6088 4.9747 1.3105 0.0034* 
The annual audit is a financial burden, 
a workload and a time-consuming 
exercise for owner-managers and 
their staff 3.5385 1.5191 2.3544 1.3871 0.0001* 
Audit exemption should be based on 
the ownership-management 
structure, rather than on economic 
size (turnover, net assets or number 
of employees) 3.5897 1.5341 2.2025 1.5391 0.0000* 
With audit exemption, the funds 
previously used for audit will now 
be used for better future cash flow 
planning and budgeting 2.8974 1.5860 1.7848 1.1510 0.0001* 
 
Note: * Significantly different between owner-managers and auditors at p < = 0.05 
 
      
Auditors were convinced that, with audit exemption, the funds previously 
used to cover the audit fee would not be utilised for better cash-flow planning and 
budgeting. Owner-managers also disagreed with this statement, though to a lesser 
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extent. In the interview sessions, eight owner-managers indicated that they would 
simply re-allocate the funds to the finance department or distribute them to 
employees to keep them motivated.  
 
4.4  Alternatives to the statutory audit requirement  
Table 3 presents the results of the responses to the statements concerned with 
possible alternatives to the statutory audit requirement. 
 
  
Table 3 
Alternatives to the statutory audit requirement 
 
   
 OM Cos CPAAs  
Mean St Dev Mean St dev p-value 
Section 3      
For owner-managed companies, a user-
centred audit methodology should be 
developed; i.e. the audit should be 
tailored to suit the needs of the owner-
managers 4.6667 1.5447 4.0759 1.6777 0.0406* 
The audit report should not be a standard 
report which Is far too familiar 3.4615 1.6197 2.7468 1.5728 0.0232* 
In owner-managed companies, the audit 
report should be addressed to other 
users to enforce the accountability 
relationship 3.3590 1.5473 2.7722 1.7755 0.0602 
Owner-managers should be granted the 
option to choose whether to have their 
financial statements audited or not 3.7949 1.7944 2.0886 1.5291 0.0000* 
An independent professional review (IPR) 
is a lighter, less costly form of assurance 
service that Is suitable for owner-
managed companies 3.3333 1.5949 2.519 1.4924 0.0075* 
 
Note: * Significantly different between owner-managers and auditors at p < = 0.05 
  
 Four out of the five statements set obtained responses from the two 
respondent groups which were statistically different. One statistical difference 
related to  the  user-centred   methodology  to  be  used  in  the  annual  audit  
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exercise. Both respondent groups agreed that the audit approach should be 
tailored to suit the needs of owner-managers. Owner-managers were, however, 
more in agreement with this statement than the auditors 
 
The auditors interviewed were in favour of a standardized audit report on the 
grounds that standardization promoted clarity, consistency and comparability. 
Owner-managers were more critical of the audit report, describing it as a 
stereotyped report, an inflexible report and a report which remained the same, year 
in, year out, except for a change in the date. These views were also reflected in the 
responses to the mail survey, resulting in a statistically significant difference.  
 
Auditors disagreed that the audit report should be addressed to other users 
to enforce the accountability relationship. Owner-managers were undecided on this 
issue. In the interview sessions, nine auditors rejected this idea, arguing that it 
would lead to catastrophic increases in audit fees and that it would mean a lot in 
terms of auditor's liability.  
 
Owner-managers expressed a neutral view on whether they should be 
granted the option to choose whether to have their financial statements audited or 
not. Auditors disagreed with this option. In the interviews, owner-managers were in 
favour of the option, describing it as democratic and fair. On the other hand, 
auditors were less enthusiastic about this alternative: eight auditors were against 
such an option, while two auditors were in favour, provided adequate protection 
was afforded to minority shareholders.  
 
Another statistically significant difference related to the responses given to 
the statement which focused on the use of independent professional reviews. 
Auditors disagreed with the concept of a review and this was also apparent in the 
interviews, where seven auditors expressed their disagreement with the use of 
reviews as an alternative to an audit. Owner-managers were more interested in the 
use of reviews, provided it was acceptable to the banks and tax department. Two 
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owner-managers were, however, completely against reviews on the grounds that 
they were irrelevant to them, as much as an audit was.  
 
4.5 Overall perspective  
The results of the final section of the questionnaire are presented in Table 4.  
 
 
Table 4 
Overall perspective    
 OM Cos CPAAs  
Mean St Dev Mean St dev p-value 
Section 4      
A statutory audit requirement is 
justifiable on the grounds of 
safeguarding societal interests 4.6923 1.0798 4.8608 1.3562 0.1559 
The annual audit is only 
undertaken because it is 
required by statute 4.4359 1.3138 4.4810 1.2285 0.8507 
A legal requirement for an audit of 
all companies is justifiable 3.9231 1.6284 4.5570 1.6621      
          
0.0155* 
Owner-managed companies would 
prefer to abolish the mandatory 
audit requirement 4.0769 1.5284 4.2911 1.4246    0.5073 
On the whole, the benefits of the 
annual audit for owner-managed 
companies exceed the costs 
associated with it 3.6667 1.4204 4.3418 1.5012     0.0154 
 
Note: * Significantly different between owner-managers and auditors at p < = 0.05 
 
 
 The final section of the questionnaire summarised the overall views of the 
two respondent groups. Both owner-managers and auditors agreed that the 
statutory audit requirement safeguarded societal interests. More auditors than 
owner-managers were in favour of a mandatory audit for all companies, and in fact, 
a statistically significant difference arose in this respect.  
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Both respondent groups agreed that owner-managers would prefer to 
abolish the mandatory audit requirement. In line with this view, both auditors and 
owner-managers acknowledged that the annual audit was only undertaken 
because it was required by statute. No statistical differences were noted for these 
two statements. A statistically significant difference arose with respect to the 
statement comparing the benefits and the costs associated with the audit exercise. 
Auditors agreed that the benefits exceeded the costs associated with the audit, 
while owner-managers were more sceptical about this. 
  
5.  Discussion of findings  
The prevailing alignment between ownership and management in the vast majority 
of Maltese limited liability companies may bring into question the need for a 
mandatory annual statutory audit requirement for such companies. It is clear from 
our findings, however, that the statutory audit of local owner-managed companies 
fulfils two major roles. The more important role of the statutory audit is that it bears 
relevance to outside third parties who may have a direct interest in the owner-
managed company. The second role of the statutory audit emanates from the 
positive effect of the audit process on the owner-manager and staff. 
 
5.1  Relevance to outside parties 
There is clear agreement that the statutory audit requirement is necessary since it 
is relevant to third parties, such as bankers, trade creditors and tax authorities. The 
statutory audit improves the reliability of the financial statements prepared by the 
owner-manager. The independent audit opinion expressed in the auditor's report 
adds credibility to the financial statements. This added credibility is particularly 
relevant when audited financial statements are used as a basis for dealings with 
bankers, suppliers, leasing companies and government agencies. The role of the 
external auditor is also useful in tackling the increasingly complex business 
transactions and the onerous requirements of the financial reporting framework. 
These factors render the statutory audit relevant to those outside stakeholders who 
Chapter 3                                    The Statutory Audit of Owner-managed Companies in Malta [AUD-1] 
85 
may not have an ownership interest in the owner-managed company but who 
nonetheless directly support its existence and viability. Our findings present the 
insurance role - the protection of third-party interests - as a major role of the 
statutory audit in the Maltese context. 
 
5.2  Positive effect on owner-manager and staff  
The statutory audit process has a positive effect on the owner-manager and staff, 
not so much by detecting material fraud and error contained in the financial 
statements, but by imposing financial discipline and providing specialist advice in 
other non-audit areas. 
  
  The statutory audit promotes a sense of financial discipline in the way 
owner-managers and their staff conduct their business activities and in the manner 
in which accounting records are maintained. It therefore serves as a psychological 
deterrent factor and an added independent check on the owner-managed 
company. It is in the Interest of third parties, particularly unsecured creditors, and 
of society in general, for the operations of a limited liability company to be 
conducted in an orderly manner and kept under scrutiny. Although local owner-
managers may puritanically argue that it is in their own Interest to be financially 
disciplined, the statutory audit still serves as a useful external influence on the 
behaviour of the owner-manager and staff.  
 
 The statutory audit may grant the owner-manager access to the financial 
expertise necessary to improve the company's systems and operations. The 
auditor acquires a detailed understanding of the organizational and control 
characteristics of the owner-managed company from the conduct of recurring 
statutory audits. The auditor also benefits from a specialist exposure to a wide 
range of companies in various industries and may therefore utilise this expertise to 
ask relevant questions which those involved in the day-to-day activities of the 
owner-managed company may fail to put forward. The auditor may act as an 
independent person on whom to bounce off constructive ideas with the aim of 
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improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the operations of the owner-managed 
company. This advice needs not be restricted to financial matters, but may also 
extend to operational and governance matters. These influences tie in well with the 
behavioural role - the influence on management and staff - of the statutory audit.  
 
It is evident from our findings, however, that local owner-managers expect a 
higher degree of added value from the auditors' services. For local owner-
managed companies, monitoring the agency relationship between shareholders 
and directors is not considered a relevant function of the statutory audit since this 
merely confirms what owner-managers already know about the company from their 
direct involvement in its day-to-day operations. There also appears to be a poor 
dialogue between the owner-manager and the auditor once the annual audit is 
finalised. Moreover, local auditors may be adopting a rigid procedural methodology 
in the conduct of the audit, thus ignoring the individual needs and characteristics of 
the owner-managed company. There is agreement that a proactive attitude is 
required in the conduct of the audit, where the auditor provides strategic advice on 
the future development of the company. This would introduce the auditor to a new, 
challenging role in the corporate governance of owner-managed limited liability 
companies.  
 
Such demands by owner-managers on the audit function may, however, put 
into question the fundamental notions of independence and objectivity upon which 
the conduct of a statutory audit is based. A continuous dialogue with the auditor 
beyond the present generally accepted levels and the involvement of the external 
auditor in strategic planning issues would narrow the distance between the audit 
function and the management function. This may question, if not in fact but 
certainly in appearance, the independence of the auditor and would therefore limit 
the credibility offered by the auditor's opinion in the interest of third parties. 
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5.3  Overall perceptions of owner-managers and auditors 
The overall picture which emerges from this study is that local auditors attach more 
significance to the roles of the statutory audit than owner-managers do. This is 
evident from the differences in the responses to the statements set. The auditors' 
mean responses are invariably higher with respect to the merits of the statutory 
audit and lower with respect to its criticisms. This discrepancy may be justified on 
the grounds of the auditors' professional understanding of the importance of their 
role in the local commercial and business environment. There may also be an 
element of self-interest, self-worth or pride which auditors associate with the 
functions which they perform. Furthermore, local owner-managers may lack the 
professional accounting and auditing background necessary to appreciate the 
positive effects of the statutory audit process. Auditors need to take these 
considerations into account in their interactions with the owner-managers.  
 
5.4  Possible alternatives to the statutory audit requirement  
The ownership-management structure of local owner-managed companies may 
strengthen the case for abolishing the statutory audit requirement, particularly in 
view of the general trend in various countries to relieve such companies from costly 
bureaucratic burdens. However, the introduction of an audit exemption regime is 
based on a natural evolution of the economy and it demands a professional and 
mature business environment. In Malta, audit exemptions may not be conducive to 
a higher level of corporate governance and accountability, particularly in view of 
the intrinsic lax culture inherent in many local owner-managed companies. 
Restricting surveillance and curtailing accountability is unlikely to stimulate 
economic activity in the interest of the local commercial community and the general 
public. In addition, the statutory audit adds value to the owner-managed company 
through the auditor's advice on internal controls, cash-flow planning and tax 
planning. This advice may be forfeited in case of a complete abolition of the 
statutory audit since local owner-managers are unlikely to voluntarily engage an 
external auditor unless this is required by lenders, particularly bankers.  
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 Local owner-managers appear to be more enthusiastic about changes to the 
current modus operandi. Owner-managers express their wish of reducing business 
compliance costs. At the same time, owner-managers acknowledge that a statutory 
audit requirement is justifiable on the grounds of safeguarding societal interests. 
Other, lighter forms of assurance services, such as independent professional 
reviews, are still new to the local business community and thus, owner-managers 
are still undecided about their relevance and applicability in the local context. The 
alternative of granting a voluntary option to owner-managers has not featured as a 
solution to the issue. This may indicate that whilst owner-managers wish to reduce 
compliance costs for their own company, they would still prefer to have the 
financial statements of their trade contacts duly surveilled by an annual audit, in 
their own interest and in the interest of society in general.  
 
 A user-centred methodology is required in the audit of an owner-managed 
company. This involves tailoring the audit process to suit the nature and individual 
characteristics of the company. Based on the results of the audit procedures 
undertaken, the auditor can fulfil an advisory role by providing recommendations in 
the management letter which add value to the owner-manager and justify the audit 
fee charged. Unfortunately, in view of the ever-increasing compliance requirements 
and the economics of audit engagements, local auditors may no longer be in a 
position to dedicate sufficient time to these important "by-products" of the statutory 
audit. This is where the local auditing profession seems to need to concentrate its 
efforts and resources: ensuring that the added value associated with the statutory 
audit process is delivered to the owner-manager in fact and in appearance, such 
that the owner-manager will actually be the one to actively and voluntarily seek the 
auditor's services.  
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6.  Summary and conclusions 
In the context of an owner-managed company, the statutory audit cannot be seen 
as monitoring the traditional agency relationship between the shareholders and 
directors since no such relationship exists. If this function were to be the only 
function fulfilled by the statutory audit, then the audit of owner-managed companies 
would indeed be irrelevant and unnecessary. However, there are other roles 
fulfilled by the statutory audit which render it an important exercise for all interested 
parties.  
 The study concludes that in the context of local owner-managed companies, 
the statutory audit fulfils two important roles. It is relevant to outside third parties 
who have no direct ownership interest in the company but who nonetheless 
contribute to the viability of the enterprise. Furthermore, the statutory audit has a 
positive effect on the owner-manager and staff - it imposes financial discipline on 
the owner-managed company, it has a psychological deterrent effect against errors 
and other irregularities, and it also grants the owner-manager access to financial 
expertise. These roles are to be taken into consideration before any alternative to 
the statutory audit requirement is introduced in the Maltese legislative framework.  
 
The study also concludes that local auditors are sceptical about the 
appropriateness of alternatives to the mandatory annual statutory audit 
requirement. On the other hand, owner-managers are more open to changes to 
this requirement. At the same time, owner-managers are well aware of the need of 
the statutory audit to safeguard the interests of third parties, particularly bankers 
and tax authorities, and to enable them to conduct their operations in the form of a 
limited liability company. 
 
 The results of our study are subject to the following limitations. Responses 
were received from a limited number of owner-managers and auditors, and so the 
responses may not be totally representative of the population. The study is also 
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limited to the viewpoints of the owner-manager and the auditor. The perspective of 
local users of audited financial statements is valuable for a comprehensive 
evaluation of the subject matter, and consequently we recommend this aspect as 
an area for further study to future researchers 
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Factors Contributing to Auditor Change Decisions in Malta  
Magri, J. and Baldacchino, P.J. 
University of Malta, Malta 
 
 
 
Auditor changes are not alarmingly high in Malta but have been rising of late and 
the driving forces in this regard could be particular to a small-island state. This 
paper seeks to elicit the perceptions of behavioural, economic or other factors that 
influence auditor-client realignments in Malta. It does this mostly by a mail 
questionnaire responded to by 97 Maltese companies. Such findings were 
complemented by 15 interviews with companies that actually changed their auditor. 
The study concludes primarily that behavioural forces provide the principal 
motivators of auditor changes in Malta. Deterioration in the working relationship 
with the auditor and lack of accessibility feature as foremost concerns. Economic 
forces, albeit being important triggers of auditor changes, come only secondary in 
importance. Underlying this, there is evidence of differences in the attitudes of 
clients and non-clients of Big 4 audit firms as well as between small and. large 
companies.  
 
Keywords : Malta, auditors, auditing, employee turnover  
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1.  Introduction  
As a tiny island state, with a population of around 400,000, Malta is heavily 
characterised by close interweaving personal relationships. Exchanges of 
information are affected amongst people who know each other. Therefore, 
confidentiality is even more difficult to maintain than in larger countries 
(Baldacchino,1992). Applying this scenario to the business environment, the 
concepts of checking and trust probably assume an increasingly important role in 
Malta, with the auditing function bearing magnified responsibilities towards the 
Maltese community. An auditor is clearly more prone to forsaking the fundamental 
principles of independence in an environment like that prevailing on a small island, 
where a predominant characteristic remains the strength of the behavioural 
relations between parties. The independent attitude, assumed integral to the 
exercise of the auditing profession, probably finds tougher barriers in such close-
knit communities and these opposing forces generally affect issues, such as that 
regarding auditor changes, in particular ways, perhaps showing interesting 
contrasts when compared to the same phenomena in larger countries.  
 
 This paper deals with the factors leading to client-initiated auditor changes 
in Malta. Internationally, the concern of the profession and also of regulators with 
respect to client-induced auditor changes is not a novelty. They can be traced back 
to the recession in the eighties where the profession ended up with excess supply 
on the market and both opinion shopping by companies and aggressive fee 
negotiations became frequent. In response, auditors started to consolidate their 
positions through mergers and competitive pressures led to a shift in auditing focus 
from detailed examinations of systems transactions to high-risk areas and 
analytical reviews (Beattie and Fearnley,1998a,b). This environment was 
jeopardizing independence and there was general acknowledgment of the negative 
consequences which are triggered as a result of auditor-client realignments. 
Voluntary auditor changes could actually undermine the profession's credibility, in 
turn damaging the business sentiment in a country.  
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 A study of such voluntary auditor changes in Malta was ,therefore, felt 
opportune in particular following the implementation of the more extreme audit 
disclosure requirements of the Companies Act 1995. This has led to the possibility 
of a more rigorous compilation of data by the regulatory authorities. In fact, 
statistics consulted through preliminary research for this paper pointed towards an 
increasing number of Maltese companies going through such auditor changes, 
although their frequency seemed to remain relatively low, possibly due to the 
environment outlined earlier. Therefore, the need became clearer to ascertain the 
nature of the factors that were increasingly inducing such changes to examine 
whether they provoked similar concerns. More generally, such a study could 
provide some insight into the different workings of the profession in small island 
states. Indeed, this paper sets out to identify such factors, both individually and 
under their diverse economic, behavioural and other characteristics.  
 
In contrast to foreign conclusions, the results indicate that the factors that 
would induce most auditor changes are behavioural, rather than economic in 
nature and there is an evident demarcation between the attitudes of companies 
which are clients of Big 4 audit firms and those which are not. The paper is 
organized as follows. The following section reviews the relevant literature on the 
subject. The next section details the results and provides an in-depth discussion on 
the relevant findings and the final section summarises these findings and analyses 
any limitations met in conducting the study.  
 
2.  Literature review 
The nature of factors that trigger auditor changes could be behavioural, economic 
or perhaps a mixture of the two. Literature tends to find mixed evidence of the 
importance of each category of factors within the auditor-change process. Beattie 
and Fearnley (1998a,b) allege that while behavioural factors are dominant when it 
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comes to selecting an auditor, purely economic factors are the more significant 
drivers of change. 
 
Various authors contend that one economic factor, the audit fee, is the most 
frequently cited reason for changing auditors, supporting the concern that exists 
regarding price-cutting in the auditing profession (Beattie and Fearnley,1995; 
Bedingfield and Loeb,1974; Woo and Koh, 2001). Fees precipitate change more 
often when they exceed "acceptable tolerance limits". Otherwise companies find 
that it is not worth going through a costly auditor change process as a reaction to a 
slight fee increase.  
 
A major candidate of auditor changes is audit quality, which concerns the 
ability of the auditor to detect problems and breaches in the accounting system. 
Menon and Williams (1991) contend that quality serves as an important 
differentiating audit attribute and is heavily reliant on the perceived credibility that 
certain auditors bring to their engagements, based on their reputation. Audit quality 
incorporates components such as the size of the audit firm in question, its name 
brand, independence practices and level of expertise. When the management of a 
company has its incentives closely aligned with those of the owners of the 
company, there is reduced need for the attributes which differentiate one audit firm 
from another in terms of quality. This is so because agency costs are minimal and 
no extra effort needs to be taken in making management credible to potential 
investors. On the contrary, there are positive relationships between increased 
agency costs and auditor switching, with company owners always seeking the 
services of "better quality" auditors such that the monitoring of management's 
stewardship would be more effective (DeFond,1992). Indeed, auditor changes 
occur more frequently by companies employing non-Big 4 audit firms. Having more 
resources to provide a certain level of service, the larger audit firms are 
synonymous with better quality (Woo and Koh, 2001).  
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A highly sensitive issue concerns the qualification of the audit opinion. The 
belief that auditor switches are often effected to defy the main purpose of external 
audit may be unfounded (Knapp and Elikai,1988). Beattie and Fearnley (1995, 
1998a, b) found that information suppression by management is the less common 
cause of auditor changes in the UK. The instances where qualified audit opinions 
may actually trigger auditor changes can be traced to cases where the qualification 
arose due to some matter of fundamental importance. Otherwise, it is not evident 
that companies shop around for a clean audit opinion (Woo and Koh, 2001). It is 
rather evident when qualified opinions are triggered by the conservative and all-too 
stringent treatment of auditing standards provokes auditor switching by companies 
(Krishnan, 1994). Despite these views, a very comprehensive study conducted by 
Krishnan et al. (1996) tested a two-way causation hypothesis between audit 
opinion and auditor switching and found evidence that audit opinion influences 
switching while switching also influences the opinion. Their arguments are upheld 
vigorously by two separate studies (Lennox, 2000, Lennox and Pratt, 2003) which 
found that when companies receive qualified audit opinions they are more likely to 
switch auditors, with such switching further increasing the probability of getting a 
better audit opinion.  It is also becoming increasingly apparent post Enron that, as 
stated by Lennox and Pratt (2003), "companies do successfully engage in opinion 
shopping, swapping auditors to suit their narrow self-interest" (p.78). Smith (1986) 
further evidenced the successful elimination of "subject to" qualified audit reports 
by switching auditors. Successor auditor reports seem to fail to identify certain 
circumstances that could have effectively led to the qualification by the 
predecessor auditor in the first place. Obviously, the author contends that, in 
certain instances, a genuine difference of opinion could be the pertinent issue. A 
study focusing on auditor-client relationships in Malta also identified the 
phenomenon of auditor switching as being rather common on the island, with 
management tending to exercise a lot of influence on companies' owners to 
engineer an auditor change following a qualification or even the threat of one. 
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These reactions were found to be more common when the qualifications carried 
tax implications (Baldacchino,1992).  
 
Disagreements over accounting principles could effectively trigger auditor 
changes. Income-decreasing accounting choices targeted towards minimising 
litigation risk by the auditor often characterise the last year with a predecessor 
auditor, while such discretionary accruals lose importance immediately in the first 
year of appointment of the new auditor (DeFond and Subramanyam,1998). 
However, according to Whisenant and Sankaraguruswamy (2000a,b,c), accounting 
disagreements account for only a minimal percentage of client-initiated auditor 
changes. This view supports earlier evidence by Beattie and Fearnley (1998a,b).  
 
Multivariate studies have shown an association between the incumbent 
auditors' level of industry specialisation and longevity on the engagement with 
auditor changes. These auditor-related variables tend to have a net positive effect 
on clients' decision to retain their present auditor (Williams, 1988). In addition to 
such auditor-related issues, there are strong views that candidate determinants 
also include client-related variables. Johnson and Lies (1990) focus on clients' 
internal structures to support their argument. Williams (1988) acknowledges that 
when a client decides to change its financing channels, its investment portfolio or 
even its operating characteristics, it will move along the auditor's cost curve 
because the latter would then have to familiarise himself with the new environment 
of the client's business. This shift could mean a loss in the audit firm's competitive 
advantage with respect to that client, thus inducing a change in auditor. Indeed, 
factors relating to "structural changes" are major determinants of auditor changes 
(Whisenant and Sankaraguruswamy, 2000a, b, c). 
 
 A highly influential client-related variable is reputation influences. When a 
client perceives that, for some reason, he is receiving a tarnished reputation, one 
way to confront the issue would be to seek the services of a new auditor in the 
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hope that management's faith in the monitoring of financial statements would be 
restored (Williams, 1988).  
 
Other purely economic factors contribute towards auditor-change decisions. 
Companies often feel more comfortable if their auditors are approved by, and have 
a good relationship with, their bankers (Beattie and Feamley, 1998a,b). Moreover, 
when companies grow and exhibit a need for auditors who possess more technical 
competence, auditor realignments take place, often in favour of larger audit firms 
that are capable of offering a better-quality service (Beattie and Feamley,1995, 
1998a, b; Whisenant and Sankaraguruswamy, 2000a, b, c; Woo and Koh,  2001). 
 
The incidence and impact of qualitative behavioural factors have become 
increasingly deterministic in auditor-change decisions. Although the major 
determinants of auditor changes remain purely economic factors, other factors 
such as poor working relationships with the audit staff, personality clashes between 
company management and the audit staff and inaccessibility of the audit partner 
may also trigger switching moves (Addams and Davis,1994).  
 
Other factors cited related to dissatisfaction with changes in the audit 
partners and with what they regarded as lack of consideration in setting meeting 
places and schedules, with the auditors always trying to make things comfortable 
for themselves (Beattie and Feamley, 1998a, b).  
 
Beattie and Feamley (1998a,b) conducted an exhaustive study about 
auditor changes and the tendering process. Their findings impinge on the 
importance of characteristics, which are of a hybrid nature, in the auditor-client 
relationship. They found that nearly half of the reasons cited for change related to 
audit staff quality issues, with a major factor being that of excessive staff turnover 
within the audit firm they employed.  
 
Other possible contributors of change have been identified as being 
changes in the company's top management (Woo and Koh, 2001), and the use of 
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inexperienced audit staff. In addition to changes in management composition. Woo 
and Koh (2001) also identified a lower diffusion of ownership, having defined this 
as the level of common stock held by the largest single shareholder, as a major 
determinant of auditor changes. 
 
 
3.  Research methodology                                                          .                                                                         
3.1 Research instruments                                                                      .                                                                                         
The main research tool adopted was a mail questionnaire. This was divided into 
three sections. The first section sought to extract any relevant respondent 
company demographics. The second section featured a list of 27 statements, 25 of 
which put the respondents into situations that could arise independently of each 
other, in their relationship with their present auditors. Respondents were asked to 
place themselves on an attitude continuum, running from very important, fairly 
important, slightly important to not-at-all important, represented by numbers 1-4, 
respectively, according to how much they believed the particular situation would 
affect them in an eventual decision to change their auditor. The third section 
sought to establish whether any respondent companies had changed auditor and 
the reasons triggering such changes, if any. 
 
 In addition, these findings were complemented by comments received from 
15 companies that had actually filed a change in auditor with the Registrar of 
Companies at the Malta Financial Services Authority between 1998 and 2002. The 
interviewees were the first to both appear in the records made available by the 
Malta Financial Services Authority, and to accept to be interviewed. They were 
asked to give their viewpoints as to why their company had effected such a change 
in auditor.  
 
3.2 Sample selection and empirical data collection                            .                                                    
A random sample of 250 companies was selected for the purposes of this study. It 
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was categorised into three company size brackets, these being: small, defined as 
companies having 10-49 employees; medium, having 50-249 employees and 
large, having 250+ employees. This sample was extracted from the business 
registry list at the National Statistics Office, featuring all 1,562 active companies 
employing more than ten employees as at the date of the study.  
 
 The questionnaires were mailed out and the responses were duly inputted 
into a coding frame that yielded a two-way matrix of variables versus respondents. 
These results were then subjected to a statistical analysis using the SPSS 
package, version 10.0 for Windows.  
 
3.3 Response rates and participant demographics  
Valid responses from 97 companies were received by the cut-off date set, 
representing a response rate of 40 per cent.  
 
Most (55/97 or 57 per cent) of the respondent companies had Big 4 firms as 
auditors, while the rest (42/97 or 43 per cent) engaged other auditors. 
Respondents were 41/97 (42 per cent) in the 10-49 employment bracket, 19 of 
which had changed auditor; 30/97 (31 per cent) in the 50-249 employment bracket, 
eight  of which had changed auditor and 26/97 (27 per cent) in the 250 + 
employment bracket, nine of which had changed auditor. Most of the auditor-
changing respondent companies were therefore in the smallest employment 
bracket (19/36 or  53 per cent).  
 
4.  Research findings  
Table 1 presents the auditor-change factors tackled in this study, in the descending 
order of importance, according to the rating total given by respondent companies. It 
identifies factors such as behavioural, economic or other, the latter comprising a 
mixture of the two. The test statistics (p-values) obtained from the analysis with 
Chapter 4                                       Factors Contributing to Auditor Change Decisions in Malta [AUD-2]   
103 
respect to the difference in responses in relation to company sizes and type of 
auditor engaged by the surveyed companies are also presented. 
 
 The most important factors presented by the survey were both behavioural 
and possibly related. These were the deterioration of the relationship between 
client and auditor and the auditor being rarely accessible. Interestingly, these 
findings stood irrespective of company size or type of auditor.  
 
 In the interviews, some small company interviewees referred to this actual 
deterioration in the working relationship as having taken place in their case when 
their auditor was a Big 4 firm. One such director referred to being treated as a 
stranger and not even known by name.  
 "I was too small fry for them and I decided there and then to change 
             auditors and go to a non-Big 4 firm." 
  
However, clearly lack of attention was not attributable to Big 4 firms dealing with 
small companies. Another interviewee,  this  time  of  a  medium-sized  company, 
switched from  a non-Big 4 firm to a Big 4 one with the hope  of  acquiring  a  better  
accessibility with the new auditor. 
 On the other hand, the third most important factor in inducing auditor-
change decisions was an economic one. Should an auditor lack reporting 
timeliness, taking a long time to submit reports  to  clients  and  more  importantly  
to  the  regulatory authorities, this would adversely affect the relationship with   his   
client,  increasing  the  probability  of  a severance in the relationship. In this 
context it was pointed out by some interviewees that auditor timeliness was 
important particularly because of the possibility of the imposition of fines by the 
regulator. 
            The next ranked factor, which was neither purely economic nor 
behavioural, related to the use of inexperienced audit staff in the completion of an 
audit. The analysis showed a significant difference in response to this factor among  
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Table 1. Ranking of factors contributing to auditor-change decisions 
 
  
 
 
Ranking  
[Rating total]  
 
  
 Factor     
category 
 
 
                  
                       Factor 
Test 
statistics 
(p-values) 
in relation    
to: 
Company 
      size            
SS                    
  Test 
statistics 
(p-values) 
    in 
relation to: 
Type of 
Auditor 
     
1. [116] Behavioural The working relationship with the 
auditor deteriorates substantially 
 
0.331 
 
0.330 
 
1. [116] 
 
Behavioural 
 
The auditor is rarely accessible 
 
0.606 
 
0.400 
3. [126]   
Economic 
 
The auditor lacks reporting 
timeliness and often takes too 
long to submit final reports to the 
client and to the regulatory 
authorities 
 
 
 
0.735 
 
 
 
0.197 
 
4. [143] 
 
Other 
 
The auditor makes use of 
inexperienced audit staff to 
complete work on the audit 
 
 
 
0.356 
 
 
 
0.039* 
 
5. [179] 
 
Economic 
 
The company has its operations 
spread over a number of 
countries. The directors feel the 
need to have an auditor with a 
global reach in terms of good 
contacts with foreign audit firms 
that have offices in the same 
countries as the company's 
operations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.088 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.207 
 
6. [181] 
 
Economic 
 
The company grows and the 
directors feel the need to have a 
more technically competent 
auditor 
 
 
 
 
0.386 
 
 
 
 
0.078 
 
7. [186] 
 
Economic 
 
The client notices a difference in 
the conduct of the audit; the 
engagement is mostly done at 
auditor's offices and audit staff 
rarely visit client's premises 
 
 
 
 
 
0.454 
 
 
 
 
 
0.446 
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Table 1 
(Continued/ 2) 
 
 
 
Ranking  
[Rating Total] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Factor 
Category 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          Factor  
               
 
 
 
 
 
 
Test 
statistics 
(p-values) 
in relation 
to: 
Company 
Size 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Test 
statistics   
(p-values) 
in relation 
 to: 
Type of 
Auditor 
 
8. [191] 
 
 
 
9. [193]         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10. [201] 
 
Economic 
 
 
 
Economic 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Economic 
 
The client notices that the 
auditor is spending less time on  
his audit                
 
The auditor informs the client 
that he will raise the audit fee 
above the current level or above 
the level that would have been 
pre-negotiated  with the client, 
which latter increase the client 
finds acceptable 
 
The auditor, despite being the 
reasonable sort, will have to 
qualify his audit opinion. The 
client disagrees because he has 
a different opinion over various 
technical accounting matters. 
They are both right in their 
arguments 
 
 
 
 
0.901 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 0.034*   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.861 
 
 
 
0.295 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
0.029* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.772 
11. [202] 
 
 
 
 
 
12. [205] 
Economic 
 
 
 
 
 
Economic 
The client becomes aware of 
other auditors who have more 
specialized knowledge of the 
industry in which the client 
company operates 
 
The client disagrees with the 
auditor over accounting issues                                   
 
 
 
 
 
0.454 
 
 
0.641
 
 
 
 
0.442 
 
 
0.436 
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Table 1 
(Continued/3) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ranking              
[Rating total] 
 
 
 
 
12. [205] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Factor 
category 
 
 
 
 
Economic              
 
 
 
 
 
 
                  Factor 
 
 
 
 
The client disagrees over the 
audit opinion; the auditor says 
he will qualify his audit opinion; 
he will do so because he is too 
conservative and follows 
auditing standards very strictly.  
The client is aware that there are 
more reasonable auditors who 
would not qualify their opinion 
under similar circumstances 
 
 
Test 
statistics 
(p-values) 
in relation 
to: 
Company 
Size 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.087 
 
Test 
statistics 
(p-values) 
in relation 
to: 
Type of 
auditor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.509 
14. [210] Economic The client becomes aware that 
his auditor does not have a very 
good relationship with the 
client's bankers 0.122 0.758 
 
15. [213] 
 
Economic 
 
The company faces a merger 
with another company. The 
move necessitates the provision 
of audit services by a group 
auditor 
 
 
 
 
0.332 0.013* 
 
16. [217] 
 
Behavioural 
 
 
There are evident personality 
clashes between key 
management in  company and 
present auditor 0.095 0.811 
 
17.[218] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18[226]                
 
 
Economic 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Other  
 
 
The audit fee  client is charged is 
relatively low, but auditor highly 
inflates the charges on other 
non-audit services he offers the 
client, such as corporate 
financial advice 
 
The audit firm has a high 
turnover of audit staff 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.895 
 
 
0.192        
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.105 
 
 
0.362 
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Table 1 
(Continued/4) 
 
 
Ranking              
[Rating total] 
 
 
 
 
19. [228] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
19. [228] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21. [231]  
 
 
 
 
 
22.[242] 
 
 
 
 
23. [245]    
 
 
 
24.[253] 
 
 
25.[263]                                 
 
 
 
 
Factor 
category 
 
 
 
 
Other 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Economic 
 
 
 
 
 
Behavioural 
 
 
 
 
 
Economic 
 
 
 
 
Economic 
 
 
 
Economic 
 
 
 
Behavioural 
 
 
 
 
 
 Factor     
 
 
 
 
The company undergoes 
changes in senior management 
in the finance function. The 
directors are aware that the new 
management does not get on 
well with the present auditor 
 
The client is of the opinion that 
the audit fee he is currently 
charged is too high. However, 
the auditor makes it very clear 
they will not negotiate  lower fee 
 
Within the audit firm the client 
engages, there is a change in 
the audit partner who normally 
takes responsibility for the 
engagement 
 
Client feels need to have a Big 4 
audit firm because he believes 
that name is synonymous with 
better quality of reporting  
 
The client is aware that his major 
competitor company also 
engages his auditor       
 
The auditor carries out the audit 
at the end of the financial year 
and does no interim audits 
  
Audit firm client engages at 
present merges with another firm      
                    
 
 
Test 
statistics 
(p-values) 
in relation 
to: 
Company 
Size 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.091 
 
 
 
 
 
0.046* 
 
 
 
 
 
0.001* 
 
 
 
 
0.000* 
 
 
 
0.130 
 
 
 
0.069 
 
 
0.866 
 
 
 
Test 
statistics 
(p-values) 
in relation 
to: 
Type of 
Auditor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.126 
 
 
 
 
 
0.017* 
 
 
 
 
 
0.003* 
 
 
 
 
0.000* 
 
 
 
0.331 
 
 
 
0.153 
 
 
0.374 
 
 
 
Note: *Company size and/or type of auditor significantly affect the attitude towards the 
auditor-change factor concerned at p < = 0.05                                                             
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respondent companies depending on whether their auditor was a Big 4 firm or not. 
In the case of companies with Big 4 auditors, the importance awarded to this factor 
was significantly higher. 
 
Some interviewees also referred to the factor of inexperienced staff. They 
explained that this was particularly relevant in the case of Big 4 auditors because 
of the continuously higher turnover of staff such firms underwent.  One interviewee 
claimed that his company had switched from a Big 4 to a non-Big 4 firm because 
repeatedly every year completely new audit staff was assigned to his company and 
needed to be "shown the ropes".  
 
The issue of company expansion has evident consequences upon auditor 
retention by clients. The next two factors, purely economic, both related to this, 
regard the need to have an auditor with a global reach and  the need to have a 
more technically competent auditor in view of company growth. Divergent views 
between the larger companies, these being clients of Big 4 audit firms in their 
majority and the smaller companies were evident in relation to both factors.  
 
Two other quality-related issues, in addition to the third ranked factor of 
timeliness referred to earlier, were referred to by the next two ranking factors: 
where the visits by the auditor to the client companies are rare and where the client 
notices that the auditor is spending less time on the audit. 
Surprisingly, it was at this point, according to the survey, that the first fee-
related factor, that of the auditor raising the fee level above the acceptable pre-
negotiated one, was considered. The second fee-related factor – that of the auditor 
wanting to retain his current high fee – was even much lower in the ranking list 
(19th). For both factors, significant differences of company size and type of auditor 
were found. Large companies clearly gave both factors less importance than 
medium and small ones. In addition, companies with Big 4 auditors also gave 
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significantly less importance to these factors. Moreover, the only three interviewed 
companies that had changed auditor because of the fee level were all, in fact, 
small. According to one of them the Big 4 status of his auditors was not worth the 
price asked: "I decided not to pay for the sake of the name".  
 
Next in the ranking list (10th) came a factor related to the sensitive issue of 
opinion shopping. This was the eventuality when a disagreement over the audit 
opinion arises between the client and auditor where, despite the auditor being the 
reasonable type, the client fully believes that his own arguments hold and will not 
accept a qualification. Another aspect of opinion shopping was tackled through a 
related factor, this being the circumstance where a client does not accept a 
qualification owing to his belief that the auditor is not reasonable but is in fact 
conservative in applying auditing standards. No significant differences were noted 
in the responses overly given by the companies surveyed to these two factors.  
 
Following the above analysis, respondents ranked a number of economic 
factors towards the middle of the list. Apart from the factor relating to the audit fee 
level, ranking 19th, which was referred to previously, none of the other factors 
exhibited significant differences in responses according to company sizes and type 
of auditor engaged by the respondents. Such factors included situations where 
clients become aware of auditors with more specialised knowledge of the industry 
in which they operate, where disagreements over accounting issues arise and 
where the client becomes aware that the auditor and the banker do not share 
mutual respect. On an island where the bank is sought continuously and is often 
the sole provider of financial support to companies, a mid-ranking for this latter 
factor proved rather surprising. Even the behavioural factor relating to personality 
clashes between key management in the company and the auditor emerged as a 
less important contributor of auditor-change decisions in Malta.  
 
Where a client is aware that his audit fee is in actual fact being subsidised 
by other non-audit services s/he would not consider it as an overly important trigger 
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for an auditor-change process. This situation ranked among the factors towards the 
lesser rankings of the list (17th). Such was the case with the next ranked factors 
relating to the audit firm having a high turnover of audit staff and the possibility that 
new senior management in the finance function of a company does not get on well 
with the present auditor. These factors, which are neither purely behavioural nor 
economic in nature, do not seem overly important as motivators of auditor 
changes.  
 
Although not regarded by companies as an important contributor to auditor-
change decisions, the behavioural factor where the person who usually assumes 
responsibility for a client's engagement changes exhibited noticeable, statistically 
significant divergencies in responses. The larger companies attributed less 
importance to this factor than did the smaller companies. Moreover, companies 
that engage non-Big 4 audit firms viewed the issue as being of more importance in 
inducing an auditor change than did the companies that are clients of Big 4 firms. 
These findings were complemented by the comments of one interviewee of a 
medium-sized company. He stated that his company changed its auditor because 
the incumbent had severed his relationship with one audit firm and they wanted to 
retain him as their auditor. To this effect they followed him to the new firm he 
joined.  
 
Another three economic factors ranked next. Each of these factors cannot 
be regarded as an evident contributor to auditor-change decisions in Malta. 
However, there were some significant results.  
 
One such factor is the perceived reputation of the Big 4 audit firms and thus 
the importance of assuming them as auditors. The need to have a Big 4 audit firm 
triggered significantly different views between the smaller and the larger 
companies. Smaller companies believed that this need would never compel them 
to change auditor whilst only a small minority of the larger firms would not give any 
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importance to this need. Moreover, companies which are not clients of Big 4 audit 
firms awarded this factor less importance.  
 
Another factor which, however, did not exhibit statistically significant results 
regarded the instance where clients become aware that their major competitors 
also engage their auditor. A small company among those interviewed reported that 
this factor provided the main impetus for its change in auditor. The company was 
the fruit of a demerger between two companies following clashes between 
proprietors. In view of the circumstances, it was decided that they would not retain 
the previous auditor simply because they could not afford to have their major 
competitors know anything about them.  
 
A behavioural factor, directly related to the audit firm, tailed the ranking list 
The eventuality that the audit firm the client engages merges with another firm did 
not seem to affect the clients' decisions whether to retain their present auditors or 
not.  
 
5.  Discussion of findings  
Behavioural concerns in the auditor-client relationship emerged as the dominant 
forces in Malta which could effectively trigger voluntary auditor changes. 
Irrespective of the size of companies and even of the type of auditor they would be 
engaging, a deterioration in the working relationship as well as accessibility to their 
auditor are important determinants of auditor-retention decisions.  
 
Most likely, it is the fostering of a sound relationship with top company 
management which makes the major difference. Companies do not attach much 
importance to how middle management and other staff get on with the auditors. 
However, a less than stable relationship between senior management and auditors 
emerged in this study as the primary inducer of auditor changes in Malta.  
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Auditor accessibility as a primary motivator of auditor switching suggests 
that what clients expect from their auditors goes well beyond the mere rendering of 
annual attestation services. The expectation of management is for it to build a 
relationship with their auditors. The latter are expected to be responsive to queries 
without delay and to be available to provide their advice on the operations of the 
company which may concern matters apart from those related to the statutory 
audit.  
 
The emphasis attributed to these behavioural factors indicates that 
underlying statutory audit services in Malta are personal relationships that play a 
major role in affecting auditor-change decisions. This is further evidenced by the 
finding that situations like the merging of audit firms do not particularly affect client 
companies. Perhaps these do not represent real threats to personal relationships 
that have been established already.  
 
However, auditor-client relationships are still perceived somewhat in 
significantly different ways by small and large companies. Small companies tend to 
foster relationships with the auditor on a personal level. In contrast, large 
companies seem to be identifying their relationship more with the audit firm. In fact, 
small companies were found to be more prone to changing their auditors should 
the person normally assuming responsibility for the audit engagement changes. 
Therefore, their relationship seems to stand on a more "personal" level, while that 
of large companies takes on a more "corporate" form: they do not seem to view a 
personal change in the audit engagement partner as effectively jeopardising this 
all-important relationship.  
 
Unlike studies to date in other countries already referred to (e.g. UK and 
Singapore), economic factors have been found here to be secondary in 
importance. Nevertheless, irrespective of size or type of auditor engaged, particular 
importance was attached to quality-related economic concerns such as reporting 
timeliness and the frequency of visits to client premises. Such issues affect 
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companies' decisions as to whether to retain their auditors, irrespective of size or 
type of auditor engaged.  
 
However, the way two other economic factors were ranked - reputation and 
audit fees - betrayed further differences between the different types of companies. 
Large and Big 4 associated companies tend significantly more to prefer to engage 
auditors with a reputation, probably as this is perceived to enhance their own 
standing in the eyes of the business community. On the other hand, other 
companies place much more importance to the level of audit fees, and issues 
related to disagreements over such a level tend to drive them more towards 
effecting auditor changes. Therefore, large and Big 4 associated companies are 
willing to pay an image-building premium, which other companies consider to be 
unaffordably expensive.  
 
With respect to other factors leading to auditor changes, even here the large 
and Big 4 companies face a different scenario from the small ones. This is 
indicated particularly by their reaction to the possibility of facing inexperienced 
audit staff. The former, large type lead to a change in auditor. On the other hand, 
the smaller ones do not seem to face many problems in this direction. It could be 
that with small practitioners and non-Big 4 audit firms, despite having fewer 
members of staff, their staff turnover (even in Malta) is not as high and 
consequently not as disruptive as in the case of the Big 4 audit firms. Staff turnover 
definitely inconveniences client companies, with client staff having to spend more 
time to help in the introduction of the changing fieldwork. Auditors and clients might 
also be concerned about getting their practical share of quality and value for 
money. On the other hand, the concern of the smaller companies might be more 
that of maintaining a personal relationship with the auditor himself and audit staff 
turnover is probably rarely an issue.  
 
Some of the salient characteristics emerging from this study help to explain 
the higher frequency of auditor changes in small companies. The major trigger of 
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such changes could probably be traced to company growth. Changes in the 
circumstances of small company operations often lead to their expansion, thus 
triggering off the need for increased competence and expertise relating to financial 
matters. As a result the services of large audit firms may come to be preferred 
since the latter are often seen to be better equipped to handle growth and the 
ensuing specialized demands. At this point, small companies tend to seek the 
services of large audit firms since the latter possess the necessary resources to aid 
them in the pursuit of growth and to meet their more specialized demands.  
 
In addition, the importance attached to the level of fees by small companies, 
taken together with the lack of importance which they attach to having a reputable 
audit firm, also point to the likelihood of higher frequency of auditor changes in their 
case. Small firms are probably more willing to substitute a decent fee level for a 
reputable image. Finally, the one-to-one personal type of relationship which small 
companies seem to prefer is also probably playing its part in increasing their 
auditor-change frequency.  
 
6.  Summary and conclusions  
It can be concluded that while the culture of auditor changes is not so much 
ingrained within the business community in Malta, it exhibits characteristics which 
are very particular to this island state. Most definitely behavioural forces in the 
auditor-client relationship are pivotal when it comes to taking decisions regarding 
auditor retention.  
 
Behavioural concerns feature across the whole spectrum of companies in 
Malta. Nevertheless, small companies tend to view these behavioural forces as 
attributes of a one-to-one relationship with their auditors. It would be blunt to say 
that they want their auditor to become their best friend, but actually it is the 
perception that they impart. Such close-knit relationships have to be safeguarded 
for the benefit of the small company community in Malta, which constitutes most 
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companies on the island, and also have to be closely guarded and carefully 
monitored to preserve the profession's loyalty to independent issues.  
 
Economic and other factors, despite being forces of auditor changes, tend to 
assume a role also albeit being secondary in importance. Particular economic 
concerns featuring predominantly within the ambit of small companies relate to fee 
issues and to the willingness of such companies to forsake quality and reputation 
for a more affordable fee. Large companies award more importance to actual audit-
related factors when it comes to auditor-retention decisions. Therefore, they 
attribute due attention to quality levels and to the reputational aspects of their 
relationship with their auditors.  
 
Understanding such intricacies will help give new insight to the auditing 
profession on the island. By carefully monitoring the factors inducing auditor 
changes, practitioners will become more aware of deficiencies in their relationship 
with their clients and this hopefully also helps in avoiding loss of clients. Moreover, 
regulators and supervisory authorities within the Maltese financial industry may 
also better elucidate the reasons behind such changes, thereby enhancing the 
credibility of the financial sector and the standing of the island as a reputable 
financial jurisdiction.  
 
The results of this study are subject to a number of limitations. This study 
focuses primarily on the identification of factors that contribute to voluntary auditor-
change decisions. However, auditor resignations are also prevalent in Malta. The 
viewpoints of professional practitioners themselves, whilst also being of utmost 
interest, do not form part of the material in this research paper.  
 
This study is also directed towards companies which employ ten or more 
employees. A consideration of micro-sized enterprises employing fewer employees 
would have unnecessarily inflated the population under study. A realistic 
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assessment of the situation of smaller companies in Malta will probably point to an 
informal and unique relationship with the auditor, justifying a study on its own.  
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The objective of this paper is to find out and compare perceptions of the audit 
profession by jurors with those of auditors themselves in the small island-state of 
Malta. The objective is achieved by considering auditor responsibility, the reliability 
of audited financial statements and the decision usefulness of audited financial 
statements. A mail questionnaire was responded to by 56 auditors and 18 jurors, 
with the latter response being complemented by a further 100 jurors responding to 
the questionnaire when delivered by hand. The study finds substantial divergences 
in the perceptions of the two respondent groups, particularly in the areas of fraud 
detection, responsibility for the internal control structure of a company, 
maintenance of accounting records, and actual work performed by an auditor. In 
addition, a particular trend in Malta is the high regard with which both respondent 
groups held the audit profession. Limitations included the size of the sample of 
potential jurors taken when compared with the actual potential juror population of 
Malta, and the original low mail response rate from the jurors group. Given the 
increase in recent years of the number of litigation cases against auditors and the 
particular need for the profession to restore public confidence in it, it is imperative 
for auditors to become more aware of how public perceptions differ from theirs. 
 
 
 
 
Keywords : auditors, perception, Malta, auditing 
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   1. Introduction 
Given the recent collapse of large companies such as Enron and Parmalat, the 
cases of litigation against auditors are increasing. Since the general public forms 
the juror pool, the primary factor in determining the outcome of any litigation 
against the auditor is the mindset of the jurors who sit in judgment during cases 
of litigation, and represent the mindset of the general public itself. There exists 
the possibility of the existence of a divergence in perception as to the auditors' 
role, as well as differences in general attitudes towards auditing. It is therefore 
becoming increasingly important to know more about any gaps, where existent, 
so that the auditor would be in a position to better present his/her case in a court 
of law.  
 
 In a study conducted by Bates (1989) in the UK, it was found that the 
general public was not very familiar with the auditing profession. Fewer than one 
in ten claimed that they knew at least a fair amount about auditing. The results 
showed that the majority believed that an auditor was responsible for detecting 
fraud of all kinds whilst three in five held the belief that the auditor was 
responsible for actively searching for fraud. Pany (1992) conducted a similar 
study in the US to determine how jurors, representing the general public, 
perceived the audit function. From the data collected, Pany concluded that a gap 
existed. Jurors expected more from the auditor than the auditors believed they 
should provide. Such results have implications on any auditor-defendants during 
cases of litigation.  
 
 In Malta, the Maltese Companies Act 1995 (the 1995 Act) is clear as to what 
should be the end result of an audit. The auditor is responsible for drawing up a 
report, being a manifestation of his/her opinion on the financial statements of the 
company. The 1995 act specifically states (Section 179) that the report 
represents the auditors' opinion as to whether the annual accounts are in 
accordance with the relevant legislation and show a true and fair view. With 
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reference to the work to be performed when drawing up the report, the 1995 act 
requires an auditor to perform any tests, which enable him/her to determine that 
proper records have been kept. This means that the auditor is not required by 
law to go through all the data. If sufficient confidence on the accounting 
information can be obtained from a sample of the data, the auditor could take 
that sample as the basis of his/her evidence.  
 
 One should note that Section 176(1) of the Companies Act 1995 gives the 
responsibility for a company's financial statements to the directors. The board of 
directors approves and signs the financial statements to be presented at the 
annual general meeting.  
 
 From a Maltese law perspective, the role of the auditor is to draw up an 
audit report giving his/her opinion as to the truth and fairness of a company's 
financial statements, whilst going through as much evidence as he/she deems fit 
in order to have a basis for the opinion given.  
 
 The purpose of this study is to determine whether there is any divergence of 
perceptions between Maltese jurors and external auditors. This includes the 
consideration of any possible effects of Malta being an island on such 
divergences. The objectives are to find out and compare how jurors perceived 
the audit profession with what the auditors themselves perceived. This is 
achieved by considering auditor responsibility, the reliability of audited financial 
statements, and the decision usefulness of audited financial statements.  
 
  The remainder of this paper is divided into four main sections. The first 
section presents relevant literature to highlight the role and function of the 
auditor. This is made by reference to the act, International Standards on 
Auditing, as well as findings of prior research related to the study. The second 
section discusses the methodology used in the study. The results of the study 
are presented in the third section. The fourth section consists of the limitations 
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encountered during the conduct of the study and presents a conclusion and 
summary of findings. 
 
 
2.  Literature review  
2.1  The expectations gap  
Before one can determine whether there exists a difference in perception 
regarding the Maltese auditor, one should have an understanding of the 
components of the expectations gap. The expectations gap may be divided into 
two components: the requirements gap and the feasibility gap.  
 
  The requirements gap is due to a gap between the auditors' actual standard 
of performance and the performance required of them by the public. This gap 
can be further subdivided into the performance gap and the standards gap. The 
performance gap occurs due to a difference between the actual standard of 
performance and the standard of performance determined by reference to 
professional standards and statutes. The standards gap can be defined as the 
difference between the standard of performance as determined by reference to 
professional standards and statutes, and the public's required standard of 
performance.  
 
 The feasibility gap refers to the gap between the public's required standard 
of performance and various public expectations. For example, believing that 
auditors are responsible for the preparation of financial statements falls within 
the feasibility gap. 
 
The expectations gap was often seen as the result of the public not 
understanding the function and nature of auditing, as well as having 
unreasonable expectations. Educating the public, typically through the audit 
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report, became important. D.M. Nally, chairman of PricewaterhouseCoopers 
(PwC), announced in March 2003 that the firm was working to close the 
expectation gap by delivering a high-quality audit. This was to be achieved by 
auditors going beyond standards. For example, auditors should expand the 
requirements to include audit procedures to detect significant fraud. PwC aimed 
to go beyond the traditional corporate reporting model, with the aim of providing 
more access to information that was subject to audit procedures and to enhance 
the transparency and completeness of disclosures. Hatherly et al. (1991) 
examined whether an expansion of the audit report could shift the perception of 
the user. The results showed that the expanded report changed reader 
perception. Such an expanded report had a halo effect by giving a sense of well-
being that influenced other dimensions not directly addressed by the expanded 
wording of the report. Although not reducing the expectation gap per se, it was 
suggested that the auditing profession should address this issue by using 
expanded reports to dampen expectations. Schelluch (1996) found corroborative 
evidence, in that the expectation gap detected in prior research studies 
appeared to have been reduced over time by introducing the long-form audit 
report.  
 
Another point of view was that the expectation gap was considered a 
result of the time lag between new demands on the profession and actually 
adjusting to them. For example, research done by Ernst & Young in the US in 
2002 suggested that over 35 per cent of all investment decisions made by fund 
managers were made on non-financial performance factors. The public was 
requesting a wider assurance function to cover not just the financial factors, but 
the entire scorecard of an organisation. This assurance had yet to be given.  
 
2.2  The auditor's role as defined by jurors  
The Australian Educational Research Pty Ltd (2003) believed that many 
members of the public expected that: 
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 auditors should accept prime responsibility for the financial statements. 
They should "certify" financial statements; 
 a "clean" opinion guaranteed the accuracy of financial statements, and that 
auditors performed a 100 per cent check of the accounting data; and 
 auditors should give early warning about the possibility of business failure; 
and  
 audits were supposed to detect fraud. 
 
  In a study conducted in the UK by Bates (1989), it emerged that the general 
public was not very familiar with the auditing profession. Fewer than one in ten 
(10 per cent) claimed to know at least a fair amount about auditing. Two in five 
(40 per cent) had no idea what proportion of a company's financial transactions 
an auditor generally checked. A total of 27 per cent believed that auditors 
generally check over 90 per cent of a company's transactions. Three quarters 
(75 per cent) believed that it was an auditor's responsibility to detect frauds of all 
kinds and three in five (60 per cent) believed it was an auditor's responsibility to 
actively search for fraud.                                                                                     
 Hanks (1992), a senior researcher for the Consumers' Association in the 
UK, said that it was of vital importance to improve the public's understanding of 
the present role of auditors. As an example Hanks cited how small investors 
relied on the auditors' report. Such investors usually felt misapprehensive of the 
status of the report, the nature of audited financial statements, the type and 
extent of work undertaken, as well as the level of assurance provided by 
auditors. It was a common misconception of the general public to believe that an 
unqualified auditors' report implied that the figures were absolutely accurate or 
that there was no fraud and/or irregularity                                              .                         
2.3  The auditor's role as defined by professional standards               .      
International Standard on Auditing (ISA) 200 states that the objective of an audit 
of financial statements is to enable the auditor to express an opinion whether the 
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financial statements are prepared, in all material respects, in accordance with an 
identified financial reporting framework (IFAC, 2003b). The standard further 
states that although an unqualified opinion to the financial statements enhances 
the credibility of the financial statements, the public cannot assume that the 
report was anything but an opinion on the financial statements. For instance, 
from an auditor's report, one cannot deduce the future viability of the entity or 
whether management was being effective in how it conducted the affairs of the 
entity. An audit is designed to provide reasonable assurance that the financial 
statements are free of material misstatement, resulting in the auditor being 
responsible for forming and expressing an opinion on these statements. ISA 200 
gives the management of the entity responsibility for preparing and presenting 
the financial statements.  
  In respect of fraud and error, ISA 240 states that an audit conducted in 
accordance with the International Standards on Auditing is designed to provide 
reasonable assurance that the financial statements taken as a whole are free 
from material misstatement. The audit may act as a deterrent, but the auditor is 
not, and cannot, be held responsible for the prevention of fraud and error (IFAC, 
2003c). 
 
  Regarding auditor responsibilities, the Code of Ethics issued by the 
International Federation of Accountants - IFAC (2003a) holds the same view. The 
code states that the aim of an audit engagement should be to provide a high level 
of assurance that the financial statements are free from material misstatement.  
 
 Although the standards guiding the profession define the auditor's role, 
members of the profession believed that the public expected otherwise of them. 
The terms "reasonable expectation" and "material misstatements" play a large 
part in the gap between the expectations of the public and that of the auditors. 
For example, when considering fraud, detection by the auditor of material 
misstatements can be difficult or even highly unlikely. Foulds (1998) explained 
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that the current business environment made detection always more difficult. 
Commerce was becoming increasingly international with transactions spanning 
several jurisdictions. Technological change had resulted in the "paperless office". 
According to Foulds such developments had made the potential for cover-ups 
enormous. On the other hand, Foulds believed that the public still held the auditor 
responsible for finding all misstatements, irrespective of the efficiency effect of 
such a task on the audit process.  
  
 When asked whether the general public had an accurate definition of what 
the auditors' role was, James E. Copeland Jr, CEO of Deloitte & Touche, said that 
there was a vast misunderstanding and expectations gap between what was 
possible for auditors to do and what the public believed they should do (Heffes, 
2002). He asserted that it was not a question of what auditors were actually 
doing, but whether it was even possible to meet the public's expectations. He 
believed that it was not possible for auditors to meet the public's expectations. 
Copeland suggested that the business press had a responsibility to help in 
educating the public about the limitations of even a well-performed audit. Flint 
(1988) said that the public's expectation of auditors was important. The audit 
performs a social function owing to investigations and reporting on achievement 
by means of standards or criteria of accountability set by society. Flint believed 
that an auditor should interpret the meaning dynamically, and thus the 
expectation, of the audit requirement. In the same document, Lee stated that the 
role of an auditor could be determined from a mix of legally and professionally 
prescribed standards of auditor behaviour within a framework of changing public 
expectations.  
 
When defining the auditors' role, there seems to be a difference of opinion 
within the auditing profession itself. This phenomenon could be the result of a 
lack of transparency. Although audits enhance the transparency of companies to 
interested parties, the audit process and findings themselves are not transparent.  
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2.4  The effect of divergences between perceptions  
The Cohen Commission (1978) considered whether a gap existed between what 
the public expected or needed and what auditors could and should reasonably be 
expected to accomplish. The commission found that users generally had 
reasonable expectations of auditors' abilities and the assurances they could give. 
The gap was more a result of the professions' failure to react and evolve rapidly 
enough to keep pace with the changing environment. This resulted  in legislation 
trying to diminish the expectation gap. The European Commission's (EC) green 
paper (COM, 1996) arrived to the conclusion that any definition of the statutory 
audit should consider the needs and the expectations of users to the extent that 
they were reasonable, as well as the ability of the statutory auditor to respond to 
those needs and expectations. Without the existence of a common definition of the 
statutory audit in the EU, a damaging gap might be created.  
 
 The problem areas included detecting and preventing fraud and error, 
warning of business failure, guaranteeing the accuracy of the accounting content 
of verified financial statements, and judging the efficiency and adequacy of 
corporate operations and management.  
 
 Pany (1992) found that US jurors had a large expectation gap towards the 
audit profession. Owing to the jurors' importance in determining the outcome of 
any litigation against auditors, this was a worrying proposition. The presence of a 
performance gap meant that professionals needed to conform to statutory 
requirements. These standards should not create a standards gap themselves. 
The standards had to anticipate the feasible demands of society, as handed down 
in common law decisions. If jurors did not have adequate standards to act as 
guidelines, incorrect judgments would be passed. The  feasibility  gap  could 
influence the jury's decision. Society   could  be  placing  unrealistic  demands  for  
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accountability. The jury could not have the required education in auditing to 
realise that the existing professional standards were adequate from an auditor's 
point of view.  
 
 Best et al. (2001) found a similar expectations gap in Singapore. This 
phenomenon was particularly apparent when considering the level and nature of 
the auditor's responsibilities.  
 
 
3.  Research methodology  
3.1  Research instrument  
In view of the large population involved, a mailed questionnaire was considered to 
be the most appropriate research tool. The questionnaire consisted of two 
sections. The first section collected background data on the survey participant, 
mainly whether he/she had prior accounting knowledge and experience and his/her 
current occupation. This data was then used to determine any possible effect on 
juror perception. The second section contained 21 semantic differential belief 
statements. These statements helped measure three factors: 
(1) Auditor responsibility. 
(2) Reliability of audited financial statements. 
(3) Decision usefulness of financial statements. 
These three factors helped create the perception of the Maltese auditor from both 
the jurors' and auditors' points of view.  
 
 The questionnaire consisted of adjectival statements marked by seven-point 
Likert scales. Respondents had to choose a number from the scale that identified 
their level of agreement with the statement. Statements 1-10 related to auditor 
responsibility, statements 11-17 to the reliability of the audited financial statements 
and statements 18-21 related to the decision usefulness of financial statements. 
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After the 21 statements, the questionnaire provided enough space for any 
comments the survey participant could have.  
The same questionnaire was sent to both auditors and jurors. The purpose 
of this was to ensure comparability of replies.  
 
3.2  Sample selection and response rates 
The electoral register was utilised to create a random sample of 100 potential 
jurors who were mailed the questionnaire. To take into consideration the exempt 
groups, these being members of parliament, police and the armed forces, any 
person falling within the exempt categories was disregarded during the sample 
creation stage. A further 100 questionnaires were delivered by hand on two 
specific dates from City Gate, Valletta.  
 
 To maintain the same tolerance levels for the two groups' replies, a sample 
of 100 warranted Maltese auditors was chosen. The latest warrant holder list as 
provided by the Accountancy Board (n.d), the Maltese accountancy profession 
regulator, was used to obtain the addresses of a random number of auditors, either 
sole practitioners or working with an audit firm, to be able to mail them the 
questionnaire.  
 
 The two participant groups had considerably different response rates. For 
the jurors, a response rate of 18 per cent was achieved. Together with the 100 
questionnaires delivered by hand there were a total of 118 valid questionnaires. In 
the case of the auditors, the response rate was of 56 per cent.  
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4.  Results and implications  
4.1  Juror group demographics         
From the valid responses received, seven major occupational categories were 
determined. These categories are listed in Table 1. The remaining professions 
were included in the miscellaneous group so as to facilitate data analysis. The 
variety of occupations meant that respondents came from different backgrounds, 
minimising the risk of bias in respondent perceptions.  
 
 The respondents' occupational experience was spread over a range of 
years. A total of 25 per cent of respondents had been in their current occupation for 
one to five years, with the remaining 75 per cent being spread over the 6 to 10,11 
to 15 and over 16 year brackets respectively. 
 
 The years of experience within an occupation served as an indication of the 
approximate age of the respondents. The results showed that the sample was 
indicative of most age groups found within the Maltese society who might be called 
upon to serve as jurors. 
 
 When asked whether they had any accounting qualifications, 19 per cent 
said  that  they  had  either  ordinary  level,  intermediate  level,  advanced  level  or 
another higher qualification. Although imparting to their holders an introductory 
understanding of accountancy, such qualifications do not necessarily mean that 
their holders know enough about the auditor's role. 
 
 Respondents with accounting qualifications were not expected to rate 
statements in a significantly different way from participants with no accounting 
qualification. This was supported by means of cross-tabulation by utilizing the Chi-
squared test. Only when ranking the statement of whether the audited financial 
statements were useful for making decisions did qualifications have a statistically 
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significant influence on the result. Regarding accounting experience, nearly 18 per 
cent of the survey participants said that they had some sort of experience. 
 
Table 1 
      
Occupation of juror group participants     
     
Subject group  Responses received 
   
Clerk  10 
Housewife     8 
Managing director     5 
Secretary    4 
Student 
 
  8 
Teacher   4 
Technician    4 
Miscellaneous   75 
Total  118 
 
  
 Out of the 21 respondents with accounting experience, around 66 per cent 
had ten years or less experience and only a minority (29 per cent) had any formal 
accounting qualification. Owing to the low proportion of respondents with 
accounting qualifications and experience, there could have been a lack of 
understanding of the actual financial statements, thereby increasing any possible 
divergence in the perception of the Maltese auditor between jurors and auditors. 
 
4.2  Auditor group demographics  
The auditor group participants came from a variety of positions within audit firms 
and also included sole practitioners. Table 2 shows the frequency of each position. 
The sample was representative of various positions within the audit firm. Apart 
from this, nearly 20 per cent were sole practitioners. Owing to the variety in work 
positions, the perception of the Maltese auditor derived from the answers was 
representative of the Maltese auditor population. Regarding the respondents' 
experience within their current grade, nearly 60 per cent had one to five years 
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experience, 14 per cent had six to ten years, 10 per cent had 11 to 15 years, whilst 
16 per cent had over 16 years experience. The high percentage of respondents 
from the one-to-five year experience bracket probably mirrored the situation of the 
auditing profession in Malta. In recent years, a larger number of people entered the 
auditing profession than was the case in prior years. However, it was found that the 
respondent's experience in his/her current grade did not seem to have a major 
impact on his/her answer.  
 
 The participants were from a variety of educational backgrounds. These 
consisted of either a university degree, primarily bachelor of accountancy [Hons] 
(35.71 per cent) or its predecessor BA [Hons] in accountancy (17.86 per cent), 
Malta Institute of Accountants qualification (3.57 per cent) or an ACCA qualification 
(42.86 per cent). 
 
Table 2 
      
Position of auditor group participants     
     
Occupation  Responses received 
   
Audit manager  3 
Auditor  29 
Consultant  2 
Partner  8 
Sole-practitioner 
 
11 
Senior auditor 1 
Senior manager  2 
Total  56 
 
 
In view of such a variety in educational background one could consider 
negligible any potential bias within the auditors' perceptions created by the 
participants' prior educational experience.  
  
Chapter 5                                Jurors' and Self-perceptions of the Statutory Auditors in Malta [AUD-3]   
134 
 All auditors within the sample said that they had prior accounting 
experience. This experience varied along the same categories as for experience in 
their grade, with most having up to five years accounting experience. Auditors were 
clearly very well informed about the uses of the financial statements and were in a 
better position to consider the questionnaire statements from an auditing point of 
view rather than let themselves be sidetracked due to accounting issues. 
Therefore, any possible divergences with the perceptions of the juror group 
became more apparent. 
                                                                                                                      
4.3  Perceptions on auditor responsibility  
After performing the Mann-Whitney U-test to check for statistical differences 
between the respondent groups' means, it emerged that jurors and auditors had 
both similar as well as different perceptions of what constituted an auditor's 
responsibility (Table 3). 
 
4.3.1 Perception differences.  
The two respondent groups had six major differences in perceptions regarding 
auditor responsibility. The largest (p = 0) of these was that jurors perceived the 
auditor as responsible for maintaining a client's accounting records. It was 
interesting to note that jurors agreed that management  should  be  responsible  for 
producing an entity's financial statements, but that these would be drawn up from 
accounting records maintained by the same auditor who audited the financial 
statements. Auditors strongly disagreed with this statement. The Code of Ethics 
issued by the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC, 2003a) states that 
auditors have an obligation to identify potential threats to independence and take 
appropriate action to eliminate them. If the auditor maintains the accounting 
records, such a threat would have been created. Such juror perception could be 
due to the fact that, although the Code of Ethics states otherwise, some sole 
practitioners in Malta do maintain such records for their client. Owing  to  the  small 
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Table 3 
      
Auditor responsibility statements      
Auditor responsibility 
Jurors Auditors  
Mean St Dev Mean St dev p-value 
      
The auditor is responsible for 
maintaining accounting records. 4.46 2.26 1.07 0.32 0.000* 
The auditor is responsible for 
detecting all fraud 4.82 1.92 1.63 1.18 0.000* 
The auditor is not responsible for 
preventing fraud 3.64 2.09 5.61 1.95 0.000* 
The auditor is responsible for the 
security of the internal control 
structure of the company 4.14 2.06 1.84 1.52 0.000* 
The auditor is responsible for 
checking every client transaction 3.40 2.08 1.39 0.85 0.000* 
The auditor does not have a say in 
the selection of audit procedures 3.61 2.08 1.55 1.23 0.000* 
Management has responsibility for 
producing the financial statements 5.27 1.95 6.21 1.82 0.000* 
The auditor is responsible for giving 
a guarantee of the long-term 
survival of the company 3.75 1.94 1.57 1.25 0.000* 
The auditor is unbiased and 
impartial 5.62 1.55 6.29 1.26 0.002* 
The auditor performs his duties 
efficiently and effectively 5.75 1.33 6.07 1.41 0.047* 
      
Note: *Mean values significantly differ from one another at p < 0.05; Std Dev. means 
standard deviation 
 
 
size of most Maltese companies, such an arrangement is more than welcome, 
even at the expense of possibly compromising the auditor's independence. 
 
 An area with considerable differences  in  perceptions   between   the   two 
groups was that of fraud. Jurors perceived the  auditor  as  responsible  both  for 
detection as well as for prevention of fraud. Such a perception could be due to the 
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presentation and form of the actual auditor's report. This indicates that the auditor 
is reasonably sure that the accounts are free of material misstatements and show a 
true and fair view. If the auditor does not give any further indication of what a 
material misstatement involves, the reader may easily believe that the accounts 
are free from fraud. The natural conclusion would be that the auditor is responsible 
for detecting and preventing fraud. This was in fact indicated in this study. All 
jurors, apart from managing directors, perceived the auditor as having 
responsibility for preventing and detecting fraud. Managing directors, who in their 
line of work probably have to deal with auditors, knew that the auditor was not 
responsible for fraud; their replies conformed with those made by  the  auditor  
group.   The  indications  were   that the  reason for such a perception gap was 
lack of communication.  
 
Another gap (p = 0) was detected regarding the auditor's responsibility for 
the security of a company's internal control structure. Jurors perceived an auditor 
as having such a responsibility. This could be due to a possible lack of clarity when 
conveying the actual scope of an audit. Jurors believed that an auditor would go 
through a client's control structure as a normal procedure of an audit and would 
have responsibility for its security. Auditors strongly disagreed with this notion. 
They are backed by International Standard on Auditing 400: Risk Assessment and 
Internal Control (IFAC, 2003d), which states that an auditor should only be 
concerned with functions within the internal control structure relevant to the 
financial statements. The auditor would obtain an understanding of such a system 
and determine its limitations. No responsibility is placed upon the auditor by the 
standard. Within the juror group, students and managing directors did not place 
any responsibility on the auditor. In the case of students this could have been due 
to the higher probability that they had been exposed to auditing in their tertiary 
studies. Regarding the managing directors, owing to their work, they knew that 
internal controls were their responsibility and not the auditor's.  
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A considerable difference (p = 0) was found regarding the use of sampling 
and selection of audit procedures. Although jurors knew that an auditor does not 
check every client transaction and that he/she has a say in the selection of audit 
procedures, the mean had a central tendency, especially for the second statement. 
This could be an indication that respondents did not have enough knowledge on 
the issue and centred on the mid-point of the Likert scale. Jurors did not have a 
clear indication of whether or not an auditor checks every client transaction. In fact 
31 per cent believed that he/she does check every client transaction. These 
misconceptions on the actual audit could be indicative of a larger problem. The 
audit profession did not give enough indications of what work was actually 
performed. Owing to such a lack of transparency within the auditor's work, a 
difference was detected between what jurors perceived an audit involves and what 
auditors perceived themselves as doing. 
 
  4.3.2 Perception similarities                                                         
  In the  remaining four differential belief statements, although the means  of   the     
  two respondent groups were  statistically  different,  both  groups  held  the  same 
  belief. The  difference was on the strength of their belief. 
 
Jurors and auditors both agreed that the financial statements were 
management's responsibility. The Companies Act 1995 placed responsibility for the 
financial statements with the directors of a company. Owing to the highly reported 
company failures of the last few years, the general public has become more aware 
of management's responsibility for the financial statements. Linked with this was that 
neither of the groups believed that the auditor should be responsible for giving a 
guarantee of a company's long-term survival. A case in point was a recent 
insolvency of Price Club, a Maltese supermarket group. Even though the auditors 
found no problems with the audited financial statements, the company still ended up 
filing for liquidation. Similar cases may have shown the reality to the public: auditors 
do not have the capacity to provide a guarantee for a company's long-term survival.  
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Both jurors and auditors themselves had a high regard of the audit profession 
in Malta. Such a perception could have been the result of the high esteem 
professional people enjoy with the Maltese population at large. Both groups 
considered auditors unbiased and impartial. If this juror perception were compared 
with the belief that an auditor is responsible for maintaining accounting records, it 
may seem contradictory. It may be that jurors could not be aware of the actual 
definition of auditor independence or of its implications.                                                     
 
4.4  Perceptions on audited financial statements          
 The two groups' perceptions on audited financial statements provided further insight 
as to any other functions the Maltese auditor was perceived to be performing.                                                                                                                        
 
4.4.1 Audited financial statement reliability                             .                                                        
There was considerable divergence between juror and auditor perceptions regarding 
the issue of audited financial statement  reliability (Table 4). Jurors tended to give 
more reliability and accuracy to audited financial statements that a competent 
auditor would have found too difficult to achieve.                              
An example where jurors gave more accuracy and reliability to audited 
financial statements was when asked about fraud. Jurors perceived audited financial 
statements as an indication that a company was free from fraud. Auditors strongly 
disagreed with such a statement, as they felt responsible and able to find only fraud 
that causes material misstatement in the financial statements. This statistically large 
(p = 0) difference in perceptions could have been the result of a lack of 
understanding of what an auditor actually does. As previously mentioned, there was 
the impression of a lack of transparency in audit procedures that could be giving the 
public the wrong impression of what work is entailed within an audit. In fact, whilst 
jurors felt that the extent of work performed by an auditor was clearly communicated, 
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Table 4 
      
Financial statement reliability statements     
   Financial statement reliability 
Jurors Auditors  
Mean St Dev Mean St dev p-value 
      
The company is free from fraud 4.11 1.94 2.45 1.59 0.000* 
The extent of audit work performed 
is clearly communicated 5.44 1.31 3.88 1.89 0.000* 
The financial statements give a true 
and fair view 5.85 1.25 6.39 1.12 0.000* 
The auditor does not agree with 
the accounting policies used in the 
financial statements 3.25 1.76 1.71 1.3 0.000* 
The current standards of audit 
practice give a clear guidance to 
auditors 5.32 1.25 5.71 1.09 0.032 
Users can have absolute assurance 
that the financial statements 
contain no material misstatements 4.56 1.69 3.75 2.36 0.062 
The extent of assurance given by 
the auditor is clearly indicated 5.24 1.45 5.43 1.7 0.100 
      
Note: *Mean values significantly differ from one another at p < 0.05; Std Dev. means 
standard deviation 
 
                                                                                                                                  
auditors themselves considered such disclosure as inadequate. This could have 
been the result of insufficient disclosure within the auditor's report. Such findings 
were highlighted within the Cohen Commission (1978), which found several 
deficiencies within the auditor's report, especially relating to the actual work 
performed by an auditor, which often confused users of financial statements.                                               
 
Jurors and auditors had no significant difference in their responses to the next 
three reliability statements. Although the respondent groups' means were 
statistically different, the two groups had the same opinion. They both agreed that 
audited financial statements show a true and fair view. Both groups were also in 
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concurrence regarding the issue of auditor agreement with the accounting policies 
used within audited financial statements. The only difference was the strength with 
which the two groups agreed. Whilst auditors strongly disagreed that they would not 
be in agreement with the accounting policies, jurors disagreed only slightly. Again, 
this might have been the result of a lack of in-depth knowledge of what is implied 
within audited financial statements, as the replies made by the managing 
directorswere very similar to those made by the auditor group. Both groups 
considered current standards of audit practice as giving clear guidance to auditors. 
In the case of jurors, this follows their trend of having a positive attitude towards the 
audit profession as a  whole. Whenever  they were asked  a  question  directly  
related  to  the  audit  profession,  they  adopted  a positive attitude in their answer.  
                                                                                                                                        
Jurors believed that, from the audited financial statements, they could have 
absolute assurance that the financial statements contained no material 
misstatements. Auditors disagreed with this, as most commented one could have a 
reasonable, not an absolute, assurance. In fact, within the auditor's report  auditors 
would say that  from  the  work  performed   one   could   have  reasonable 
assurance that the financial statements are free from material misstatement. This 
was a difference in the perceived assurance given. This difference becomes more 
serious when comparing what participants replied as to the auditor's communication 
of the extent of assurance given. Both jurors and auditors agreed that the extent of 
assurance given was clearly communicated. Since the assurance given was 
considered as clearly communicated, the implication was that jurors believed that, 
through such communication, the auditor was saying that one could have absolute, 
not reasonable, assurance that audited financial statements contained no material 
misstatements.                                                                     .                                            
4.4.2 Decision usefulness of audited financial statements                           .                                                       
These statements had the least statistical differences.  Such an occurrence could be 
due to the public's widespread exposure to audited financial statements as 
contrasted to an auditor's report (Table 5).  A statistical difference (p = 0) was  found  
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Table 5      
Decision usefulness of financial statements     
 
Jurors Auditors  
Mean St Dev Mean St dev p-value 
      
The audited financial statements 
show that the company is well 
managed 4.93 1.61 2.91 1.50 0.000* 
The audit profession adjusts quickly 
to new demands by clients 4.50 1.62 4.18 1.54 0.233 
The audited financial statements do 
not give enough indications of the 
company's performance 3.47 1.88 3.68 1.69 0.344 
The audited financial statements 
are not useful for making decisions 3.03 1.85 3.11 1.51 0.413 
      
Note: *Mean values significantly differ from one another at p < 0.05; Std Dev. means 
standard deviation 
  
  in the perceptions towards how useful audited financial statements are when 
considering whether an entity was well managed.  Auditors strongly disagreed with 
the statements. Jurors  slightly  agreed  that  management   performance   could    
be   determined    by analysing audited financial statements. Again, this follows a 
positive trend adopted by the public. More reliance was placed on audited financial 
statements, probably as they perceived that no other indicators were available for 
use to assess management. As the financial statements showed a true and fair view 
and the public considered them free of all fraud and misstatement, it was no surprise 
that in their view the financial statements should  show that the company is well 
managed. 
 
Jurors and auditors both perceived the audit profession as adjusting quickly 
to new demands made by clients. As already highlighted, the jurors' answer to this 
statement continues their positive perception  trend  towards the Maltese auditor. 
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From the answers, the Maltese public holds the Maltese auditor in high regard even 
if in certain cases they had a wrong perception of what his/her work actually 
involves. The auditor group itself had a high regard of the Maltese audit profession 
and the work performed.   
 
Both groups agreed that audited financial statements give indications on a 
company's performance. Although some auditors commented that other indicators 
might need to be considered in order to grasp the overall picture, they still felt that 
the audited financial statements were the main indicator of performance. Linked to 
this was the perception that audited financial statements were considered useful for 
making decisions. 
 
                                                                                                                                              
5.  Limitations  
A limitation encountered was the size of the sample of potential jurors taken 
when compared to the actual potential juror population of Malta. Considering the 
valid questionnaires for both groups, with 95 per cent  confidence  interval,  one  can 
calculate the findings' maximum error as being 9 per cent for the jurors' group and 
13 per cent for the auditors' group. 
 
Another limitation was the low response rate from the jurors' group. If none of 
the questionnaires were delivered by hand and assuming the same rate, there would 
have been only between 36 and 40 valid questionnaires.                              
 
It was also noted that some statements had some central tendency within the 
replies. This could have been due to the respondents not understanding the 
statement and selecting a mid-point on the Likert scale - a phenomenon that could 
have probably been avoided by providing a "do not know" option  beyond  the  Likert  
scale.  
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6.  Summary and conclusion                                    .                                                               
Various writers found a perception gap between auditors and the general public on 
the perceived roles of the external auditor. In Malta, both jurors and auditors had 
similarities and divergences in perceptions in various areas. Starting with the 
similarities, the audit profession is held in high regard in Malta, being considered as 
performing its role efficiently and effectively in an unbiased and impartial manner. 
Current standards of audit practice were considered as giving clear guidance to 
auditors and the assurance given by the auditor in the audited financial statements 
was considered as clearly communicated. Both groups considered audited financial 
statements as showing a true and fair view, as giving an indication of company 
performance and as being useful for decision-making. Jurors and auditors also 
agreed that a company's management should be held responsible for the financial 
statements. 
 
 The differences in perceptions between the two groups related mainly to the 
auditor's responsibility for various issues, ranging from fraud, to the security of a 
company's internal control structure. A major perception gap was found in the area 
of prevention and detection of fraud and material misstatements. Jurors gave 
responsibility to the auditor in both prevention and detection of fraud in a company, 
and at the same time considered audited financial statements as giving absolute 
assurance that they contained no misstatements. There was a discrepancy in the 
perceived audit work done. Jurors perceived an auditor as responsible for 
maintaining a company's accounting records and for ensuring the security of an 
entity's internal control structure. This gap was considered the result of a lack of 
communication of the audit work performed, as further evidenced by jurors not being 
sure whether an auditor uses sampling and if the auditor or the client selected audit 
procedures. It emerged that there was not enough transparency in audit procedures. 
Although auditors knew this, .the general public was under the false impression that 
an auditor gave enough communication of the work performed. The study also       
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indicated that in Malta the audit   .profession was regarded in a very positive light 
when compared with the perception .elsewhere. Both jurors as well as auditors 
themselves held this positive view.  
 
The final discrepancy in perceptions was that jurors considered audited 
financial .statements as an indication of management performance.  
 
 
References 
Regulatory 
 
Cohen Commission (1978).     The    Commission   on    Auditors’ Responsibilities:  
Report, Conclusions, and  Recommendations.  Manuel  F. Cohen,  Chairman. 
New  York, NY: AICPA. 
European Commission (COM)  (1996). The role,  the  position    and     the   liability  
of  the statutory auditor within the European Union.  Green paper, Brussels. 
International     Federation    of      Accountants   (IFAC)   (2003a).   Handbook     of       
International     Auditing,      Assurance,      and      Ethics     Pronouncements.  
International   Federation of Accountants, New York, NY. 
International Federation of  Accountants (IFAC)   (2003b).  Objective   and  general   
general    principles    governing     an    audit     of      financial      statements.    
International  Standard  on     Auditing   200,   International      Federation     of    
Accountants, New  York, NY. 
International    Federation    of    Accountants   (IFAC)   (2003c).    The       auditor's  
responsibility    to    consider    fraud   and    error  in    an  audit   of   financial    
statements.  International     Standard     on      Auditing    240,     International 
Federation of Accountants, New York, NY. 
Chapter 5                                Jurors' and Self-perceptions of the Statutory Auditors in Malta [AUD-3]   
145 
International  Federation   of  Accountants (IFAC) (2003d). Risk  assessments  and  
internal   control.   International   Standard   on   Auditing   400,    International   
Federation  of Accountants, New York, NY. 
 
Other 
Australian   Educational    Research (2003).   Activity-based risk  evaluation  model 
 of auditing: glossary of auditing terms: 
         www.abrama.net/abrama/expect_gap_g.html [14 August 2003]. 
Bates, B. (1989).   Knowledge  and  opinions  of  audits among the   general public.
  Report  by Market  and  Opinion  Research   International    Ltd  (MORI)  on  
 behalf  of  KPMG Peat Marwick McLintock, London. 
Best, P.J., Buckby, S. and Tan, C., (2001). Evidence  of  the audit  expectation gap  
in Singapore. Managerial Auditing Journal, 16(3): 134-144. 
Flint, D. (1988).      Philosophy  principles  of auditing:  an   introduction.  Macmillan 
Education. 
Foulds, M. (1998).  Fraud and the role of the auditors.  Accounting   and  Business: 
38-40. 
Hanks, J., (1992).  The   expectations   gap   –   the    consumer    angle.   Journal  
of Accountancy, February: 33. 
Hatherly, D.,  Innes,  J. and  Brown, T., 1991.    The    expanded    audit    report -  
An empirical investigation.  Accounting   and   Business  Research, 21(84): 
311-319. 
Heffes, E.M. (2002). The future   of  corporate   reporting: from  the  top.  (Financial 
Reporting). Financial Executive, 18(9): 54-57. 
Pany, K. (1992). Expectations  of  the  audit   function. The  CPA  Journal: LXIII (8): 
: 58-9. 
Schelluch, P., 1996.  Long-form  audit  report  messages:  further   implications   for  
 the audit expectation gap. Accounting Research Journal, 9(1) :  48-55. 
 
 
Chapter 5                                Jurors' and Self-perceptions of the Statutory Auditors in Malta [AUD-3]   
146 
Further reading 
Accountancy Board (n.d). Code   of  Ethics  for  Accountants,  Ministry   of Finance, 
Valletta. 
Anderson,   J.C., Jennings,   M.M.,Lowe,   D.J.    and    Reckers,   P.M. (1997). The    
The  mitigation  of  hindsight  bias  in  judges'  evaluation of auditor decisions. 
 Auditing A Journal of Practice and Theory,  16(2): 20. 
Audit  Practices  Board (1991).   Proposals   for    an   expanded   auditors'   report. 
Accountancy, November: 125-7. 
Companies Act - Malta, 1995. Chapter 386  of the Laws of Malta. 
Dewing, I.P. (2001).  Bridging the expectations gap. Accountancy, July: 9 8. 
Dewing, I.P. (2002).    UK    fund   managers,  audit   regulation  and      the      new  
accountancy  foundation:  towards a narrowing   of   the   audit    expectations 
gap?  Managerial Auditing Journal, 17(9): 537-45. 
Ernst & Young (2002). The  role  of  auditors.    Professional  Banker,    September: 
 www.icfai.org/icpe/study@icfai/octoberl/9_oct.htm [14 August 2003]. 
Ezzell, W.F. (2002).  AICPA      chair     tells    how       to       restore      profession.    
SmartPros Editorial Staff:  
 www.accounting.smartpros.com/x6816.xml [5 September 2003]. 
Frank, K.E. (2001).  The  expectations   gap:   perceptual     differences     between 
auditors. jurors  and  students.  Managerial Auditing Journal, 16 (3): 145-9. 
Frank, K.E., Hanson, R.K., Lowe, D.J.  and  Smith, J.K. (2001). CPA's  perceptions     
of   the   emerging   multidisciplinary   accounting/legal   practice.   Accounting 
Horizons. 15(1), pp.35-48. 
Goodman, L. (2002).   International     research    implications    for    academicians   
and standard setters ongoing   concern reporting:  evidence  from  the  United  
States:  
  www. pbfea2002.ntu.edu.sg/papers/6078.pdf [5 August 2003]. 
Hrdlicka, G. (2002).  Survey:  damaged    perception    of    accounting    profession   
not likely to change. SmartPros Editorial Staff: 
     www.accounting.smartpros.com/x36059.xml  [15 September 2003]. 
Chapter 5                                Jurors' and Self-perceptions of the Statutory Auditors in Malta [AUD-3]   
147 
International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) (2003).    The  auditor's  report    on      
financial     statements.      International      Standard     on      Auditing     700,  
International  Federation  of Accountants, New York, NY. 
Jenkins, G. (1999). The auditor  as   an   advocate  for    the    clients:   perceptions   
of  the auditor-client relationship.  Journal of   Applied    Business    Research,  
15 (2): 73-8. 
Johnson, E.N., Jordan Lowe, D.  and Reckers, P.M. (2000).     A      new    culture? 
Evidence       of  support  for  diversity   in   public   accounting    performance 
evaluation judgments.    In    Advances    in    Behavioural   Research:  13-35.   
Emerald    Group   Publishing Limited.  
Lawson, G. (2002).  Caveat    auditor:    the    rise     of      accountants'       liability.   
Centre  for  Legal Policy: 
 www.manhattan-institute.org/html/cjm_16.html [14 September 2003]. 
Loft, A. (2000).  Expectations  gap: 
www.auditexpectationsgap.ntu.edu.sg/papers/6200.pdf [16 August 2003]. 
Lowe, D.J. and Reckers, P.M. (1994).The  effects   of    hindsight   bias  on    jurors' 
evaluations of auditor decisions. Decision Sciences, 25(3): 401-426. 
Market   and   Opinion   Research  International  (MORI)  (2003).  Stakeholders' 
views  on  the future of auditing: 
 www.mori.com/pubinfo/mac-stakeholders-views.shtml [16 August 2003]. 
Nally, D.M. (2003).      PwC   poised   to     close     profession's     expectation     
gap.  SmartPros Editorial Staff:  
 www.accounting.smartpros.com/x37474.xml [10 September 2003]. 
Porter, B. (2000).  Principles  of  External   Auditing.   4th   ed.,  John   Wiley  &  
Sons,  London. 
Power, M. (2001).   The    Audit    Society:    Rituals    of    Verification.     4th    ed.,   
Oxford University Press,  Oxford. 
Strawser, R.H. (2001).      The   New    Auditor's     Report:  Will    it     Close      the  
Expectations   Gap    in     Communications?     Texas      A&M       University,  
College Station, TX. 
Chapter 5                                Jurors' and Self-perceptions of the Statutory Auditors in Malta [AUD-3]   
148 
Tabone, N.  and Baldacchino,  P.J. (2003). The statutory audit  of  owner-managed   
companies  in  Malta.  Managerial Auditing Journal,  18(5): 387-398. 
Thorpe, J. (2003), The role of auditors: 
www.icfai.org/icpe/study"icfai/octoberl/9_oct.html [6 October 2003]. 
Zelin, A. (2003).  Sampling  and  Tolerances.    Market    and    Opinion    Research      
International, London. 
Chapter 6                                                                                    Qualified Audit Opinions in Malta [AUD-4]   
149 
CHAPTER 6 
 
 
Qualified Audit Opinions in Malta 
                                                   [AUD-4] 
 
 Farrugia, K.J1 and Baldacchino, P.J.1 
 
 
Managerial Auditing Journal 
  
 
Vol. 20, Issue 8, 2005, pp. 823-843 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1Department of Accountancy, Faculty of Economics, Management and 
Accountancy, University of Malta. 
 
Chapter 6                                                                                    Qualified Audit Opinions in Malta [AUD-4]   
150 
Qualified Audit Opinions in Malta 
Farrugia, K.J. and Baldacchino, P.J. 
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This paper has the objective of identifying the different types of qualifications in 
auditor's reports of companies in Malta, the extent of multiple and repeated 
qualifications in such reports and any significant relationships between such main 
types of qualifications and firm-specific variables. The study in this small 
Mediterranean island is designed to investigate the auditor's reports of 419 
companies in the period 1997/2000. This is also complemented by an analysis of 
12 interviews held with audit partners in different practices.  Results show that 19.9 
per cent of sampled companies had a qualified auditor's report. The most common 
type of qualification was that of limitation-on-scope found in small companies and 
issued by non-Big Four audit firms. Small companies were also prone to going 
concern qualifications in view of their more common net liability situations. 
Disagreement-with-management qualifications were found to be more likely in 
larger companies and to be mostly issued by Big Four audit firms. The 
methodology adopted by the study may also be used in similar future studies in 
other small states and further research could possibly be undertaken on the 
motivation behind the issuance of such qualifications. The study concludes that 
Maltese companies, which are as yet all required to be audited irrespective of size, 
have an apparently high rate of audit qualifications and also that the auditor's 
reports of non-Big Four audit firms are often deficient or even incompatible with the 
wording of the International Standards on Auditing.  
 
Keywords: Malta, audit reports, auditing standards  
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1.  Introduction  
As is the case in many other countries, the Maltese external auditor is required by 
company law to examine the financial statements of companies and to express an 
opinion thereon, whether they are prepared in all material respects according to an 
identified financial reporting framework. In compliance with the Maltese Companies 
Act enacted in 1995, such a framework is based on the International Financial 
Reporting Standards issued by the International Accounting Standards Board and 
the auditor's opinion is drawn up in accordance with the International Standards on 
Auditing issued by the International Federation of Accountants. The Act imposes 
the filing of the auditor's opinion with the Registry of Companies together with the 
respective financial statements for companies registered under this Act, 
independent of their size and whether public or private. The auditor's opinion is 
expressed in an auditor's report and is normally in a brief and standard form. An 
opinion is issued without a modification when the auditor has sufficient evidence to 
support the disclosures and amounts in the financial statements. Otherwise, a 
modified audit report is issued. Modifications may be of two types. The first type, 
not the subject of this paper, relates to matters not affecting the auditor's opinion 
and requires the inclusion of an emphasis-of-matter paragraph. The second type 
concerns matters which do affect the auditor's opinion. 
 
The rest of this paper relates to the latter type of modification. It was only 
with the coming into force of the Maltese Companies Act that all locally registered 
companies were obliged to file their financial statements with the Registry of 
Companies. In addition, such research could easily be undertaken following the 
enactment of this Act since access to auditors' reports in the financial statements of 
locally registered companies became available electronically. This type of study 
has identified the main types of qualified audit opinions issued by Maltese auditors 
between 1997 and 2000 and the extent of multiple and repeated qualifications 
during the same period. It will also examine any significant relationships between 
such main types of qualifications obtained and firm-specific variables consisting of 
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the type of company and industry, the net asset value, the size of the company and 
its auditor, and the company's issued share capital.  
 
The paper is organised into four main sections. The first summarises the 
relevant literature. The second section discusses the methodology used in the 
study. The third section then presents the results and implications of the study. The 
final section summarises the findings and the limitations of the study.  
 
2.  Literature review  
International Standard on Auditing or ISA 700 (International Federation of 
Accountants or IF AC, 2001) gives three categories of matters that affect an 
auditor's opinion. The first category is the qualified opinion, which has two generic 
grounds for qualification, one being circumstances leading to a limitation on the 
scope of the auditor's work and the other being circumstances leading to 
disagreement-with-management. In both cases, the auditor's opinion states that 
the financial statements give a true and fair view of the company's situation, except 
for the matter/s leading to the qualification. The second category is the disclaimer 
of opinion, which arises when the effects of the limitation are so material and 
pervasive to the financial statements that, as a whole, they could be misleading. 
The third category is the adverse opinion expressed on matters in financial 
statements which are so material and pervasive that the auditor concludes that 
they are seriously misleading.  
 
The same standard also specifies that a material matter regarding a going 
concern problem needs to be disclosed in an emphasis-of-matter paragraph. In 
addition, ISA 570 (IFAC, 1999) deals with the reporting of going concern issues, 
and lists three instances in which an auditor is to express a qualification. The first 
instance relates to financial statements not including adequate disclosure about a 
going concern problem. In such a case, the auditor's report is to be qualified, 
preferably including a reference to the material uncertainty casting doubt on the 
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company's going concern. The second instance is where, in the auditor's 
judgement, the company cannot continue as a going concern and yet the financial 
statements have been prepared on the basis that it can. Here, an adverse opinion 
is to be expressed in the auditor's report. The final instance refers to a limitation-
on-scope qualification where management is unwilling to make or extend its 
assessment of the entity's ability to continue as a going concern. 
  
It is to be noted that up to the coming into force of the Maltese Companies 
Act 1995, most auditors drafted their detailed audit report wording in line with UK 
auditing practices. Research undertaken by Hopkins (1995) examined a sample of 
1,000 auditor's reports in the UK for qualifications in December 1983 and again in 
December 1994. He found that the qualification rate had gone down from 34.8 to 
3.8 per cent during the period. Yet, such a decrease was mostly related to both the 
abolishment between the two dates of the small company audit qualification and to 
the exclusion of small companies' opinion from the 1994 sample following their 
exemption from the annual statutory audit requirement. Another divergence 
between the two dates was the marked reduction in the need for a qualification due 
to disagreement with management. This indicated more management compliance 
with the UK auditing standards over the years. There was also a shift in reporting 
an audit report modification due to a going concern uncertainty in the intervening 
period, since fundamental uncertainty ceased to be a matter of qualification, and 
auditors started disclosing going concern uncertainties faced by their clients by 
way of an emphasis-of-matter paragraph. Another indication of the low recent rate 
of qualifications in auditor's reports in the UK was illustrated by- Company 
Reporting (2001). This revealed that less than 1 percent of the 392 companies 
which were listed in its database and which published their financial statements 
during the period April 2000-2001 had an audit report qualification. This could be 
contrasted with earlier findings in the UK: Firth (1978) had found that 247 out of a 
total of 3,000 (8 per cent) stock exchange quoted companies in the UK had a 
qualification between 1974 and 1975. Clearly, fewer qualifications are being issued 
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in the UK in recent years. The UK journal the Audit Report (2002a, b, c, d,and e) 
attributed this to two main factors. The first was the beneficial impact of SAS 600 
(The Auditing Practices Board, 1993) and its later additions, which elaborated more 
on the circumstances leading to a qualification and how the auditor's report was to 
be worded in such circumstances. The second reason was the movement towards 
audit exemption for more companies which has already been referred to above. It 
was also found that limitation-on-scope qualifications were still prevalent in the UK 
during 2002 and a number of these were either deficient, issued without sufficient 
clarity or grounds for qualification or even not in accordance with SAS 600. In fact, 
a small number were still modelled on the old UK standards (CCAB, 1980), such 
as using the "subject to" verdict. Finally, the journal referred to deficiencies in the 
use of the going concern qualification. This included a lack of clarity in wording this 
qualification, the unnecessary inclusion of the qualification and its confusion with 
the limitation-on-scope one. 
  
Various studies on the impact of qualified opinions have been carried out in 
a number of other countries. However, most of these studies limited their 
population to qualifications found in listed companies only. In France, between 
1986 and 1995, Soltani (2000) identified 543 auditor's reports of companies (6.4 
per cent) containing a qualification, mostly related to disagreement on non-
conformity with accounting principles and on the calculation of provisions and also 
to scope limitations, respectively. Similar findings were reported in Australia where 
Ball et al. (1979) found a number of qualifications for reasons that included 
disagreement on depreciation on buildings, valuation of shares and other assets 
and provisions and also limitation-on-scope qualifications. Additionally, in Australia, 
Wines (1994) looked at 100 auditor's reports for the years 1980-1989 and came up 
with an average qualification rate of around 22.8 per cent. Furthermore, in the US, 
research by Butler et al. (2004) found that since the introduction of SAS 58 
(American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1988) in the US in 1988, the 
average qualification rate had decreased from 12.9 per cent between 1980 and 
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1987 to 0.65 per cent between 1988 and 1999, but there was also a marked 
increase in unqualified opinions including an emphasis-of-matter paragraph in the 
auditor's report. In Singapore, Chan and Walter (1996) found that between 1973 
and 1985, a company  listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange had a 9 per cent 
probability of receiving a qualification with the most common circumstances leading 
to a qualification being asset and liability valuation, going concern and non-
compliance with accounting standards. 
  
A number of studies already referred to also dealt with multiple and 
repeated qualifications. For example, Ball et al. (1979) found 15.4 per cent of 
qualified auditor's reports with multiple qualifications and 13.8 per cent of such 
reports were repeated for two subsequent years, and 0.9 per cent of them also 
repeated for three subsequent years. Yet in France (Soltani, 2000), the figures for 
repeated qualifications were considerably higher with 51.9 per cent repeated for 
two subsequent years and  20.4 per cent repeated for more than two subsequent 
years. In addition, when the 543 companies were categorised into the types of 
qualifications obtained, the highest percentage (26.5 per cent) had a multiple 
qualification in their auditor's report. In Singapore, Chan and Walter (1996) found 
that 62.3 per cent of the auditor's reports between 1973 and 1985 were repeated 
and also that out of first time qualified auditor's reports, 5.8 per cent had a multiple 
qualification. In the UK, Firth (1978) observed that once a firm received a 
qualification for two consecutive years, there was a fair chance that the audit report 
would be qualified the year after and this was proved by his findings where 70 per 
cent of firms having a qualified auditor's report between 1972 and 1974, again 
received a qualification for a third time in the period 1974-1975. 
  
In Malta, Mugliette (1987) found 13 qualified auditor's reports out of a 
sample of 100 private non-exempt companies during 1985. Qualifications included 
the small company qualification, followed by limitation-on-scope qualifications due 
to restricted internal control procedures or an inadequate system over stock control 
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and recording or even uncertainty on financial statement items such as debtor's 
values, investments and current liabilities. Disagreement-with-management 
qualifications were quite rare. Baldacchino (1992) interviewed 20 managers and 20 
auditors and found that the small company qualification was still highly prevalent. 
Since this qualification was not specific regarding the issues involved, it was 
considered to have little if any practical effect and consequently management was 
much less sensitive to it than to qualifications referring to such specific control 
weaknesses.  
 
Given the apparent need for qualifications in small companies in Malta, one 
may argue for the exemption of such companies from the statutory audit 
requirement, as has been done earlier in several other countries. Yet, Tabone and 
Baldacchino (2003) confirmed the perceived importance of the small company 
audit to outside third parties and its deterrent value on management and staff. If 
removed, the small company audit would therefore need replacement by an 
appropriate alternative.  
 
With respect to the firm-specific variable of whether the company was small 
or not and its relationship to qualifications, Keasey et al. (1988) examined 180 
small companies from the UK Companies House for the three years 1980-1982 
and found that a total of 114 auditor's reports (21 per cent) incurred the small 
company qualification. Most of these auditor's reports belonged to companies 
which were audited by a large audit practice, had a secured loan, declining 
earnings, large audit lags and also had few non-director shareholdings. 
Furthermore, once the auditor expressed such a qualification, it would be more 
likely that this would appear again in the following year's auditor's report. A UK 
study was carried out by Abulizz et al. (1990) on a sample of 542 companies which 
had qualified audit opinions between 1978/1979 and 1981/1982 and of which 52.9 
per cent were small. The study found that in total, large and medium companies 
received proportionately more qualifications than small ones. Small companies 
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were more prone to receive adverse opinions, disclaimer of opinions and going 
concern qualifications. Medium-sized companies incurred disagreement-with-
management qualifications on facts, amounts and the level of disclosure in 
financial statements, while large companies tended to incur qualifications on 
disagreement as to valuations in financial statements and non-audit of a 
subsidiary. This was contrasted with findings in other studies. For example, Warren 
(1975, 1980) and Chow and Rice (1982) found that, among listed companies, the 
larger ones reported fewer qualifications than those of a smaller size. 
  
With respect to the firm-specific variable of size of audit firm as it relates to 
qualifications, research in the US research by Butler et al (2004) found that 
companies with a Big Five audit firm as auditor had a higher frequency of receiving 
an unqualified audit opinion. Abulizz et al. (1990) found concurring results that Big 
Eight audit firms were more likely to issue serious qualifications while other audit 
firms qualified on the less serious matters. Moreover, in this regard, the Audit 
Report (2002a) commented that auditor's reports compiled by the larger audit firms 
tended to be less faulty since they afforded a technical department which gave 
advice on the ongoing changes in audit reporting. On the other hand, smaller 
practices often paid less attention to the detail and explanations of qualifications in 
their auditor's report and even though the standardised recommended wording had 
been changed, they tended to persist in copying a similar auditor's report as had 
been issued the year before.  
 
3.  Methodology  
For the purpose of this study, companies in Malta were classified in the same 
manner as in the Maltese Registry of Companies, i.e. private non-exempt, private 
exempt, international trading non-exempt and international trading exempt [Note 1]. 
International trading companies are normal trading companies except that they are 
precluded from trading in Malta. There were 9,776 companies active at 1 January 
1997, the beginning of the four-year period under study. A sample of 565 
Chapter 6                                                                                    Qualified Audit Opinions in Malta [AUD-4]   
158 
companies was selected using the random sampling technique; these consisted of 
3 public, 121 private, 385 private exempt, 36 international trading non-exempt and 
20 international trading exempt companies. Results obtained from this sample can 
be inferred onto the whole population at a percentage error rate of 3.8 per cent. Of 
these, 146 were not considered further because they either did not file any financial 
statements during the four-year period (86), or did not file financial statements for 
more than two years (60), bringing down the number of companies actually taken 
into account to 419 companies. Out of these, 124 companies were found with at 
least one qualification during the four years. Information with respect to companies 
with a qualification and relating to the required firm-specific variables already 
referred to was collected manually. It is to be noted that the type of industry 
variable is based in accordance with the statistical classification of economic 
activities required by the European Union [Note 2]. Another variable was the size of 
the company, which categorized all companies in the sample as either small or 
non-small. In line with the Maltese Companies Act (Section 185), a company was 
classified as "small" if balance sheet total is less than Lml.l million (approx. Euro 
2.69 million), turnover less than Lm200,000 (approx. Euro 490,000) and the 
average number of employees during the accounting period was not more than 50. 
The information was then statistically analysed through the data package, BMDP 
Release 7. 
  
The above findings were complemented by an additional 12 semi-structured 
interviews with Maltese audit partners, four out of each of the Big Four audit firms, 
other audit firms and sole practitioners. All Big Four audit firms had clients in the 
sample company population with a qualified auditor's report. The other eight 
interviewees were selected out of both those having clients found featuring as 
qualified in the companies sampled for study (two other audit firms and two sole 
practitioners), and out of others not having such clients (two other audit firms and 
two sole practitioners), the latter being selected randomly from the Malta Business 
Directory  (Debono, 2002). 
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A number of questions on the issues investigated in this paper were 
compiled and asked to the 12 interviewees (Appendix). The interview also included 
a case study (Figure 3) seeking to find out how the respondents would draft an 
auditor's report of a small company with a lack of internal controls and proper 
records. Respondent replies are analysed in the following section together with the 
analysis of the qualified auditor's reports already referred to above. 
 
 
4.  Results and implications  
4.1  Types of qualifications  
Audit opinions over the four-year period 1997/2000 of the 419 companies making 
up the sample population are shown in Figure 1. It is noted that a minority 
averaging 11.9 per cent of the audit opinions were classified as neither qualified 
nor unqualified, since the financial statements of these companies were either not 
filed for up to two financial years (6.8 per cent) or consisted of an emphasis-of-
matter paragraph (5.1 per cent). Lack of filing was particularly noticeable in 1997, 
since it was the first year in which every company, independent of size, had to file 
the statutory annual financial statements. Out of 1,676 auditor's reports for the 
period, 1,143 (68.2 per cent) were unqualified with the remaining 333 (19.9 per 
cent) having a qualification. 
 
Further analysis by year and type of company of the average qualification 
rate for the period is summarised in Table 1. It can be seen that most qualifications 
relate to private exempt companies and international trading ones. Public 
companies were omitted from further study since their  auditor's  reports  contained  
 
 
Chapter 6                                                                                    Qualified Audit Opinions in Malta [AUD-4]   
160 
 
                                                                                                                              
no qualified opinions. Additionally, it may be noted from Table 1 that no material 
fluctuations in audit report qualifications occurred from year to year with the 
exception of an increase of 20 qualified opinions from 1997 to 1998 in the private-
exempt company category.                                                                                        
 
 In the interviews complementing the above findings, respondents stated 
that for the periods under review, they had issued a qualified auditor's report to a 
number of their clients. However, their estimates of the average qualification rates 
fluctuated highly between those given by respondents in Big Four audit firms who 
gave the average rate as 5 per cent and those in other audit firms and sole 
practitioners who both gave an average rate of around 20 per cent. Some of the 
latter also added that the probable reason for their high rate of qualification was 
that the majority of their clients were private exempt companies. 
 
The 333 qualified audit reports referred to earlier belonged to 124 different 
companies. Interestingly, 19 of these companies (15.3 per cent) had changed their 
auditor up to the end of the period and most (17/19) of those that changed were 
private-exempt companies. However, no  association  could  be  noted  between                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
change in auditor and removal of qualification. In fact, it was noted that only one of 
these companies which changed their auditor obtained a clean auditor's report in 
the first subsequent report issued by the new auditor. On the contrary, five of these 
companies obtained their qualification only after changing to a new auditor. 
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                   Figure 1: Audit opinions from the sample population 
 
 
Table 1   
 1997 – 2000 qualified audit reports by year and by type of company   
Type of company 
Total number 
of companies 
sampled 
Companies with qualified opinion 
for the years 
Four-year 
average 
number of 
qualifications 
Average four-year 
qualification rate 
(percentage) 1997 1998 1999 2000 
        
Private exempt 289 56 76 76 68 69.0 23.9 
ITC exempt 15 3 2 3 3 2.8 18.3 
ITC non- exempt 29 2 4 4 5 3.8 12.9 
Private non-exempt 83 9 8 6 8 7.8 9.3 
Public 3 0 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 
Total per year 419 70 90 89 84 83.3 19.9 
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 Figure 2 segregates qualified auditor's opinions found during the period into 
four of the different types of qualifications as referred to by ISA 700 namely: 
limitation on scope, going concern, disagreement with management and disclaimer 
of opinion. The adverse  opinion type was omitted as no resort to it was made. One 
notes here that the numbers shown in Figure 2 refer to qualifications for the period 
- a total of 386 for the four years and not to the number of qualified auditor's 
reports already given as 333. The difference consists in 53 other qualifications 
found in the auditor's report containing multiple qualifications. It can be immediately 
seen that limitation-on-scope qualifications outnumbered the other types of 
qualifications taken together  and  even  showed  an  increase  over  the   four-year  
 
                           Figure 2: 1997-2000 qualified  opinion types                              
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period. The different types, together with the extent of repeated and multiple 
qualifications will now be further analysed.            
                                                                                                                                                
4.2  Limitation-on-scope qualifications 
As one may compute from Figure 2 panel B, out of a total of 386 qualifications for 
1997/2000, 253 (65.5 per cent) were due to limitations on the scope of the work of 
the auditor. Such qualifications were mostly found on their own (202/253) but there 
were instances (51/253) where they formed part of multiple qualifications. As to the 
latter, there were 19 multiple qualifications due to limitations-on-scope faced by the 
auditor in more than one area, while the remaining limitation-on-scope 
qualifications were found together with some other type of qualification (18 with 
going concern and 14 with disagreement-with-management). Table 2 analyses the 
253 qualifications into four groups being, small company qualifications, non-
specific limitations, specific limitations and other. 
  
 One notices that the most frequent limitation-on-scope qualification was the 
small company one, still modelled on the Type Six UK original one (CCAB, 1980), 
despite that the latter was abolished by the Audit Practices Committee way back in 
1989. Understandably, this qualification was prevalent in private and international 
trading exempt companies, most of which are also probably classified as small. 
The next most common qualification was the non-specific limitation on scope. 
Local auditors issued such a qualification in those cases where they had no 
practical audit techniques to enable them to issue a clean opinion, but still failed 
either to mention the specific area/s which could not be so verified or to quantify 
the effect of such a qualification on the financial statements. This type of limitation-
on-scope qualification with a generic wording featured mostly in private companies, 
both exempt and non-exempt. As is also the case with the previously mentioned 
Type Six qualification, this was still being issued in breach of the requirement of 
ISA 700 that, in the case of an audit opinion other than unqualified, the reasons 
leading to a qualification are to be mentioned in the auditor's report and that where  
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Table 2 
1997 – 2000 number of audit reports limitation-on-scope qualifications  
Year 
Small 
company 
qualification 
Non-specific 
limitation 
Specific 
limitation Other 
Total  
number of 
qualifications 
      
1997 14 11 14 6 45 
1998 29 16 14 5 64 
1999 25 21 21 7 74 
2000 18 25 20 7 70 
Total 86 73 69 25 253 
Group percentage of four year total 34.0 28.9 27.3 9.8  
 
Note: Total number of companies samples was 419 for each of the four years 
                                                                                                                       
 
possible the effects on financial statements of non-compliance with IFRS's are to 
be quantified. Another limitation-on-scope qualification was the specific one, where 
auditors were unable to carry out the desired auditing procedures mainly owing to 
deficiencies in the internal control system, lack of proper accounting for cash sales, 
non-attendance for stock-take and lack of confirmations of other balance sheet 
items such as debtors and allocation of costs to contacts. Qualifications of this type 
were generally found in international trading companies, where they occurred 
because the auditor could not verify material balances of branches outside the 
country which directly affected the financial statements. Other types of limitation-
on-scope qualifications were few and related to lack of proper books of accounts 
and opening balances limitations. 
         
 In the interviews, most of the respondents (10/12) stated that the major type 
of qualification given to their clients was limitation on scope. The circumstances 
leading to such a qualification were similar to those already referred to above, 
namely, the small size of the companies they audited. Small size rendered 
impracticable any reliance on the internal control system and verification could only 
be performed through detailed tests. Problems encountered while conducting such 
tests were often related to the sales figures since most of the transactions were on 
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a cash basis. This resulted in an unsatisfactory audit trail. Similarly, auditors found 
it difficult to verify the amounts due by their clients and in a number of companies 
this often led to qualification. In some cases, a limitation-on-scope situation arose 
where, despite the stock figure being material, management did not perform the 
yearly stock-take. 
  
Interviewees were also presented with a case study involving a small 
company as shown in Figure 3. In this company, the auditor could not perform all 
audit procedures owing to various deficiencies in the internal control and 
accounting systems. They were asked about the type of opinion which they would 
issue in such a case. Big Four audit firms qualified such a case study with either a 
specific limitation-on-scope qualification or with an outright disclaimer of opinion. 
On the other hand other audit firms were split between the non-specific limitation-
on-scope qualifications and the Type Six ones, while most sole practitioners 
selected the Type Six qualifications.  
 
4.3  Going concern qualifications                                                                        .                                                                            
Figure 2 panel B, shows that  this was the next most issued type of qualification, 
making up 18.7 per cent of total qualifications during the four-year period. Out of 
the 72 companies with a going concern qualification in their auditor's report, 52 had 
this qualification on its own, while the remaining 20 had a multiple qualification (18 
with a limitation-on-scope and two with disagreement-with-management 
qualification). As already seen, ISA 570 lists the circumstances for issuing qualified 
or modified auditor's reports owing to going concern uncertainties, and 
recommends the wording to be used by the auditor in these instances. Yet, as 
shown in Table 3, only 4.2 per cent of the qualifications complied with this ISA. 
Those qualifications which did not comply with this ISA are categorised in the table 
either as still in accordance with an old UK Model (CCAB, 1985) or as being 
qualified despite having an emphasis-of-matter situation or ambiguous wording. 
 
Chapter 6                                                                                    Qualified Audit Opinions in Malta [AUD-4]   
166 
One of your clients is a relatively small-sized importing company, generating 
annual turnover of around Lm 100,000 (approx. Euro .245,000), employing 
two individuals and with the owner-manager keeping the accounting records 
himself. At the end of the year you are required to carry out the audit. The 
company does not have a proper accounting system since items are just 
listed on a cashbook and there are no appropriate systems of controls. The 
audit procedures you have performed did not provide satisfactory comfort. 
Can you outline the type of audit opinion you would issue to this client? 
                                Figure 3: Case study presented to interviewees                       
                                     
 
Table 3 
1997 – 2000 number of audit reports with going concern qualifications  
Year 
Ambiguous 
wording 
Qualified “except   
for” emphasis-of-
matter situations 
1985 UK 
guideline 
model 
ISA 
compliant 
Total  
number of 
qualifications 
      
1997 7 5 2 1 15 
1998 9 4 4 1 18 
1999 12 4 5 1 22 
2000 13 1 3 0 17 
Total 41 14 14 3 72 
Group percentage of four year total 57.0 19.4 19.4 4.2  
 
Note: Total number of companies samples was 419 for each of the four years 
 
 
 
 The first group of reports (19.4 per cent of the going concern qualifications) 
modelled on the old UK Auditing Guidelines were qualified on the basis of 
uncertainty. However, in the UK, this standard was abolished in 1994 and replaced 
by SAS 130 (The Auditing Practices Board, 1994), which removed the need for 
qualifying on such a basis. In this situation, compliance  with  ISA 570  would have 
entailed an unqualified report with an emphasis-of-matter paragraph. Interestingly, 
all qualifications in this group were made by sole practitioners and this implied that 
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they were not up to date with current standards. The second group (19.4 per cent 
of the going concern qualifications) ambiguously qualified "except for" despite 
using the wording of an unqualified auditor's report including an emphasis-of-
matter paragraph, as recommended by ISA 570. This group of qualifications was 
again mostly the prerogative of sole practitioners although one other audit firm also 
committed such ambiguity. The third and largest group of qualifications not 
complying with the ISA involved various ambiguous wordings which ostensively 
followed no particular standard or model. Most of these auditor's reports explained 
the reason/s for qualification in just one sentence such as "the financial statements 
have been prepared on a going concern basis, which assumes the company's 
support of the company's bankers and directors". Apart from being short when 
compared with the examples included in the IFAC standards, it does not provide 
adequate information about qualifications to the reader. In other cases, though the 
explanatory paragraph of the auditor's report elaborated more on the matter/s 
leading to the qualification, yet the wording used was not compatible with that 
recommended by any particular standard. The ambiguities were committed by 
different types of auditors but in no case by any Big Four audit firm.  
 
Two of the interviewees, who were also sole practitioners, confirmed that 
they would qualify a situation which according to ISA 570 was an emphasis-of-
matter one. This involved the specific fundamentally uncertain situation where 
liabilities exceeded assets at the end-of-year balance sheet. 
 
4.4  Disagreement-with-management qualifications  
The third type of qualification, making up 15 per cent of total qualifications was 
related to disagreement with the treatment or disclosures of matters in the financial 
statements. This type of qualification was found on its own in 42 companies, and 
was included as a multiple qualification in 16 companies (14 of which with a 
limitation-on-scope and two with a going concern qualification). This type of 
qualification was sub-divided into three categories. The most common (25/58) was 
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that where the auditor disagreed with management as to the non-preparation of 
consolidated financial statements by the parent company. It is to be noted that, 
although companies with direct shareholding in each other were required by IFRS's 
to prepare consolidated financial statements, yet they could still remain exempt 
under the Maltese Companies Act if the group satisfied a number of criteria as 
listed in the Act. As a result, not all auditors were treating this situation uniformly. A 
few cases were found of such a situation where auditors did not qualify but merely 
inserted a note in the auditor's report of the parent company referring to the 
IFRS/Maltese law inconsistency and that on the basis of the law consolidated 
financial statements had not been prepared. In these cases, a note describing 
details was also added to the financial statements. The second category (20/58) 
was that of disagreement due to inappropriate accounting treatment and departure 
from IFRS's, with the majority of disagreements being due to a lack of a 
professional valuation of property. The third category (13/58) was disagreement as 
to facts and/or amounts in the financial statements, mainly in view of the fact that 
management did not provide for depreciation on property and fixed assets. Most of 
the qualifications in the last two categories were found in auditor's reports of 
private non-exempt companies. This was probably because these were commonly 
much larger than the exempt companies and could afford to employ separately 
from their auditor their own professional accountant, one who could easily hold 
different viewpoints that were different from those of the auditor on the appropriate 
accounting treatment of items in the financial statements. 
  
As to interviewees, these were divided on the audit report treatment of the 
first category referred to above, which is that relating to the lack of preparation of 
consolidated financial statements. On the one hand, partners in three Big Four 
audit firms and one from the other audit firms declared that they would qualify their 
auditor's report. On the other hand, another Big Four audit firm respondent as well 
as three from other audit firms stated that they would not qualify but merely add a 
note in the auditor's report. Sole practitioners did not take a stand on this matter 
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because, as they stated, they had not yet encountered such a situation. Overall the 
need became clear for more consistency between the law and the IFRS's. With 
respect to the other categories of disagreement-with-management qualifications, 
respondents confirmed that these were more common in the private non-exempt 
companies. In this context, a Big Four audit firm partner commented that the larger 
clients were more prone to disagreement-with-management qualifications in view 
of the complexity of their business. In his view this was in contrast to the smaller 
less complex businesses, which were more prone to limitation-on-scope 
qualifications. A sole practitioner added that such matters of disagreement were 
mostly encountered by the Big Four audit firms and other audit firms. In his 
experience, sole practitioners preferred to iron out any disagreements with 
directors before the financial statements were signed by them.  
 
4.5  Disclaimers of opinion  
Only three disclaimers of opinion were found in the period 1997/2000. Two were 
expressed in the auditor's report of a company whose auditors could not perform 
audit procedures on a number of financial statement items and the other in a 
company with a seriously impaired going concern in addition to the non-provision 
for depreciation by directors. The rarity of these qualifications was also confirmed 
in the interviews where most (9/12) remembered only a few cases of such a 
qualification in their whole career, while the others (3/12) could not remember ever 
issuing such a qualification. A Big Four audit partner stated that his firm had mostly 
issued disclaimers in the first year audit of small companies because the required 
changes were only carried out in subsequent years.  
 
4.6  Multiple and repeated qualifications  
The frequency of multiple and also of repeated qualifications with respect to the 
types of qualifications identified above was also separately considered. Out of the 
124 companies with a qualification, there were 98 whose auditor's reports (79 per 
cent) contained a qualification repeated at least once. Out of a total of 386 
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qualifications found during the period, only 35 were found to have been issued for 
one year only. Figure 4 breaks down the remaining 351 repeated qualifications 
during the period. Of these, 86 consisted of 43 qualifications repeated for the 
following year only, 129 consisted of 43 qualifications repeated for the two 
subsequent years and 136  consisted  of  34  qualifications  repeated  for  all  three  
 
 
                        Figure 4: Companies with audit qualification repetitions                
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subsequent years. In terms of the number of qualifications, it can be noted that   
limitation-on-scope qualifications outnumbered the other types.  As has already 
been seen, most such qualifications related to private exempt companies, which 
seemed to be either unable or unwilling to improve on their internal control or 
financial reporting limitations. Going concern qualifications were the next type 
involving repetitions. Interestingly, in this type of qualification repetitions rarely 
extended beyond two subsequent years, an indication that matters often changed 
radically for better or for worse after this period. On the contrary, the disagreement-
with-management types mostly continued to be repeated beyond the following 
year. 
  
 Interviewees differed as to the extent of repetition. All respondents claimed 
to have issued repeated qualifications during the period under review. Yet, Big 
Four audit firm respondents stated that these were not significant in their case. 
However, in the experience of other audit firms and of sole practitioners, a clear 
majority of the qualified auditor's reports in any financial year contained the same 
qualification as that issued the year before. Respondents from other audit firms 
and sole practitioners agreed with the above findings that limitation-on-scope 
qualifications, more than other types, were subject to probable repetition for a 
number of years especially if they belonged to private exempt companies. In the 
opinion of a sole practitioner, "it would be too costly for small-sized companies to 
introduce proper accounting records and/or systems of internal control and 
therefore a repeated qualification is accepted by management". Another sole 
practitioner gave as his motivation to issuing repeated qualifications, his continued 
uncertainty in assessing the going concern status of his clients; a number of these 
had been facing a net liability situation for a number of years but management had 
opted not to cease trading. As the liquidity position had never improved, his report 
had remained qualified for going concern. Two Big Four audit firm respondents 
stated that most of the disagreement-with-management qualifications were 
repeated beyond the following year because the management of the respective 
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client companies generally retained its controversial disagreement with respect to 
its accounting policies.  
 
It was found that 14 per cent (53/386) of the qualifications were multiple. 
The most common were the private exempt company multiple qualifications 
(38/53). The latter were due to either a limitation-on-scope on more than one 
financial statement item (19/38) or the combination of a limitation-on-scope and a 
going concern qualification (14/38) or a limitation-on-scope with disagreement-with-
management qualification (3/38), or, finally, disagreement-with-management with a 
going concern qualification (2/38). International trading companies also faced 
multiple qualifications (11/53) due to the non-preparation of consolidated financial 
statements together with a limitation-on-scope qualification. Private non-exempt 
companies had the next most multiple qualifications (4/53) and the circumstances 
were due to a combination of a limitation-on-scope and a going concern 
qualification faced by the auditor.  
 
A number of auditor's reports incurred multiple repeated qualifications. 
These were mostly common in private exempt companies since, as already 
mentioned, their management was often unwilling to implement measures to 
remedy the deficiencies mentioned in the qualified auditor's report. More than half 
of the private exempt companies, with a multiple qualification as described in the 
previous paragraph, had the same qualified auditor's report repeated beyond the 
year following the first. A small number of international trading companies also 
faced repeated multiple qualifications. In their case, nothing could be done by 
management to avoid the qualification since, at the time of study, the issue of 
exemptions given by the Companies Act with respect to group financial statements 
had not yet been resolved. In addition, as the activities of such companies were 
performed outside Malta, the auditor could face a limitation-on-scope on his work 
as the required audit tests could not be carried out.  
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As to interviewee comments with respect to multiple qualifications, these 
differed between those of audit partners and those of sole practitioners. For audit 
firms, multiple qualifications were rare. On the other hand, the situation was 
different for sole practitioners who often reported on the financial statements of 
private exempt companies where such a situation was deemed to be more 
common.  
 
4.7  Qualifications and firm-specific variables  
The second part of the research consisted in identifying any associations among 
the three classifications of qualified audit opinions (limitation on scope, going 
concern and disagreement with management) and the selected data variables, 
using the chi-squared test, for each of the four years 1997/2000. No association 
was found between the auditor's opinions and two of the variables, i.e. whether the 
company was small or not and the issued share capital of the company. 
 
In another test, a significant relationship (p = 0.0000 for all the four years) 
was found between the disagreement type of qualification and the type of company 
for the whole period under study. Qualifications of this type were mostly prevalent 
in international trading companies, followed by private non-exempt companies.  
 
Another significant relationship over all four years was found between 
auditor's qualifications and the type of industry (1997: p = 0.0051, 1998: p = 
0.0024, 1999: p = 0.0022, 2000: p = 0.0024). It was found that, particularly over the 
period under study, disagreement-with-management qualifications were mostly 
common in companies in the import, wholesale and retail business and this was 
followed by the financial intermediation sector. The high relative percentage of 
companies with a disagreement-with-management qualification falling within these 
two industries and the results of the chi-squared test pointed out that if the auditor 
disagreed with the company's accountant on financial statement issues it was 
probably a company operating within these two sectors. As for limitation-on-scope 
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qualifications, the test was only significant for 1998, and no relationship was 
identified for going concern qualifications throughout the four years. Therefore, no 
evidence was found establishing any significant relationship between these two 
qualification types and the type of industry. The final test checked whether there 
was any association between the net asset values of companies which received 
qualified audit reports and the type of qualification obtained. Net asset values were 
grouped into four categories, namely those values between Lm0 - Lml0,000 (Euro 
0 - approx. Euro 24,500), those above Lml0,000 for both positive and negative 
figures. Over the four-year period such an association was found significant only 
for the going concern type of qualification (1997: p = 0.0057; 1998: p = 0.0004; 
1999: p = 0.0066; 2000: p = 0.0003). Interestingly, companies with a going concern 
qualification had a negative net asset value for at least one of the years in which 
they had such qualification.  
 
Use was also made of the chi-squared test to identify a relationship between 
companies with a repeated qualified auditor's report and firm-specific variables. A 
relationship (p = 0.0121) was found between the repeated qualification and the 
type of company. The results showed that a qualification in private exempt 
companies and international trading non-exempt companies had a significantly 
higher chance of being a repeated one. Significance was also identified between 
repeated qualifications and whether the company was small or not (p = 0.0204). In 
this regard, exempt companies, which also satisfied the criteria for classification as 
small companies referred to earlier, had a higher probability of obtaining a 
repeated qualification than those which did not satisfy such criteria. 
  
4.8  The auditor and qualifications  
Finally the research investigated the association between qualified opinions and 
the type of audit firm voicing such opinion. The chi-squared test was used to 
identify a relationship between the type of qualification and the size of the audit firm 
expressing it. A highly significant relationship was found for the four-year period 
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(1997: p = 0.0022; 1998: p = 0.0001; 1999: p = 0.0000; 2000: p = 0.0000) between 
disagreement-with-management qualifications and the type of auditor. Such a 
highly significant association was due to the fact that most of disagreement-with-
management qualifications (45/58) were expressed by a Big Four audit firm, with a 
minimal amount expressed by other audit firms and sole practitioners. Less highly 
significant results were found for the association between limitation-on-scope 
qualifications and the type of auditor (1998: p = 0.0122; 1999: p = 0.0102; 2000: p 
= 0.027) since the test was significant for only three years. Over the four years, 
most of the limitation-on-scope qualifications were issued by sole practitioners, 
followed by other audit firms, with a small percentage issued by the Big Four audit 
firms. No relationship was found between the going concern qualification and the 
type of auditor issuing it.  
 
4.9  Implications  
At 19.9 per cent, the four-year average rate of qualifications appears at first high. 
Yet, one needs to take into account that the scope of the study went beyond public 
companies and covered all the different types of Maltese registered companies. It 
also included small companies which in Malta are all subject to the statutory audit. 
Indeed, private exempt companies, most of which are defined as small, had the 
highest qualification rate out of all the four types of companies. As one may note, 
these findings contrast with those found in the UK by Abulizz et al. (1990) but are 
in line with other studies elsewhere such as those of Chow and Rice (1983) and 
Warren (1975, 1980). Furthermore, the qualification rate found in this study would 
probably have been much higher had all the companies in the sample population 
filed their financial statements for the period under study. In this respect there is 
clearly a pressing need to impose tougher penalties for non-filing than at present.  
 
Given the smaller-sized company scenario, the large predominance of 
limitation-on-scope qualifications is probably not surprising. As already seen, 
similar results were obtained in UK  by Hopkins (1995) when analysing a sample of 
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1,000 audit reports, such results contrasting with other studies elsewhere focusing 
only on public and listed companies (Soltani, 2000; Ball et  al., 1979; Chan and 
Walter, 1996) where most qualifications were found to be disagreement with 
management. It is clearly disquieting to see that, in this study, the majority of 
limitation-on-scope qualifications were not specific ones and often deficient by 
today's standards. Therefore, they probably resulted in few, if any, practical 
pressures on management to carry out the needed changes. In addition, it was 
found that limitation-on-scope opinions in Malta qualifications were mainly issued 
by sole practitioners and to a lesser extent by other audit firms. This implies that a 
number of auditors within these categories are less proactive than others and 
continue to issue qualifications based on outdated standards. These findings agree 
with similar comments referred to earlier that were expressed in the UK by the 
Audit Report (2002a).  
 
Findings both from the sampled companies and from the semi-structured 
interviews pointed to the persistent use of the outdated Type Six qualification on 
the islands as a reporting practice resorted to mostly by sole practitioners but also 
by other audit firms. Therefore, even in Malta's case, the presence is felt of the 
inherent problems in small audits, this underlining the urgency of settling the long 
standing debate of whether to abolish Malta's statutory small audit requirement on 
the same lines as in other countries and/or perhaps introduce an alternative 
exercise as suggested earlier. In addition 90 per cent of the qualified opinions were 
also found in the auditor's reports of companies defined as small.  
 
Deficiencies were also clearly portrayed by the going concern qualifications. 
The majority of such qualifications were not adhering to the use of the wording 
recommended by IFAC and were even failing to give a clear explanation for the 
given qualification. Action needs to be taken to tackle the ambiguity and overuse of 
such qualifications. The relationship identified between the going concern 
qualification and the negative net asset value of the company with a qualification 
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further proves that this type of qualification is resorted to when the company is 
merely going through a difficult financial situation. As already stated, in these cases 
ISAs recommend the inclusion of an emphasis-of-matter paragraph in the auditor's 
report and not a qualification. In this regard, the profession needs to emphasise 
how it may help to see that sole practitioners and, to a lower extent, other audit 
firms, report more in line with current auditing standards. 
  
Findings from the study also indicated a relationship between disagreement-
with-management qualifications and Big Four audit firms. Such results are also 
consistent with findings in the UK by Abulizz et al. (1990). It can be seen that other 
audit firms and sole practitioners are finding it more difficult to qualify auditor's 
reports for disagreement with management. This is an area which definitely calls 
for further research, as it may imply issues of lack of independence, or even that 
particularly in the case of sole practitioners, there is no effective second opinion on 
the part of the auditor given that both accounting and reporting are effected by the 
same person, especially in companies which do not afford a qualified accountant.  
 
Although the number of repeated qualifications found in this study appears 
high, yet similar studies elsewhere also reported high percentages (Ball et al, 1990; 
Soltani, 2000; Chan and Walter, 1996; Firth, 1978). Yet, interestingly it appears 
that in Malta the highest percentage of repeated qualifications are those recurring 
for more than three subsequent years. Analysing them by the type of qualification it 
was found that limitation-on-scope qualifications were mostly repeated. This 
substantiates further the need to bring to an end deficient and non-specific 
qualifications as it confirms that such qualifications are not making management 
feel pressured to implement the required measures in order to change the auditor's 
report to unqualified in future years. This paper found that around 14 per cent of 
the audit qualifications were multiple, such a percentage being similar to those 
found in other studies (Ball et al., 1990; Soltani, 2000; Chan and Walter, 1996). 
Yet, further analysis revealed that multiple qualifications due to                                 
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limitation on the scope of the auditor's work outnumbered the other types. Again, 
the incidence of this qualification in almost all reports containing multiple 
qualifications indicates that its presence might in itself be symptomatic of there 
being a higher chance of having some other qualification. 
 
Finally, it is clear that even in Malta the Big Four audit firms issue less 
qualified auditor's reports. Again this is in line with similar research effected 
elsewhere (Butler et al., 2004; Abulizz  et al., 1990). 
 
5.  Summary and conclusions  
This study has attempted to analyse the type of qualified audit opinions in Malta 
between 1997 and 2000. It has also studied the extent of multiple and repeated 
qualifications in the same period and found significant relationships between such 
main types of qualifications and firm-specific variables.  
 
Despite the limited geographical size of the Maltese islands, the average 
qualification rate for the four years was 19.9 per cent, the majority of which 
emanated from private exempt companies. The majority of qualifications in this 
type of companies were due to limitation on scope of the auditor's work or to going 
concern issues. The small size of such companies rendered impossible any 
reliance on internal controls and, where no proper accounting records were kept, 
the auditor's task was even made more difficult. In addition, most of the repeated 
and multiple qualifications identified in the study, originated from auditor's reports 
of small companies. It can be concluded that the profession needs to delve more 
deeply into the auditor's reports issued by other audit firms and sole practitioners 
as the way in which such reports are drafted frequently makes them deficient or 
even incompatible with the recommended wording of the ISA's. Moreover, the high 
qualification rate among small companies extends the debate on whether such 
companies should be exempted from the full scope audit. As to disagreement-with-
management qualifications, these feature more in larger companies. Perhaps 
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factors such as inter-practitioner competition and the fact that auditors may also be 
personally employed in small companies may be impeding the small company 
auditor from disagreeing with management in the same manner as his larger 
company counterpart. Finally, it is concluded that the type of qualification is 
associated with the size of audit firms, whereby disagreement-with-management 
qualifications are mostly issued by Big Four audit firms, while limitation-on-scope 
qualifications tend to be issued by sole practitioners and other audit firms.  
 
The study faced a number of limitations. The four-year period on which the 
research was based was the first in which all companies falling under the 
Companies Act (1995) irrespective of whether they were exempt or not, started 
also to file their financial statements. Therefore, findings could not be meaningfully 
compared to earlier periods. It is, therefore, recommended that the period under 
study is compared with periods of subsequent years as and when the information 
becomes available. This was the first extensive research known to be undertaken 
in Malta specifically investigating qualified audit opinions in recent years. The 
methodology undertaken in this study could serve as the basis for studies in other 
small states which could look into the types of qualified audit opinions issued, and 
into what motivates the issuance of such qualifications. Further studies could also 
investigate the extent of non-compliance by the auditing profession in respect of 
whether the recommended wording is that allowed by either their local legislation 
or auditing standards in force. Hopefully, the situation will be increasingly one of 
continual improvement.  
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Notes  
1. Private companies and international trading companies become  exempt on 
condition that they have no more than 50 debenture holders and that  nobody 
corporate is a shareholder.  
2. This is known as the Nomenclature statistique des activités économiques 
dans la Communauté européenne. 
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Appendix. 
 Auditor interview schedule  
(1) In your experience, what percentage of your audit reports contained 
qualifications during 1997/2000? 
(2) Of the types of qualifications below, which was the most commonly issued 
between 1997 and 2000?  
• limitation-on-scope;  
• going concern;  
• disagreement-with-management;  
• disclaimer; and  
• adverse.  
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(3) In what circumstances have you faced limitations on the scope of your 
audit?  
(4) If a client's balance sheet total liabilities exceed total assets, would this 
effect your auditor's report, and if so, how?  
(5) In case you perform group audits which are exempt from preparing 
consolidated accounts due to the Maltese Companies Act, how does this affect 
your auditor's report?  
(6) In your experience, what are the main disagreements with management 
leading to qualified opinions?  
(7) In case you issued a disclaimer or adverse opinion, what were your 
reasons?  
(8) During 1997/2000, did you ever need to repeat qualifications in subsequent 
years? If so, which types?  
    (9)  During 1997/2000,  how frequent  did  you  find  the  occurrence  of  multiple 
qualifications ?  
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Factors influencing First-Time External Auditor Selection in Malta 
Baldacchino, P.J.  and  Cardona, C. 
University of Malta, Malta and PwC Malta 
 
 
 
This paper attempts to shed some light on the factors - behavioural, economic and 
others - that influence a client’s selection of an external auditor in Malta. A 
comparison is also made between the clients' perceptions and the views 
expressed by auditors themselves. This study shows that relationships exist 
between a number of client characteristics and the size of the audit practice 
appointed. Responses from both auditors and audit clients indicate that Maltese 
clients value factors of a behavioural nature more than those of an economic one. 
The study implies that auditors need to strive to understand their clients' 
businesses and industries if they are to provide timely and relevant advice and 
services, deliver the levels of quality that their clients have come to demand from 
the profession, and even exceed their clients' expectations. The paper therefore 
provides external auditors with important insights into those factors influencing their 
selection. 
 
Keywords: auditor selection, Malta, external auditing 
Chapter 7                               Factors Influencing First-Time External Audit Selection in Malta [AUD-5]   
186 
1.  Introduction 
In Malta, the Companies Act, 1995 requires that all companies carry out a statutory 
audit of their financial statements irrespective of their size, capital structure or 
business activity (Tabone and Baldacchino, 2003). This requirement has resulted 
in the need to select and appoint a statutory auditor within each and every 
company incorporated in Malta, and its sister island Gozo.                                     
 
 External auditor selection is the process of choosing from among the 
various audit firms and sole practitioners capable of performing the statutory audit 
as required by Maltese Law. In order to select between different auditors, many 
factors need to be considered by the client, with these being determined during the 
initial stages of the external auditor selection process. The importance of a good 
external auditor selection process stems from the concept of the asymmetrical 
distribution of information amongst a company's stakeholders. Information 
asymmetry exists when one party possesses information that another party lacks 
(Gaa, 2005, p.1). 
 
1.1  Responsibility for auditor selection 
High profile scandals have served as instigators for change throughout the 
corporate world, also leading to a change in the way the companies appoint their 
external auditors. In America, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was signed into law on July 
30, 2002. One of the changes implemented under Provision 301 of this legislation 
was that the selection of external auditors no longer remained the competence of a 
company's management, with the responsibility for doing so being shifted directly 
to the audit committee and board of directors. This act is designed to address the 
concern that, if management selects the auditor, it will choose the auditor based on 
the likelihood of receiving a 'clean' audit opinion rather than on the auditor's 
competence (Keating et al., 2003).  As Crouch (2004) writes, permitting senior 
management to have sole control over external auditor selection and retention is 
like the fox guarding the hen's house. 
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The Eighth Directive, or what commentators are labelling, Europe's 
equivalent to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, has also been enacted on the island. 
Amongst other provisions, the Directive requires that, "in a public interest entity, the 
proposal of the administrative or supervisory body for the appointment of a 
statutory auditor or audit firm shalI be based on a recommendation made by the 
audit committee "(Art 41, Para.3).                                                                                                            
 
As regards the actual appointment of the statutory auditors, in Malta it is 
only the first company auditor that can be appointed by management. During a 
company's first Annual General Meeting shareholders are given the power to 
confirm an auditor's appointment, or otherwise.                                                           
 
In 1995, Beattie and Fearnley wrote that at the time it was generally agreed 
that no comprehensive, well-specified theory of auditor selection existed. While 
these authors have since conducted and published research in the field, based on 
studies in the UK, existing research into external auditor selection in Malta dates 
back over a decade to a study carried out by Galdes in 1994. The purpose of this 
present study is to shed some light on the current trends influencing external 
auditor selection within the small Mediterranean island-state of Malta. The paper 
commences with an overview of relevant literature, following which the findings 
emanating from the responses to two mail questionnaires, received from 68 
companies and 33 auditors respectively, are presented and discussed. Finally, the 
conclusion is offered. 
 
2.  Literature review 
In its corporate governance toolkit, PriceWaterhouseCoopers or PwC states  that 
while auditor independence  is a "key issue to be addressed", yet  there are "no set 
rules" in auditor selection. Irrespective of how selection is made, it is important to 
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"determine at the outset what attributes are required of the external auditor to 
ensure the selection process is sufficiently robust" (PwC, 2005, Section 4.1) 
 
2.1  Behavioural versus economic factors 
Beattie and Fearnley (1998) claim that extant theory of auditor choice is grounded 
in economic theory. They posit that a void in theory arises from the failure to 
incorporate behavioural factors into research carried out in this area. In 2004, 
Magri and Baldacchino incorporated both behavioural and economic aspects in 
their study on the factors leading to auditor change in Malta. The study confirms 
the importance of behavioural factors, finding that the top two factors leading to a 
change of auditor were behavioural. The authors found that, while foreign studies 
on auditor change decisions cite economic factors as being predominant, Maltese 
companies attribute  importance to both behavioural and economic factors. 
 
2.2  Main factors influencing auditor choice 
2.2.1  Audit fees 
Audit fees vary from one engagement to another but, according to Turpen (1995), 
much of the variability of these fees can be explained by client attributes 
associated with audit effort and audit risk. The complexity of the audit is therefore a 
main component in the determination of the audit fee. In their study into auditor 
choice and change, Beattie and Fearnley (1998) find that fees are the most 
frequently cited factor influencing the selection of a new auditor. Nevertheless, 
research shows that auditors have a tendency to purposely discount their fees 
during the first and subsequent initial years of an audit (Turpen, 1995; and Simons, 
2011) so as to attract clients. When choosing an auditor, clients should therefore 
be aware of the risk of low-balling, a practice whereby an auditor charges a fee that 
is lower than the costs incurred to carry out an audit; this may imply that, as the 
auditor establishes a steady relationship with his client, fees are likely to rise.
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 Literature is nevertheless inconsistent about the idea that audit fees are the 
topmost factor considered when choosing an auditor (e.g. Addams and  Davis, 
1994; Glass Lewis & Co., 2006). The fall in importance of seeking a low audit fee 
could be the result of a change in corporate culture following a string of high profile 
accounting scandals. In Krell (2006), Mark Heimbouch, CFO at Jackson Hewitt, 
referred to how auditing has increasingly moved from being a commodity to a 
question of quality and value as well as a vital component of corporate 
governance. 
 
Rather than looking at which auditor can provide their company with the 
lowest-cost audit, Monks (2007) says that clients become less sensitive to fees 
once they are able to see the value in a service. He claims that professionals must 
spend time getting to know their clients better and hence gain an understanding of 
their needs, tailoring their services so as to be able to provide clients with the value 
of service they desire. Addams and Davis (1994, p.38) find that "fees are not the 
primary reason for obtaining or retaining a client... meeting client needs is the 
overwhelming issue". 
 
2.2.2  Auditor's expertise 
As international standards and legislation develop further, bringing about 
increasingly complex accounting rules, auditors need to possess highly specific 
skills in order to continue to provide the level of service expected of them (Krell, 
2006). Section 4.1 of Part A of the Maltese Code of Ethics for Warrant Holders 
(Accountancy Board, 2004, p.3) requires that warrant holders "maintain 
professional knowledge and skill at the level required to ensure that clients... 
receive competent professional service". 
 
 Clients expect their audit partners and engagement staff to be technically 
competent, as the results of a study on the importance of audit firm characteristics 
by Beattie and Fearnley (1995) suggest. Addams and Davis (1994) find that, linked 
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to technical expertise, clients also demand that their auditor has a certain level of 
experience within the industry that they operate in. 
 
 Sukhraj (2007, p.1) reports Ken Lever, Financial Reporting Committee 
Chairman of the Hundred Group of Finance Directors, as saying that, "the growth 
in complexity of reporting is leading to a greater reliance by audit firms on their 
technical departments that apply 'rules' to a set of facts without necessarily having 
a deep knowledge of the circumstances or business context" and that, "the 
profession is increasingly moving toward a more combative relationship with 
companies which discourages cooperation which ultimately could have an indirect 
impact on the quality of the audit. 
 
2.2.3  Quality of service and auditor size 
As with any other purchase, clients also look at the quality of the service they will 
receive when selecting a potential auditor. The concept of audit quality is often 
associated with the joint probability of an auditor both discovering and reporting a 
breach (DeAngelo, 1981). Given the inherent difficulty in finding a measure for 
audit quality, the author finds that auditor size may be used as a proxy for quality. 
The reasoning is that the larger the audit firm (and therefore its fee income), the 
more it stands to lose in terms of clients and fees in the event that it incurs a loss of 
reputation due to a mistake on its part. A larger audit firm will therefore employ 
more rigorous techniques aimed at identifying fraud or other misconduct in order to 
safeguard its reputation. Taken literally, DeAngelo's argument suggests that a 
cardinal ordering of auditor size can be used to proxy for audit quality (Francis and 
Wilson, 1988). 
 
The collapse of Arthur Andersen, coupled with a string of mergers within the 
audit market, has left only four truly global firms. This has brought about increased 
debate – amongst those who think that audit quality is commensurate with the size 
of the audit firm – about the level of auditor choice available to companies (e.g.
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Oxera Report, 2006), as well as discussions on whether a Big 4 audit necessarily 
provides better quality. In Hawkes (2006, p.1), Steve Maslin, Head of Assurance at 
Grant Thornton, is reported as saying, "I am tired of the sustained campaign by the 
Big Four that they provide better audits than anyone else. We have taken over 
audits from the Big Four firms and found problems in the accounts." 
 
What seems to be emerging from this ongoing debate is that non-Big 4 firms 
provide quality audits too and that companies should not look for quality solely from 
Big 4 firms but rather, that they should choose an auditor that can deliver the level 
of quality they desire, regardless of whether the auditor is a Big 4 firm or not. 
                                                                                                                                    
2.2.4  Location of the auditor 
Stokes (1992) argues that the geographical proximity of the auditor is relevant 
since it permits a flexible and timely response to client needs. Nevertheless, 
Galdes (1994) suggests that this argument may not apply to a microstate like Malta 
where, given its size, it is easy for an auditor to reach almost any part of the island. 
Galdes found that when selecting an auditor in Malta, location ranked as the least 
important out of nine factors. Literature is therefore, inconsistent about the true 
level of importance given to the auditor's location when selecting an auditor, at 
least with respect to Malta. 
 
2.2.5 Relationship between Client and Auditor  
 While economic factors play a pivotal role in the selection process, companies are 
placing increasing weight on more qualitative, behavioural factors when making 
their choices. Addams and Davis (1994) find that CEOs place considerable 
importance on the relationship established between the audit firm's key personnel 
and the client's decision makers during the course of the auditor-evaluation 
process. Research on auditor change decisions in Malta by Magri and Baldacchino 
(2004) finds supporting evidence of the importance of the relationship between 
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client and auditor. Maltese companies ranked  'a substantial deterioration in this 
relationship' as being the foremost reason leading to a change in auditor. 
 
Literature seems to indicate that clients do not want to feel as though their 
auditor's only contact with them is during the annual audit. Kriss Bush, CFO of 
Jump TV, is quoted by Krell (2006, p.1), saying that, "some auditing partners are 
managing their relationships with client companies strictly by the book, and those 
relationships tend to lack chemistry..." 
 
Investing in good client-auditor relations can be of long-term benefit to a firm 
and help increase client loyalty (Kuenzel and Krolikowska, 2007). The authors 
claim that a good relationship helps to retain clients for longer, thus improving the 
auditor's profitability. In order to foster commitment, Kuenzel and Krolikowska 
advise audit partners and staff to take advantage of both formal and informal 
situations to pass on knowledge that is of value to the client. This supports the view 
that clients are not solely interested in their auditor fulfilling the requirements of a 
statutory audit, but demand more in terms of value-added services. 
 
2.2.6 Non-audit services 
Auditors are known to provide other services to businesses apart from auditing, 
including the provision of advisory and taxation services. Seattle and Fearnley 
(1995) and Addams and Davis (1994) find that the ability to provide non-audit 
services ranked amongst the top half of those factors influencing auditor selection.   
 
 Based on all the factors outlined, client-auditor alignments can be viewed as 
the minimum cost match between client needs and auditor services (Seattle and 
Fearnley, 1995). The authors claim that a significant change in either the client or 
auditor's characteristics may result in realignment between a client and his auditor 
if the other party is unwilling or unable to accommodate this change. 
 
Chapter 7                               Factors Influencing First-Time External Audit Selection in Malta [AUD-5]   
193 
3.  Research methodology 
3.1  Research instrument 
The main research tool adopted was the postal questionnaire. This was chosen 
both because of the ability to send it to a large sample at once as well as allowing 
respondents the ability to remain anonymous in their response. Two questionnaires 
were designed for the purpose of this study – one which was mailed to companies 
and the other to auditors in public practice. 
 
 The questionnaires were divided into three main sections. The first section 
sought to collect information relating to the respondent company or audit firm. The 
second section related to auditor choice. Respondents were asked to rate the level 
of importance attributed to each of 23 factors thought to influence the selection of 
an auditor using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from Very Unimportant (1), Neutral 
(4) to Very Important (7). The third and final section sought to extract respondent 
demographics.                                                                                                    
 
Similar questionnaires were sent to companies and auditors, the purpose 
being to ensure comparability of replies. 
 
3.2  Sample selection and response rates 
After piloting the research instrument with a client and an external auditor, mail 
surveys were carried out amongst a random sample of 330 Maltese companies 
registered after October 2004 but before February 2006. This not only ensured that 
the companies had been in operation long enough to have chosen their external 
auditor, but also that this choice had not been made too long before the date of the 
study.                                                                                                                     
 
 Previous studies in Malta indicated a higher response rate amongst 
practising auditors and consequently a random sample of 70 practising auditors 
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was selected from a warrant holder list provided by the Malta institute of 
Accountants. Given the nature of the study, qualified auditors working in business 
were excluded from the sample so as to elicit responses solely from warrant 
holders in public practice. 
 
By the cut-off date, scheduled five weeks after the mail-out of 
questionnaires, valid responses from 68 companies and 33 auditors were received, 
representing response rates of 20.6% and 47.1% respectively. The majority of 
companies that responded employed nine or less employees (66.2% of 
respondents), with a minority employing 50 or more (5.9% of respondents). With 
respect to auditors, sole practitioners represented the largest segment of 
respondents (42.4% of respondents), followed by members of non-Big 4 firms and 
Big 4 firms (30.3% and 27.3% of respondents, respectively). 
 
The data collected were subject to analysis using SPSS. The most 
frequently used test is the chi-squared test, which is able to indicate whether two 
variables are significantly related or not. If the p-value lies below 0.05 the 
hypothesis that the two variables are related is accepted. This indicates that the 
result can be generalized, as it is not attributable to chance. If however the value is 
greater than 0.05, the hypothesis can be rejected. 
 
4.  Research findings 
The findings presented are based upon the tests conducted on the 68 valid 
responses, received from the postal survey carried out among individuals involved 
in the selection of an auditor within newly-registered companies. Comparative 
findings, which were derived from the tests performed on the 33 responses 
received from auditors, are also presented where relevant. 
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4.1 The bearing of an organization's characteristics over the auditor the  
.......type of auditor engaged 
From the analysis performed, it resulted that certain characteristics of a company 
can have an influence over the type of auditor chosen. As evidenced in Table 1, 
companies employing between 0-9 employees are more  likely  to  make  use  of  a 
 
Table 1: Cross-Tabulation - Type of Auditor Appointed  
Versus Number of Persons Employed by the Company 
 What type of Auditor did you appoint? 
Big 4 Non-Big 4 
Sole 
Practitioner 
Total 
How many 
employees 
does the 
company 
employ? 
0-9 Count 5 17 23 45 
Percentage 35.7 63.0 85.2 66.2 
10-49 Count 6 9 4 19 
Percentage 42.9 33.3 14.8 27.9 
50-249 Count 2 1 0 3 
Percentage 14.3 3.7 0.0 4.4 
250 + Count 1 0 0 1 
Percentage 7.1 0.0 0.0 1.5 
Total Count 14 27 27 68 
Percentage 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Note: Sample Population - Companies. 
 
sole practitioner. Conversely, companies that employ more than 50 employees are 
more likely to make use of a Big 4 firm. Given the p-value (0.023) obtained, it can 
be concluded that there is a significant association between the number of persons 
employed by a company and the type of auditor appointed. This result may be 
generalized because it is not attributable to chance. 
 When company respondents were asked whether their company formed a 
part of a group of companies or not, 43.3%  replied affirmatively, with the remaining 
56.7% saying that their company did not form a part of a group.  
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As seen from Figure 1, companies that are part of a group are more likely to 
appoint a Big 4 auditor, while sole practitioners are more likely (p: 0.003) to be 
chosen by those companies that do not form a part of a group of companies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2  Being or intending to become listed on a stock exchange 
4.2.1 The clients' perspective 
In the survey sent to companies, respondents were asked to indicate whether their 
company was, or intended to become, listed on a stock exchange at the time the 
auditor was chosen. The majority responded negatively, with just 6% of valid 
responses claiming that their company was, or intended to become, listed at the 
time when the auditor was chosen. Nevertheless, when these responses were 
cross-tabulated against the type of auditor chosen, it was found that there exists a 
significant association (p: 0.000) between the type of auditor appointed and 
whether a company is, or intends to become, listed on a stock exchange or not. 
From the analysis, it was seen that while all three types of auditors were selected 
to perform audit engagements for non-listed companies, companies that are, or 
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intend to become, listed on a stock exchange are more likely to appoint one of the 
Big 4 firms. 
 
Respondents were also asked whether their company was, in fact, listed at 
the time of this study. When these responses were cross-tabulated with the type of 
auditor appointed, similar associations (p: 0.020) to those described above were 
obtained. 
 
4.2.2 The auditors' opinion 
In the questionnaire sent to auditors, respondents were asked to indicate what type 
of auditor a company is likely to choose when it is, or intends to become, listed on 
a stock exchange. From the valid responses received, 91.2% indicated that a Big 4 
firm would be chosen, with the remaining 8.8% indicating that a non-Big 4 firm 
would be appointed. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that respondents from 
across all three types of audit practices showed consensus that a Big 4 firm is most 
likely to be appointed. 
 
4.3  Matters relating to the external auditor selection process 
4.3.1 Meeting the auditor prior to appointment 
Respondents were asked to indicate whether they held a meeting with a 
prospective audit or prior to making their choice as to who to appoint. The absolute 
majority responded that they had indeed held a meeting with at least one auditor. 
However, 13.8% responded that they did not meet anyone prior to making their 
decision. Furthermore, when asked to indicate whether they have changed their 
first company auditor, 35.3% of respondents answered with assent. It is interesting 
to note that from the analysis performed, the results show that companies holding 
a meeting with more than one auditor seem more likely to change their auditor than 
those that either did not meet anyone, or else only met a single auditor prior to 
appointing the auditor. The p-value (0.001) obtained suggests that this association 
is not attributable to chance. 
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4.3.2 Explanation and provision of non-audit services to audit clients 
In the survey sent to companies, respondents were asked to indicate whether their 
auditor explained what services, other than auditing, were offered by the firm, prior 
to his appointment. Of the valid responses received, 71.6% were affirmative while 
the remaining 28.4% said that their auditor had not. Furthermore, respondents 
were also asked to indicate whether their auditor was presently providing any non-
audit services to the company such as tax, accountancy or advisory services. 
 
From the analysis it became evident that those companies receiving an 
explanation from their auditor about non-audit services are more likely to actually 
engage their auditor in the provision of such services. Since the p-value (0.022) 
does not exceed the 0.05 level of significance, we can accept that there exists a 
significant association between the explanation of non-audit services by an auditor 
and the eventual provision of such services to the audit client. 
 
4.4  Audit quality 
In an attempt to determine whether individuals equate an audit firm's size with a 
particular level of audit quality, respondents were asked to rate their level of 
agreement with the following statement: The larger the audit firm, the better the 
audit quality. 
 
4.4.1 The clients' perspective 
The mean rating score (2.96) indicated that respondents from companies felt that 
they 'slightly disagreed' with the statement presented above. Nevertheless, it is 
evident from Table 2 that companies that are, or intend to become, listed on the 
stock exchange are more likely to agree with this statement (mean: 5.25) 
compared to companies that are not listed (mean: 2.81). Given that the p-value 
(0.028) is less than the 0.05 level of significance, this association can be 
generalized because it is not attributable to chance. 
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Table 2: Audit Quality - Mean Rating Scores Attributed 
to the Statement Relating to Audit Quality by Companies that were, 
or Intended to Become, Listed on the Stock Exchange or Not 
 The larger the audit firm, the better 
the audit quality 
N 
Mean 
Rating 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
for Mean 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Were you listed (or 
did you intend to 
become listed) on a 
stock exchange 
when choosing your 
auditor? 
Yes 4 5.25 2.062 1.031 1.97 7.00 
No 64 2.81 1.582 0.198 2.42 3.21 
Total 68 2.96 1.697 0.206 2.55 3.37 
Note: Rating Score: 1 >= Strongly Disagree; 4 = Neutral; 7 =; Strongly Agree; and Sample 
Population: Companies. 
  
 
A significantly different rating was also given to the statement depending on the 
type of auditor appointed by the respondents. As Table 3 illustrates, respondents 
who appoint a Big 4 firm tend to agree more (mean: 4.43) with this statement  than 
those who appoint a sole practitioner (mean: 2.59) or a non-Big 4 firm (mean:2.56). 
The p-value (0.017) suggests that this result may be generalized and is not 
attributable to chance. 
 
4.4.2 The auditors' opinion 
Responses from auditors resulted in a mean rating score (3.78) that also tended 
toward disagreement with the statement. Nevertheless, Big 4 audit firms tend to 
agree with this statement more than the smaller firms. The p-value (0.017) implies 
that this result is not attributable to chance and can therefore be generalized to the 
population of auditors. 
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Table 3: Audit Quality - Mean Rating Scores Attributed to the Statement Relating to Audit 
Quality by Companies that Appointed Different Types of Auditors 
 
The larger the audit firm, the better the audit quality 
N 
Mean 
Rating 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
What 
type of 
auditor 
did you 
appoint
? 
Big 4 14 4.43 2.174 0.581 3.17 5.68, 
Sole Practitioner 27 2.59 1.338 0.257 2.06 3.12 
Non-Big 4 27 2.56 1.340 0.258 2.03 3.09 
Total 68 2.96 1.697 0.206 2.55 3.37 
Note: Rating Score: 1 = Strongly Disagree; 4 = Neutral; 7 =; Strongly Agree;  and  Sample 
Population: Companies. 
 
 
 4.5  Auditor choice:  mean  rating  scores   attributed   by   clients   and     
........auditors 
 
In order to determine the importance attributed to a number of influential factors 
when selecting a company's first external auditor, respondents were asked to 
provide a rating, ranging from very unimportant (1) to very important (7) to each of 
the 23 factors presented to them. Tables 4 and 5 list these factors in descending 
order of importance based on the mean computed for the respective samples.   
Each factor was classified as being 'behavioural' or 'economic' in nature. Factors 
that did not clearly pertain to either of the categories were classified as ‘other’ 
factors.                                                                                                                            
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 The clients' perspective is presented in Table 4, and the auditors' opinion is 
presented in Table 5. 
 
4.5.1 A comparison of client and auditor responses 
In order to establish whether the ranking order elicited by clients and auditors, in 
Tables 4 and 5 respectively, are indeed similar, the Spearman correlation 
coefficient was computed. The coefficient obtained (0.884) indicates a very strong 
positive relationship between the ranking orders elicited by the two groups of 
respondents. Given that the p-value (0.000) is less than the 0.05 level of 
significance, this result is not attributable to chance. 
 
 These findings imply that auditors are strongly aware of the importance 
attributed by clients to the 23 factors. Figure 2 illustrates the responses further. 
 
 
Table 4: Factors Influencing External Auditor Selection Ranked According 
to the Mean Rating Scores Attributed by Individuals Involved 
in the Choice of Their Company's First Auditor 
Ranking by 
Companies 
[Ranking by 
Auditors*] 
Factors Influencing 
External Auditor Selection 
Category N 
Mean 
Rating 
Std. 
Deviation 
1 [2] Quality of Service Economic 68 6.32 1.190 
2 [1] , 
Availability of the auditor 
when needed Behavioural 67 6.13 1.347 
3 [5] 
The work proposed by the 
auditor meets the client's 
expectations Economic 68 5.99  l .333 
4 [3] 
Establishing a long-term 
relationship with  auditor Behavioural 68 5.91 1.346 
5 [11] 
Ability of the client to 
develop a good working 
relationship with the 
auditor or audit team Behavioural 68 5.81 1.479 
6 [6] 
Auditor's understanding of 
the client's business Economic 68 5.69 1.595 
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 Table 4 continued     
Ranking by 
Companies 
[Ranking by 
Auditors*] 
Factors Influencing 
External Auditor Selection 
Category N 
Mean 
Rating 
Std. 
Deviation 
7 [7] 
Provision of a value-for-
money audit Economic 68 5.62 1.404 
8 [8] 
Auditor's experience 
within the client's industry Economic 68 5.51 1.540 
9 [12] Personality of the auditor Behavioural 68 5.38 1.812 
10 [13] 
Recommendation(s) made 
about the auditor Behavioural 68 5.31 1.623 
11 [15] 
Independence of the 
auditor Behavioural 68 5.28 1.819 
12 [9] Provision of tax services Economic 68 5.16 1.742 
13 [4] Audit fee Economic 68 4.91 1.777 
14 [10] 
Provision of advisory 
services Economic 68 4.87 1.946 
15 [17] 
Provision of accounting 
services Economic 68 4.63 2.014 
16 [16] Size of auditor's practice Economic 68 4.15 1.595   
17 [14] 
The fee charged for other 
non-audit services Economic 68 4.03 1.853 
18 [18] 
 
That the auditor does not 
perform the audit of the 
client's competitor(s) Economic 68 3.96 2.147 
 
19 [23] 
 
That the audit firm 
selected was a non-Big 4 
firm 
 
 
 
Other 
 
 
 
68 
 
 
 
3.38 
 
 
2.165 
20 [22] 
Proximity of the auditor's 
office/s to  client's office/s Economic 68 3.31 2.039 
21 [21] 
That the auditor selected 
was a sole practitioner Other 68 3.18 1.969 
22 [19] 
Global presence of the 
audit firm Economic 68 3.10 1.830 
23 [20] 
That the audit firm 
selected was a Big 4 firm Other 67 2.66 2.049 
Note: * Vide Table 5; Rating Score: 1 = Very Unimportant; 4 = Neutral; 7 = Very 
Important; and Sample Population: Companies. 
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Table 5: Factors Influencing External Auditor Selection Ranked According to the Mean 
Rating Scores Attributed by Auditors 
Ranking by 
Auditors 
[Ranking by 
Companies*] 
 
Factors Influencing 
External Auditor 
Selection 
Category N 
Mean 
Rating 
Std. 
Deviation 
 1 [2] 
Availability of the auditor 
when needed Behavioural 33 6.27 1.069 
2 [1] Quality of Service Economic 33 6.06 0.788 
3 [4] 
Establishing a long-term 
relationship with the 
auditor Behavioural 33 5.94 0.933 
4 [13] Audit fee Economic 33 5.94 1.197 
5 [3] 
The work proposed by 
the auditor meets the 
client's expectations Economic 33 5.85 1.034 
6 [6] 
Auditor's understanding 
of the client's business Economic 33 5.82 0.950 
 7 [17] 
Provision of a value-for-
money audit Economic 33 5.73 1.069 
8 [8] 
Auditor's experience 
within  client's industry Economic 33 5.73 1.069 
  9 [12] Provision of tax services Economic 33 5.55 1.148 
10 [14] 
Provision of advisory 
services Economic 33 5.39 1.059 
11 [5] 
Ability of the client to 
develop a good working 
relationship with the 
auditor or audit team Behavioural 33 5.39 0.966 
12 [9] Personality of the auditor Behavioural 33 5.30 1.015 
13 [10] 
Recommendation(s) 
made about the auditor Behavioural 33 5.30 1.159 
14 [17] 
The fee charged for other 
non-audit services Economic 33 4.76 1.300 
15 [11] Auditor independence  Behavioural 33 4.67 1.594 
16 [16] 
The size of the auditor's 
practice Economic 33 4.36 1.270 
17 [15] 
Provision of accounting 
services Economic 33 4.24 1.521 
18 [18] 
That the auditor does not 
perform the audit of the 
client's competitor(s) Economic 33 4.24 1.714 
19 [22] 
Global presence of the 
audit firm Economic 33 3.97 1.510 
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 Table 5 Continued     
Ranking by 
Auditors 
[Ranking by 
Companies* 
Factors Influencing 
External Auditor 
Selection 
Category N 
Mean 
Rating 
Std. 
Deviation 
20 [23] 
That the audit firm 
selected was a Big 4 firm Other 33 3.76 1.437 
21  [21] 
That the auditor selected 
was a sole practitioner Other 33 3.55 1.277 
22 [20] 
Proximity of auditor's 
office/s to client's office/s   Economic 33 3.39 1.478 
23 [19] 
That the audit firm 
selected was a non-Big 4 
firm Other 33 3.30 1.237 
Note: *Vide Table 4; Rating Score: 1 = Very Unimportant; 4 = Neutral; 7 - Very Important; 
and Sample Population: Auditors. 
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4.6  Selecting the three most important factors 
In addition to providing a rating of 1 to 7, respondents were asked to consider the 
list of 23 factors, select the three most important factors taken into consideration 
when choosing their auditor, and write them in descending order of importance. 
Tables 6 and 7 rank the factors mentioned as most important, second most 
important and third most important, as listed by clients and auditors respectively. 
The clients' perspective is presented in Table 6, and the auditors' opinion is 
presented in Table 7. 
 
 
Table 6: Top Three Factors Influencing External Auditor Selection Cited by Respondents 
Responsible for Appointing the Auditor Within Their Company 
Ranking by 
Companies 
Factors Influencing 
External Auditor 
Selection 
Individual Ranking Frequency* Factor 
Ranking 
from 
Table 4** 
Most 
Import
ant 
Second 
Most 
Important 
Third 
Most 
Important 
Total^ 
1 Quality of Service 111 171 44 32 4 
2 
Availability of the 
auditor when needed 
82 111 171 26 2 
3 Audit Fee 37 112 112 25 13 
4 
Auditor's understanding 
of the client's business 
82 83 35 19 6 
5 
Establishing a long-term 
relationship with the 
auditor 
37 64 53 14 4 
Note: * Superscripts indicate the rank of factors within each of the top three slots (thus, for 
example, three respondents cited 'audit fee' as the most important factor when choosing 
their auditor and this was the seventh most frequently cited such reason); ^ Factors are 
shown in decreasing frequency of total citations across the three top slots; ** The factor 
ranking provided in the rightmost column is shown for comparison purposes only and is 
reproduced from the rankings obtained in Table 4; and Sample Population: Companies. 
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Table 7: Top Three Factors Influencing a Client’s External  
Auditor Selection process as Cited by Practising Auditors 
Ranking by 
Companies 
Factors Influencing 
External Auditor 
Selection 
Individual Ranking Frequency* Factor 
Ranking 
from 
Table 5** 
Most 
Import
ant 
Second 
Most 
Important 
Third 
Most 
Important 
Total^ 
1 Audit Fee 101 171 44 22 4 
2 
Availability of the 
auditor when needed 
33 52 61 14 1 
3 
Establishing a long-term 
relationship with the 
auditor 
33 52 23 10 3 
4 Quality of Service 33 25 23 7 2 
5 
Auditor's experience 
within client's industry 4
2 19 19 6 8 
Note: * Superscripts indicate the rank of factors within each top three slots (thus, for example, 
five respondents cited 'establishing a long-term relationship with the auditor' as the second 
most important factor when choosing their auditor and this was the second most 
frequently cited such reason); ^Factors are shown in decreasing frequency of total citations 
across the three top slots; ** The factor ranking provided in the rightmost column is shown 
for comparison purposes only and is reproduced from the rankings obtained in Table 5; and 
Sample Population: Auditors. 
 
 
4.7  The importance of economic and behavioural factors 
4.7.1 The clients' perspective 
It is evident from the mean rating scores obtained that behavioural factors are 
slightly more important to clients when choosing their auditors, with three out of the 
top five factors being behavioural. The mean ratings shown in Table 8 confirm this 
finding, with behavioural factors obtaining a higher overall mean rating score than 
the other two categories. The p-value (0.000) obtained suggests that this result is 
not attributable to chance and can be generalized. 
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Table 8: Overall Mean Rating Scores Attributed by 
Clients to Behavioural, Economic and Other Factors 
 
Mean 
Rating 
Stf. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Behavioural Factors 5.66 1.586 0.079 5.51 5.82 
Economic Factors 4.82 1.962 0.064 4.69 4.94 
Other Factors 3.07 2.075 0.146 2.79 3.36 
Note: Rating Score: 1 = Very Unimportant, 4 = Neutral, 7 = Very Important; and Sample 
Population: Companies. 
 
 
4.7.2 The auditors' opinion 
As shown in Table 9, responses from auditors echo those elicited from companies, 
with the former attributing more importance to behavioural factors than economic 
ones. Given the p-value (0.000) obtained, this occurrence is not attributable to 
chance and can be generalized to the population of auditors. 
 
 
Table 9: Overall Mean Rating Scores Attributed by  
     Auditors to Behavioural, Economic and Other Factors 
 
Mean 
Rating 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Behavioural Factors 5.48 1.241 0.088 5.31 5.65 
Economic Factors 5.07 1.494 0.070 4.94 5.21 
Other Factors 3.54 1.320 0.113 3.27 3.80 
Note: Rating Score: 1 = Very Unimportant, 4 = Neutral, 7 = Very Important; and Sample 
Population: Companies. 
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4.8  Relationships between respondent characteristics and mean rating  
.  .....scores 
 
In addition to being asked to rate the importance attributed to influential factors, 
clients were also asked to provide information pertaining to themselves as well as 
to the company they form part of. From the analysis performed on this data, a 
number of statistically relevant relationships were identified between the rating 
scores attributed and respondent characteristics. 
 
4.8.1 Location of the company 
Respondents were asked to specify on which island their audit is held, in order to 
establish where the main activities of the company are carried out. The majority 
(92.6%) responded that their audit is held in Malta with the remainder being held in 
Gozo. As shown in Table 10, significant differences exist between the mean rating 
scores attributed to the below-mentioned factors depending on whether a 
company's audit takes place in Malta or Gozo. 
 
 Respondents from Gozo attributed more importance to each of the three 
factors listed in Table 10, compared to respondents   from   Malta.   The   largest 
difference in mean rating scores between the two categories of respondents was 
with respect to 'the proximity of the auditor's office{s) to the respondents' office(s)'. 
Respondents from Malta felt that this factor was 'slightly unimportant' (mean: 3.13), 
whereas their Gozitan counterparts thought that their prospective auditor's location 
was 'important' (mean: 5.60) when considering whom to appoint. As illustrated by 
the p-values obtained in Table 10, the relationships are not attributable to chance 
and can therefore be generalized to the population of clients in Malta and Gozo 
respectively. 
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Table 10: Mean Rating Scores Attributed to Factors Influencing 
External Auditor Selection, Depending on the Location of the Client 
Factors 
Influencing 
External 
Auditor 
Selection 
Where 
is your 
Audit 
held? 
N 
Mean 
Rating 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
p-
Value Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
That the 
auditor does 
not perform 
the audit of 
the client's 
competitor(s) 
Malta 63 3.81 2.093 0.264 3.28 4.34 
0,043 Gozo 5 5.80 2.168 0.970 3.11 7.00 
Total 68 3.96 2.147 0.260 3.44 4.48 
Proximity of 
the auditor's 
office(s) to 
the client's 
office(s) 
Malta 63 3.13 1.896 0.239 2.65 3.60 
0.031 Gozo 5 5.60 2.608 1.166 2.36 7.00 
Total 68 3.31 2.039 0.247 2.82 3.80 
Provision of 
tax services 
Malta 63 5.05 1.755 0.221 4.61 5.49 
0.024 Gozo 5 6.60 0.548 0.245 5.92 7.00 
Total 68 5.16 1.742 0.211 4.74 5.58 
Note: Rating Score: 1 = Very Unimportant, 4 = Neutral, 7 = Very Important; and Sample 
Population: Companies. 
 
 
                                                                                                                   
4.8.2 Type of audit firm selected                                                                               .                                                                        
Respondents were asked to specify the type of auditor chosen to perform their 
company's audit. As shown in Table 11, a relationship exists between the response 
to the aforementioned  question  and  the  importance  attributed  to  the  factors 
listed in the said table. Respondents that ultimately chose a Big 4 firm attributed 
more importance to an "auditor's level of industry experience" as well as to an 
'"auditor's global presence". Given the p-values obtained, the relationships 
identified in the Table 11 are not attributable to chance. 
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Table 11: Mean Rating Scores Attributed to Factors Influencing 
External Auditor Selection, Depending on the Type of Auditor Appointed 
Factors 
Influencing 
External 
Auditor 
Selection 
What type 
of Auditor 
did you 
appoint? 
N 
Mean 
Rating 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
p-Value 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Auditor's 
experience 
within the 
client's 
industry 
Big 4 14 6.21 1.578 0.422 5.30 7.00 
0.027 
Non-Big 4 27 5.30 1.436 0.276 4.73 5.86 
Sole 
Practitioner 
27 5.37 1.573 0.303 4.75 5.99 
Total 68 5.51 1.540 0.187  5.14 5.89 
Global 
presence of 
the audit 
firm 
Big 4 14 4.57 1.742 0.465 3.57 5.58 
0.003 
Non-Big 4 27 3.00 1.776 0.342 2.30 3.70 
Sole 
Practitioner 
27 2.44 1.528 0.294 1.84 3.05 
Total 68 3.10 1.830 0.222 2.66 3.55 
Note: Rating Score: 1 = Very Unimportant, 4 = Neutral, 7 = Very Important; and Sample Population: 
Companies. 
 
 
 
4.8.3 Intention to be listed on a stock exchange 
Individuals involved in the choice of their company's auditor were asked whether 
their company was, or intended to become, listed on the stock exchange at the 
time when their auditor was chosen. Based on the results presented in Table 12, a 
number of relationships were identified between the listing status of companies and 
the mean attributed to certain factors influencing external auditor selection. 
Respondents from companies that were, or intended to become, listed, in fact 
attributed greater importance to each of the five factors in Table 12. 
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Table 12: Mean Rating Scores Attributed to Factors Influencing External  
Auditor Selection, Depending on Whether a Company is  
(or Intends to Become) Listed on the Stock Exchange or not 
Factors 
Influencing 
External 
Auditor 
Selection 
Were you 
listed (or did 
you intend to 
become 
listed) on a 
stock 
exchange 
when 
choosing your 
auditor? 
N 
Mean 
Rating 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
p-Value 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Auditor's 
experience 
within the 
client's 
industry 
Yes 4 7.00 0.000 0.000 7.00 7.00 
0.011 No 64 5.42 1.541 0.193 5.04 5.81 
Total 68 5.51 1.540 0.187 5.14 5.89 
Ability to 
develop a 
good 
working 
relationshi
p with the 
auditor or 
audit team 
Yes 4 7.00 0.000 0.000 7.00 7.00 
0.032 
No 64 5.73 1.493 0.187 5.36 6.11 
Total 68 5.81 1.479 0.179 5.45 6.17 
The size of 
the 
auditor's 
practice 
Yes 4 6.00 0.000 0.000 6.00 6.00 
0.009 
 
No 64 4.03 1.573 0.197 3.64 4.42 
Total 68 4.15 1.595 0.193 3.76 4.53 
That the 
audit form 
selected 
was a Big 4 
audit firm 
Yes 4 5.50 1.732 0.866 2.74 7.00 
0.012 No 63 2.48 1.942 0.245 1.99 2.97 
Total 67 2.66 2.049 0.250 2.16 3.16 
Global 
presence of 
the audit 
firm 
Yes 4 5.50 1.000 0.500 3.91 7.00 
0.012 No 64 2.95 1.768 0.221 2.51 3.39 
Total 68 3.10 1.830 0.222 2.66 3.55 
Note: Rating Score: 1 = Very Unimportant, 4 = Neutral, 7 = Very Important; and Sample Population: 
Companies. 
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The mean rating scores differed the most with respect to 'whether the audit firm 
selected 'was a Big 4 audit firm' or not, as well as the 'global presence of the audit 
firm'. It seems that compared to a company that is not listed on a stock exchange, 
a company that is, or intends to become listed, is likely to give more importance to 
these factors when choosing its prospective auditor. Furthermore, the p-values 
obtained suggest that the relationships presented in Table 12 are not attributable to 
chance. 
 
4.8.4 Forming part of a group of companies                                             .                                                              
Clients were also asked whether their company forms a part of a group or not.  As 
exhibited in Table 13, a relationship exists between the mean rating scores 
attributed to the two factors mentioned, and whether a company forms a part of a 
group of companies or not. 
 It seems that companies that indeed form a part of a group attribute lesser 
importance to their prospective auditor's ability to provide "accounting" and 
"advisory" services, compared to those companies that do not form a part of a 
group. The p-value obtained suggests that this result is not attributable to chance 
and can therefore, be generalized to the entire population of companies. 
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Table 13: Mean Rating Scores Attributed to Factors 
 Influencing External Auditor Selection, Depending on  
Whether a Company forms Part of a Group of Companies or not 
Factors 
Influencing 
External 
Auditor 
Selection 
Does your 
company form 
part of a 
group of 
companies? 
N 
Mean 
Rating 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
p-
Value Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Provision of 
Accounting 
services  
No 38 5.29 1.659 0.269 4.74 5.83 
0.006 Yes 29 3.90 2.110 0.392 3.09 4.70 
Total 67 4.69 1.979 0.242 4.20 5.17 
Provision of 
advisory 
services 
No 38 5.32 1.694 0.275 4.76 5.87 
0.040 Yes 29 4.24 2.132 0.396 3.43 5.05 
Total 67 4.85 1.956 0.239 4.37 5.33 
Note: Rating Score: 1 = Very Unimportant, 4 = Neutral, 7 = Very Important; and Sample Population: 
Companies. 
  
4.8.5  Respondents' levels of accounting knowledge                                               .                                                      
The questionnaire sent to companies also sought to establish the level of 
accounting knowledge of respondents.                                                                           
 As shown in Table 14, the level of accounting knowledge seems to have an 
effect over the level of importance ascribed to the ability of a prospective auditor to 
provide 'accounting' and 'advisory' services.                                                              
 Clients that are not as knowledgeable in accounting seem to attribute 
greater importance to the provision of both accounting and advisory services. 
Conversely, individuals who have studied accounts up to a diploma or university 
level  are   neutral    as    to    their   auditor's   ability  to   provide   these   services
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.  Table 14: Mean Rating Scores Attributed to Factors Influencing External Auditor 
Selection, Depending on the Respondent's Level of Accounting Knowledge 
Factors 
Influencing 
External 
Auditor 
Selection 
What is your 
Level of 
Accounting 
Knowledge? 
N 
Mean 
Rating 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
p-
Value Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Provision of 
Accounting 
services  
None 5 5.60 2.074 0.927 3.03 7.00 
0.000 
Basic Level 28 5.64 1.420 0.268 5.09 6.19 
Advanced 
Level 
5 6.00 0.000 0.000 6.00 6.00 
Diploma/ 
University 
Level 
11 4.18 1.834 0.553 2.95 5.41 
Professional 
Level 
17 2.59 1.543 0.374 1.79 3.38 
Total 66 4.64 1.997 0.246 4.15 5.13 
Provision of 
advisory 
services 
None 5 5.80 2.T68 0.970 3.11 7.00 
0.000 
Basic Level 28 5.75 1.351 0.255 5.23 6.27 
Advanced 
Level 
5 6.00 0.000 0.000 6.00 6.00 
Diploma/   
University 
Level 
11 4.18 1.537 0.464 3.15 5.21 
Professional 
Level 
17 3.29 2.085 0.506 2.22 4.37 
Total 66 4.88 1.926 0.237 4.41 5.35 
Note: Rating Score: 1 = Very Unimportant, 4 = Neutral, 7 = Very Important; and Sample Population: 
Companies. 
                                                                                                                     
Furthermore respondents possessing a professional level of accounting knowledge 
claim that they view these factors as 'slightly unimportant' to them when selecting 
an auditor. The p-values obtained suggest that these findings are not attributable to 
chance and can thus be generalized to the population of respondents. 
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5.  Discussion on findings 
With a multitude of auditors to choose from, Maltese and Gozitan companies alike, 
without a doubt, had to develop a set of criteria against which they can assess and 
make a final selection as to whom they would appoint as their auditor. This section 
discusses the major findings that have emanated from the study, outlining those 
decisive factors upon which individuals ultimately decide whom to appoint. 
 
5.1  What influences a client's decision? The quality dilemma 
Clients evaluate their prospective auditors primarily on the 'quality of service' that 
can be offered to them. Nevertheless, when asked whether they associate the size 
of the auditor with a particular level of quality, as postulated by DeAngelo (1981), 
companies generally disagreed, leading to the question of how is quality indeed 
assessed and measured in the Maltese Islands? If 'quality' is of such fundamental 
importance to clients then there must surely be a way of measuring it. 
 
5.1.1 Availability of the auditor 
A possible measure of quality could be the 'availability of the auditor' once 
appointed. Companies expect their auditor to be on hand when needed and not 
only meet the management once a year, during the annual audit. An auditor should 
therefore strive to build a strong, long- term business relationship with his client, 
offering invaluable advice and support that goes beyond his clients' expectations. 
This could provide the level of quality that companies seem to have come to 
presume from their auditor. 
 
5.1.2 Size of the audit practice 
In the case of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs), a larger audit firm 
does not imply better quality. This is possibly a result of their experience with larger 
firms who at times view SMEs as being too small, consequently not dedicating 
enough time, attention or senior personnel to these clients. 
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On the other hand, the size of an audit practice can be an indication of 
quality amongst some clients such as those that are thinking of going public. Such 
clients believe the larger size of an auditor to be commensurate to better quality, 
possibly implying that to these businesses a larger audit firm is able to bring a 
better reputation to their company through brand awareness and the global 
presence of their audit firm. Listed companies almost exclusively opt for a Big 4 
audit, suggesting that as Maltese companies and the Maltese stock exchange 
continue to grow and mature, the demand for the services of Big 4 firms may 
likewise expand. 
 
5.2  Relationships or economics: what do clients prefer? 
Magri and Baldacchino (2004) had established that while earlier foreign studies cite 
economic factors as being prevalent with respect to auditor change, in Malta  
importance was being attributed to both economic and behavioural factors. The 
results of the present study go a step further, indicating that when choosing an 
auditor, clients tend to place more weight on behavioural factors compared to 
those of economic nature. This confirms the suggestions made to auditors by 
Kuenzel and Krolikowska (2007), investing in good client-auditor relations and 
taking every opportunity to pass on advice can be of long-term benefit to a firm, 
and help increase client loyalty. It seems that, other than fulfilling statutory 
requirements, clients in Malta seek to establish a personal relationship with their 
auditor, partner or audit team. This bias toward behavioural factors may arise due 
to the fact that Malta is a mini-state in which importance is given to familiarity and 
acquaintances. 
5.3 Evaluating the audit fee 
Beattie and Fearnley (1998) found that the 'audit fee' is usually the most frequently 
cited factor influencing auditor choice. However, the present study found that this 
was not reflected in the Maltese scenario. Clients give much less importance to the 
fee when choosing their first auditor, ranking this below factors such as the 
'personality of an auditor' and an 'auditor's independence'. Nevertheless, auditors   
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 seem to have the impression that their clients give noticeably more importance to 
the audit fee, possibly suggesting that during negotiations with their auditors, 
clients place more weight on the audit fee than they are willing to admit.  
 
 Another possible explanation to this ostensible inconsistency is that, while 
clients have a number of expectations from their auditor, including "quality of 
service", "availability", "proposed work", "understanding of the business and 
industry" and the "provision of non-audit services", if their auditor fails to meet 
these expectations, they will cite the audit fee as being too high. 
 
5.4 Across the channel 
Clients in Gozo, Malta's sister-island, feel that an 'auditor's location' is more 
important to them compared to their counterparts in Malta. Gozitans also feel that 
they are uncomfortable appointing an auditor who also 'audits their competitors', 
this possibly being a characteristic of a limited market with only a few players within 
each segment. Companies operating in such an environment may become extra 
vigilant in trying to prevent their competitors from gaining information about their 
operations. This may imply that a company in Gozo has a limited choice of auditors 
if it wants to avoid those auditors that audit its competitors, while at the same time 
appointing an auditor that is located close to its place of operation. This quest for 
auditor independence may further imply that there exists a market for Maltese 
auditors in Gozo. However, auditors and audit firms should become aware that if 
they intend to win clients on Malta's smaller sister-island, they must consider how 
to appear more accessible, possibly opening an office on the island, or visiting 
clients more regularly. 
 
5.5  Comparing perceptions 
Upon comparing the responses elicited from both clients and auditors, it was 
established that similarities indeed existed, with some responses being identical to 
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prospective clients are looking for in an auditor. One can only hope that, other than 
merely being aware of what influences clients when selecting their auditor, 
practitioners will actually strive to provide their customers with what they desire. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
Perhaps one of the main conclusions of this study is that the all-important factor 
influencing external auditor selection is the 'quality of service' that the client 
expects his auditor to provide once appointed. Coupled with the overall importance 
attributed to factors of 'behavioural' nature, this may imply that clients in Malta look 
for more than just the lowest audit fee that they can find. In addition it was also 
observed that quality is not determined by the size of the audit firm, but possibly by 
"the availability of an auditor" and the ability to develop a "long-term working 
relationship with an auditor". 
 
 The study also determined that while clients did not rank the audit fee as 
one of the topmost influential factors, the fee was indeed one of the most 
frequently cited issues when clients were asked to mention the three most 
important factors influencing their choice of auditor. It may be inferred from this 
apparent inconsistency that when clients mention that the fee per se has 
influenced their decision, it may actually be that other – perhaps unquantifiable –
factors really influenced their choice of auditor. 
 
 In general it was also noted that auditors possess a fairly accurate 
understanding of what clients value most when appointing their prospective 
auditors. Nevertheless, despite the similarities, it was interesting to observe that, in 
the auditors' opinion, clients give considerably more importance to the audit fee 
when selecting their auditor. 
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The discussion and conclusion emanating from the study imply that auditors need 
to strive to provide value throughout the course of the statutory audit. Clients are 
not only interested in an auditor's technical knowledge, but would like to choose an 
auditor who they believe will give them time and build a strong working relationship 
with client management. 
 
 The results of our study are subject to the following limitations. Responses 
were received from a limited number of clients and auditors. Keeping this in mind, 
wherever the chi-squared test was performed, only significant relationships (with a 
p-value <0.05) have been presented. Further research is necessary to verify the 
validity of the results of this paper to other countries by replicating this research 
with other companies and auditors in other economies, particularly island-states.  
 
 
References 
Regulatory 
Accountancy Board  (2004). Ministry of Finance,  Government  of   Malta.  Code  of  
 Ethics for Warrant Holders, Malta.                                                                  
Companies Act - Malta, 1995.  Chapter 386 of the  laws of Malta. 
Eighth Directive (2006), EU Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament   and  
 of the Council. 
Sarbanes, P. (2002).  Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002.     In    The      Public    Company 
 Accounting    Reform  and  Investor  Protection   Act.  Washington   DC:  US 
 Congress.   
 
Other 
Addams, H.L. and Davis, B. (1994).  Privately held  companies  report  reasons  for      
 selecting  and switching auditors. The CPA Journal, 64(8):38.                                   
Chapter 7                               Factors Influencing First-Time External Audit Selection in Malta [AUD-5]   
220 
Beattie, V. and Fearnley, S. (1995). The importance  of   audit   firm  characteristics 
 and  the drivers of auditor  change  in  UK  listed   companies.     Accounting   
 and Business Research, 25 (100): 227-239.                                                              
Beattie, V. and Fearnley, S.(1998). Audit market competition: auditor changes and  
 the  impact  of   tendering.  The  British Accounting Review, 30 (3): 261-289. 
Crouch, T. (2004). Seven-year auditor rotation: 
 http://www.auditnet.org/articles/TC%2OSeven%20Year%20Auditor%20 
 Rotation. htm  [21 April, 2007]. 
DeAngelo, L. E. (1981). Auditor size and audit quality. Journal of  Accounting and    
 Economics, December: 183-199. 
Francis, J.R. and Wilson, E.R. (1988).  Auditor  changes:   A  joint  test  of  theories 
 relating to agency  costs  and  auditor  differentiation.   Accounting   Review: 
 663-682. 
Gaa, J.C. (2005).  Accounting  ethics. In Werhane, P. H.  and Freeman, R.E. (eds). 
  Business   Ethics,  The  Blackwell  Encyclopaedia   of   Management :   1-7, 
 Blackwell Publishing, Maiden, MA. 
Galdes, J. (1994). The selection of statutory auditors: an  analysis  of  Maltese  and  
 foreign  practices.   B. Accountancy (Hons)    dissertation,    Department    of    
 Accountancy, University of Malta.                                                                   
Glass Lewis & Co. (2006). Mum's the word:                                                          
 http://  www.soxfirst.com/50226711/Auditor7o20Turnover.pdf. [14 October,  
 2007].                                                                                                     
Hawkes, A. (2006). Big Four and beyond: Is bigger better?: 
 http://www.accountancyage.com/accountancyage/analysis/2T71153/bigger-
 better. [8 August , 2007].                                                                             
Keating, E.K., Fischer, M., Gordon, T.  and  Greenlee, J. (2003).      The     relation 
 between auditor  selection and  adverse   audit    findings:   examination   of    
 nonprofits subject to the Single Audit Act. In ARNOVA Conference(January).                                                                               
Krell, E (2006).  The New Dynamics   of   Auditor   Selection.    Business   Finance, 
 November: 18.                                                                                         
Chapter 7                               Factors Influencing First-Time External Audit Selection in Malta [AUD-5]   
221 
Kuenzel, S. and Krolikowska, E., 2007.   Client   loyalty:   play   the    loyalty     card 
 Accountancy Age:   
 http://vww.accountancyage.com/accountancyage/features/2188173/client- 
 loyalty-play-loyalty [21 October , 2007].                                                         
Magri, J. and Baldacchino, P.J., 2004. Factors   contributing    to    auditor- change 
 decisions in Malta. Managerial Auditing Journal, 19(7): 956-968.                   
Monks, J. (2007). True Value of Your Services  Because You're Worth it .   Best 
 Practice Magazine :                                      
 https://www.thepacepartners.com/the-true-value-of-your-services-because-
 youre-worth-it [18 October, 2007].                                                                   
Oxera, C.L.  (2006), Competition and choice in the UK audit market:  
 http://www.frc.org. uk/documents/pagemanager/frcCompetition %2 Oand 
 %20choice %20in%20the%20UK%20audit%20market.pdf. [1September, 
 2006].                                                                                      
PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2005) (PwC).  Corporate  Governance  toolkit  for  small 
 and medium enterprises, PwC Australia.                                                     
Simons, D., 2011.  Lowballing    and    learning    effects.      Betriebswirtschaftliche   
 Forschung und Praxis: BFuP, 63 (2): 160-179.                                                                        
Stokes, D. B. (1992). The  market   for   audit   services:    Evidence    from    audit   
 firm mergers. Paper   presented   at    the    Annual    Conference    of    the   
 American Association, USA.                                                                                        
Sukhraj. P. (2007).  Hundred  group:  auditors   are   too   combative.  Accountancy  
 Age: 
 http://vwvw.accountancyage.com/accountancyage/news/2201M18/hundred-
 groupslams- auditors [18 October, 2007].                                                                
Tabone, N. and Baldacchino, P.J., (2003).   The  statutory audit of owner-managed 
 companies in Malta. Managerial Auditing Journal, 18 (5): 387-398.           
Turpen, R.A. (1995).   Audit fees - What research tells us. The CPA Journal,  65(1): 
 54.
Chapter 8                                              An Analysis of the Development of Audit Fees in Malta [AUD-6]   
222 
CHAPTER 8 
 
 
An Analysis of the Development of Audit Fees in Malta 
                                                                                              [AUD 6] 
 
Baldacchino, P.J.1 and Borg, J.2 
 
 
The IUP Journal of Accounting Research and Audit Practices 
 
 
Vol X111, Issue 2, 2014, pp. 27-52 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Head and Senior Lecturer, Department of Accountancy, Faculty of Economics,          
. Management and Accountancy, University of Malta. 
  E-mail: peter.j.baldacchino@um.edu.mt 
2 Associate, Malta Institute of Accountants and A/Lecturer, University of Malta 
 
Chapter 8                                              An Analysis of the Development of Audit Fees in Malta [AUD-6]   
223 
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This paper seeks to assess the development of the pricing of statutory audits in 
Malta over time, with a view of changes in its determinants, the Global Financial 
Crisis (GFC) and other potentially significant events. The findings reveal that there 
seems to be a general difficulty in realigning the audit fee in response to variations 
in its drivers, with a degree of price rigidity or stickiness being attributed to 
elements of imperfect competition and imperfect information in the market. The 
study also suggests the prevalence of implicit contracts between audit firms other 
than the Big 4 and their audit clients in order to mitigate the increase in audit fees 
expected since the recent GFC from 2008. Such behaviour needs to be studied 
more deeply to understand its persuasiveness across other microstates. 
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1.  Introduction 
Every limited liability company incorporated in Malta is required by law to appoint a 
qualified independent auditor registered with the local accountancy board, with the 
remuneration thereof being defined rather unclearly in the Companies Act (Cap. 
386 of the Laws of Malta) as including 'sums paid in respect of expenses'. 
 
The audit fee constitutes one of the audit engagement's terms that, as per 
ISA 210 (IFAC, 2009a), must be agreed to by the auditor and management (or 
those charged with governance). In so far as its estimation is concerned, Dickins et 
al. (2008) argue that it is not only an art, but also a science. In fact, a number of 
researchers have opted to scientifically examine the correlation between different 
variables and the pricing of audits, especially since the seminal work of Simunic 
(1980).  
 
Moreover, Hay et al. (2006) have interestingly put forward a meta-analysis 
of audit fee models, which indicates that the significance of such variables can 
change overtime. To this end, Raluca (2011) has identified the recent Global 
Financial Crisis (GFC) from 2008 as an important breaking point for the behaviour 
of the audit fee.  
 
This study contributes to the existing stream of research by somewhat 
complementing the work by Baldacchino et al. (2013). In fact, while Baldacchino et 
al. (2013) have been the first to empirically analyze the factors influencing the 
pricing of external audit services in the Maltese environment, the main objective of 
this longitudinal study is to arrive at evidence on trends or developments in such 
audit fees and the impact of their determinants overtime.  
 
Understanding whether the influence of such determinants has changed 
over time should help auditors answer questions like whether they have been able 
to align the engagement fee with the client risk involved, perhaps instituting 
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revisions to their processes for setting audit fees as a result. Meanwhile, the 
management can be made aware of how shifts in the company can lead to either 
an increase or a decrease in the audit fee charged. Furthermore, it will be 
interesting to see whether, especially with a view of the financial turbulence during 
the end of the last decade, the external auditor's/compensation is exhibiting some 
general upward or  downward pattern.  
 
The present research aims to assess the stability or otherwise of the audit 
fee in the Maltese environment and its development in relation to changes in its 
drivers over the period under examination by asking the following research 
questions:  
 How have audit fees in Malta reacted to movements in their 
determinants between 2004 and 2011?  
 What trends are being exhibited by the audit fee in the Maltese 
environment during the period under study?  
 What relevance, if any, have the GFC and other events had on the 
prices charged in the Maltese audit market?  
 
The paper is structured as follows: after a brief introduction of the topic at 
hand, an assessment is made of the literature tackling audit fees and their 
development over time. Subsequently, the method adopted for obtaining the 
relevant data is described, the results of which are then presented and analyzed 
with a view of the literature in the field. This is followed by a summary of the most 
relevant facts, together with the concluding remarks, limitations encountered and 
recommendations. 
 
2. Literature review 
2.1  Audit fee determinants 
Numerous studies have been carried out worldwide over the past 30 years to 
investigate which factors influence the pricing of external audit services, and this by 
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providing empirical evidence on the relationship between the audit fee charged and 
the attributes of the companies audited. Pioneering in this regard has been the 
seminal paper by Simunic, dating back to 1980.  
 
Such models are based on historical research of a cross-sectional nature, 
relying on data drawn from a short period of time (like a single year) and modelling 
the audit fee as a function of a number of independent variables. The main audit 
fee determinants are largely auditee size, complexity and risk. However, these are 
usually accompanied by parameters for the size of the auditor and a host of other 
factors used more or less sporadically accordingly. 
 
2.1.1 Client size 
Client size is included as one of the audit fee determinants across virtually all 
published literature (Hay et al., 2006), with the natural log of the auditee's total 
assets typically used as a proxy (Al-Harshani, 2008). A significant positive 
association is expected a priori, consistent with the hypothesis that, ceteris paribus, 
the larger the client, the greater the workload to complete the audit and the greater 
will be the price charged (Zhang and Myrteza, 1996).  
 
Meanwhile, Chan et al. (1993) contend that turnover should be used to 
measure size, especially where the audit approach is not based on the balance 
sheet as traditionally is the case, even though this has problems too in terms of the 
effect of corporate policy, capital intensity and varying definitions thereof (Naser et 
al., 2007). 
 
2.1.2 Client complexity 
Hay et al. (2006, p.169) state that "the empirical evidence strongly supports 
a positive relationship between complexity and audit fees". Eighty-two of the 
studies analyzed by these authors include the number of subsidiaries as a 
surrogate, in line with the conjecture that auditing many branches is associated 
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with embarking on additional work (Ho and Ng, 1996) and a more resource-
consuming audit (Hackenbrack and Knechel,1997), for which a higher price should 
be charged.  
 
2.1.3 Risk  
Simunic (1980) penned that the pricing of audit services is not only a function of 
the cost of performing the audit (including a normal return), but a premium is also 
added by audit firms to compensate themselves for potential losses. However, 
Jubb et al. (1996) argue that multivariate audit fee modelling should employ 
different measures recognizing different components of this concept of 'risk'.  
 
2.1.4 Other contributing factors  
Auditor size 
Different studies ask whether the type of auditor affects the audit fee, with a variety 
of answers being obtained after relying on a dichotomous variable to distinguish 
between large and small audit firms. On the one hand, consider the findings of 
Langendijk (1997), evidencing that large audit firms do not charge significantly 
higher prices in the Netherlands. However, Palmrose (1986) argues that some kind 
of mark-up is requested by auditors of a large size as a signal of greater quality, 
with Shapiro (1983) evidencing a premium that "provides a flow of profits that 
compensate the seller for the resources expended in building up the reputation"  
(p. 678).  
 
The so-called Big 4 are perceived by auditees on the demand side to be 
more able in the delivery of the audit itself due to such aspects as their 
international coverage (Oxera Consulting, 2006), for example, explaining the 
estimates of Chen and Hsu (2009), who indicate an average audit fee premium of 
15.6%. 
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Company status 
 A public limited company is charged an audit fee that is significantly higher than 
that charged to its private counterpart (Clatworthy and Peel, 2007), with listed 
entities requiring greater audit work (Langendijk, 1997). Such surcharge in the 
case of public enterprises may be reflecting the additional experience required by 
the auditor to ensure compliance with specific rules and regulations (Dickins et al., 
2008).  
 
Initial audit engagements 
 Ho and Ng (1996) expect an increase in the audit fee justifying the additional costs 
incurred in an initial audit engagement, say as auditors will spend time familiarizing 
themselves with the client's operations and accounting systems. This is in addition 
to the notion envisaged by Van (2010) that a new client relationship poses a prime 
inherent risk for audit firms, resulting in a higher price being charged.  
 
On the other hand, note that DeAngelo (1981) presents a model predicting 
what is known as 'low-balling', or the alleged tendency for the auditor to charge a 
lower price for new audits with a view to recovering any losses in subsequent years 
(Simon and Francis,1988). 
 
Same as predictions in the theoretical literature, empirical evidence is mixed 
with respect to low-balling. For instance, whereas Sankaraguruswamy et al. (2012) 
find substantial increases for the second audit year, Craswell and Francis (1999) 
report fee discounting only when the initial audit in question involves an upgrade in 
audit quality. Furthermore, new clients have been found by Niemi (2002) to pay 
higher fees. 
 
2.1.5 Maltese-specific factors  
The findings of Baldacchino et al. (2013) indicate that companies owned by 
foreigners tend to pay higher audit fees than those owned by the locals in Malta. 
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Cognizance should also be taken of another Malta-specific factor as per 
Baldacchino et al. (2013), stating that relatively lower fees are charged to entities 
under government ownership. This differential can be explained by the idea put 
forward by Rubin (1988) that the public sector involves a divergence from the 
private sector even in terms of the procedures surrounding the auditing contracting 
process. 
 
2.2  Audit fee movement over time 
Despite the audit market being studied extensively in both developed countries 
(like the US, the UK and Australia) and emerging economies (like Hong Kong, 
Malaysia and Jordan), academic literature contains very little by way of systematic 
analysis of the long-term behaviour of audit fees paid to external auditors. 
 
2.2.1 Trends in audit fee from the 1980s 
The findings of Carson et al. (2003) suggest a 'mature' audit market in Australia 
since, in real terms, audit fees have been relatively stable over the period of 16 
years between 1984 and 1999. Parallels can be drawn with the evidence of Menon 
and Williams (2001) using the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
filings, finding that audit fees remained flat in the 1990s.  
 
The more recent panel dataset by Oxera Consulting (2006) for the UK 
evidences an average increase of 11.7% per annum between 1995 and 2004, with 
a faster growth rate registered as from 2000. This is consistent with the analysis of 
496 of the S&P 500 companies by Ciesielski and Weirich (2006), finding a 103% 
increase in total audit and related fees during the period 2001-2004. More 
specifically, using median results, Markelevich et al. (2005) quote a rise in audit 
fees of approximately 80% from $239,000 in 2000 to $430,000 in 2003.  
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This upward trend is somewhat confirmed by Audit Analytics (2011) data, 
showing that accelerated filers with the SEC witnessed a rise in audit fees as a 
percentage of the revenue earned between 2002 and 2009. On the contrary, 
Waresul and Hasan (2012) document declining audit fees after adjusting for 
inflation in Bangladesh between 1990 and 2003. The authors note how such a 
phenomenon can have long-term implications as it might drive talented individuals 
away from the profession. 
 
2.2.2 Audit fee stickiness and price rigidities 
Price changes have been found to be less frequent for services than for goods by 
Bils and Klenow (2004), despite their failing to specifically include the statutory 
audit in their analysis. However, using data for the US firms, Zhang et al. (2011) 
identify such rigidity for audit fees too, in the sense that they do not immediately or 
fully adjust to changes in their determinants as predicted by a standard audit fee 
model. This is because such traditional models are implicitly based on the 
assumption of a frictionless auditing market, with Ferguson et al. (2005) also 
discussing how both imperfect competition and imperfect information contribute to 
this sluggishness.  
 
Note that the study by Ferguson et al. (2005) attributes the considerable 
difference in the explanatory power between levels and first differences 
specifications of the audit fee to the presence of pricing frictions in the auditing 
market. Evidencing such difference in explanatory power is the model developed 
by Ghosh and Lustgarten (2006), yielding an R2 of almost 77% when estimated at 
levels and approximately 12% in first differences form. 
 
Delving deeper into the matter, Carson et al. (2003) find only changes in the 
client size and non-audit fee variables as significantly accounting for variations in 
the price charged per annum, thus appearing to reject the notion of sensitivity to 
the likes of changes in the client's complexity and risk over time. 
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2.3  The global financial crisis 
The GFC has reignited interest in the profile of the auditing profession as a whole 
(ACCA, 2011). For example, one can refer to literature dealing with how the extent 
of modifications, auditor turnover and auditor resignation has changed in recent 
years (Chen and Zhang, 2012).  
 
 Furthermore, Raluca (2011) identifies the GFC as a breaking point for the 
behaviour of the audit fee over time, comparable to the Savings and Loan Crisis in 
the US during the 1980s (Doogar et al., 2012). In fact, Chen and Zhang (2012) find 
the significantly higher audit fee charged during the post-financial crisis period as 
an indication of a higher audit workload.  
 
The GFC has caused a change in auditor behaviour in response to a higher 
risk being perceived in an environment largely characterized by financially 
distressed clients (Xu et al., 2011). More specifically, Mautz and Sharaf (1961) 
argue that auditors increase their professional skepticism and audit effort in similar 
situations.  
 
On the other hand, Ettredge et al. (2011) find that as much as 49.6% of the 
sampled clients have managed to exert fee pressure on their auditor and obtained 
concessions to relieve some of the economic hardship with the recession. 
Therefore, despite changes in their clients' characteristics (such as increased size, 
complexity and other audit cost drivers), auditors seem not to have responded by 
increasing their audit work and the resultant audit fee as expected. 
 
2.4  Other potentially significant events 
The extant foreign literature suggests that  certain  unique or one-off developments 
may have a considerable impact on the audit fee charged from one year to another 
by having a direct bearing on the world of auditing. 
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2.4.1 New auditing standards and other regulatory influences  
Menon and Williams (2001) note a significant increase in audit fees in 1988, when 
the Auditing Standards Board issued the so-called 'expectation gap' standards. 
Wong (2009) also states that the change in the regulatory environment has been 
the most significant for the development of audit fees in Australia in the 2000s.  
 
Hard facts point out to a rise in audit and related fees of as much as 41% in 
2004 alone (Ciesielski and Weirich, 2006). Similarly, Audit Analytics (2011) reports 
a 45.52% increase in the average amount of audit fees paid by SEC accelerated 
filers per $1 million in revenue between 2003 and 2004. As confirmed by Pandit 
and Rubenfield (2010), this major spike is attributed to a large extent to be in 
compliance with Section 404 of SOX, specifically mandating auditors to attest that 
the client's control system is functioning adequately.  
 
2.4.2 Changing competitive dynamics of the auditing industry  
Maher et al. (1992) report a decrease in real audit fees between 1977 and 1981, 
when the auditing profession apparently increased competition in the market for 
independent audit services by removing restrictions. Meanwhile, the 1998 merger 
between PriceWaterhouse and Coopers & Lybrand affected market concentration 
as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, leading to a price increase in the 
audit market (Oxera Consulting, 2006).  
 
 On the other hand, Pong (2004) concludes that as the dominance of few 
large firms increased, the market actually experienced a 9.7% decrease in 
inflation-adjusted audit fees between 1991 and 1995, rather than higher charges.  
 
2.4.3 Audit technology and productivity improvements  
Once productivity in auditing improves (such as through the use of audit software), 
audit effort and the resultant fee charged should fall, as confirmed by Wong (2009).  
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More specifically, Menon and Williams (2001) opine that integrating 
technology into the audit process leads to a more structured approach, which in 
turn should result in increased cost-effectiveness as per the findings of Gist (1994). 
 
2.4.4 Looking into the future 
Note that as there is expected to be a growing demand for more regular reporting 
in the future (ACCA, 2011), more work will be done by the auditor, possibly being 
translated into higher prices.  
 
It is also worth considering the possible impact on audit fees of the 
measures proposed by the Green Paper of the European Commission  (COM, 
2010) with the aim of providing for the improvement of the profession. These 
include joint audits, with Andre et al. (2013) finding significantly higher audit fees 
where this is a mandatory requirement. 
 
3.  Data and methodology 
3.1  Research design 
On the basis of its raison d'être, this study employs a mixed approach. In fact, a 
dynamic model of audit fees largely involving first differences is combined with a 
series of semi-structured interviews involving open-ended questions. Such 
respective quantitative and qualitative methods are viewed as complementary, in 
line with the notion of triangulation. 
 
Rather than a levels specification as per the study conducted locally by 
Baldacchino et al. (2013) and much of the international research dealing with audit 
fees, changes analysis is used here to examine directly whether variations in the 
audit fee from one year to another are brought about by changes in its 
determinants. Definitions of the potential determinants of inter-company audit fee 
changes are given in Appendix 1. Hence, inferring the temporal development in 
audit fees from cross-sectional differences is avoided (Ghosh and Lustgarten, 
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2006). Using first differences also has the advantage of naturally controlling for the 
impact of correlated omitted variable bias, which typically arises when estimating a 
cross-sectional regression (Haw et al., 2012).  
 
More specifically, proxies have been taken for the determinants of the 
auditor's remuneration discussed in the preceding section, with first differences 
being calculated where necessary. The model was revisited after conducting 
preliminary semi-structured interviews, when the paramount importance of 
considering the lagged values within the Maltese context immediately emerged.  
 
In fact, 10 interviews with audit partners from Big 4 and other audit firms 
supplement results from the model as practitioners share with the researcher their 
knowledge and experience of the development of the auditing market in Malta. 
Broad and non-directional questions have been asked, "starting with words like 
'what' and 'how' to encourage descriptions by the respondents revolving around the 
objective and research questions of this study. 
 
3.2  Data collection  
Publicly available data is used, in line with prior audit fee studies, following the 
manual perusal of the financial statements submitted by the sampled companies 
since such information is not readily available in a database.                                                       
 
 Official lists of public and private limited liability companies in Malta have 
been obtained from the Registry of Companies as per Figure 1. The relevant 
number of active companies excludes shipping companies (which are not required 
to file a copy of their annual accounts with the Registrar of Companies).  
 
 Note that this empirical study manages to take into consideration a time 
period spanning over the eight years between  2004  and  2011  by  making use  of 
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panel data, with the same cross-sectional entity being repeatedly surveyed over 
the years under scrutiny. Thus, the model findings are based upon a sample of 880 
firm-years relating to 110 individual and unique active companies in Malta during 
the period that has been chosen with significance being tested at 0.05 level. 
 
4.  Results and discussion 
4.1  Determinants of changes in audit fee 
4.1.1 What drives a change in audit fees from one year to another?  
Two coefficients were found to be statistically significant at 95% confidence level, 
with their significance values given in Table 1.  
 
 Furthermore, as expected a priori, the identified relationships are positive as 
evidenced by the β coefficients in Table 2.  Therefore, it seems that changes in the 
audit client's asset base and number of subsidiaries (surrogating for the auditee's 
size and complexity respectively) contribute with a one-period lag to explaining the 
Figure 1: Population of Public and Private Limited Companies in Malta 
 
Total number of companies as on November 1, 2012: 
58,069 
 
Active companies registered until December 31, 2011: 
29,530 
 
Active companies registered until December 31, 2003: 
13,047 
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change in the engagement fee. This can be explained by reference to the changing 
investment in resources for the auditing process (Simunic, 1980). 
 
Table 1: Results of Tests of Between-Subject Effects 
 Type III 
Sum of 
Square 
df Mean 
Square 
F-Value Sig. 
LAGChgLNA
SSETS 0.766 1 0.766 6.402 0.012 
LAGChgSUB 11 1 0.874 7.308 0.007 
 
 
Table 2: Parameter Estimates 
  
Β 
 
Std. 
Error 
 
t-Value 
 
Sig. 
95% of Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
LAGChgLNASSETS 0.088 0.035 2.530 0.012 0.020 0.155 
LAGChgSUBS 0.052 0.019 2.703 0.007 0.014 0.091 
 
Logically, it follows that an increase in the audit client's size should be 
accompanied by expanding effort on the audit, say as more individual items will 
need to be scrutinized to give the same level of assurance on the population 
(Simunic, 1980), as mentioned by audit partners interviewed: "If the sheer amount 
of what you have to audit were to increase, this would be more-or-less matched 
with an increase in the number of hours allotted to that engagement." 
 
Similarly, Hackenbrack and Knechel (1997) argue that audits of complex 
entities consume more labour resources, explaining the positive relationship 
between complexity and audit fees that has been empirically noted. In fact, 
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practitioners have pointed out that a revision upwards of the audit fee is also likely 
to be necessary when the audit client  "implements a new computerized system" or 
"automates its processes", in which case specialists in the field will need to be 
relied upon.  
 
Another auditee-specific factor, which has emerged from the semi-
structured interviews, is "how organized that audit client is". Due to the integrity of 
internal controls and the quality of internal documentation being questionable, the 
auditor will have "to dig deeper" before reaching an objective. This affects the time 
spent on the job and can lead to cost overruns having a bearing on the price 
charged for the following year's audit engagement.  
 
4.1.2 How stable is the audit fee in relation to changes in its determinants?  
Blinder (1991) finds how there is a lag ranging from three to four months for price 
adjustments following significant demand or cost shocks. In parallel, changes in 
auditee size and complexity have here been found to contribute with an annual lag 
to explaining audit fee changes. This is opposed to the case with the standard 
audit fee models that, being built on a static framework, assume full price changes 
within a single period.  
 
This notion of a one-period delay to intra-company audit fee changes is also 
supported by the finding that challenges encountered during the audit vis-ά-vis the 
auditee's system are "taken into account when quoting the price for the following 
engagement". Therefore, in line with the international findings of Zhang et al. 
(2011) and Ferguson et al. (2005), it seems that audit fees in Malta do not seem to 
respond instantaneously to the forces of demand and supply. 
 
Furthermore, given that we cannot generalize with 95% confidence about 
the significance of the other coefficients from the dynamic audit fee model 
attempted, it appears that auditors in the Maltese environment are unable to 
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institute price changes for audit engagements in response to variations in certain 
auditee characteristics and other factors like risk (Full results of dynamic model of 
audit fees are presented in Appendix 2). This can lead to courses of action like 
putting in less auditing effort, which perhaps compromises audit quality. 
 
4.1.3 What relevance do the Maltese-specific factors have when it comes to  
 changing audit fees? 
Foreign ownership 
Businesses coming in from abroad are used for paying larger sums of money for 
professional services and, in the words of the interviewees, they seem to be "more 
willing and able to pay a higher price" for the statutory audit.  
 
Audit services tend to be loss-leaders that open the door to more lucrative 
non-audit services like consultancy. However, foreign-owned entities "are perhaps 
the best audit clients to have, because they are very likely to be profitable in 
themselves". 
 
Foreign firms "typically accept changes more easily" when the audit partner 
feels that an increase is due as they are accustomed to paying more as audit fees 
abroad. However, this discrepancy is not the only reason, because international 
companies with overseas shareholding have been described as "appreciating more 
what goes into an audit" and "being pretty favourably impressed with the quality of 
our work".  
 
Therefore, not only are foreign-owned firms typically charged more than 
their local counterparts (Baldacchino et al., 2013), but audit fees seem to be less 
sticky here. This promises an advantage so much so that a possible strategic 
avenue is envisaged with an auditor focusing solely on a portfolio of international 
audit clients, even though there would be little room for manoeuvre here if the audit 
fees were to be negotiated at the group level.  
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Government involvement 
 From the interviews, it has emerged how value-for-money is a very important 
consideration where significant government involvement is concerned. For 
example, it has been mentioned how parliamentary questions might come into play 
to expose the audit fee being charged, so "the cheapest-is-best attitude is 
favoured".  
 
Notwithstanding that, audit partners have highlighted how state-owned 
enterprises are gradually moving away from the mere lowest bid rule, with certain 
recent tenders that are including different specifications (in terms of experience 
and so on), which serve as criteria to be met for the statutory audit to be provided.  
 
Note that, on the contrary, a number of audit partners have expressed how 
their audit firms do not bid for audits of state-owned auditees, usually involving 
hourly rates that are "lower than that paid to the maid". Furthermore, interviewees 
have described it as being "something very sad" that government tenders typically 
have a clause stipulating that the cheapest auditor will be chosen.  
 
Therefore, the degree of price-competitiveness is somewhat less in the case 
of companies that are in the hands of the public, in the sense that there is more 
openness to a warranted change in audit fees. This can be attributed to the idea 
that the traditional private audit client attaches a value to the relationship and 
sense of mutual trust built with the auditor, and will not easily replace such auditor 
with a less expensive one. 
 
4.2 Recent trends in the audit fee 
4.2.1 What brings about this rigidity of audit fees in the Maltese environment? 
The descriptive statistics given in Table 3 show that the mean change in audit fees 
for the sample of companies chosen was approximately 11.6%. However, the 
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median result is reported to be 0%, suggesting that changes in the pricing of 
statutory audits are generally not very high. 
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Median SD Minimum Maximum 
ChgAUDFEE 0.116 0 0.349 -0.688 4 
LAGChgLNASSETS 0.038 0.021 0.456 -6.496 3.464 
LAGChgSUBS 0.04 0 0.699 -4 10 
 
In fact, from the distribution of the actual changes in the audit fee as per the 
sample taken into consideration, we immediately spot a considerably large spike 
around the level of 0, as shown in the histogram presented in Figure 2.              
 
 Delving deeper into the matter, a relatively high incidence of no actual audit 
fee change in the sample taken into consideration can be noted from Table 4.        
 
 This suggests an element of sluggishness in audit fees, which can be 
attributed to frictions in the auditing market brought about by the following issues:  
 
Imperfect competition 
Explicit contracts: From the interviews, it emerged how contracts can be explicitly 
entered into for the provision of statutory audit services that fix a price even for a 
period of five years, for example. This can lead to problems, because  one  would  
not be able to change the quoted audit fee even if more work than expected were 
to be subsequently envisaged.  
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Table 4: Incidence of Zero Change 
Year Incidence of Zero Change 
2005 75 68.182% 
2006 50 45.455% 
2007 48 43.636% 
2008 21 19.091% 
2009 47 42.727% 
2010 54 49.091% 
2011 56 50.909% 
Total 351 45.584% 
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Non-audit services: Audit partners have stressed how "profit margins on audits are 
always declining", especially where audit clients are local firms. Therefore, it makes 
business sense to consider the role of the audit in getting a foot in the door for 
other more profitable services like consulting and tax advisory, as envisaged by 
Adelopo (2009), thus making competition in the auditing world less than perfect. 
 
Imperfect information  
Coordination failure: Since information in the auditing environment seems to be 
less than perfect, auditors will hesitate before spurring a rise in prices until they are 
more certain that any change in the auditee's business is not temporary, or until 
competitors move first (Ball and Romer, 1991). 
Commodity mentality: Especially, indigenous audit clients in Malta prefer not to 
spend any more money than necessary on this intangible, without appreciating its 
value in terms of the comfort and order that it tends to bring about. Audit partners 
expressed how "a culture has been ingrained" over time, with the audit being seen 
merely as "a compliance cost". This is opposed to the case where foreign-owned 
companies are concerned, as discussed earlier.  
 
4.2.2 How are audit fees moving in Malta? 
Table 5 has been compiled to compare and contrast the recent movements of the 
audit fee in terms of market prices and inflation-adjusted dimensions, with 
calculations for the annual rate of change, the inflation index constructed and the 
mean audit fee in real terms being based on the nominal mean audit fee for 2004 
of €5,778. 
 
 Literature dealing with initial audit engagements (e.g. DeAngelo, 1981; and 
Ho and Ng, 1996) points out that first year audits are theoretically more costly to 
perform. From this, it can be deduced that a recurring audit allows cost savings to 
be derived as the auditor is automatically more familiar with the auditee. However, 
the upward trend in audit fees for the companies in question may indicate that 
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these possible 'learning curve' benefits are not being shared with the audit client in 
the form of lower prices in Malta. 
 
 Such quantitative results (Table 5) show a consistent upward movement in 
the audit fee between 2004 and 2011, and these can be coupled  with one of the 
findings from  the   qualitative  interviews   that   "revision  downwards  of  an  audit   
fee is not very common". With the exception of the  final  year  under  scrutiny,  this 
 
Table 5: Mean Audit Fees and Inflation 
Year Mean Audit 
Fee (€) 
(Nominal/Market 
Price) 
Rate of 
Change 
(%) 
12-Month 
Average 
Rate 
(%) 
Inflation 
Index 
Y 2004 = 
100 
Mean Audit 
Fee (€) 
(Real/Constant 
2004 Prices) 
2005 6,154 6.507 3.01 103.01 5,974 
2006 7,532 22.392 2.77 105.86 7,115 
2007 8,727 15.866 1.25 107.19 8,143 
2008 9,779 12.055 4.26 111.75 8,751 
2009 11,273 15.278 2.09 114.09 9,881 
2010 12,180 8.046 1.51 115.81 10,517 
2011 12,510 2.709 2.72 118.96 10,516 
Note: Authors' workings are supplemented by the 12-month moving average of the 
Retail Price Index (RPI) by the National Statistics Office (NSO) in Malta. Note that 
the relative figures for December each year have been used, since virtually all of 
the sampled companies have a financial year ending on December 31. 
 
                                                                                                                        
trend is confirmed even after controlling for increases in the price level, as shown 
in the multiple line chart presented in Figure 3.  
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Audit quality concerns 
Studies show that downward movements in the audit fee are smaller and slower 
than upward ones (Ferguson et al, 2005; and Zhang et al, 2011). In fact, both 
Shapiro (1983) and Palmrose (1986) imply that a higher price signals greater 
quality, so the auditee might not really request an audit fee decrease even when 
the expected audit costs fall (Ferguson et al., 2005).  
 
Euro changeover in 2008 
 The euro changeover in Malta in 2008 should have given an impetus for such 
upward audit fee movement, in line with statistical evidence showing that such a 
happening leads to price developments in certain sectors (Ehrmann, 2006). In fact, 
Table 4 has illustrated how the incidence of zero audit fee change fell to a 
minimum of 19% between 2007 and 2008. 
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Inflation 
 The importance of considering inflation is evidenced by the likes of Maher et al. 
(1992)  as they went a step further and actually restated audit fee figures using  the 
relevant Consumer Price Index. This appears to be applicable also to Malta as 
interviewees have talked about there being "almost a standard increase" in audit 
fees due to inflation from one year to another.  However, the movement of statutory 
audit prices should continue to be monitored closely in the future since a tapering 
off of the real audit fee, even though it appears to have risen in nominal terms, has 
been noted in Table 5 between 2010 and 2011. Building on the arguments given 
by Waresul and Hasan (2012), as auditors pocket less all the time, this makes it 
more difficult to devote resources for investment that is essential to deliver high 
quality audits. 
 
4.3  Global financial crisis and other events 
4.3.1 How has audit fee setting been affected by the global financial crisis?  
Table 6 shows the mean pre-crisis and post-crisis audit fee. The paired-samples t-
test was resorted to in order to investigate whether the mean difference in the audit 
fee charged before and after the recent GFC as from 2008 is statistically 
significant, with the test hypotheses being posited as follows:   
Ho: There is no significant difference between the mean post-crisis and pre-crisis 
fee.    
 Ha: There is a significant  difference  between  the  mean  post-crisis   and pre-
crisis fee.           
Table 6: Post-Crisis and Pre-Crisis Mean Audit Fees (in €) 
 
Mean Audit Fees 
Post-Crisis Pre-Crisis 
Nominal/Market Prices 11,436 7,048 
Real/Constant 2004 
Prices 
9,916 6,752 
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 Tables 7 and 8 show  that the probability is not greater than 0.05, thus the 
null hypothesis can be rejected, implying that the difference between the relative 
mean audit fees shown cannot really be attributed to chance. 
 
Table 7 Results of Paired Samples Test (Mean Audit Fees at Nominal/Market Prices) 
 
Paired Differences 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
 
Mean SD 
Std. Error 
Mean 
Lower Upper 
t-
Value 
df 
Sig. 
(2-
Tailed) 
Pair 1 
PostCrisis-
PreCrisis 
4.3879709E3 1.3885274E4 13239089E3 1.7640265E3 7.0119153E3 3.314 109 0.001 
 
Table 8 Results of Paired Samples Test (Mean Audit Fees at Real/Constant Prices)  
 
Paired Differences 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
 
Mean SD 
Std. Error 
Mean 
Lower Upper 
t-
Value 
df 
Sig. 
(2-
Tailed) 
Pair 1 
PostCrisis-
PreCrisis 
3.1642257E3 1.1581306E4 1.0946996E3 994.5667633 5.3338847E3 2.890 109 0.005 
 
Audit partners from the Big 4 explained how "the recession brought more 
work on going concern and more reviews of projections", with such issues as 
impairment implying "more input from the top people". Given that the auditor was 
from a Big 4 audit firm in almost 81% of the observations in the sample (711 firm-
years out of 880), this can serve to explain the statistically significant difference 
between the mean post-crisis and pre-crisis audit fee.  
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On the other hand, interviewees from other audit firms expressed another 
possible reaction of audit fee setting as from 2008, which can be effectively 
summed up using this analogy: "If a ship were to be sinking, you would do your 
utmost to salvage it."  
 
In some instances, such audit partners seem to have intervened themselves 
in revising the audit fee downwards, with the prospect of strengthening ties with the 
auditee and reaping the benefits as the situation improves in the long run. 
 
In fact, auditors other than the Big 4 expressed how it would have been an 
ill-advised course of action, if they were to have raised the price charged. Thus, 
they seem to have had to temporarily absorb the impact of the maintenance or 
augmentation of the scale of their work in the face of an increased audit risk as 
"increased cost consciousness" featured on the audit clients' agenda. This can be 
explained in terms of the 'invisible handshake' characterization by Okun (1980), as 
opposed to the market being cleared through the working of an 'invisible hand'. 
 
Neo-Keynesians highlight the importance of implicit understanding between 
participants when market conditions are tight in order to avoid price increases 
(Blinder et al., 1998), supporting the contention that such a relationship with the 
customer drives price sluggishness.  
 
However, authorities have expressed their fear that auditors may be 
tempted to cut corners on audit quality by curtailing required audit effort in the light 
of the fee pressure exerted by auditees facing financial challenges during such 
times when every entity feels the pinch (PCAOB, 2010).  
 
Moreover, important implications for auditor independence can stem from 
the pricing of the statutory audit (Magee and Tseng, 1990). Therefore, especially in 
such cases where the auditor practically shares the economic pain accompanying 
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the recession by agreeing to audit fee reductions, the interests of stakeholders 
other than merely the audit client per se need to be kept in mind.  
 
 
4.3.2 What impact have new standards and regulations had on audit fees? 
There is a  strong  case  for  arguing  that  changes  in  the  overarching  regulatory    
framework can trigger higher prices for the statutory audit, as evidenced in the 
international literature (e.g. Menon and Williams, 2001; Wong, 2009; and Audit 
Analytics, 2011). For example, in this regard, an audit partner has highlighted the 
implications of the revised ISA 600, imposing more onerous requirements in 
relation to the group audit. 
  
Furthermore, even accounting rules can considerably alter the scope of an 
audit as they are revisited: "They all boil down to changes in the audit work to be 
carried out." 
  
At the end of the day, auditors cannot consider themselves not to constitute 
a business enterprise, and a couple of respondents stated how they explicitly ask 
the auditee for an audit fee increase expected as a result of such changes. 
However, the majority of the audit firms in question opined that "the increases in 
audit fees have not been adequate, with the result that we" ended up suffering the 
difference". This can be due to the auditee being, at the end of the day, interested 
in the end-result of the statutory audit (irrespective of what has gone into the 
process), possibly having serious negative repercussions on audit quality. 
 
4.3.3 How is competition affecting statutory audit pricing?  
Audit partners have expressed how "there is a very high level of competition" in the 
Maltese auditing environment, which can explain why no double-digit rate of 
change has been registered in the mean audit fee charged to the sampled 
companies for the years 2010 and 2011.  
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In terms of the quantity of audit clients, "more firms are coming in from 
abroad, so the market is growing". As noted by the interviewees from the Big 4, this 
has provided an excellent opportunity for the medium-sized players to grow and, 
"especially in the last 2 or 3 years, we have started seeing some movements from 
Big 4 to lower than Big 4."  
 
Such audit partners also expressed how they face stiff competition from 
smaller audit firms as they are perhaps seen more as a "trusted advisor" by their 
clients. Not being "audit-centric" has been deemed to make it easier "to build a 
base" upon which to get across audit fee increases when necessary. 
 
4.3.4 What is the future of audit fees? 
Note that the situation of audit fees is evolving all the time, so different avenues 
can be pursued to shed light on the direction in which the pricing of statutory audits 
can move in the future. 
IT improvements 
 Rather than being reflected in lower audit fees as hypothesized by Menon and 
Williams (2001), advancements in audit technology have been mentioned by 
interviewees to be crucial in order to compensate for the extra auditing effort to be 
put in following the implementation of new standards and regulations. Not 
computerizing more and more of the work involved implies that "you will be wasting 
a lot of precious time", so it is advisable that auditors use Computer-Assisted Audit 
Techniques (CAATs) that make them more efficient. 
Growth in internal auditing 
 As hypothesized by Gerrard et a/. (1994), increased internal audit effectiveness 
may play a part in mitigating the rise in external audit fees as it strengthens 
accountability within organizations. In fact, the availability and extent of reliance on 
the internal auditor's work is one of the considerations mentioned by ISA 300 
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(IFAC, 2009b) in establishing the overall audit strategy, because duplication of 
effort can be reduced (Morrill and Morrill, 2003). 
 
The potential impact of the EC Green Paper on audit policy 
 Interviewees mentioned how the EC proposals can "change the status quo" and  
have a considerable effect on audit fees. In fact, audit partners have expressed 
how "joint audits might push up the price" in line with the findings of Andre' et al. 
(2013), as pointed out earlier, whereas the mandatory rotation of audit firms can 
drive it down.  
 
The role of rising labour costs 
 Interviewees expressed how audit fees in Malta are "unrealistically low" when 
compared to those abroad, sometimes being described as "absolutely obscene". 
To their knowledge, this comparison has remained "fairly stable over the years". 
However, notable is the danger viewed by a number of audit partners that "we 
might become the victims of our own success". As Malta continues to enjoy this 
prosperous period in financial services, businesses from abroad in the hedge 
funds, remote gaming and similar markets affect the industry negatively by "paying 
over-the-top salaries to professionals". Therefore, audit firms have to bear 
increasing internal costs as they counteract in order not to fall behind, eventually 
being translated into higher prices charged.  
 
5.  Conclusion 
This longitudinal study embarked on a bid to understand the stability or otherwise 
of the pricing of statutory audits in a microstate over time, with Malta as a reference 
point. Therefore, the intertemporal development of audit fees is examined with a 
view of changes in their determinants, the GFC and other potentially significant 
events.  
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Changes in auditee size and complexity have been found to be significant 
when explaining the change in the audit fee, albeit with a one-period lag, together 
with how organized the auditee is. However, research findings point out that the 
assumption of frictionless audit markets implied in standard audit fee models 
should be rejected. In fact, there seems to be a general difficulty in realigning the 
audit fee in response to variations in its determinants over time.  
 
Thus, the research community is here made aware that audit fees in Malta 
seem to exhibit a degree of price rigidity or stickiness, attributed to elements of 
imperfect competition and imperfect information in the market. Notwithstanding 
that, it appears that there is more openness to a warranted increase in audit fees 
where companies are foreign-owned or not in the hands of the government 
concerned.  
 
Moreover, evidence of a statistically significant increase in audit fees since 
2008 has been found. However, at the same time, a prevalence of implicit 
contracts between audit firms other than the Big 4 and their audit clients in order to 
mitigate this increase is suggested. Such behaviour needs to be studied more 
deeply to understand its pervasiveness across other microstates. 
 
5.1  Recommendations 
5.1.1 A "value pricing" approach 
As opposed to the traditional "time-based billing" method, this study suggests 
invoicing audit clients on the basis of the external value created thereto. Changing 
the pricing culture by shifting away from a focus on the internal costs of generating 
the service can align the interests of the auditor and the auditee, making it easier 
for auditors to institute audit fee changes where auditees' expectations are met.  
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5.1.2 Partners with special focus on business development 
Specific partners should be in charge of identifying new business opportunities for 
the audit firm and nurturing the relationship with existing clients. Such a person 
ought to have the right attitude towards the job and adequate communication skills, 
making it easier to sit down with the auditee and arrive at a rational basis upon 
which to increase the price of the statutory audit.  
 The pricing of statutory audits depends on negotiation, categorically, so the 
auditor should actively strive to enhance the audit experience and foster a sort of 
"working relationship" with the audit client. This is bound to change the currently 
predominant perspective that audits are there "just for the signature at the end of 
the audit report". 
 
5.2  Limitations 
 This study discusses changes in audit fees in Malta without delving into the firm- 
specific rates per hour charged for the time spent by staff and partners on the 
engagement, the structure of which is likely to be considered highly confidential by 
providers of such professional services. Furthermore, no data has been collected 
for the smallest of companies in Malta, which are allowed by the Companies Act to 
file only abridged accounts that do not reveal certain information.  
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APPENDIX 1  
Definition of Potential Determinants of Inter-Company Audit Fee Changes 
A  univariate  general  linear model has been developed, involving a combination of covariates 
 and fixed factors in a bid to explain the dependent variable , such variables  defined as follows:  
ChgAUDFEE:          The percentage change in audit fees (disclosed in the notes to the accounts) 
                                 from one year to another, expressed in decimal form. 
ChgLNASSETS:       The change in the natural logarithm of total assets (as shown in the balance    
                                 sheet) from one year to another, being a measure of changing auditee size. 
ChgLNREVENUE:   The change  in  the  natural  logarithm  of  total  revenue  (as  shown  in  the 
                                 income statement) from  one  year to  another,  being  another  measure of 
                                 changing auditee size. 
ChgSUBS:                The  change  in  the  number  of  subsidiary  undertakings  (disclosed  in  the  
                                  notes  to  the  accounts)  from  one  year  to  another,  being  a  measure of 
                                  changing auditee complexity.      
ChgDELAY:              The change in the audit report lag  (defined as the number of calendar days 
                                  between the  financial  year  end and the date of the auditor's report) from 
                                  one year to another, being a measure of changing audit risk. 
ChgGEARING:         The change in  the  gearing  ratio (defined as total liabilities divided by total 
                                  assets) from  one  year  to  another,  being  a measure of changing financial  
                                  risk. Note  that  "American  gearing"  is  used  here  in accordance with Pike 
                                  and Neale (2009).    
ChgROCE:                The  change  in  the  return  on  capital  employed  (defined  as  the  ratio of   
                                  Profit after tax  to  total equity) from one year to another, being a measure 
                                  of changing operating risk.     
LOSS:                        An  indicator  variable  that  equals '1' where profit after tax is negative and    
                                  '0' otherwise. 
LOSS_NoLOSS:        An  indicator  variable  that  equals  '1'  where  a  company  changes  from a  
                                  negative   to  a  positive  profit  after  tax   figure  being  registered  and   '0'  
                                  otherwise. 
NoLOSS_LOSS:        An  indicator  variable  that  equals  '1'  where  a  company  changes from  a  
                                  positive  to   a  negative profit  after  tax   figure   being  registered   and  '0'  
                                  otherwise.     
MOD_NonMOD:     An  indicator  variable  that  equals  '1'  where  a  company is issued a clean 
                                  audit report following a previous modified audit report and '0' otherwise.   
NonMOD_MOD:     An   indicator   variable   that   equals  '1'   where   a  company  is   issued  a  
                                   modified   audit  report   following   a  previous  clean  audit  report  and '0'  
                                   otherwise.   
NEWAUDITOR:        An indicator variable that equals '1' where the external auditor is not the  
                                  same as for the previous year and '0' otherwise. 
AUDITORTYPE:        An indicator variable that equals '1' where the external auditor is coming  
                                  form a Big 4 audit firm and '0' otherwise. 
COMPANY:              An indicator variable that equals '2' for a public limited company and '0' for a 
                                  private limited company. 
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APPENDIX 2 
Full Results of Dynamic Model of Audit Fees 
The full results obtained from the dynamic model of audit fees attempted using 
PASW (SPSS) are shown in the following table: 
Dependent Variable: ChgAUDFEE 
 Type III Sum of 
Squares 
Df Mean 
Square 
F-Value Sig. 
  Corrected Model  3.282# 14 0.234 1.960 0.019 
  Intercept 0.004 1 0.004 0.037 0.848 
LAGChgLNASSETS 0.766 1 0.766 6.402 0.012 
 LAGCHgLNREVENUE 0.060 1 0.060 0.503 0.478 
 LAGChgSUBS 0.874 1 0.874 7.308 0.007 
 LAGChgDELAY 0.011 1 0.011 0.093 0.760 
 LAGChgGEARING O.400 1 0.400 3.346 0.068 
 LAGChgROCE 0.012 1 0.012 0.098 0.755 
 LAGLOSS 0.122 1 0.122 1.017 0.314 
 LAGLOSS_NoLOSS 0.017 1 0.017 0.142 0.706 
 LAGNoLOSS_LOSS 0.038 1 0.038 0.318 0.573 
LAGMOD_NonMOD 0.210 1 0.210 1.759 0.185 
LAGnonMOD_MOD 0.073 1 0.073 0.608 0.436 
LAGNEWAUDITOR 0.027 1 0.027 0.230 0.632 
AUDITORTYPE 0.369 1 0.369 3.088 0.079 
COMPANY 0.076 1 0.076 0.631 0.427 
Error 77.150 645 0.120   
Total 89.287 660    
Corrected Total 80.432 659    
N       Note: # R2 =0.041 Adjusted R2 = 0.020 
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APPENDIX 2 (Cont) 
Dependent Variable: chgAUDFEE 
  
Β 
 
Std. 
Error 
 
t-Value 
 
Sig. 
95% of Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Intercept    -0.046 0.130 -0.357 0.721 -0.301 0.209 
LAGChgLNASSETS 0.088 0.035 2.530 0.012 0.020 0.155 
LAGChgLNREVENUE 0.023 0.032 0.709 0.478 -0.040 0.085 
LAGChgSUBS 0.052 0.019 2.703 0.007 0.014 0.091 
 LAGChgDELAY -3.451E-5 0.000 -0.305 0.760 0.000 0.000 
 LAGChgGEARING -0.001 0.001 1.829 0.068 -9.365E-5 0.003 
 LAGChgROCE -0.001 0.003 -0.312 0.755 -0.006 0.004 
[ LAGLOSS=0] 0.039 0.038 1.009 0.314 -0.037 0.114 
[ LAGLOSS=1] 0a - - - - - 
[LAGLOSS_NoLOSS=0] 0.017 0.045 0.377 0.706 -0.071 0.105 
[LAGLOSS_NoLOSS=1] 0a - - - - - 
[LAGNoLOSS_LOSS=0] -0.030 0.053 -0.564 0.573 -0.134 0.074 
[LAGNoLOSS_LOSS=1] 0a - - - - - 
[LAGMOD_NonMOD=0] 0.090 0.068 1.326 0.185 -0.043 0.224 
[LAGMOD_NonMOD=1] 0a - - - - - 
[LAGNonMOD_MOD=0] 0.058 0.075 0.779 0.436 -0.089 0.205 
[LAGNonMOD_MOD=1] 0a - - - - - 
[LAGNEWAUDITOR=0] 0.031 0.064 0.479 0.632 -0.095 0.156 
[LAGNEWAUDITOR=1] 0a - - - - - 
[AUDITORTYPE=0] -0.062 0.035 -1.757 0.079 -0.131 0.007 
[AUDITORTYPE=1] 0a - - - - - 
[COMPANY=0] -0.028g -0.035 -0.795 0.427 -0.096 0.041 
[COMPANY=1 0a - - - - - 
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Organizational Culture,  Personnel Characteristics  
and  Dysfunctional Audit Behaviour 
Baldacchino, P.J1., Tabone, N1., Agius, J2. and Bezzina, F1. 
1University of Malta, Malta and 2KPMG Malta 
This paper analyses the incidence and impact of dysfunctional  audit  
behaviour (DAB) within audit firms. It investigates the impact of organisational 
culture and individual audit personnel characteristics on the acceptance of 
dysfunctional practices among audit staff. A mixed methods approach is employed. 
A questionnaire is distributed among the audit personnel of forty audit firms in the 
European island-state of Malta. This is complemented by eight semi-structured 
interviews with audit partners from different firms. The perceived reinforcement of 
underreporting of chargeable time, inappropriate behaviours by superiors and the 
individual’s locus of control are found to be significant predictors of the acceptance 
of dysfunctional practices. The study also indicates that audit experience leads to a 
reduction of such behaviour and that Big Four auditors are less accepting of 
dysfunctional practices than those in smaller firms.  Furthermore, the 
organisational culture within audit firms and an individual’s perception of control 
exhibit significant influence on the acceptance of dysfunctional practices.  The 
study thus seeks to help in enhancing audit quality by raising awareness on the 
impact of dysfunctional practices and sheds new light on factors contributing 
to such behaviour and thus seeks to help by indicating ways to enhance audit 
quality.  
 
Keywords: dysfunctional audit behaviour, organizational culture, personnel                
.                    characteristics 
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1.  Introduction 
Auditor behaviour received increased attention following recent audit failures and 
increased litigation against audit firms. A lack of due diligence and professional 
scepticism in conducting audit engagements has led to auditors not discovering 
significant financial frauds. Audit firms are often blamed for not predicting business 
failures and this has negatively impacted the reputation of the auditing profession 
(Copeland, 2005). Studies have shown that the quality of audits is threatened by 
audit personnel’s negligent behaviour and poor performance, often referred to as 
Dysfunctional Audit Behaviour (DAB). This may lead to the auditor’s inability to 
identify material misstatements in the financial statements being audited (Nor, 
2011).   
 A common causal factor of DAB among numerous studies is the presence 
of time budget pressures within audit firms (Gundry & Liyanarachchi, 2007). These 
may negatively influence the auditor’s own actions by tempting him/her to take 
shortcuts, this threatening audit quality. However, since time budgets are essential 
features in the effective planning of audit engagements, other studies have sought 
to identify factors that contribute to auditors acting dysfunctionally, rather than 
functionally, to such  pressures (Donnelly et al., 2003; Morris, 2009; Paino et al., 
2012). Consequently, the aim of this study, based in Malta, is to examine the 
impact of aspects of audit firm culture and individual auditor characteristics on the 
acceptance of DAB among audit personnel, thus extending prior research in the 
area.                  
 As for firm culture, audit firm governance in particular has various 
implications for audit quality (Jenkins et al., 2008). Leaders, through their actions, 
set the tone of the company and influence the behaviour of its employees. The 
study investigates the impact of such culture on DAB acceptance by looking at the 
perceived reinforcement by superiors of under-reporting of time, and also their 
behaviour through their own engagement in DAB and inappropriate requests made 
to audit personnel. 
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        The individual characteristics of auditors may also help shape audit 
behaviour. As stated by Herrbach (2005, p.390), audit firms are “a collection of 
individuals with different needs, goals and interests.” The audit environment may 
be interpreted in different ways depending on the individual, leading to conflicting 
behaviours within a single firm. This study sheds light on the influence of three 
specific individual characteristics on the acceptance of DAB: an individual’s locus 
of control, performance and turnover intentions.                                                               
 Understanding the impact of these aspects on the behaviour of audit 
personnel should better guide audit firms in enhancing audit quality. In fact, the 
International Audit and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB, 2013,p.19) identified, 
among others, “the values, ethics and attitudes of auditors, which in turn, are 
influenced by the culture prevailing within the audit firm” as inputs that shape the 
quality of audits. 
       The study adopts a mixed methodology approach, unlike most related prior 
studies which have employed a quantitative research one (Donnelly et al., 2003; 
Paino et al., 2012; Svanberg and Öhman, 2013). Interviews were accordingly 
conducted with selected audit partners to gain further insights on the findings of  
the questionnaire. 
       The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The following section evaluates 
relevant literature, followed by a description of the research methodology adopted 
in the study. The findings of the study are presented and discussed  subsequently, 
followed by the conclusion that also forwards some recommendations while 
acknowledging the limitations. 
 
2.  Literature review 
Audit quality has received increased focus following recent corporate scandals 
such as those of Enron, Worldcom and Parmalat. Copeland (2005) argued that 
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these ethical failures have led to a loss of trust in the capital markets and stained 
reputations for most people working in the capital markets, even those who were 
not at fault. The need for high quality audits has been recommended to prevent a 
repetition of such events in the global economy, as well as to restore confidence in 
the markets and the auditing profession (Kingori, 2003). DeAngelo (1981,p.186) 
defines audit quality as "the market-assessed joint probability that a given auditor 
will both (a) discover a breach in the client's accounting system, and (b) report the 
breach". It is also commonly defined relative to the close conformity of the audit 
with applicable auditing standards (Watkins et al., 2004). 
        More recently, the IAASB (2013,p.10) embarked on a project to create a 
framework for audit quality that “describes the input and output factors that 
contribute to audit quality at the engagement, audit firm and national levels”. This 
consultation paper places emphasis on input factors that foster audit quality which 
include, amongst others, auditors that display appropriate values, ethics and 
attitudes. This framework encourages audit firms to seek new ways of improving 
audit quality in their particular environments.  
 
2.1  Dysfunctional audit behaviour  
Herrbach (2001) described an agency problem within auditing between the owners 
of the audit firm - the partners (principals) and the audit personnel (agents). The 
audit partner issuing the audit opinion is involved in the performance of the audit in 
all stages but may not be present in the preparation of all audit documentation. 
This may tempt individual audit staff, facing time budget pressures, to participate in 
various dysfunctional acts which may not be in the best interest of the audit firm 
(Herrbach, 2001).  
       Time budget pressures are a result of a firm allocating insufficient hours for 
staff to finish individual tasks and procedures. Auditors react to time budget 
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pressures in one of two ways. One is to act functionally by working additional hours 
and charging all hours to the client; increasing the time budget or finding more 
efficient audit techniques (Otley & Pierce, 1996a; Svanberg and Öhman, 2013). 
The alternative is to engage in DAB by taking shortcuts and thereby compromising 
audit quality. This occurs during the auditor’s execution of work in completing 
auditing tasks and is defined as undesirable acts performed by auditors that may 
directly or indirectly reduce audit quality (Kelley & Margheim, 1990; Nor, 2011). Of 
the two ways, DAB may erroneously be considered by staff to be more in the 
interest of the firm, probably more so in the more recent post-crisis audit market, 
which has been found to be characterised by high competition and sticky audit fees 
(Baldacchino and Borg, 2014). Thus, audit firms are forced to absorb additional 
costs, and to focus on cost reduction. Yet, dysfunctional behaviour which is 
intentionally taken up by audit personnel may reduce the quality of audit evidence 
obtained and increase the risk that an inappropriate audit opinion is issued, to the 
detriment of financial statements users (Coram et al., 2008). 
        The main types of DAB mentioned in prior studies are underreporting of time 
and Premature Sign-Off (PMSO) of audit steps. The latter type is an Audit Quality 
Reduction (AQR) Act, defined as an audit procedure poorly carried out (Herrbach, 
2001). Such an act “poses a direct threat to the reliability of audit records which 
form the basis of the audit opinion” (Otley & Pierce, 1996a, p.35).                                 
2.1.1 Under-reporting of chargeable time (URT)                                                  .   
In this form of DAB, personnel react to audit pressure by completing the necessary 
audit procedures in their own time without reporting actual hours (Rhode, 1978). 
 Such under-reporting is often viewed as unethical since it involves providing 
false information and presumably violates audit firms’ policies and ethical 
standards (Buchman and Tracy, 1982; Kingori, 2003). 
         URT has been found to indirectly impact audit quality. Since time budgets of 
future audit engagements are frequently based on budgets of present 
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engagements, URT may lead to understated and unrealistic budgets (Agoglia et 
al., 2011). In future engagements, audit personnel may feel pressured to work in 
the budgeted time and may decide to take shortcuts and engage in AQR acts 
(Akers & Eaton, 2003). It is also thought to impair personnel evaluations and client 
billing (Lightner et al., 1982 and Agoglia et al., 2011).  
       URT has been known to be an issue present in the auditing profession for 
decades. Rhode (1978) noted that 55% of American Certified Public Accountants 
(CPAs) participating in his study admitted to engaging in under-reporting of 
chargeable time. A high incidence of under-reporting of chargeable time was also 
noted in recent studies (Morris, 2009; Svanberg and Öhman, 2013; Zakaria et al., 
2013). Morris (2009) posited that URT is frequently viewed as essential in auditing 
and remains accepted in the profession even though it may lead to a reduction in 
quality in future audits.                                                                                            .  
2.1.2 Premature sign-off (PMSO) 
Rhode (1978) found that approximately 60% of CPAs had engaged in PMSO, or 
signing off a necessary audit step (not covered by an additional audit step) without 
having completed it or noted the omission of procedures. Otley & Pierce (1996b) 
found that only 40% of responding Irish senior auditors indicated to never engaging 
in PMSO. They concluded that this behaviour weakens a firm’s control system and 
seriously threatens audit quality. In contrast,  Nor (2011) found that only 24.8% of 
audit personnel among Malaysian audit firms admitted to never engaging in such 
an act. PMSO may also create adverse legal consequences to the audit firm and 
team members (Kelley & Margheim, 1990). Studies in the US (Kelley and 
Margheim, 1990; Malone and Roberts, 1996) observed that PMSO was the least 
commonly resorted to act of the AQR acts examined. This finding is supported by 
Coram et al. (2008) who found that, being fraudulent, false sign-off is perceived to 
face the most severe consequences by audit staff. 
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2.2  Organisational culture  
Organisational culture has been viewed as the very essence of an audit firm, 
serving as a means of controlling undesirable employee behaviour (Jenkins et al., 
2008). An organisation’s culture is moulded through leaders’ actions such as how 
they allocate resources, what behaviour they reward, and how they recruit, select 
and promote subordinates (Schein, 2004). Through such actions, they set the 
norms and values, and influence the behaviour at the workplace positively or 
negatively. The effect of organisational culture on auditors’ acceptance of DAB is 
examined focusing on two aspects: the perceived reinforcement of under-reporting 
of chargeable time and superiors’ dysfunctional behaviour.                                        
 2.2.1 Perceived reinforcement of under-reporting of chargeable time                 .                   
Priorities and goals are set through what leaders consistently pay attention to, 
reward and stress (Schein, 2004). If a firm signals to its employees that unethical 
behaviour is punishable and ethical behaviour rewarded, employees will be 
encouraged to behave ethically (Svanberg and Öhman, 2013). Rhode (1978) 
outlined that the ability to meet time budgets is perceived by audit personnel as 
important for advancement. In view of a competitive culture within the firm, the 
emphasis to remain within budgeted time may lessen the importance of quality, 
encouraging dysfunctional practices. 
 According to Akers and Eaton (2003), respondents engaging in URT 
perceive that such an act leads to job satisfaction, advancement and a sense of 
accomplishment. In addition, Agoglia et al. (2011) found that audit managers were 
more likely to give high evaluations to known under-reporters than to staff who 
accurately reported exceeding the budget when the manager had the desire to 
retain the client. They also concluded that managers preferred recruiting known 
under-reporters on future audit engagements. On the basis of the above, one 
would expect to find that the reinforcement of URT within audit firms leads to a 
higher acceptance of DAB. 
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2.2.2 Superiors’ dysfunctional behaviour                                                              . 
Leaders are probably a main influence on organisational culture since they 
determine the organisational tone: employees learn what behaviour is expected 
from them by noting superior behaviour (Schein, 2004). Audit firms usually adopt a 
clear hierarchical structure having different managerial levels, with the audit partner 
at the top followed by managers and seniors (Herrbach, 2001). If an audit manager 
is commonly known to engage in DAB, then this would send a clear message to 
staff that such behaviour is acceptable (Nor, 2011), this creating a dysfunctional 
culture. Therefore, superiors set the example. Belkaoui and Pikur (1987) found 
supervisors to be the most important source of appraisal and feedback to seniors 
regarding acceptable performance, with immediate supervisors having more 
influence on subordinate behaviour than the firm as a whole. 
      Studies have shown that URT was significantly influenced by whether superiors 
requested or were perceived to approve such behaviour among senior auditors 
(Lightner et al., 1982; and Taylor et al., 2012). 
       When a supervisor asks a subordinate to engage in URT, stress is created, 
impacting the latter’s behaviour. Such stress is caused by compliance, conformity 
and obedience pressures emerging from the supervisor’s request (Akers and 
Eaton, 2003). The effect of inappropriate supervisor requests depends on the 
subordinates’ assessment of the cost and benefit consequences of their response. 
Audit personnel may give precedence to securing a favourable evaluation over the 
risk of getting caught (Lord & DeZoort, 2001). 
       Otley and Pierce (1996b) found that only 37% of respondents had never either 
been requested or encouraged to engage in URT by managers and such 
management prompting was more likely effected through implicit encouragement 
than explicit request. 
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2.3  Individual characteristics 
The evaluation of what drives auditors to engage in DAB requires an analysis 
beyond their behaviour related to their work. It is relevant to explore individual 
factors leading to differences in audit personnel’s acceptance of DAB. Identifying 
the characteristics of audit team members affecting their reactions to pressures is 
vital in understanding auditor behaviour. We will now overview the relationship 
between the acceptance of DAB and the (i) locus of control, (ii) self-rated employee 
performance and (iii) turnover intentions of audit personnel. 
2.3.1 Locus of control                                                                                               . 
Events leading to rewards or reinforcements are perceived differently by 
individuals. One difference is attributed to whether an individual perceives such 
rewards as contingent to one’s own behaviour or to forces independent of one’s 
actions (Rotter, 1966). In fact, individuals may be divided into two: internals, who 
believe that rewards are a direct result of their actions and externals, who believe 
that rewards or reinforcement follow little action from oneself but are mainly 
contingent to an external force such as powerful others, luck or chance (Rotter, 
1966).  
       Externals tend to feel powerless since they see outcomes as governed by 
forces beyond their control and consider planning futile. Such individuals may 
make use of manipulation or deception as an attempt to exert some form of control 
on the perceived hostile environment which does not value hard work (Gable & 
Dangello, 1994). Solar & Bruehl (1971) stated that externals may feel that, so as to 
acquire the reinforcements required for survival, they have to manipulate others. In 
an audit environment, manipulation or deception would be reflected by the 
incidence of DAB and the sacrificing of audit quality (Donnelly et al., 2003). It is 
therefore expected that an auditor with an external locus of control will be more 
willing to engage in dysfunctional practices. This positive association was found to 
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be significant among audit personnel in the US (Donnelly et al., 2003) and in 
Malaysia (Paino et al., 2012).                                                                     
2.3.2  Employee performance                                                                                    . 
DAB is often employed by audit team members to manipulate the performance 
measure and distort any true performance indicator (Donnelly et al., 2003). Such 
behaviour is expected to take place where individuals see themselves as 
performing below expected levels. In their effort to survive and obtain the required 
reinforcements, they may be more accepting of manipulation and deception (Solar 
& Bruehl, 1971). This becomes essential for them where they cannot meet 
organisational or individual goals through their own efforts (Donnelly et al., 2003). 
Therefore, audit personnel with a low opinion of their own performance exhibit a 
higher acceptance of DAB (Donnelly et al., 2003; and Nor, 2011). However, Paino 
et al. (2012) found a significant and positive relationship between employee 
performance and DAB acceptance and argued that such a positive relationship 
could reflect audit team members’ attempts to retain their high performance.  
2.3.3 Turnover intentions                                                                                   .  
This is a term that refers to the intention to disassociate oneself from the firm                                                                                 
(Ameen et al., 1995). Audit firms are known to face high turnover rates 
characterised by auditors staying with a firm for three to four years until a level of 
expertise is gained (Herrbach, 2001). Being part of the nature of the auditing 
profession, job burnout, time budget pressures and long working hours play a 
significant role in contributing to high turnover rates within audit firms (Herda and 
Lavelle, 2012). 
       Malone and Roberts (1996) stated that when audit staff members intend to 
resign in the near future, they may be more willing to engage in DAB since they 
would be less worried about possible termination if caught. In addition, audit 
personnel with high turnover intentions may be less afraid of the potential adverse 
effects of DAB on their performance appraisal and promotion (Donnelly et al., 
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2003). Studies conducted in the US (Donnelly et al., 2003) and China (Yuen et al., 
2013) found positive and significant relationships between turnover intentions and 
the acceptance of DAB. On the contrary, it may be argued that committed 
employees may be more willing to engage in DAB in order to enhance their 
performance evaluations and chances of promotion. In fact, Paino et al. (2012) 
found a negative and significant relationship between turnover intentions and the 
acceptance of DAB in Malaysia. Hence, one wonders whether this relationship is in 
fact context specific or, rather, a case of an odd chance fluctuation. 
 
3.  Objectives 
As stated earlier, this study investigates the impact of aspects of audit firm culture 
and individual auditor characteristics on the acceptance of DAB among audit 
personnel. Analysis of the impact is built up by three research questions:  
1. How do audit personnel respond to tight budgets and to what extent do they 
engage in quality reduction acts?  
2. What are their attitudes towards the under-reporting of time? More 
specifically:  
- Is under-reporting of time perceived as unethical by personnel, and, if so, 
does perception vary as a function of demographic variables? 
- Are personnel willing to report significant mistakes made during their 
audits, and, if so, does this willingness vary as a function of demographic 
variables? 
- Is under-reporting of time punishable by audit firms, and, if so, does 
punishment incidence vary by firm type? 
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- Does under-reporting of time lead to benefits and, if so, how important 
are these benefits and does the overall level of benefits vary as a 
function of demographic variables? 
3. Can aspects of organisational culture and individual/firm characteristics 
significantly predict dysfunctional audit behaviour acceptance among such 
audit personnel? 
       This empirical study adopts a mixed methods approach. The sampling design, 
the build-up of the research instruments and participation as well as the data 
analysis procedures are now expounded. 
 
4.  Data and methodology  
4.1  Population and sampling 
The target population of the study consists of all the 702 audit personnel in the 40 
registered Maltese audit firms as listed on the website of the Malta Accountancy 
Board as at 23rd September 2013. For this population size to be reached, the 
partners responsible for HR within these firms were contacted and kindly asked to 
disclose the total number of audit personnel in their respective firms. They were 
then asked to support the study by forwarding an e-mail containing information 
about our questionnaire and a hyperlink to an online questionnaire to their audit 
personnel. They were assured that the responses provided were strictly 
confidential and that the data gathered would be used for research purposes only. 
In addition, a signed supervisor consent form was enclosed with the e-mail for 
authenticity purposes. 
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4.2  Research instruments and participants  
4.2.1 Questionniare                                                                                          .            
A structured questionnaire was purposely designed for the present study using the 
Kwiksurveys online software tool. This questionnaire contained four sections – 
Section A on dysfunctional audit behaviour (incidence and acceptance of 
dysfunctional audit behaviour), Section B on organisational culture (perceived 
reinforcement of under-reporting of time, superiors’ engagement in dysfunctional 
audit behaviour), Section C on individual factors (locus of control, employee 
performance, turnover intentions) and Section D on demographic information on 
the respondent’s background (gender, audit experience, job position, firm type). 
Audit partners were requested to skip Section B since this inquired about the 
behaviour of one’s superior. Table 1 specifies the number of items pertaining to 
each construct used in the questionnaire and the source(s) from which each 
construct was adopted.  
       All the Cronbach alpha coefficients exhibited in Table 1 exceeded 0.7, 
indicating that all the construct measures were internally consistent. Apart from 
these measures, the questionnaire included five items on the response of audit 
personnel to tight budgets adopted from Kelley & Seller (1982) and Otley & Pierce 
(1996b). These items, however, produced a low Cronbach alpha coefficient of 
0.104 and attempts to eliminate particular items to improve overall internal 
consistency proved futile. These items will therefore be examined separately and 
will not be combined into a single scale. 
       Respondents were requested to indicate their level of agreement with the five-
point Likert-type questions ranging from ‘strongly disagree to strongly agree’ or 
from ‘never to always’. Apart from the Likert-type statements, respondents were 
also asked to answer on a dichotomous scale (No vs. Yes) each of the following: 
"Under-reporting of time is ‘unethical", "Under-reporting of time is punishable at my 
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place of work", and "If I realise I have made a significant mistake during an audit, I 
would definitely report it".  
 Between September 20th and November 5th of 2013, 278 completed 
questionnaires were received but 26 of these had to be discarded because they 
contained missing information. This resulted in a net sample of 252 (35.8% 
response rate). Assuming 95% confidence in the estimate, that 50% of the sample 
will have the specified  attribute (worst  scenario  for  categorical  variables)  and  a  
   Table 1: Constructs - Sources used, Number of Items and Cronbach's Alpha Coefficients 
Construct Adopted from 
No of 
items 
Cronbach 
α 
DAB incidence Kelley & Margheim (1990), Otley and Pierce (1995)      5 0.850 
DAB acceptance Donnelly et al . (2003)     12 0.855 
PR of URT Lightner et al. (1982); Akers and Eaton (2003)            8 0.876 
SE in DAB Lightner et al. (1982); Otley & Pierce (1996b)     6 0.830 
LOC Spector (1988)   16 0.804 
EP Donnelly et al. (2003)          7 0.833 
TI Donnelly et al. (2003)     3 0.822 
Note: DAB = Dysfunctional Audit Behaviour, PR = Perceived Reinforcement, URT = under-reporting 
of time, SE = Superior’s Engagement, LOC = Locus of Control, EP = Employee Performance,                   
TI = Turnover Intentions. 
sample size of 252, the resulting margin of error is 4.95% (Lenth, 2012). As this 
margin of error is within the ± 5% margin, it can be tolerated (DeVaus, 2002).  The 
single largest groups were female (50.4%), audit seniors (52.0%), employed by Big 
Four Firms (54.0%), and had five to nine years of auditing experience. A more 
detailed summary of the demographic characteristics of the respondents is 
presented in Table 2. 
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Table 2:  Respondent Characteristics 
Demographic Characteristic Category Frequency Percentage 
Gender Male       125          49.6 
 
Female       127      50.4 
Audit Experience 0-1 year         58      23.0 
 
2-4 years         62      24.6 
 
5-9 years         94      37.3 
 
10+ years         38      15.1 
Firm Type Big Four       136      54.0 
 
Non 
Big Four        115      46.0 
Job Level Audit Junior          49      19.4 
 
Manager          45      17.9 
 
Audit Senior        131      52.0 
 
Partner          27      10.7 
 
4.2.2  Interviews                                                                                                         .                                                                                                              
The objective of conducting interviews was to gain a better understanding of the 
attitude towards dysfunctional audit behaviour within Maltese audit firms and the 
organizational factors influencing such behaviour. Non-standardised semi-
structured interviews were held with eight audit partners, one from each Big Four 
firm and four with audit partners selected at random from the smaller audit firms. 
Such interviews follow a pre-established interview schedule but allow the 
researcher to freely change the  order  of  the  questions  and  to  probe  further  by 
asking additional questions (Kajornboon, 2005). The sample size chosen falls 
within the recommended sample size interval for interviews (Kvale & Brinkmann, 
2009), particularly when considering a homogeneous population (Guest et al., 
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2006), in order to reach data saturation and validity. The interview schedule 
developed was based on a preliminary analysis of the responses gathered from the 
questionnaire by November 5, 2013. This analysis enabled the interviews to delve 
into the key findings of the questionnaire. The interview schedule was sub-divided 
into three sections and each question was carefully designed to promote objectivity 
and exclude any personal biases. 
 Initial contact was made by way of an e-mail sent to selected audit partners 
inviting them to participate in the research study. The e-mail provided the audit 
partners with the interview schedule. Interviews were subsequently held with the 8 
audit partners at their respective audit firms. The interviews, which were conducted 
between November 2013 and January 2014, lasted around 40 minutes each. 
Permission was granted from the interviewees to audio record the meetings which 
were consequently transcribed to facilitate analysis. To ensure anonymity and 
confidentiality, we assured the participants that no names will be disclosed. 
4.2.3 Data analysis procedures                                                        .                            
To answer the research questions, we used descriptive statistics; the mean and 
standard deviation were used with interval/ratio scales, the median and the 
interquartile range was used with ordinal scales while counts and percentages 
were used with nominal scales. To rank items on the basis of mean ranks, the 
Friedman test was used and in the presence of an overall significant difference, the 
Wilcoxon test as post-hoc test was used to examine pair-wise differences. The 
Bonferroni correction was applied to counteract for the problem of multiple 
comparisons among sub-groups inflating the Type 1 error (Miller, 1991). In 
determining whether a variable could be predicted by a set of independent 
variables (predictors), stepwise multiple regression was used when the 
independent variable used the interval/ratio scale of measurement, binary logistic 
regression being used when the dependent variable was binary/dichotomous and 
qualitative. Finally, in determining whether an association existed between 
categorical variables, cross-tabulations accompanied with the Chi-squared test 
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were generated. All the above statistical analysis was conducted in the SPSS V20 
software package. 
 
5.  Results 
Once the interviews were transcribed, content analysis was used to identify themes 
or patterns in the text. This facilitated the interpretation of the findings that emerged 
from the question. 
5.1  How  do the audit personnel respond to tight budgets and to what   
.      extent do audit personnel engage in quality reduction acts? 
As to how audit personnel respond to tight budgets, all audit personnel 
participating in our study reported that they engaged in some kind of response in 
relation to tight budgets. A Friedman test revealed that the mean ranks of the 
responses pertaining to the five statements outlined in Table 3 differed significantly 
from each other (χ2(4) = 287.16, p < 0.001). A series of Wilcoxon tests (with 
significance set at p ≤ 0.005 after applying a Bonferroni correction) revealed the 
statement that was rated most highly was - "working harder but charging all time 
appropriately". This was followed by"requesting and obtaining a budget increase",  
the "under-reporting of time by working on personal time", "shifting time to non-
chargeable items", and "reducing the quality of audit work to meet budget" 
respectively. More detailed statistical output is presented in Table 3. 
 In the interviews, most of the audit partners (6/8) stated that the time budget 
in the previous year was usually taken as the basis for setting the current year’s 
budget, with the budget being adjusted accordingly for past efficiencies and/or 
inefficiencies. Furthermore, half the interviewees (4/8) suggested that less time 
was allocated for subsequent audits since one had more experience with the client. 
All audit partners (8/8) agreed that staff members should speak up when they 
perceive a particular time budget for a task to be unattainable and should discuss it 
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with their manager. Half of them (4/8) stated that they expected audit team 
members to work overtime to meet the budgets since “the reality is that there is so  
 
Table 3: Response to Tight Budgets - Descriptive Statistics and Rank Ordering 
Statement* 
Reported 
to some 
Extent*** 
Median 
(IQR) 
Mean 
Rank 
Wilcoxon 
Test** 
(Post-Hoc) 
Summary 
Work harder but charge all time properly 97.8% 4 (3-4) 4.23 A 
Request and obtain a budget increase 85.3% 3 (3-4) 3.46 B 
Underreport time by working on personal time    83.2%  3 (2-3) 2.93 C 
Shift time to non-chargeable items 68.5% 2 (2-3) 2.59 D 
Reduce the quality of audit work to meet budget 45.1% 1 (1-2) 1.79 E 
Note:  N = 252; *Scales are ordinal and range from 1 (never) to 5 (always); **different letters 
signify statistically significant differences after applying Bonferroni correction, with sig. set at p ≤ 
0.005; ***All excluding strongly disagree 
 
much work to be done in the busy season.” In addition, two audit partners (2/8) 
admitted that they intentionally under-allocated hours in the budget and assumed 
staff would work beyond an eight-hour day. 
 As to the extent to which audit personnel engage in quality reduction acts, 
the mean of the responses pertaining to the five items eliciting incidence of 
dysfunctional audit behaviour acts outlined in Table 4 was relatively low (M = 1.63, 
SD = 0.60). In fact, only 16.8% of the respondents reported that they did not 
engage in any one of these five quality reduction acts during the previous year, 
albeit those who did, did so to a low extent. The responses to these five statements 
differed significantly from each other in mean ranks (χ2(4) = 104.32, p < 0.001). 
Acceptance of weak client explanations was rated highest, and this was followed 
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by a reduction in the amount of work performed on an audit step below what they 
considered reasonable, failure to reach an accounting principle, a superficial 
review of client documents, and the signing off on an audit step without completing 
the work or noting the omission/PMSO. A summary of statistical output is exhibited 
in Table 4. 
 
Table 4: Audit Quality Reduction Acts - Descriptive Statistics and Rank Ordering 
Statement* 
Reported 
to some 
Extent*** 
Median 
(IQR) 
Mean 
Rank 
Wilcoxon 
Test** 
(Post-Hoc) 
Summary 
Accepted weak client explanations 68.5% 2 (1-2) 3.59 A 
Reduced amount of work performed on an  
audit step below what you considered reasonable 
 
49.5% 
 
1 (1-2) 
 
3.15 
 
B 
Failed to research an accounting principle     49.5%  1 (1-2) 3.01 B, C 
Made superficial reviews of documents 41.8% 1 (1-2) 2.85 C 
Signed off an audit step without completing 
the work or noting the omission/PMSO 
 
26.1% 
 
1 (1-2) 
 
2.40 
 
D 
Note:  N = 252; *Scales are ordinal and range from 1 (never) to 5 (always); **different letters 
signify statistically significant differences after applying Bonferroni correction, with sig. set at p ≤ 
0.005; ***All excluding strongly disagree. 
  
 In the interviews, the Big Four audit partners unanimously stated that they 
were not aware of AQR acts within their firms and that serious repercussions would 
arise for such behaviour. PMSO was seen as the most serious act by all the Big 
Four audit partners since it gave “a false sense of security that the work was done.” 
A common concern among all the Big Four audit partners was that certain 
individuals did not demonstrate sufficient professional scepticism and had lost the 
natural "curiosity" that was essential in the auditing profession.  
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 Moreover, a non-Big Four audit partner affirmed that certain audit clients 
were too small and did not really need to be audited, especially the owner-
managed ones. Unlike in other European countries, these firms were still required 
by Maltese regulation to present a set of audited financial statements. In such 
cases, where the client did not show interest in the audit and the audit fee was low, 
the audit staff might take shortcuts since the work was “boring” and the audit was 
“something we know nobody wants”.  
  All audit partners (8/8) agreed that each AQR act was detrimental to audit 
quality, drawing towards a less robust audit opinion. One Big Four audit partner 
highlighted the impact of AQRs on future audits since, once accepted, they would 
also spread to other audit engagements. Despite knowing about the risks such 
behaviours posed, all audit partners (8/8) seemed confident that, through their 
review systems in some cases involving four-level exercises, any such shortcuts 
were being picked up. 
 
5.2   What are the attitudes of employees towards under-reporting of   .     
.       time? 
 
5.2.1 Do audit personnel perceive the under-reporting of time as unethical? If so,      
..........does this perception vary as a function of demographic variables?                                   
The majority of the audit personnel (74.5%) acknowledged that under-reporting of 
time is unethical. Binary logistic regression revealed that when the four 
demographic variables (gender, audit experience, firm type and job position) were 
entered on Step 1, none of them could adequately distinguish between those 
acknowledging that under-reporting of time is unethical and those who do not. A 
summary of the binary logistic regression output is presented in Table 5. 
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Table 5: Variables in the Binary Logistic Regression Equation 
 (Perception of Under-Reporting of Time) 
 B S.E. Wald Df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a 
Gender(1) -.137 .367 .139 1 .709 .872 
Firm Type(1) -.343 .386 .789 1 .374 .709 
Job Position -.513 .234 4.816 1 .028 .599 
Audit Experience .422 .216 3.818 1 .051 1.526 
Constant 1.650 .666 6.132 1 .013 5.206 
Note:  a Variable(s) entered on step 1: gender, firm type, job position, audit experience. 
5.2.2 Are audit personnel willing to report significant mistakes made during an          
.      audit? If so, does this willingness  vary  as  a  function  of  demographic                   
.     variables?                                                                                     .                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
The vast majority of audit personnel (94.6%) reported that they generally report 
a significant mistake during an audit. Binary logistic regression  revealed that 
none of the four demographic variables could adequately distinguish between 
those who are willing to report a significant mistake during an audit and those 
who are unwilling (Table 6). 
Table 6. Variables in the Binary Logistic Regression Equation  
(Reporting significant mistakes during an audit) 
       B       S.E. Wald Df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a 
Gender(1) .858 .739 1.345 1 .246 2.357 
Firm Type(1) -.038 .762 .003 1 .960   .963 
Job Position .148 .392 .143 1 .705 1.160 
Audit Experience .837 .458 3.338 1 .068 2.309 
Constant .454 .983 .213 1 .644 1.575 
Note: a Variable(s) entered on step 1: gender, firm type, job position, audit experience. 
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5.2.3 Is under-reporting punishable by audit firms? If so, does the punishment  
...........incidence vary by firm type?  
Only 34.8% of the respondents reported that URT is punishable by their firm. A chi-
squared test revealed that there was no significant association (χ2 = 1.87, p = 
0.171) between punishment for URT (No vs Yes) and firm type (Big Four vs Non-
Big Four).  
       In the interviews, all audit partners (8/8) stated that URT was against their 
firm’s policy and that they encouraged their staff to report all chargeable hours, 
including overtime. Most of them (7/8) affirmed that under-reporting of time 
defeated the scope of knowing the costs of audit engagements for the firm. A Big 
Four audit partner (1/8) pointed out the importance of gathering the correct data 
about the time spent on an audit because “that is the only way we are able to 
renegotiate the fees going forward”. Sometimes, an audit client may be 
“disorganized” and that could explain why audit team members worked late.  
       Most audit partners (6/8) acknowledged that they were aware of URT in their 
firms. Big Four partners (4/8)  stated that they frequently reminded staff of the 
importance of charging all productive time. In one case, a Big Four audit partner 
(1/8) described that they had introduced a policy whereby audit staff members get 
paid for overtime, and so “there is an incentive for them to charge.” Most audit 
partners interviewed (7/8) stated that, when they become aware of an audit team 
member who has resorted to URT, s/he would not be reprimanded but rather called 
to be reminded that s/he should report all chargeable hours. A Big Four audit 
partner (1/8) argued that: 
                     "We do not penalise someone with such a commitment to us simply  
   because s/he refused to put down the hours. His/her bonus will not   
   be affected by this." 
       Moreover, two of the audit partners (2/8) in smaller firms claimed that URT 
compensated for the time wasted during the day browsing the internet, checking e-
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mails and phone chatting. Most interviewees (6/8) did not believe that URT could 
impact audit quality, one declaring that “as long as you work the hours, it’s 
irrelevant for audit quality whether or not you report them”. With regards to URT, a 
Big Four audit partner (1/8) stated that: 
                     "You have to break that mould. There has to come a  time  when  
   personnel state the amount of time they actually spent and then 
   the firm will have to see how it is going to handle this." 
       Once the hours really being put in an audit are identified, the audit fee would 
be adjusted accordingly. However, another Big Four audit partner (1/8) argued that 
if his audit firm addressed this issue while other firms in the market did not, its 
quoted fees, being based on the really higher number of hours, would result higher, 
and thus it would lose clients. This audit partner  stated that in their case they had 
to “struggle to get acceptable efficiencies on engagements.”  
5.2.4 Does under-reporting of time lead to benefits? If so, how important are these 
..........benefits?  
The responses to statements outlined in Table 7 differed significantly from each 
other with respect to their mean ranks (χ2(7) = 102.32, p < 0.001). Summary 
statistics revealed that URT very often leads to (i) more interesting and challenging 
assignments, (ii) superiors believing that they are as competent or even more 
competent than their peers, and (iii) promotion and advancement; but sometimes it 
leads to (i) a better periodic evaluation, (ii) higher job security, (iii) a feeling that 
they are as competent as their peers, (iv) a feeling of accomplishment and (v) more 
job satisfaction. A summary of the statistical output is presented in Table 7. 
5.2.5 Can aspects of organisational culture and individual/firm characteristics ........ 
.       .significantly predict DAB acceptance among audit personnel? 
In the preliminary analysis, we examined zero-order correlations between DAB 
acceptance  and  the   independent   variables   used   in   the   regression   model.  
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Table 7. Under-reporting of Time Benefits: Descriptive Statistics and Rank Ordering 
Under-reporting of time leads to: * 
Reported 
to some 
Extent 
Median 
(IQR) 
Mean 
Rank 
Wilcoxon Test** 
(Post-hoc) 
Summary 
- more interesting and challenging jobs 94.5% 4 (3-4) 4.23 A 
- superiors believing that they are as competent  
or even more competent than their peers                               
93.5% 
4 (3-4) 3.46 A 
- promotion and advancement 94.2% 4 (2-4) 2.93 A 
- better periodic evaluation 91.6% 3 (2-4) 4.79 A,B 
- higher job security 91.6% 3 (2-4) 1.79 B,C 
- feeling as competent as peers 87.1% 3 (2-4) 1.79 B,C 
- a sense of accomplishment 90.3% 3 (2-4) 1.79 C, D 
- more job satisfaction 84.5% 3 (2-4) 1.79 D 
Note: N = 252; *Scales are ordinal and range from 1 (never) to 5 (always); **different letters 
signify statistically significant differences after applying Bonferroni correction, with sig. set at                
p ≤ 0.00178. 
 
This revealed that DAB acceptance was significantly correlated with:  
(i) the two organisational culture characteristics, namely perceived 
reinforcement of URT (r = 0.402, p < 0.001) and superior 
requests/engagement (r = 0.280, p < 0.001); and  
(ii) three of the seven individual/firm characteristics, namely locus of control 
(r = 0.312, p < 0.001), turnover intentions (r = 0.168, p = 0.008) and audit 
experience (r = -0.162, p = 0.010). 
       DAB acceptance was not significantly associated with gender (r = 0.059, p = 
0.348), job status (r = 0.069, p = 0.273), employee performance (r = -0.035, p = 
0.581), and firm type (r = -0.110, p = 0.082).  
Chapter 9                                                                Organizational Culture, Personnel Characteristics and 
                                                                                                Dysfunctional Audit Behaviour [AUD-7]   
287 
       Stepwise multiple regression was then used to determine which of these nine 
independent variables emerged as significant predictors of DAB acceptance. 
Perceived reinforcement of URT was entered in Step 1 (F1,222 = 42.57, p < 0.001, 
R2 = 0.16), supervisor engagement/requests in Step 2 (F2,221 = 27.40, p < 0.001, R
2            
= 0.20), audit experience in Step 3 (F3,220 = 21.06, p < 0.001, R
2 = 0.22), firm type 
in Step 4 (F4,219 = 18.40, p < 0.001, R
2 = 0.25) and locus of control in Step 5 (F5,218         
= 16.71, p < 0.001, R2 = 0.28). The regression coefficients are exhibited in Table 8. 
  
Table 8. Regression Coefficients Table (Step 5)a 
 Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardize
d 
Coefficients 
T Sig. Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
 
(Constant) 1.067 .188  5.685 .000   
Perceived Reinforcement of 
URT 
.212 .054 .251 3.955 .000 .825 1.213 
Supervisor 
engagement/requests 
.198 .060 .210 3.323 .001 .834 1.199 
Audit experience -.142 .043 -.196 -3.335 .001 .957 1.045 
Firm type -.259 .083 -.191 -3.137 .002 .893 1.120 
Locus of Control .249 .090 .176 2.778 .006 .830 1.205 
Note:  a Dependent Variable: DAB Acceptance 
 
 
       Table 8 shows that the DAB acceptance increases as reinforcement of under-
reporting of time increases, supervisory engagement/requests increase, locus of 
Chapter 9                                                                Organizational Culture, Personnel Characteristics and 
                                                                                                Dysfunctional Audit Behaviour [AUD-7]   
288 
control increases, and audit experience decreases. Additionally, DAB acceptance 
is less likely to occur from Big Four audit personnel. 
      There was no statistical evidence that the error terms were positively auto 
correlated since the Durbin Watson statistics (d =1.953) was close to 2 and greater 
than Savin and White’s (1977) upper cut-off value (dU0.05 = 1.82 for k = 5). The 
Variance Inflation factors (VIFs) were all close to 1 implying that there were no 
issues concerning multicollinearity (Field, 2009). 
       Although firm type was not significantly correlated with DAB acceptance, it 
emerged as a significant predictor of DAB acceptance. This means that ‘firm type’ 
is a suppressor variable and its inclusion helps to reduce the error variance in the 
other predictors and explain better the variability in DAB acceptance - the criterion 
variable (Bezzina & Saunders, 2014).  
 In the interviews, all audit partners (8/8) admitted that attainment of time 
budgets was one of the factors considered in the evaluation and promotion process 
of audit staff. A Big Four audit partner argued: “It is expected that you achieve your 
time budget because it is assumed that time budgets are reasonably set.” 
However, emphasis was made that various other factors were considered in the 
evaluation process of staff including discussions about each of the staff members 
with managers, feedback reports and the quality, knowledge and experience 
placed in the audit file.  
       Similarly, audit managers were selected on the basis of a number of criteria 
including experience, knowledge, commitment to the firm and being in possession 
of the right competencies. Two of the Big Four audit partners (2/8) stated that 
managers strived to look efficient since they felt responsible for the budget and 
might be afraid of facing the audit partner with a “budget that has gone wrong.” It 
became clear from the interviews that supervisors were selected because they 
were trustworthy and it was not tolerated that they, or even their superiors engaged 
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in or requested others to engage in DAB. A Big Four partner (1/8) commented: “I’d 
hate to think we have that situation.” 
 
6.  Discussion  
6.1  Time  budget   pressures  in    the   performance  of   statutory           
.       audit engagements 
The findings provide evidence of the presence of time budget pressures among 
audit firms under study. Results indicate that respondents were almost as  inclined 
to engage in URT as  to request a budget increase in response to tight budgets, 
although in other studies elsewhere   {e.g. Otley & Pierce (1996b) and Zakaria et 
al. (2013)} audit staff were even more inclined to engage in URT.  Maltese audit 
partners  do expect audit staff to work beyond regular hours to meet time budgets 
and this may dishearten audit personnel from requesting budget increases, 
particularly if such requests were rejected by audit managers or partners in the 
past. 
       URT distorts the measures of cost and profitability on an audit, and impairs 
audit fee renegotiations on future ones. URT also conceals the fact that audit staff 
worked beyond reported hours owing to disorganisation in the client’s accounting 
record-keeping. Although contingent fees are not permitted, the audit fee which is 
generally agreed upon in advance at the start of the audit should include scope for 
variation so as to take account of unexpected factors in the work. Therefore, URT 
may also be imposing a constraint on revenue growth and restricting the revenue 
earned both on current and future audit engagements. 
       Given that prior year time budgets are used to plan future time budgets, these 
are also inaccurately set if URT is present within the audit firm. This leads to tighter 
time budgets for audit staff which may impact the quality of work by increasing the 
incidence of AQR acts, as noted by Atkers and Eaton (2003) and Agoglia et al. 
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(2011). Moreover, purposely allocating fewer hours on an audit engagement to 
enhance profitability may further perpetuate the pressures from time budgets.  
       Our findings indicate that AQR acts are not widespread among the surveyed 
audit personnel, with most of them being performed only rarely by respondents. 
Yet, even such limited acts can pose a direct threat to the reputation of an audit 
firm and to audit quality. 
 
6.2   Audit firms perceived as reinforcing URT  
Although the majority of respondents agreed that URT is unethical, it was only 
16.8% of the same respondents that stated that they never engaged in URT. This 
percentage compares to 5% and 12% of Malaysian and Swedish audit firms as 
reported in Nor (2011) and Svanberg and Öhman (2013) respectively. A 
substantial number of audit personnel may therefore be going against their own 
ethical beliefs. For this reason, the perceived reinforcement obtained from URT 
must be of considerable value. Our findings show that audit staff members 
consider that URT leads to various rewards associated with the staff evaluation 
process, where the attainment of time budgets would typically be one of the main 
factors considered. Our findings therefore support in this respect those of Akers & 
Eaton (2003) and Agoglia, et al. (2011).  
       The perceived reinforcement of URT has been found to be a significant 
predictor of DAB acceptance. If URT is perceived to be tacitly rewarded within an 
audit firm, an environment is created where audit personnel are willing to act 
against their ethical beliefs and are more accepting of further dysfunctional 
practices. Despite URT being against firm policy, the lack of disciplinary action 
taken against under-reporters may be sending a mixed signal to audit personnel. 
Instead of deterring such behaviour, audit firms may be seen as rewarding the use 
of URT which, in turn, leads to a higher acceptance of dysfunctional practices.  
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       Two reasons emerge why URT may not be subject to sanctions within audit 
firms in Malta despite the known repercussions associated with it: first, that URT is 
perceived as having no severe impact and, secondly, that URT is perceived as 
helping to maintain audit fee levels. Despite being aware of URT within their firm, 
most partners do not really consider that it is a pervasive problem – in fact, in their 
view, some URT may even be compensating for the unproductive hours spent by 
staff during the day, this resulting in more realistic reported hours. Anyway, the 
immediate costs of URT are borne by audit staff themselves through foregone pay 
or leave, and current audit fee levels are therefore not affected. 
 
6.3   Superiors engaging in dysfunctional behaviour 
Audit partner/ manager trust is fundamental. Although audit partners expressed 
confidence that their managers were trustworthy, the findings show that 
inappropriate behaviour among superiors is not uncommon. It was only 41.3% of 
respondents who stated that their superior never engaged in PMSO. Therefore, the 
incidence of PMSO among superiors as reported by respondents was much higher 
than the respondents’ own reported engagement in such a practice. This is quite 
concerning.   
       PMSO compromises audit quality and provides a false sense of assurance. 
Furthermore, individuals who resort to PMSO must do so in the belief that they will 
not be caught.  Audit personnel admitted to being subject to implicit requests from 
their superiors to underreport time whilst implicit requests to PMSO were less 
common. Similar to Otley & Pierce (1996b), explicit requests occurred far less 
frequently than implicit ones. The findings also illustrate that audit superiors within 
Big Four firms are more likely to engage in or request others to underreport time 
than those from smaller audit firms. Given that time budgets are perceived as more 
unattainable in Big Four firms, superiors may be more inclined to underreport time 
Chapter 9                                                                Organizational Culture, Personnel Characteristics and 
                                                                                                Dysfunctional Audit Behaviour [AUD-7]   
292 
in order to appear efficient. The hierarchical structure of Big Four firms could also 
be contributing to such an attitude. 
       The importance of budget attainability attached by superiors to their own 
performance evaluations may in turn be motivating the wrong type of personnel 
behaviour. Superiors’ dysfunctional behaviour induces the adoption of similar 
practices among subordinates since their superiors are their main source of 
performance feedback. In fact, performance evaluations of audit staff often include 
discussions with managers and the evaluation of feedback reports. As a result, 
audit team members are likely to work hard to please their superiors, even if that 
implies engaging in dysfunctional practices.  
 
6.4   External locus of control – a DAB predictor  
External LOC was found to be a significant predictor of DAB acceptance. 
Therefore, individuals with an external LOC are more accepting of DAB than 
individuals with an internal LOC. These results are consistent with the studies by 
Donnelly et al. (2003), and Paino et al. (2012) referred to earlier. These findings 
also complement those of Solar & Bruehl (1971), and Gable & Dangello (1994), 
where externals were found to be more willing to resort to manipulation to obtain 
the reinforcements required to survive.  
       Audit firms need to ensure that hard work is rewarded and appreciated through 
frequent reinforcement practices, supporting the recommendation of the IAASB 
(2014) for creating a culture where audit quality is valued. On the other hand, 
reinforcing inappropriate or unethical practices like URT is unfair towards 
hardworking audit personnel who do not engage in similar practices. In particular, 
for personnel with an external LOC, this will lead to a perception of a hostile 
working environment.  
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6.5  Experience and DAB acceptance 
Our findings suggest that more experienced audit staff exhibit lower levels of DAB 
acceptance than less experienced personnel (as also evidenced in Nor, 2011). A 
range of factors could explain such occurrence. For example, the various efforts 
undertaken by audit firms to enhance audit quality may be having the desired effect 
on audit staff. This includes training whereby audit personnel are reminded of the 
importance of every step involved in an audit engagement including the proper 
documenting and reporting of audit work. Moreover, experienced personnel are 
often more mature and may be more appreciative of audit work and more 
conscious of the consequences of dysfunctional behaviour.  
 
6.6  Big Four - better behaviour? 
Although audit personnel within Big Four firms perceived budgets to be more 
unreasonable than their non-Big Four counterparts, our findings suggest that Big 
Four audit staff are inherently less accepting of DAB. This finding was also 
expressed in studies by Margheim and Pany (1986) and Nor (2011). This study 
puts forward two main arguments that advance support to this finding:  
(i) better control mechanisms - Big Four firms are known to display a highly 
competitive internal environment characterised by high pressures and robust 
internal controls, and therefore incorporate internal support mechanisms to mitigate 
the possible consequences on audit quality. Furthermore, Big Four firms may have 
more extensive reviews and effective quality control procedures passed down from 
their foreign network firms; and  
(ii) tedious work associated with small audit clients – the Maltese Companies Act, 
1995 requires all companies incorporated in Malta to be subject to a statutory audit 
(other than very small private entities which meet the requirements listed under 
Article 185 (1) (b) of the Companies Act). Small audit clients, such as owner-
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managed companies, are usually associated with low audit fees and the work 
carried out on such audit engagements would most likely be routine and 
uninteresting. Audit personnel within small audit firms face such circumstances 
more often and hence may be more prone to take shortcuts and justify resorting to 
AQR acts (as evidenced in a UK study by Willett and Page, 1996). 
 
7.  Conclusion 
This study has sought to shed light on the impact of aspects of audit firm culture 
and individual auditor characteristics on the acceptance of DAB among audit firms 
based in Malta. It concludes that audit firm culture exhibits significant influence on 
such acceptance by audit personnel. This relates in particular to the perceived 
reinforcement of underreporting of chargeable time and inappropriate behaviours 
by superiors. As for individual auditor characteristics, an individual’s perception of 
control in his/her work has also been found to be a significant predictor of such 
acceptance. Results also indicate that audit experience leads to a reduction of 
such behaviour and that audit Big Four personnel seem to be less accepting of 
dysfunctional practices than those in smaller firms.  
       Further indications of the study are that, while not being a widespread 
problem, DAB is an important issue for audit firms. URT is a widely resorted act 
among audit personnel, possibly causing increasingly tight time budgets for 
subsequent audit periods. The high URT incidence is likely caused by the mixed 
signals given by audit firms to their staff. Despite being against firm policy, there 
appears to be a lack of disciplinary measures taken towards known under-
reporters. Consequently, the belief that audit firms reward under-reporters is 
revealed to lead to a higher DAB acceptance among audit personnel. Furthermore, 
while not common, the mere presence of AQR acts such as the acceptance of 
weak client explanations and the superficial review of client documents is serious 
for audit firms as it increases the risk that a material misstatement is not detected 
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during the conduct of an audit engagement and it directly impacts the reputation 
risk of the firm.  
       We recommend further research into the reasons for the higher acceptance of 
DAB within smaller audit firms, although a possible justification for this has been 
put forward in this study. Furthermore, it is hoped that, as part of their effort to 
enhance quality, audit firms step up their action to respond to the various causes of 
DAB among audit personnel that have been uncovered. Firms need to ensure that 
they are clearly communicating internally the adverse effects of such DAB to their 
audit personnel. In particular, an unambiguous message needs to be sent regularly 
that URT is not acceptable and that there are other more important factors apart 
from attaining time budgets that are given due consideration in the staff appraisal 
process. Beyond discouraging DAB, this should positively help existing personnel 
understand the importance of providing high quality audits. In addition, we 
recommend that more attention be focused on the quality, attitudes and intentions 
(such as apparent locus of control and expected durability) of staff upon 
recruitment, given the significance of each individual’s attitudes on the firm’s audit 
quality.  
 The results of our study are subject to the limitations encountered in its 
scope and conduct. The study only analyses the relationship of DAB with aspects 
of firm culture and selected individual characteristics. Other potential factors 
contributing to the acceptance of DAB among audit personnel have therefore been 
excluded. Furthermore, the incidence of DAB was measured using self-reported 
measures in the questionnaire. Given that these questions were of a sensitive 
nature, the respondents may have understated their engagement in such practices. 
Finally, the perspectives of audit clients and ex-audit personnel are probably 
valuable for a comprehensive evaluation of the subject matter, and we believe that 
this is an interesting avenue for further research.  
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Appendix 
Questionnaire  
                                                     Section A: Dysfunctional Audit Behaviour 
      1. In response to tight budgets, how often do you? 
           N = Never   R = Rarely   S = Sometimes 
           O = Often    A = Always 
          N         R      S      O A 
           1.1  Work  harder  but  charge   all   time   properly.      
1.1  1.2   Under-report  time  by   working  on personal 
                time. 
     
1.1  1.3  Reduce  the  quality   of   audit   work  to  meet  
               meet budget. 
     
1.    1.4   Request and obtain a budget increase.      
1.1      1.5   Shift time to non-chargeable items.      
 
2.  To what extent do you agree about acting in any of the following manners when  
conducting an audit engagement over the past year? 
 
N         SD = Strongly Disagree    D = Disagree 
             N = Neutral  A = Agree  SA =  Strongly Agree 
        SD         D        N      A  SD 
1.1   2.1  Accepted weak client explanations.      
1.1   2.2  Made      superficial      reviews      of      client 
                documents. 
     
1.1   2.3  Failed  to research an accounting principle.      
1      2.4  Reduced  the  amount  of   work   performed  
                on an audit step below what you considered 
                reasonable. 
     
1.1   2.5  Signed   off   on    an    audit     step    without 
                 Completing  the     work     or     noting     the          
   is            omission/PMSO.   
     
 
      3. I would  be  more accepting of  auditors signing off a  required  audit  step  without  
finishing the work or noting the omission if: 
         3.1  They     believe    the    audit    step    will    not 
       find anything wrong if completed. 
     
         3.2  On previous audits  there  were  no  problems 
                 with this part of the client's systems/records.             
     
1.1    3.3  Audit supervisor  shows  strong  concern  over 
                the time it's taking to complete the audit  step 
                and is putting pressure onto getting it done. 
     
1.1   3.4  They believe the audit step is unnecessary.      
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Appendix (Cont/2) 
 
4.  I would  be more accepting of  auditors under-reporting time if: 
N          SD = Strongly Disagree    D = Disagree                    
.      N = Neutral  A = Agree  SA =  Strongly Agree 
        SD         D        N      A  SD 
1.1    4.1  It improves their  chances  for  promotion and  
                 advancement. 
     
1.1    4.2  It improves their performance evaluation.      
1.1    4.3  It is suggested by their immediate supervisor.      
1      4.4  Others   under-report   their    time   and   it  is 
                necessary to compete with them. 
     
 
5.  I would  be more accepting of  auditors altering/replacing audit procedures if: 
1.1   5.1  They  believe  the  original   audit   procedure 
                 was unnecessary. 
     
1.1  5.2  On  previous audits there  were  no  problems 
               problems   with   this   part    of    the    client's  
               systems/records.   
     
1.1  5.3  They  do  not  believe  the   procedure   would  
               find anything wrong. 
     
1     5.4  They   are  under  a  lot  of  time  pressure   to 
                complete the audit. 
     
 
6.  Please read each of the following statements carefully and then specify the extent of your 
disagreement/agreement with each item accordingly. 
1.1   6.1  Under-reporting of time is unethical.      
1.1   6.2  Under-reporting   of   time  is   punishable   at  
                 my place of work. 
     
1.1   6.3  If   I   realized   I   have   made   a     significant 
                mistake  during  an  audit,  I  would  definitely 
                 report it. 
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                                                     Section B : Organizational Culture  
      If you are a partner in an audit firm, please ignore this section and move to Section C. 
 
        7. What is the likelihood  that underreporting of time leads to:  
N        VU = Very Unlikely   U = Unlikely   N = Neutral  
              L = Likely   VL = Very Likely 
N       VU         U      N      L    VL 
1.1   7.1   Better periodic evaluations.      
1.1   7.2   Superiors thinking that you are  as  competent 
                 or even more competent than your peers. 
     
1.    7.3   Higher job security.      
1.1      7.4   Promotion and advancement.      
           7.5    Subsequent assignments  to  more  interesting  
                     and challenging jobs. 
     
            7.6   Feeling as competent as your peers.      
            7.7   Feeling of accomplishment.      
            7.8   Feeling of job satisfaction        
 
8.  How often does your superior engage in the following activities?  
           N = Never  R = Rarely   S = Sometimes   
           O = Often   A = Always 
        N         R          S         O         A 
1.1      8.1  Underreporting of time.       
1.1      8.2  Signing  off  a  required  audit  step without  
f                  finishing the work or noting the omission. 
     
 
 9.  How often does your superior request you to underreport time? 
1.1      9.1   Implicitly      
1.1      9.2   Explicitly      
 
 10. How  often  does  your  superior request  you  to  sign  off  a  required  audit  step  
without finishing the work or noting the omission?  
1.1       10.1  Implicitly      
1.1       10.2  Explicitly      
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                                                     Section C : Individual Characteristics 
        11.   Please read each of the following statements carefully  and  then  specify  the  extent  of 
                your disagreement/agreement with each item accordingly: 
N            SD = Strongly Disagree    D = Disagree                       
.      N  = Neutral  A = Agree  SA =  Strongly Agree 
  SD         D         N         A  SD 
     *11.1  A job is what you make it.      
1.1     *11.2  On   most  jobs,  people   can   pretty  much 
                      accomplish   whatever   they   set   out   to  
                      accomplish. 
     
1.       *11.3  If you know what  you  want  out  of  a  job, 
   Y                  you can find a job that gives that to you.  
     
1.1         *11.4   If   employees    are     unhappy     with      a 
                            decision made by their  boss,  they  should 
                             do something about it. 
     
                   11.5   Getting the   job   you   want   is   mostly   a   
                              matter of luck. 
     
                 11.6  Making  money is   primarily   a   matter   of 
                           good fortune. 
     
               *11.7  Most  people  are   capable  of  doing  their 
                           jobs well if they make an effort.  
     
          11.8  In order to get  a  really  good  job  you 
                    need   to   have    family     members   or 
                           friends in high places. 
     
.         11.9  Promotions  are   usually a matter of good 
                           fortune. 
     
11.        11.10  When it comes to  landing  a   really  good 
                         job, whom you  know  is   more important 
                         than what you know. 
     
*        11.11  Promotions are given  to  employees who 
                              perform well on the job. 
     
             11.12  To make a lot of  money you have to 
                         know the right people. 
     
             11.13  It   takes  a    lot   of    luck   to    be    an 
                       outstanding employee in most jobs. 
     
        *11.14  People  who   perform   their  job  well 
                       generally get well rewarded. 
     
        *11.15  Most  employees have  more  influence 
                       on their supervisors than they think. 
     
         *11.16  The  main  difference    between   people 
                       who make  a  lot  of   money  and  people 
                       who make less money is luck. 
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       12. How would you self-rate your performance?  
N        WBA = Well Below  BA = Below Average               
A = Average    AA= Above Average                    
WAA = Well Above Average     
       WBA        BA       A        AA       WAA 
1.1    12.1   My performance   with   regard  to   planning 
                    (i.e. determining goals and budgeting). 
     
1.1    12.2   My performance with regard to investigating 
                   (i.e.  collecting   and   preparing   information, 
                     financial reports, inventories). 
     
1.      12.3  My performance with regard to coordinating 
                  (i.e.     exchanging     information,     arranging 
                    meetings and giving advice). 
     
1.1        12.4  My performance with  regard  to  supervising 
                      (i.e.    directing,    leading,   counselling      and 
                       training subordinates). 
     
             12.5  My performance with regard to  staffing  (i.e. 
                        employment interviewing and recruiting) 
     
             12.6   My performance with regard to representing  
                        (i.e. promoting the firm's interests). 
     
             12 .7    Overall performance  O     
 
13.  Please read each of the  following  statements  carefully  and  then  specify  the  extent  
of your disagreement/agreement with each time accordingly. 
N         SD = Strongly Disagree    D = Disagree                       
.    N  = Neutral  A = Agree  SA =  Strongly Agree                                                                                    
        SD D   N A  SD 
1.             *13.1   I plan to remain with my current  firm 
                             until I retire. 
     
1.1           *13.2  I plan to remain with my  current  firm 
                             for at least two more years. 
     
1              *13.3  I plan to remain  with my current  firm 
                            for at least five more years. 
     
N      Note: * These statements were reverse scored.  
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                                                     Section D: Demographics 
 This section elicits demographic information about you and your firm and is for the purpose 
  of statistical analysis only. All answers are strictly confidential and anonymous. 
14.    Gender31 
                               Male                     Female 
13.      Years of audit experience  ____________________________________-- 
14.     Job position      
                              Partner                     Manager                      Senior                       Junior 
15.      Firm type 
                               Big Four Firm                        Other 
                                                                           
 
                                                                                                Thank you for your contribution. 
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A largely ignored but important doubt lingers with the advent of the myriad of 
corporate governance laws, rules, standards and codes: are the overall 
implications of such a regime, if any, being appropriately weighed? This paper 
debates some such implications and their significance on Maltese listed 
companies by considering one particular proposed corporate governance change 
by the European Union Commission: the statutory inclusion in its Proposed 
Amending Directive Com (2004) 725 of a Corporate Governance Statement in the 
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1.  Introduction                 
 
The traditional definition of corporate governance is that of "the system by which 
companies are directed and controlled" (Cadbury,1992: Section 2.5). Indeed, 
corporate governance is concerned with the interaction of a company's 
management, board of directors and stakeholders in ensuring the fairness of such 
a system. It needs hardly be said that corporate governance systems needed 
reform in the past decades for the sake of protecting the various stakeholders. For 
example, neither the USA nor the European Union could envy each other in the 
light of recent major corporate scandals such as Enron and Parmalat. Crises 
stimulate the search for new and more rigorous methods of surveillance and 
control (Moran,1986). As would therefore be expected, both legislators and 
regulatory bodies have been increasingly involved in the tightening up of the global 
legislative regulatory framework. 
 
 Perhaps the strongest evidence of this was, in the U.S.A, the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 which, according to the opening of the Act itself, was enacted 
"to protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate 
disclosures" (Sarbanes, 2002). In a comparable manner, in the European. Union, 
the 8th Directive on Company Law was finally implemented in 2006 further to the 
Commission's 2003 Action Plan for Modernising Company Law and Corporate 
Governance at EU Level (COM, 2003). Among other changes, the 8th Directive 
mandates audit committees for listed companies and includes fundamental 
changes around the relations of the board directors with the auditors. 
 
 Indeed, several other new rules, accounting and auditing standards and 
improvements have by now taken hold in many countries: it is good news for 
investors that boards of directors are becoming increasingly independent, audit 
committees are acting with newly found scepticism and autonomy and chief 
executive officers are assuming greater responsibility for financial reporting 
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(Deloitte and Touche, 2006). After all, a much-quoted survey of investor 
perceptions indicates that investors are willing to pay more for a company that is 
well governed and that the quality of corporate governance standards ranks 
alongside financial performance and other factors when deciding whether to invest 
in a company (Mckinsey, 2004). 
 
 In this vein, and even beyond legislation, most countries have developed 
their code of recommendations in this area - witness, for example, the many 
recent corporate governance codes listed by the European Corporate Governance 
Institute on its website (ECGI, 2006), including that of Malta introduced in 2001, 
revised in 2005 and intended to be adopted by issuers of listed securities. 
 
 Since 2001 the Malta Financial Services Authority (MFSA) listing rules have 
encouraged such issuers to 'endeavour to adopt' the principles of the "Code of 
Good Corporate Governance". The Rules require issuers to include in the Annual 
Report a statement, verified by the auditors, with regard to the effective measures 
they have taken to ensure compliance with the Code. Therefore, although the 
whole Code as such is not obligatory, listed companies in effect would already 
best adopt the "comply-or-explain" principle of explaining from which parts of the 
Code they depart, if they do so, and their reasons. 
 
 Yet a largely ignored but important doubt lingers with the advent of the 
myriad of this and further corporate governance laws, rules, standards and codes: 
are the overall implications of such a regime, if any, being appropriately weighed? 
This paper debates some such implications and their significance on Maltese 
listed companies by considering one particular proposed corporate governance 
change by the European Union Commission: the statutory inclusion in its 
Proposed Amending Directive of a Corporate Governance Statement in the Annual 
Report of listed companies (COM, 2004) 
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2.  The proposed new corporate governance statement 
 
The Amending Directive proposes a Corporate Governance Statement which not 
only requires the application of the 'comply-or-explain' principle already referred to 
above to a specified code of corporate governance, but also a number of other 
disclosure requirements. The main such requirements are: 
 the disclosure of the operation of the shareholder meeting and its key 
powers,  
 a description of shareholders' rights and how they can be exercised,          
as well as the composition and operation of the board of directors and its 
committees, and 
 the disclosure of the companies' internal control and risk management 
systems. 
 
 With regard to the first two disclosure requirements above regarding 
shareholders and board of directors, these should still create no significant 
changes with respect to Maltese listed companies: the descriptions will mostly 
involve disclosing what is already required in Maltese company law, in itself EU-
compliant. However, there are major issues to consider even in Malta if the 
Commission were to move ahead with the third disclosure requirement of the 
companies' internal control and risk management systems. In this respect, even 
according to the Explanatory Memorandum of the proposed directive itself (COM, 
2004 ,Section 2c), consultation has already shown that stakeholders disagree as 
to the need to go further than the application of the "comply-or-explain" principle. 
In fact, "while business was reluctant to go further other stakeholders favoured 
additional disclosure, in particular information about the risk management system 
applied by listed companies". 
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3.  Disclosing to everybody in the dark? 
 
A main issue here is that unless benchmarks are first agreed and established as to 
what is expected to be disclosed, such disclosures will probably be meaningless 
and mostly wasteful of resources as little, if any, inter-company comparisons or 
even inter-period comparisons may be carried out. Both phrases "internal control" 
and "risk management systems" are wide-ranging and umbrella ones. Internal 
controls involve so many aspects of the organisation - among others, its plans, 
lines of reporting, delegation of authority, segregation of duties, physical security 
aspects, management and supervision, the internal audit, personnel policies and 
the overall control environment. Similarly, risk management systems also 
permeate almost everywhere: there are business, financial, physical, managerial, 
legal, foreign exchange and several other types of risks to manage. 
 
 If serious enough, sub-committees of listed company boards of directors 
such as audit and risk management committees need in fact to be continuously 
occupied with both controls and risks. Yet, one may ask what - with this increased 
requirement - the "other stakeholders" are really after, because the exercise may 
unwittingly result in another public relations showcase showing the acceptable 
law-abiding face of their companies. How worthwhile is it for such boards to 
engage further financial and legal consultants at considerable cost to venture out 
politically correct information? While Annual Reports are increasingly thick and 
glossy, they are also probably being read less. Additionally, given the differing 
tastes of the various stakeholders, there will invariably be variances as to which 
items to disclose and also as to the desired level of detail - too commonly virtually 
impossible to satisfy. Can this merely lead to expensive information overload? 
 
 Even from the management's perspective, this may be an example of a 
questionable add-on to the contrasting demands which are continuously being 
made on them both for more accountability and for more value by stakeholders in 
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search of an ever-bigger piece of the corporate cake. After all, over the years, in 
addition to many more demands on boards of directors, traditional watchdogs 
have been highly empowered while others freshly installed, all in the name of 
corporate governance: the external auditors with their tightened international 
auditing standards, the internal auditors with their more strategic role, the varying 
regulators with their pressing and expensive demands, in many instances even 
three or more of them such as industry, listing and company ones, government 
authorities at the various levels - local, central and European all armed with new 
compulsory legislation. In allocating scarce resources in a tough, cost-cutting and 
dynamic environment, the "boss" or chief executive officer already finds it difficult 
as it is to strike a successful balance between delivering a good bottom line and 
coping with these elements of the regulatory framework. 
 
 In particular, stakeholders remote from the boardroom may too easily 
underestimate the significance of this. Requiring companies to disclose more and 
more on what they are doing will not necessarily make their operations more 
understandable. If one is not careful enough, companies may substantially be 
made to churn much more paperwork than before, but stakeholders given only a 
false sense of security.  
 
 This is not to say that the march of modern corporate governance needs to 
stop. The scrutiny of the governance and control being exercised at the top is a 
process that is to go on: new and better ways may be thus found for exercising 
reasonable checks and balances such as preventing anyone from having 
unfettered powers of discretion, distinguishing between possibly conflicting roles 
even beyond chairman and chief executive, and improving on the existing 
relationships of Boards of Directors and the different types and sizes of 
shareholders, and even making directors and chief executives more generally 
accountable. But before promulgating new rules, the regulating authorities need to 
undertake serious impact assessments of such regulations taking into reasonable 
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account the major stakeholders involved. A lesson to Europe in this context was 
the largely unforeseen cost to many American companies of implementing the 
above-mentioned Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the USA (Sarbanes, 2002). While 
benefits were clearly reaped, the stricter regime has also resulted in consultancy 
and audit shooting up dramatically, at least in the initial years. As a result, 
controversies still rage as to how far it is cost-beneficial both to the companies and 
to their stakeholders. 
 
 More specifically to this corporate governance statement requirement, the 
demand for more information to be made public can have its benefits if the sender 
knows clearly what to give and the receiver what to expect. This would entail 
spelling out specific details of the benchmarking standards. In working these out, 
the regulators would need also to consider and as far as possible take into 
account the potential pitfalls emanating from the attitudes of the parties involved 
as such attitudes may effectively inhibit the transmission of meaningful 
information. For example, senders may be too intent on protecting their interests 
and may be shrewd or resourceful enough to be able to filter the information in that 
interest. On the other hand, the major "stakeholders" could easily include 
inquisitive and potentially manipulative competitors, lethargic shareholders 
interested only in their dividend cheques, potential short-termist investors trying to 
speculate on the market, financial advisors with too many hats or conflicts of 
interest (particularly in a small island-state) and even some journalists with their 
political agenda on how to interpret company communications. While definitely one 
cannot solve all issues resulting from such attitudes, yet their consideration would 
definitely influence the type of information to be asked for. 
 
4.  Giving less but what is needed 
Perhaps an even better alternative is to re-examine the need for the corporate 
governance statement to go beyond the "comply-or-explain" principle. If one 
borrows the concept from auditing, the typical established statutory audit report 
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addressed to company shareholders does not in any way venture information 
unless there is the need for qualification or emphasis - and the approach seems to 
have worked. One reason for this is that the accompanying statutory financial 
statements are already heavily and increasingly regulated as to what to contain or 
not. One may therefore either decide not to ask for more disclosure with respect to 
corporate governance, or if more information is to be required, reserve it to the 
major changes that have occurred in controls or risks during the year. However, 
this information could also be incorporated with the other statements or reports in 
the Annual Report, such as in the directors' report. In any case, one perhaps 
needs best to avoid general descriptions of systems: what if you were made to 
listen to the whole story of what happens in your car controls by your mechanic 
every morning before starting off? In reality, you are only interested if anything is 
wrong. 
 
 Furthermore, inasmuch as a car mechanic will best point out car trouble, it 
is not the company but an independent specialist who will probably be best 
equipped to make – rather than merely verify aspects - of the statement. Rather 
than a financial auditor, perhaps it would be best to engage a management 
specialist for the purpose. Thus, if independent Board of Director sub-committees 
are functioning in a company, the chairman of, say, the Risk Management 
Committee may be required to present the risk management aspect in a report to 
the AGM, while the chairman of the Audit Committee will present the internal 
control aspects. 
 
5.  A question of priorities 
Perhaps, the pertinent question is even more fundamental: is the current emphasis 
on information disclosure the best approach to ensure progress in corporate 
governance? Could it be that regulatory priorities need re-shuffling? After all, 
irrespective of the regulatory framework in force, it is invariably dependent for its 
success or failure on the persons involved. Before regulating the flow of 
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information, it could be much better to think of tightening up the present regulation 
of the persons involved in the process. For this, one perhaps needs to re-visit the 
corporate governance modus operandi taken for granted over the years. For 
instance, with respect to the minimum qualifications required of directors: should 
candidates for board directorships in non-financial listed companies continue to be 
considered fit and proper for the position despite their having no background in 
ethics, law and finance, and/or business education in general? Are shareholding 
interests and financial backing to remain enough in practice to secure appointment 
to the boards of such companies? Furthermore, on being appointed to this 
position, should a short introductory familiarization course, if held at all, suffice? 
  
 In addition, with respect to the statutory term of appointment of directors: 
given that they are in charge of long-term strategies for their companies, is it wise 
to appoint them every annual general meeting? Why not have their appointment 
for a non-renewable but reasonable number of years such as five to seven years? 
In this manner, one would promote the long-term vision and continuity at the top 
which are necessary for many corporate governance matters. Why should 
directors care about minimizing risks if the weight of such risks will become 
apparent only beyond the term of office - next year or even after?  Moreover, 
although a profit retention policy may be needed for a company's long-term 
financial survival, how can directors refrain from recommending that extra dividend 
demanded by shareholders once they are completely dependent on such 
shareholders for imminent re-election? 
 
6.  Conclusion 
In conclusion, the proposed corporate governance statement disclosure 
requirement cannot be described as a scourge, but it is not a boon either. It could 
easily be like driving a car repeatedly around a roundabout - a fuel-consuming 
exercise without going anywhere. To continue on the car analogy, it is also 
useless to try to stop cars from overspeeding, but then fail to insist on a proper 
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driver's licence. In the area of corporate governance, we may need not only to 
slow down and not over-regulate, but, probably even more importantly, to insist 
with a sense of urgency on a proper licence for the corporate drivers in charge. 
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Benchmarking in Maltese Internal Audit Units 
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The organisation-wide drive towards total quality management (TQM) and the call 
for sound corporate governance require that Maltese internal audit (IA) units 
benchmark their operations as a first step towards the critical evaluation of their 
processes and the management of change. The purpose of this paper is to 
determine the awareness of this process in Maltese lA units, its perceived major 
benefits and limitations and also major barriers in its implementation. The objective 
of this study is achieved through a series of semi-structured interviews with 12 
Maltese lA executives representing most Maltese lA units. This study concludes 
that Maltese lA executives have a weak grasp of the benchmarking process and 
that current lA evaluation techniques are mere rudimentary comparisons, 
essentially backward and inward-looking in nature. Maltese lA executives 
appreciate the benefits of benchmarking as an effective lA quality tool but are 
divided as to its limitations. In addition, there are organisational and cultural 
barriers preventing them from attaining its potential benefits.  In addition to the 
analysis of major obstacles to the implementation and development of this TQM 
tool in a European ministate, this study points to possible regulatory and 
organisational changes for future improvements.  
 
Keywords:  internal auditing, benchmarking, Malta, total quality management  
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1.  Introduction  
Even though the number of internal audit (lA) units is limited in a small island like 
Malta, such units are not insulated from the general shift in orientation away from 
traditional assurance towards consulting and value-added services of lA. One of 
the pressures pushing lA in this direction is the entry of accounting firms into lA. 
This is inducing lA units to safeguard their professional status by reviewing the 
quality of their operations (Dittenhofer, 2001b) and expanding their role into 
operational and managerial audit (Guoming,1997). Internal knowledge makes lA a 
helpful ally in the early detection (Xiangdong,1997) and solution (Bencini, 2003) of 
modern business problems. Ultimately, the status of lA is determined by its value 
(Xiangdong,1997). 
 
 A number of researchers, such as Flesher and Zanzig (2000), found 
evidence that some audit customers do not recognise the value of lA, and may 
even restrict the internal auditor's role to internal control evaluation over traditional 
areas such as accounting and finance. Indeed, unless lA moves into value-added 
activities, the lA function risks being perceived as an overhead, and even worse, 
being outsourced (Liu et al.,1997). The new operational and consulting orientation 
of lA elicits the question of whether lA units are sufficiently equipped with 
resources and expertise to fulfil their role as consultants (Nagy and Cenker, 2002).  
 
In addition, the string of debacles that followed the Enron scandal in the 
USA, including the Worldcom, Adelphia and Parmalat cases, reminded managers, 
board members and other stakeholders of the need to focus on internal controls. 
Cadbury (1992) attributed failures of quoted companies to control failures. In the 
USA, a report by the Committee of Sponsoring Organisations of the Treadway 
Commission (COSO, 1992) had also reinforced and re-emphasised the proactive 
role of lA in establishing and maintaining an effective and efficient internal control 
system. lA is the principal mechanism through which the board of directors and 
management monitor the quality of internal controls. Such a proactive role of IA 
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also allows external auditors to place reliance on the work of lA and to reduce the 
extent of external audit work (IFAC, 2003). lA quality also takes on a new 
dimension in today's competitive environment, by ensuring that internal controls 
are strong enough in times when business risk is augmented by organisation-wide 
change (Liu et al.,1997).  
 
As corporate conduct deficiencies call for corrective action, the lA function 
is being driven to participate in the organisation-wide quality revolution labelled 
total quality management (TQM): "Under the TQM concept, internal auditors are 
viewed as part of the management team, helping others work towards achieving 
long-term, overall welfare of the organisation" (Rezaee,1996, p. 320). The auditing 
profession is no longer insulated from the worldwide phenomenon of consumer 
empowerment. It needs to focus on customer needs and to provide services that 
customers value (Cooper, 2003). lA units that want to withstand the pressures 
acting on modem lA must learn to love change. Change drives continuous 
improvement, which is the underlying philosophy of TQM. In order to counter such 
challenges, opportunities and pressures acting on the lA function, internal auditors 
need to become conversant with the theoretical and practical aspects of TQM 
techniques (Hawkes and Adams,1995). A study by Rand (1994) revealed weak 
familiarity with, and low usage of, TQM techniques by a majority of the surveyed lA 
managers. However, Vinten (1996) states that the lA function in general is willing 
to adopt such modern management concepts. For example, in the UK, an attribute 
standard of the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA, 2004a, para.1300)  requires chief 
lA executives to "develop and maintain a quality assurance and improvement 
program that covers all aspects of the intemal audit activity and continuously 
monitors its effectiveness."  
 
A major modern TQM approach to lA performance evaluation is 
benchmarking, which may be defined as: "the process of continuously measuring 
and comparing one's business processes against comparable processes in 
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leading organisations to obtain information that will help the organisation identify 
and implement improvements" (Andersen and Pettersen, 1996, p.4). 
Benchmarking is what Peters (1989, p. 229) calls"creative swiping" - learning other 
companies' best practices and doing new things or doing old things in a new way. 
As one of the most effective business strategies that is working for organisations 
of all sizes in all industries, benchmarking "has the potential to propel quantum 
improvement in internal auditing" (Julien,1993).  
 
This paper sets out to determine the awareness of this process in Maltese 
lA units, its perceived major benefits and problems and also major barriers in its 
implementation. The results indicate that Maltese lA executives are only poorly 
aware of the benchmarking concept and that current lA evaluation techniques are 
mere rudimentary comparisons, essentially backward and inward-looking in 
nature. Maltese lA executives appreciate the benefits of benchmarking as an 
effective lA quality tool but are divided as to its limitations. In addition, there are 
organisational and cultural barriers keeping them out of reach of its potential 
benefits.  
 
The paper is organised as follows. The next section reviews the relevant 
literature on the area and is followed by a section that discusses the methodology 
used in the study. The following two sections present the results and implications. 
The final section presents a summary and conclusion of the findings and 
limitations of the study.  
 
2.  Literature overview  
2.1  Alternative lA quality evaluation techniques  
Before examining in some detail the benchmarking approach, it is appropriate to 
take a preliminary look at two alternative IA quality evaluation techniques found in 
the literature, namely standard-based performance evaluation and results 
examination.  
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One of the objectives of the IA quality program required by the IIA is to 
"provide assurance that the internal audit activity is in conformity with the 
Standards and the Code of Ethics" (IIA, 2004a, para. 1300). Cangemi and 
Singleton (2003) developed a four-step IA evaluation program, based on 
compliance with department, corporate and professional IA standards. This 
evaluation program involves making a summarised review of all IA assignments 
using a quality assurance checklist, a detailed review by seniors of randomly 
selected assignments, an annual self-assessment conducted by the quality 
assurance coordinator and a tri-annual external review. However, Dittenhofer 
(2001a) opines that IA performance evaluation based on IA standard compliance 
allows for the possibility of conforming to operational standards without being 
productive. This cannot be afforded in times when quality is being continuously 
redefined through innovation rather than a fixed standard:  
"Clinging to tradition, many of us still over-emphasise  the  element  of 
 compliance. This limits the potential of audit to deliver value-for-money  
 and will continue to do so until we broaden our scope." (Peters,1992, p.16).  
 
Dittenhofer (2001a) considers it more appropriate to focus on aspects that 
relate more closely to the intended outcome of the IA process. He advocates the 
use of "results examination" where IA effectiveness can be ascertained by looking 
at whether the auditor has found the auditee's actions to be successful in 
achieving its goals and objectives. According to Dittenhofer, results examination 
involves identifying the auditee's objectives, establishing the criteria that could 
signify their achievement or otherwise, and using the established criteria to 
determine whether and to what degree the auditee's actions have resulted in the 
achievement of objectives. Although this approach is more results-oriented, its 
success depends on the measurability and subjectivity of the criteria chosen. 
 
2.2  IA benchmarking  
In any case, IA quality evaluation may be approached through benchmarking. The 
Andersen and Pattersen (1996) definition of this approach has already been 
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referred to in the introduction and shows that the approach may be divided into 
five elements: it is a process, that is, a structured, systematic and continuous 
exercise; it requires measurement and comparison of processes; it involves 
comparisons of like with like; it entails an external perspective; and it should result 
in the implementation of identified potential improvements.  
 
Camp (1989) of Rank Xerox, the pioneer of benchmarking, further 
developed benchmarking into four stages, namely planning, analysis, integration 
and action.                
                                                                                                                           
2.2.1 Planning                                                                                                         .                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
Planning starts off with the commissioning of a team supported by sponsor who 
has authority and stature in the organisation to drive the exercise and support the 
findings (Camp,1989; Cook,1995; McNamee,1995). Camp (1989) divides the 
planning stage into three steps. The first of these steps is to identify the activity to 
be benchmarked and the quantitative and qualitative measures to be used 
(Camp,1989; Cook,1995; McNamee,1995). The second step is to identify the 
benchmarking partner (Camp, 1989; McNamee,1995). A prerequisite of effective 
benchmarking is the availability of participation from reliable information resources 
(Babachicos,1999). Four routes may generally be taken to establish benchmarking 
partners, namely, benchmarking with organisations in related industries, best 
practice benchmarking, internal benchmarking and external competitive 
benchmarking. With respect to the latter. Cook (1995) proposed a direct 
relationship between the degree of such external propensity and the potential for 
improvement. Finally, one should establish the appropriate means of collecting 
internal and external data, who will be involved in data collection (Camp,1989; 
McNamee,1995), the aggregation level of the data (Cook,1995; McNamee,1995) 
and the number of benchmarking partners required (Cook,1995). The collection of 
data should be well planned (Brown et al.1994) and based on the principles of a 
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relevant benchmarking code of conduct to ensure that benchmarking efforts are 
not derailed over a breach of etiquette (McNamee,1995)  
                                                                                                                                 
2.2.2 Analysis                                                                                                  .                                                                                                           
This involves the interpretation of information as a basis for action and 
implementation. According to Camp (1989) this involves two steps, namely the 
establishment of the performance gap and the projection of future performance. In 
the first place, one should quantify and determine the reasons for the current gap 
between the company and benchmarking partner. This will "inject energy into the 
program as the size of the problem - and the opportunity - comes into view" 
(Peters, 1989, p. 74). Ratios and formulae make lA performance evaluation more 
visible, but unless such data is standardised, comparative analysis would not be 
workable. Babachicos (1999) proposes the development of a benchmarking 
survey to provide each participating lA executive with a data source for 
comparison, based on a confidentiality agreement. One such survey is the Annual 
Report of the Global Auditing Information Network (GAIN) organised by the 
Institute of Internal Auditors (USA) (IIA, 2004b). 
  
However, it is important not to reduce the problem to metrics (McNamee, 
1995). One must step back and look for things the numbers are not telling us. 
Examples of performance indicators to measure qualitative issues are: employee 
absenteeism or the number of suggestions made to a suggestion scheme in order 
to gauge motivation; the number of layers in a department and the frequency of 
gathering and acting on feedback by management to monitor management; and 
the number and types of complaints to determine customer satisfaction 
(Cook,1995). Cangemi and Singleton (2003) propose the use of the balanced 
scorecard system to combine qualitative and quantitative lA performance 
measures.  
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The second step in the analysis stage is to project future performance, that 
is, estimate, over an agreed time frame, the change in performance of the 
company and the benchmarking company in order to assess if the gap is going to 
grow or decrease (Camp,1989; McNamee,1995). 
                                                                                                                             
2.2.3 Integration                                                                                                       .                                                                                                       
Integration involves two further steps. The first is the effective communication of 
findings and establishment of goals to eliminate the performance gap (Camp,1989; 
McNamee,1995). The second is the development of action plans to achieve the 
established goals. Discussions with lA staff, possibly forming quality circles (Zettie, 
2002), give staff the opportunity to identify better procedures (Babachicos,1999) 
and to prioritise areas of change through cost-benefit analysis and other 
techniques (Cook,1995). Even a small change could be the start of a journey to 
significant improvement (Babachicos,1999).  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
2.2.4 Action                                                                                                   .       
Finally, action should be taken to implement the plans, report and reassess the 
benchmarks. The first step is to implement the actions, plans and strategies. This 
involves good project planning and management (Camp,1989). Two-way 
communication, management support, a coaching leadership style and the use of 
readily understandable language are ways of overcoming resistance, which 
generally manifests itself at this stage (Cook,1995). The second step is to assess 
and report the results of the action plans (Camp,1989). Finally, one will reassess 
or recalibrate benchmarks on a regular and systematic basis and maintain good 
links with the benchmarking partners (Camp,1989). Cook (1995) even suggests 
the formation of benchmarking consortia where representatives of the companies 
involved meet on a regular basis to share information and experiences. 
 
2.3  The benefits and limitations of lA benchmarking  
The benchmarking philosophy is in line with Ishikawa's (1990) concept of "forward  
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looking quality" or Kano et al. (1996) "attractive quality" where "learning as much 
as possible from individual examples of failures and success" (Kondo, 2002,         
p.301) is preferred to traditional statistical techniques.  
 
The external perspective of benchmarking provides a "helicopter vision" 
(Cook, 1995, p.30) that not only prevents complacency, but also accelerates and 
manages change. It is a versatile tool that highlights value gaps and pinpoints 
areas in which potential and necessity for improvement exists, sets performance 
goals, and generates an understanding of world class performance (Cook,1995).  
 
Benchmarking is also helpful in setting up, retaining and maintaining an IA 
department, by helping to overcome the lack of documentation on such a strategic 
process (Liu et al.,1997).  
 
Kondo (2002) also suggests that activities that bring out human qualities, 
such as creativity and innovation, in the quest for quality improvement, stimulate 
employees' satisfaction and desire to work.  
 
On the other hand, benchmarking has been criticised for requiring a large 
investment in time, labour and capital (Blakeman, 2002) and for drawing 
companies towards imitation and homogeneity (Campbell et al., 2000). It has also 
been argued that it lacks predictive power. At best, it provides a snapshot view of 
the present but provides no clues to future know-how (Campbell et al., 2000). 
Others argue that it gives only limited information about how to correct shortfalls, 
and creates difficulties in selecting the indicators to be used (Benchmarking PLUS, 
2004).  
 
3.  Research methodology  
3.1  Research instruments                                                                          .                                                                               
The small size of the population involved facilitated the adoption of the personal 
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semi-structured interview. Personal interviews enable direct communication in a 
two-way conversation, where the interviewer may probe for a clearer or more 
comprehensive explanation if the respondents' answers are unclear or brief. The 
interviewer may also provide feedback in clarifying any questions respondents 
may have about the instructions or questions. Moreover, the presence of an 
interviewer generally increases the percentage of people who are willing to 
complete the interview, especially in cases such as this, where the questionnaire 
was somewhat long. The interview schedule was divided into two sections. The 
first stage of the interview consisted of 16 questions that sought to establish the 
extent of familiarity with benchmarking in an lA context, whether respondents had 
ever considered conducting the exercise, its implementation and the nature of 
benchmarking practices adopted. A mixture of five-point Likert scale and open-
ended questions were used in this section. The use of open-ended questions was 
deemed to be more appropriate to this exploratory study since the range of 
responses was not known. Also, respondents are free to answer with whatever is 
uppermost in their thinking, to provide useful insight into current lA benchmarking 
practices.  
 
Both interviewees that benchmarked formally and those that benchmarked 
informally were required to pass on to the second section of the interview 
schedule. The first three questions were aimed at obtaining an understanding of 
the respondents' awareness of benchmarking, its benefits and problems. Five-
point Likert scales were used in these three questions. All respondents, except 
those claiming to be performing formal benchmarking, were required to answer the 
final three questions of the interview, the objective of which was to determine the 
extent to which interviewees were willing to adopt benchmarking as defined to 
them and the barriers which they expected if they were to implement the process. 
A mixture of multiple choice questions and five-point Likert scales was employed 
here.  
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The final part of the interview was aimed at obtaining a number of 
respondent characteristics, which information was checked with other data 
gathered in the interview in order to ascertain any meaningful relationships.  
 
3.2  Sample selection and response rates  
The sample consisted of one group of 18 Maltese lA executives representing the 
whole known population of Maltese lA units based on a list compiled in two earlier 
studies by Galea (2004) and Attard (2004). After further research another two 
organisations were added to this list. The small population of 20 can be explained 
by the fact that mostly it is the larger public companies which have as yet adopted 
the lA function in this small island-state. Respondents for the research questions 
were the executives of Maltese lA units as these were specifically required to 
deploy an lA quality assurance and improvement program by the IIA (2004a,b). 
The interview proceedings were recorded and a transcript prepared after each 
interview. Quantifiable data, such as five-point Likert scale ratings, were inputted 
and analysed by Microsoft Excel. The sections of the interview were analysed by 
means of formulae, tables and graphs.  
 
Out of the 20 potential interviewees, 12 participated in the interview. Out of 
the non-participants, two lA executive posts were vacant, while the remaining six 
were not available to participate in the study.  
 
4.  Results of the study  
4.1  Awareness of lA benchmarking  
The first part of the interview schedule was aimed at establishing the awareness of 
benchmarking in Maltese lA units. Out of the 12 participants, 11 had come across 
the term "benchmarking" in relation to lA, eight of whom had considered 
performing the benchmarking exercise. Of these seven had actually implemented 
it. Most lA executives (4/7) were performing the exercise themselves. Others (2/7) 
stated that the whole lA unit was involved in benchmarking, mainly because of the 
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small size (one to five employees) of the lA team and the fact that benchmarking 
was intrinsic to the lA exercise. The remaining lA executives (1/7) had a 
benchmarking team. On average respondents were indifferent to the importance of 
the role of a sponsor to drive the benchmarking project and support the findings. 
However, they still agreed that planning the benchmarking exercise was important.  
 
4.2.  IA benchmarking practices  
Respondents who claimed to be benchmarking informally (4/7) based the selection 
of area to benchmark on the capability of the process or activity of being 
benchmarked, judgement based on past performance coupled with personal 
experience, and the risk associated with particular activities or processes. 
 
Interviewees who claimed to be benchmarking formally (3/7) based their 
selection on the awareness of current best practices (through training and 
professional reading), lA standards requirements, the risks associated with 
particular activities or processes, activities selected by the global holding 
company, and processes or activities measured in a benchmarking survey. 
 
Three common performance indicators emerged amongst interviewees. 
Most (4/7) used control reliance factors (that is, scores assigned to measure risk in 
various areas) monitored internally over time. Others (2/7) measured lA 
productivity in terms of the proportion of total available man-hours allocated to 
productive activities monitored internally over time, while a few (1/7) monitored the 
timeliness of the audit report internally over time.  
 
Other performance indicators were the percentage of recommendations 
implemented and training per capita, both monitored internally over time, and other 
relevant performance indicators reported in an international benchmarking survey. 
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None of the interviewees considered evaluating lA staff motivation through 
the benchmarking exercise. A few (2/7) used customer satisfaction surveys to 
seek feedback from auditees on issues such as the timeliness, clarity and 
conciseness of the audit report and whether lA objectives were clearly stated. 
Performance ratings were benchmarked internally over time. While some had 
plans to develop a customer satisfaction survey in the future, others stated that 
issues of organisational culture had to be addressed prior to moving towards the 
appropriate lA set-up. An alternative to the customer satisfaction survey was the 
close-out meeting where, as one interviewee explained, lA findings and 
performance are discussed in a meeting with auditees at the end of every audit. 
  
None of the interviewees had formal procedures for the selection of 
benchmarking partners. Some (3/7) benchmarked with members of their own 
group of companies. The choice was justified on the grounds that, being a 
member of a foreign group of companies, it was natural for them to seek to benefit 
from a foreign perspective when information was so easily accessible. Others (3/7) 
claimed to be benchmarking informally and internally over time. The reasons 
advanced by the latter respondents included lack of co-operation between Maltese 
internal auditors, problems of comparability with similar foreign organisations due 
to differences in the environment in which the organisations operate, lack of 
permission (for competitive reasons) to share lA performance information, lack of 
local competition against which to benchmark and the need to ensure that 
procedures and controls are well in place prior to benchmarking externally. One 
respondent (1/7) claimed that lA performance information was obtained from a 
combination of foreign benchmarking partners (organisations within the same 
industry and best practice organisations in unrelated industries) through a global 
benchmarking survey.  
 
Only two IA executives made use of benchmarking surveys and the type 
used by each was different. The first type was a quality assurance and 
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improvement survey administered by the head of the IA group of companies on 
the basis of results of internal self-assessment (performed every two years) 
between members of the group in different countries and external reviews 
(performed every five years). The other type of survey was an international survey 
of the GAIN administered by the IIA (USA), available for a fee. Such a survey 
therefore had a wider external perspective and its choice was attributed to the fact 
that no direct local competitors existed, in consequence of the quasi-monopoly 
status of the group in question. It was described by the respondent to be an open 
and advanced form of IA benchmarking which fostered sharing of IA performance 
data amongst IA units in different industries and countries.  
 
The users of both types of surveys claimed there were problems of 
comparability and interpretation of data owing to differences in the size of 
organisations and their business environment as most were based in different 
environmental, social, political and cultural contexts. None of the other 
interviewees were aware of the GAIN and similar surveys, although they stated 
that they would be interested in administering similar surveys when the nature of 
such surveys was described to them.  
 
None of the respondents were members of a benchmarking consortium. 
The respondents of the banking and finance sector pointed out that a joint audit 
forum had been set up by the Malta Bankers' Association, for the discussion of 
relevant IA issues. However, no IA performance data was exchanged during such 
meetings.  
 
In general, the ethical dimension of IA benchmarking was neglected, with 
none of the interviewees being aware of the European benchmarking code of 
conduct (EFQM, 2001).  
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Most IA units (5/7) identified their performance gap by conducting an annual 
or semi-annual review to assess whether IA department objectives were met. A 
few (2/7) compared results of IA department performance against survey results 
and compiled a report of quantitative performance gaps.  
 
None of the interviewees had an organised approach for developing action 
plans to close or increase the identified performance gaps. Two interviewees 
claimed that decisions for action to be taken on reported performance results were 
made by top management and communicated to the IA department. Most of the 
interviewees (5/7) did not have organised procedures for prioritising areas of 
improvement. Others (2/7) based their prioritisation on the risk ratings of the areas 
benchmarked.  
 
None of the interviewees who benchmarked informally had procedures to 
ensure their benchmarks were up-to-date. On the other hand, different ways of 
keeping benchmarks updated were identified amongst the interviewees that 
performed benchmarking on a formal basis, namely regular updating of the IA 
standards and procedures by the group's parent, annual subscription to a global 
benchmarking survey and pressure exerted by the internal auditors on the IIA to 
update (in line with developments in current environmental conditions and IA 
needs) the standards against which IA performance was evaluated.  
 
4.3  Factors promoting lA quality  
Factors promoting the need to improve lA quality were rated by the seven 
respondents who claimed to be benchmarking, as shown in Table 1. 
   
 While Maltese lA executives agreed that the increased emphasis on IC 
quality is relevant in pushing quality upwards in the lA units' agenda, they 
disagreed that the threat of outsourcing is a factor promoting lA quality. In this 
context, opinions were mixed about the relevance of pressure to motivate lA staff 
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through creative activities such as benchmarking and of dissatisfaction with  the  
existing  lA  expectations  gap.  
 
Table 1 
Factors promoting the need for higher lA quality 
 
 
The need for higher lA quality arises owing to: 
 
Mean (n = 7) 
 
SD 
 
The general increased emphasis on the quality of IC 4.00 0.58 
Pressure to motivate lA staff through creative activities such as 
benchmarking 3.14 1.07 
Dissatisfaction with the existing lA expectations gap 3.00 0.58 
The threat of outsourcing the lA function  1.43 0.53 
  
Notes: 1 - completely irrelevant; 5 - highly relevant   
 
Respondents also added additional factors considered to be creating the 
need for higher lA quality such as the role for lA as a change agent within the 
organisation and the participation of IA in project implementation throughout the 
organisation, the need to ensure monitoring of lA by the regulator and credibility in 
the eyes of both external auditors and the regulator, which credibility influences 
the continuity of operations especially in the banking and finance sector.  
 
4.4  The benefits and limitations of IA benchmarking  
The attributes of benchmarking as an effective IA quality improvement tool and the 
perceived limitations of benchmarking were rated by the seven respondents who 
claimed to be benchmarking, as shown in Tables 2 and 3 below. 
 
 lA executives agreed that benchmarking has various attributes as an lA 
quality tool.  One perceived  attribute was  that it highlights value gaps and  
pinpoints areas in which potential and necessity for improvement exist. However, 
they were indifferent as to the role of benchmarking in accelerating and managing 
change, mainly because of the difficulty of changing organisational culture. 
 
 Mixed views were shown   with   respect   to   the   resources   required   for 
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Table 2 
Benefits of benchmarking as carried out 
 
The attributes of benchmarking as an effective IA quality 
improvement tool are that it 
 
Mean (n = 7) 
 
 
SD 
 
Highlights value gaps and pinpoints areas in which potential and 
necessity for improvement exist 4.14 0.38 
Generates an understanding of world class performance 4.00 1.00 
Is versatile and applicable to a wide range of areas 3.71 1.11 
Facilitates the setting of performance goals  3.57 0.79 
Creates an external perspective  3.57 0.98 
Accelerates and manages change  3.00 0.58 
   
Notes: 1 - completely irrelevant; 5 - highly relevant 
  
 
 
                                                                                                                          
Table 3 
Limitations of IA benchmarking as carried out 
 
 
Benchmarking 
 
 
Mean (n = 7) 
 
 
SD 
 
Requires large investment in time, labour and capital  3.00 1.73 
Gives limited information on how to correct performance shortfalls  2.57 1.13 
Draws companies towards imitation and homogeneity  2.43 0.53 
Involves difficulties of identification of performance indicators  2.43 1.62 
Lacks predictive power  1.86 1.07 
   
Notes: 1 - completely irrelevant; 5 - highly relevant 
  
 
                                                                                                                      . 
benchmarking. Some claimed that the exercise required a lot of time to set up, 
filter relevant information and keep the data updated, while others argued that 
costs could be reduced if information resources were pooled. lA executives 
disagreed that benchmarking lacks predictive power, with some adding that past 
experience coupled with knowledge of the industry is one way of predicting future 
performance.  
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4.5 The future of lA benchmarking  
A good number (4/9) of the lA executives who were unaware of, or had not 
considered adopting or had even chosen not to implement lA benchmarking or that 
only adopted it at the informal level, thought it to be a good idea for the future. 
Some of these, mainly from government-owned entities in the maritime industry, 
deemed lA benchmarking to be a useful exercise once other more important lA 
issues were addressed. They claimed that while the lA function was still evolving 
in the relevant entities, organisational culture was slowing down the process. One 
lA executive claimed that:  
       "... the lA function is evolving in hiccups because of the fire-fighting nature  
        of problem solving and the lack of support  from  the Board  for innovative 
        management techniques such as lA benchmarking."  
 
 Others (2/9), all from the banking and finance sector, had formal 
benchmarking as part of the lA audit strategy. The remaining respondents (3/9) 
had different points of view. One interviewee (an outsourced internal auditor) 
explained that, although benchmarking had important benefits to offer in the 
management of change, none of his clients had ever requested the service. An in-
house lA executive claimed that in the industry in question "formal benchmarking 
is adequate but not available" because of competition and confidentiality issues. 
The remaining interviewee (an outsourced internal auditor) considered 
benchmarking a "refinement of lA" and stated that full-scale benchmarking would 
only be useful after ensuring the appropriate procedures and controls were in 
place and operating effectively.  
 
As benchmarking partners, some of these lA executives (3/9) would opt for 
organisations in related industries in the future. Two of these considered both 
Maltese and non-Maltese partners while the remaining interviewee opted for only 
Maltese partners, given the unique Maltese operating environment. Others (3/9) 
would also opt for Maltese and non-Maltese partners but identified as acceptable 
to them organisations in both related and unrelated industries and, particularly, 
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best practice organisations irrespective of industry, as well as direct competitors 
within the same industry. A few (2/9) opted only for competitors in their own 
industry. One of these considered only non-Maltese competitors, given that there 
were no direct Maltese incumbents in the field, while the other interviewee 
considered both Maltese and non-Maltese competitors. One respondent opted 
only for best practice organisations in unrelated industries, claiming that 
"management is management - it's the same everywhere irrespective of whether 
you're managing people, risk ... anything." None of the interviewees considered 
adopting internal performance comparisons in the future.  
 
As can be seen in Table 4, most such interviewees considered a lack of 
adequate benchmarking partners to be the main barrier they expected to 
encounter in performing the benchmarking exercise. This was mainly due to a 
perceived lack of cooperation from other lA executives in the same industry or 
because of a lack of direct competitors given a quasi-monopoly status. Response 
to expected barriers relating to a lack of human resources, high compliance costs, 
reluctance to disclose information and forfeiting market share to competitors was 
mixed. With respect to reluctance to disclose information, response was 
particularly varied – while some considered the sharing of lA performance 
information a positive opportunity, others expressed concern for confidentiality. 
However, on average, the other problems of benchmarking did not seem to worry 
the respondents. However, interviewees pointed to barriers additional to the above 
which they expected to encounter in adopting benchmarking. These were 
problems of comparability of information, the need to                                                                                                                     
address more important problems in the organisation and in the lA set-up before 
finding the time for benchmarking, a lack of support from top management and an 
incompatible organisational culture.  
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Table 4 
Barriers to introducing formal lA benchmarking 
 
 
Problems expected in introducing benchmarking are 
 
 
Mean (n = 9) 
 
 
SD 
 
A lack of adequate partners 4.13 1.13 
A lack of human resources 2.88 1.36 
High compliance costs 2.75 1.17 
Reluctance to disclose information 2.75 1.98 
Forfeiting market share to competitors 2.63 1.41 
   
Notes: 1 - completely irrelevant; 5 - highly relevant 
  
                                                     
 
5.  Discussion of findings 
5.1  The types of benchmarking 
5.1.1 Risk-based results examination 
It is clear that most of the lA executives claiming to be performing benchmarking 
on an informal basis monitor risk ratings of their auditees internally over time and 
deduce the performance of the IA function from the extent to which risk has been 
mitigated at the auditee level. The inference of IA performance from the degree of 
auditee objective-achievement is close to what Dittenhofer (2001a) called "results 
examination." However, being risk-based, this practice lacks the logic of 
Dittenhofer's theory, since the inherent part of total risk is uncontrollable by the IA 
function and is subject to change, possibly distorting IA performance inference and 
rendering it meaningless. This practice also lacks the external perspective 
required in benchmarking. A look at the profile of the relevant respondents reveals 
that while lA units consider an external perspective to be problematic owing to the 
sensitive nature of IC and risk information, all of these respondents are public 
listed companies. This implies that, since most financial information is publicly 
available, it may easily be possible for them to share IA performance information, 
other than IC and risk information, without impinging on the confidentiality issue.                                                                                                                              
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5.1.2 Standard-based performance evaluation                                                 .                                                                 
Where benchmarking was considered on a formal basis, the indications are that 
such formal comparison of current standards is made against European or 
international standards, these being either IA standards established by the IIA or 
quality standards and procedures established by foreign holding companies.  
 
The control element is highly evident in this form of performance evaluation, 
where standards are an instrument of ensuring uniform quality. Yet, the concept of 
benchmarking is incompatible with standardisation - it is rather about learning to 
embrace change first and then trying to improve. Moreover, as stated by 
Dittenhofer (2001a), standard-based IA performance evaluation allows for the 
possibility of conforming to operational standards without being productive. This 
could limit the potential of IA to deliver value for money (Peters, 1992).  
 
An interesting observation is that for this category of respondents 
confidentiality is of relatively little concern. This may be helped by the fact that 
standards are common to all members of the group, thus leading them to place 
less emphasis on competition. Yet, problems are encountered in the comparison 
and interpretation of IA performance data because of the different cultural, 
regulatory and environmental settings in which the different members of the group 
operate. This raises the argument in favour of benchmarking with Maltese 
competitors, where available, or with competitors established in countries with the 
same economic and environmental fabric similar to that of Malta. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
5.1.3 Survey-based benchmarking                                        .                                                                                            
It has been seen that benchmarking surveys are being used only rarely, and this is 
unfortunate as such an approach may have a greater potential for significant 
improvements because of its wider perspective. However, even here it has been 
seen that there may easily remain considerable difficulties in interpreting survey 
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results if the participants are based in different environmental, social, political and 
cultural contexts such as in global surveys.  
 
Perhaps, rather than thinking of global benchmarking, it would be better to 
organise a national consortium for Maltese IA executives where IA performance 
information can be exchanged between IA representatives. Eventually, this effort 
may be extended to include European partners operating in a similar regulatory, 
economic and cultural environment. Although this would not eliminate 
comparability problems, it would be an additional opportunity to learn from a 
broader external dimension.  
 
Once such a national lA benchmarking consortium is set in motion and a 
mutual understanding of what is expected of the exercise is obtained, including the 
choice of performance indicators, benchmarking efforts may be organised in 
survey format to accompany less frequent consortia meetings. Participants would 
thus be in a position to regularly benefit from the feedback given by the results of 
such surveys.   
 
This could also lead to the setting up of a benchmarking award recognising 
benchmarking excellence. Such an award could serve as a platform for those 
excelling to disseminate their knowledge and to help in the further improvement of 
IA units. 
 
5.2  The awareness of IA benchmarking                                            
As seen earlier, benchmarking involves five elements: it is a process and requires 
the measurement and comparison of processes, comparison of like with like, an 
external perspective and the implementation of identified potential improvements.  
  
 However, current IA performance evaluation practices in Malta portray a 
different picture. Rather than considering benchmarking as a process, in the sense 
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of a structured, systematic and continuous exercise, Maltese IA units perform 
benchmarking in an unstructured manner on an annual or semi-annual basis. 
None of the IA units focus on the comparison of how tasks are actually performed. 
Instead they focus on quantitative performance measures, which not only present 
problems of comparability across organisations, but also lack the qualitative 
dimension necessary for breakthrough improvements. Unfortunately, most IA units 
have not yet removed their blinkers - they compare their quality with their own 
performance in preceding time periods, and thus fail to exploit the direct 
relationship proposed by Cook (1995) between the degree of external propensity 
and the potential for improvement.  
 
Notwithstanding the high percentage of Maltese IA executives who came 
across the benchmarking concept in an IA context and are implementing some 
form of IA performance evaluation, most Maltese IA units therefore demonstrate a 
weak grasp of the benchmarking concept and a limited scope of its application. 
Current IA performance evaluation practices are mostly mere rudimentary 
comparisons, incompatible with the benchmarking concept, and this leaves 
Maltese IA units out of reach of its potential benefits.  
 
5.3  Benefits, limitations and barriers in Maltese IA benchmarking  
The importance of IA quality evaluation and improvement in Malta is mainly driven 
by the increased emphasis on IC quality. Against this background, IA executives 
appreciate the value of benchmarking and attribute the emergence of 
benchmarking as an effective IA TQM tool to its benefits. Most that are not 
performing benchmarking seem willing to implement its concept someday, 
although only a few seem prepared to do this in the foreseeable future. The 
problems identified by Maltese IA executives seem not to be so much those 
inherent in the nature of benchmarking itself. In fact, major limitations, as referred 
to in the literature, seem to be ignored or at the least met with mixed views by IA 
practitioners already embracing the concept. For example, the limitation of the 
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investment required in time, labour and capital was met with such mixed views. 
Neither seems the failure to embrace the benchmarking concept to be primarily 
due to the poor grasp of it as already mentioned. 
  
The major issue seems rather to be that of the perceived barriers of an 
organisational and cultural nature in the implementation of benchmarking. Such 
barriers may perhaps best be re-classified as five, namely an under-developed lA 
function, the controlling versus value-adding dilemma in the lA unit, a lack of 
awareness of the ethical dimension, a lack of Maltese benchmarking partners and 
network, and an incompatible organisational culture.  
 
In the first place, most respondents consider lA to be a luxury in view of its 
current under-developed stage. In this context, as one respondent commented, 
benchmarking is seen as a "refinement of lA," which may be addressed only when 
such lA function reaches a more developed stage. At this stage the objectives of 
the average lA function probably remain hazy, with, for example, some of the lA 
executives also being directly responsible for risk management. One would 
therefore expect to find too many divergences in lA practices hampering 
meaningful benchmarking. However, an appropriate step in the direction towards a 
more level playing field and common grounds of comparison is the clarification 
within organisations of the objectives of the lA function. 
 
The lA dilemma of how far to move away from mere controlling and towards 
adding value is also another benchmarking barrier. While some lA units seem to 
be shifting towards such orientation, others seem to want to remain firmly control-
oriented. One such indication of this is that currently there are very few lA units 
that make use of customer satisfaction surveys, although some do have plans to 
use them. In addition, when asked to identify factors which they considered to be 
promoting the need for lA quality, some interviewees made control-oriented 
comments (e.g. the need to ensure monitoring of lA performance by the regulator), 
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while others made value-oriented comments (e.g. the role of lA as a change agent 
and the participation of lA in project implementation throughout the organisation). 
 
Another barrier is the insufficient ethical awareness. lA executives are 
concerned that benchmarking will reveal confidential information to competitors. 
These inhibitions are the result of a general lack of regard to the ethical dimension 
of the exercise and the lack of awareness of an acceptable code of conduct such 
as the European Benchmarking Code of Conduct (EFQM, 2001). Adopting the 
latter would help to ensure that confidentiality is not breached, and thus facilitate 
the exchange of IA performance data. 
 
A further issue is the lack of Maltese benchmarking partners and network. 
Most organisations having an lA function often lack same-scale competitors owing 
to their relatively large size. However, as stated in the literature, there are 
arguments in favour of benchmarking with units outside one's industry (lacobucci 
and Nordhielm, 2000) and units in organisations of a different size. As one 
interviewee put it, "at the end of the day, lA is the same everywhere, whether it is 
in a manufacturing company, a service provider or a financial institution." The use 
of international lA benchmarking surveys such as GAIN (IIA, 2004b) would help in 
overcoming the lack of Maltese benchmarking partners. However, the immediate 
use of such surveys would still present problems of comparability in view of the 
various differences already referred to earlier. An alternative way out is to start 
looking at ways of establishing a Maltese lA benchmarking structure which permits 
the confidential exchange of standardised lA performance data. This may first best 
be effected in the banking sector where there is already an established lA forum 
for lA executives to meet regularly to discuss lA issues. As yet lA benchmarking is 
not part of their agenda, probably because of the different sizes of Maltese banks. 
However, it is important to keep in mind that lA benchmarking is not only about 
comparing quantitative data which, by nature, is susceptible to distortion due to 
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size differences. It also involves the comparison of IA processes, and therefore 
remains worthwhile for consideration in the agenda.  
 
A final important barrier is the incompatible organisational culture. While in 
some organisations IA benchmarking has been adopted to align the IA function 
with the rest of the organisation's effort towards TQM, in other organisations IA 
executives face serious barriers in performing the exercise because of a general 
complacency within the organisation. In some cases, especially the government-
owned organisations, this complacency starts from the topmost levels of the 
organisation, and works against the need to accept the notion of change before 
seeking to improve. Unless there is an organisation-wide willingness and top 
management support to set the proper tone for change, the benchmarking efforts 
of IA executives will be futile. As one respondent commented "one can take the 
management horse to the water, but one cannot make it drink." 
 
Probably, in order to set up an appropriate foundation for IA benchmarking, 
one needs to promote the IA function and its role through a more rigorous 
regulatory framework Making an effective, full-time IA function a mandatory 
requirement for Maltese listed companies could be a first step in this direction 
helping to induce the early adoption of the necessary IA culture. This may perhaps 
also be followed in due course by the development and maintenance of a 
mandatory IA quality assurance and improvement program.  
 
Finally, a benchmarking award that recognises benchmarking excellence 
would provide a platform for those excellent examples to disseminate their 
knowledge and further the improvement of IA units. 
 
5.4  Limitations of the study 
A limitation in carrying out this study, to be taken into account particularly if one is 
to compare these results to those that may be found in other countries, is the small 
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number of respondents on which the study was necessarily based given the 
limited number of Maltese IA units. In addition, although the interview schedule 
was sent one week in advance to all participants, the extent to which they 
prepared for the interview could have varied considerably, this possibly resulting in 
inconsistencies in the quality of replies.  
 
6.  Summary and conclusions 
This study set out to establish the awareness of benchmarking in Maltese IA units 
and to determine the need for, benefits of and barriers in the performance of this 
exercise. This objective was achieved through a series of interviews with 12 
Maltese IA executives representing the majority of Maltese IA units.  
 
This study concludes that Maltese IA executives have a weak grasp of the 
benchmarking process and that current IA evaluation techniques are mere 
rudimentary comparisons, essentially backward  and inward-looking in nature. 
Maltese IA executives appreciate the benefits of benchmarking as an effective IA 
quality tool but are divided as to its limitations. In addition, there are organisational 
and cultural barriers preventing them from attaining its potential benefits.  
 
It can also be concluded that although benchmarking awareness is weak 
and that the technique is as yet little used, there is a general willingness to adopt 
the benchmarking concept in the future. If Maltese lA executives want to protect 
their professional status and start being perceived as value-adding agents, they 
need to expend more effort to become more organised and to ward off cultural 
complacency by mutual learning and going outside their lA box 
 
Hopefully, it will not be too long before benchmarking overcomes its barriers 
in  Malta and becomes a normal IA practice, thus establishing another milestone to 
a rapidly evolving profession. 
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The main objective of this paper is to ascertain the major conflicts of interest faced 
in the governance of the Maltese co-operative movement consisting of three 
governing institutions and individual co-operatives, as well as the financial 
implications of such conflicts. Results from personal semi-structured interviews 
point to a lack of awareness on the deeper meaning of what constitutes a conflict 
of interest. Furthermore, no clear delineation of roles among the three institutions is 
as yet present. With respect to co-operatives, results reveal that the majority of 
conflicts of interest surface within committees of management owing to varying 
personal/entity interests and the overlapping roles of directorship and 
management. In the authors' view, at the co-operative level, the need arises for the 
development of a general Code of Ethics and for better training for those in charge 
of governance, as well as for skill gap analysis and the formalization of their 
relevant policies. On the other hand, at the institutional level, the need beckons for 
general restructuring, including revisions to the appointment system of the 
respective governing bodies. 
  
 
Keywords: conflicts of interest, governance, Maltese co-operatives, co-operative          
.                 finance 
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1.  Introduction 
Co-operatives were one of the early structures formed with the specific aim of 
assisting groups of workers that have an entrepreneurial spirit to achieve their 
aims. In fact, according to Luccock (n.d.), "No one can whistle a symphony. It takes 
an orchestra to play it" . The International Co-operative Alliance, the organisation 
that represents co-operatives and the co-operative movement worldwide, defines a 
co-operative as "an autonomous association of persons united voluntarily to meet 
their common economic, social and cultural needs and aspirations through a 
jointly-owned and democratically-controlled enterprise." (ICA,1995, p.1). Thus co-
operatives are distinct  from other forms of public or private organisations in that 
they are democratic structures owned and controlled by their members, whereby 
each person has one vote. Furthermore, members are guided by a set of seven 
principles that enable them to put their co-operative and ethical values into 
practice. 
 
 The main objective of this paper is to ascertain the major conflicts of interest 
faced in the governance of the Maltese co-operative movement consisting of three 
governing institutions and individual co-operatives, as well as the financial 
implications of such conflicts. The analysis is based on semi-structured interviews 
held between October 2010 and March 2011 with 9 representatives of the three 
institutional bodies - the Co-operatives Board, Koperattivi Malta and the Central 
Co-operative Fund - as well as with members of the committees of management  
or professional management of 22 Maltese co-operatives willing to participate in 
the study out of a total of 52 existing at the time of study.  The analysis must 
therefore be interpreted within the limitations of such response, with the overall 
position being noted as prevailing as at 31st March 2011. Yet, in this latter context, 
no significant changes to such position were noted by the authors up to 15 May, 
2012. 
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2.  The corporate governance of co-operatives 
Within the Maltese co-operative framework, one finds various hierarchical levels in 
its governance. With respect to the three above-mentioned governing institutional 
bodies:  
 The role of the Co-operatives Board is to "register, monitor and exercise 
supervision over co-operative societies and ensure that they operate in full 
compliance with the provisions of the Co-operative Societies Act" (CSA, 
2001, Art. 3[1]). Moreover, the Co-operatives Board is to assist and give 
advice to the Minister responsible on all co-operative aspects. The Board is 
appointed by the Minister and is composed of the Chairman, Secretary and 
between 2 to 6 other members. 
 
 Koperattivi Malta (KM) is a non-political organisation set up by the CSA 
2001 and it must "have at least absolute majority of all primary co-operatives 
societies" registered with it as members (CSA, 2001, Art 106 [a]). However, 
registration with KM is not compulsory. Its Council is made up of a maximum 
of 9 individuals elected from the member co-operatives. The roles of 
President, Secretary and Treasurer are then selected from the elected 
individuals. Its main role is to assist co-operative societies in Malta and to 
represent and promote the Maltese co-operative movement, both locally and 
internationally. It also has to provide a variety of services to member co-
operatives, including education and training. 
 
 The Central Co-operative Fund (CCF) is imposed by Art 91 of the CSA 2001 
and is to be used to promote co-operative education, training and research, 
and for the general development of the Maltese societies in every aspect of 
the economy and society. Those co-operatives whose annual audited 
financial statements show a surplus contribute to the fund to the extent of 
5% of such surplus. The CCF committee is obliged to exercise a high 
degree of diligence in administering the funds under its responsibility 
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(Government of Malta, 2002). Such a board is composed of 7 members: 2 
members elected from the Co-operatives Board, 1 member from Koperattivi 
Malta and the rest are selected from Maltese co-operatives. 
 
 Individual co-operatives are categorised into five sectors, namely: 
producers, workers, consumers, social co-operatives and public sector co-
operatives.  Within each co-operative, the hierarchical levels are the Supervisory 
Board (optional), the Committee of Management (COMM), Professional 
Management and Members/Employees. 
 
 Members of the COMM are users, owners and controllers of the society and 
the COMM is vested with the conduct and management of the affairs and business 
of the co-operative (CSA, 2001). On the other hand, the function of the Supervisory 
Board is to ensure that co-operative affairs are conducted in accordance with the 
provisions of the Act, the Statute and the resolutions and decisions adopted at the 
general meetings. From the replies of respondents, it emerged that the majority of 
co- operatives have opted to do away with the Supervisory Board and adopted 
instead a single-tier system of corporate governance with the COMM managing the 
whole affairs of the society. 
 
 In some co-operatives, the COMM may appoint a person or persons as full- 
time professional manager/s responsible for implementing strategies approved by 
the COMM. 
 
 The COMM approves all members that are admitted in a society. Munkner 
(1982) describes the position of a member as having a dual capacity - as a 
member of the co-operative group, and as user of the services and facilities of the 
co-operative. A member has the right to one vote in the AGM, irrespective of the 
number of shares paid. Apart from members working in a co-operative, there can 
be both voluntary as well as paid employees engaged by the COMM. Even though 
Chapter 12                                           Conflicts of Interest in the Governance of Maltese Cooperatives  
                                                                                     and their Financial  Implications  [CG-3]                  
357 
employees do not have a voting right, it is their duty to abide by the society's 
principles and values and work towards common goals. 
 
3.  Conflicts of interest defined 
For the purpose of this paper, a working definition of conflict of interest (COI) is the 
following: 
"A conflict of interest arises when the personal or professional interests   
 of a member who is authorised to take decisions have  the  potential  to  
 be at odds with corporate and societal values." (Brown, 2008, amended). 
 
 In situations involving a group of people, conflicts of interest (COIs) are 
common, and can hardly be avoided. In fact, from the study, the perception of the 
majority of respondents is that while in general everybody states that they try to 
avoid conflicts of interest, the reality is different in that one accepts them "as part of 
human nature". Yet, all this is tied up with the "individual's moral values and 
ethics". Overall, personal interests and financial gains were identified as the most 
common sources of conflicts. 
 
 In reality, conflicts of interest can be mainly categorised into pecuniary and 
non-pecuniary interests (OECD, 2003). Pecuniary interests involve an actual or 
potential financial gain that may arise from a member who has decision-making 
power, including  improved  employment  or post-employment prospects, gifts or 
hospitality, financial rewards and business referrals.  Non-pecuniary  interests  do 
not have a direct financial component, but still have financial implications, and may 
arise from personal or family relationships or involvement in social or cultural 
activities. A COI may also be looked at it in simpler terms as it is generally a 
situation in which someone in a position of trust has competing professional or 
personal interests that strongly colour one's perceptions, making the individual 
incapable of taking decisions objectively. 
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4.  Risks of conflicts of interest 
Conflicts of interest carry a number of risks, including that board members may be 
held liable if prudent management of an organisation's resources is not exercised. 
Higuera (1996) mentioned that a 1974 court decision in the USA, known as "The 
Sibley Hospital Case: Trustees and their loyalty to the Institution" confirmed that 
board members can be held legally liable for COIs because they constitute a 
breach of fiduciary responsibility. Olear (2008) states that nothing undermines a 
community's faith in their leadership faster than impropriety and self-dealing 
amongst the board and management team. 
 
 According to Brown (2008), if COIs are not dealt with, risks can go beyond 
financial penalties and remedies. The lasting effect of ignoring COIs is reputational. 
Individuals on the governing body could be tainted with the ethical aspects of the 
matter, and both personal and corporate reputations could be ruined for a lasting 
period of time. 
 
5.  Should conflicts of interest be regulated? 
According to Campbell and Houghton (2005), ethical behaviour does not simply 
mean conforming to legal and professional rules, but is indeed a culture of 'doing 
the right thing'. However, it is inevitable that individuals are faced with ethical 
decisions and COIs. Thus it is fundamental that both internal and external 
regulatory frameworks and measures are engrained in the culture of co-operatives. 
 
 In an ideal scenario, COIs should be avoided at all costs. Since within any 
community enterprise certain COIs are inevitable, one needs to know how to deal 
with them in a constructive manner. Both extremes of a complete regulatory 
framework, or complete self-regulation, are considered to be inappropriate. The 
majority of respondents stressed that a general Code of Ethics (COE), with a set of 
rules, needs to be established. Regulation cannot cover every possible situation, 
yet it would serve as a solid base for the identification and minimisation of 
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instances of COIs. The way in which such a COE is to be drafted needs to leave 
enough space for self-regulation. Such a COE will also best form part of the CSA 
2001, in order to strengthen regulation in this respect, since there is only one 
clause regulating such an important matter. 
 
 More tools within all levels of the co-operative movement need to be 
developed for the appropriate management of COIs. Disclosure policies need to be 
drawn up consisting of a detailed questionnaire or statement, with a regular review 
and update. Full and accurate prior disclosure, followed by abstention from 
decision making on matters in which conflicts may potentially exist, will probably be 
the best practice. Decisive action should always be taken on the merits of each 
case even if this entails suing for damages in serious cases. Whilst such structures 
may initially be costly to implement, their contribution to the financial stability of the 
system should in the long-term outweigh costs, promoting informed decisions 
within a stronger framework – this also eventually leading to the strengthening of 
liquidity, profitability and investment. 
 
6.  The financial implications 
When a co-operative experiences any type of COI, proper corporate governance 
may be seriously undermined if this is not dealt with appropriately, with negative 
consequences on the financial stability of  the society. While varying financial 
implications are involved in any business activity, COIs clearly tend to give rise to 
strategic and operational activities which result in adverse financial ones as 
indicated in Table 1 below. In this context, the study indicates that individual 
awareness of such financial effects of a COI, such as unprofitability, risky business 
and arrangements with third parties of low credibility often comes about when 
these have actually been realised. 
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Table 1 
Financial Implications of Strategic and 
Operational Activities Resulting from COI's 
 
Strategic 
Activities 
 
• Inefficient use of time, resources and money 
• Erroneous decisions on short and long-term capital investments 
• Biased decisions taken 
• Negative impact of agreed strategies and objectives 
• Undermining of effective internal controls 
 
 
 
 
 
Operational 
Activities 
• Questionable business ventures with third parties of low  
credibility 
• Trading in markets which do not allow profitable return on 
investment 
• High risk of insider trading 
• Engaging in risky business agreements that can have serious 
   repercussions on the operational viability of the co-operatives if    
.. the venture fails 
• Loss of contracts due to negative reputation 
• Pricing frauds 
• Proper tendering systems not observed with potential risk of not   
   benefitting from the most advantageous offers or services 
• Excessive consultancy fees  
 
 
7.  Towards a better institutional framework 
Through this study, the main issues identified as needing specific intervention in 
the three institutions are highlighted in Figure 1 below. As shown, analysis 
revealed that the current roles of these institutions are not clearly defined and that 
the current appointment system of the board/councils is also leading to real and 
perceived COIs, sometimes leading also to resource wastage and inter-institutional 
disputes. 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
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Issues Identified as Possibly Leading to 
Institutional Conflicts of Interest 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Individual co-operatives need to look up to the three institutional bodies in 
order to function properly and prosper. If the relationship amongst the institutions is 
not strong and appropriate, co-operatives tend to perceive them negatively and 
thus also to be  adversely affected.  In all communities, the strength lies in their 
leadership and the intra-relationships governing them. 
 
 One consideration is whether the Co-operatives Board is to retain its current 
structure and regulatory role, or transform itself into a co-operative authority with 
stricter monitoring powers and a more active role in the development of new 
legislation and policies. Such transformation would result in the regulator being in a 
better position to inspect and ensure compliance with co-operative regulation and 
principles, and hence to utilise better the full powers already provided in the current 
legislation. 
 
1. Clarification 
of roles 
2. Appointment 
conflics 
Koperattivi 
Malta 
The 
Co-operatives 
Board 
The Central  
Co-operative  
Fund 
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 As for the relevance and adequacy of the appointment systems, the Board 
clearly needs wider representation of the various parties concerned in the 
movement. The fact that Board members are appointed by the responsible 
Minister, with the majority having to pass through a steep learning curve each time 
that there is a Ministerial change, has been considered a great disadvantage. 
Probably, a more balanced and stable alternative would be to have equal 
representation of government, KM and individual co-operatives, together with an 
Opposition member. 
 
 On the other hand, Koperattivi Malta (KM) is one of the contributors to this 
lack of clarity in roles, as it has no specific roles entrenched within the Co-operative 
Societies Act 2001. Furthermore, the current nomination process to the AGM and 
consequently to council needs to be looked into. Nominating individuals on the 
basis of two delegates per co-operative may not be entirely just. Probably, a wider 
and more direct representation could be achieved leading to better awareness, 
understanding and acceptance. One way may be having delegates nominated 
directly and separately by all co-operative members in each sector, with the 
number of nominations being proportionate to the total number of members in each 
sector. Wider representation would hopefully lead to more  enthusiasm  on the 
nomination process to the council itself. It is important that emphasis is placed on 
the independence of council members, particularly in the context of ongoing 
business relationships, as these will be perceived negatively owing to possible COI 
implications. However, this will not necessarily preclude a council member from 
being a "supplier of services" provided that a scrupulously independent tendering 
process is conducted. 
 
 With respect to the Central Co-operative Fund (CCF), the appointment of its 
Board, with potential concurrent membership of both the KM and the CCF, can 
evidently cause uneasiness within the institutional bodies, as well as with co-
operatives vis-à-vis the institutions. 
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 The principal consideration is the perceived COI arising from the fact that 
the majority of individuals on the CCF board are also allowed to form part of the 
KM Council. As a result, the same individuals may wear different hats for different 
occasions, such as with their dual role in the presentation and approval of projects. 
This may easily be perceived as not conducive to the optimal allocation of funds. 
Of course, this does not mean that the CCF board membership would necessarily 
exclude a member or two sitting concurrently on the KM Council. Such 
representation may be important for informed decisions to continue to be made. 
However such person/s, if any, cannot be allowed to participate in conflicting 
situations such as project presentation and approval. Funds approved by the CCF 
are also to be monitored by the CCF within a stricter regulatory framework. For 
example, quarterly reviews may be established whereby financial performance is 
evaluated against the budgets with corrective action being required immediately 
when the latter are not being achieved. 
 
 In deciding on the future of the CCF, a number of alternatives are proposed 
in order to ensure the elimination of COIs. This involves changing the present set-
up by way of KM/CCF amalgamation, or by the introduction of a Board of Trustees 
composed mostly of independent members. Probably, the latter alternative 
involving trustees would be a superior alternative because  while leading to less 
bureaucracy, KM/CCF amalgamation would necessitate a formula to cater 
equitably for the financing of non-KM member entities, unless KM membership first 
becomes compulsory for all Maltese co-operatives. 
 
8.  Coordinating the entities into a better framework 
The clarification and differentiation of the major roles of the three institutions, 
including the elimination of any present overlapping need to be emphasised for 
them to achieve the strength necessitated by the movement.  It has already been 
proposed that the regulatory role would be better under the responsibility of a co-
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operative authority  with wider powers and representation of the various 
stakeholders. 
 
 This authority may be ultimately responsible for a fund trust run by five 
trustees appointed by the authority in agreement with KM. A legal requirement will 
be imposed, whereby all trust members would be unrelated and independent from 
any dealings within the co-operative movement and at least three would be 
professionals with sufficient expertise in commercial banking and, possibly, co-
operatives, such as commercial lawyers, accountants and bankers. The chairman 
would be chosen by the trust members from amongst these professionals. The co-
operative authority might also elect an internal audit unit to monitor the approval 
and usage of the CCF funds. Fund trustees need to have their own executive team 
working independently from that of the authority. 
 
 On the other hand, as the statutory arm of the co-operative movement, KM 
would also be statutorily regulated with possible changes to the system of election 
to council as referred to earlier. It would have its own support unit composed of, 
say, a lawyer, accountant, and professional consultant/s - such as industrial 
psychologist and /or other relevant professional. This could provide services to all 
KM-affiliated co-operatives and their members, while also being open to non-
affiliated co-operatives at a charge. Services would typically include feasibility 
studies for new projects, management, skills and social audits. Hopefully, such 
changes would contribute to better and more independent monitoring, more 
operational effectiveness, and meaningful investment appraisals. 
 
9.  Conflicts of interest within individual co-operatives 
Figure 2 identifies the three areas in which such COIs within individual co- 
operatives will now be discussed. 
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Management and members 
 
Conflicts of interest within the 
Committee of Management 
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Management 
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Figure 2 
Conflicts of Interest within Individual Co-operatives 
 
                                                                                         
          
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9.1  Conflicts of interest within the committee of management 
The original Co-operative Societies Act 1974 allocated specific managerial roles 
and authorities to the COMM based on the requirement of a two-tier system of 
corporate governance with a supervisory board responsible for the direction of the 
co-operative. However, since this board was made non-mandatory by the CSA 
2001, most co-operatives have functioned with a COMM only, performing also the 
function of the higher board. 
 
 Given also the common absence of a manager, this committee is also trying 
to balance the dual responsibilities of providing long term direction and the day-to-
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day management of the business. This paves the way for possible COIs owing to 
unclear direction/management roles, at times creating internal conflicts and even 
squabbles that lead to negative consequences on the finances of the co-operative. 
The Act needs therefore to be amended to clarify the role of a committee of 
management now performing the function of a mixed board of directors. This may 
lead, for example, to the creation of audit committees. 
 
 Furthermore, currently, the law does not specify any qualifications required 
by members to form part of the COMM. As membership of the co-operative society 
is a legal requirement for election to the COMM, there is a strong possibility of a 
skills gap being created with the COMM. This may necessitate the employment of 
a manager to support such skills, which may involve significant costs. 
 
 The issue may be tackled in various ways. Compulsory membership of the 
co-operative for election to the COMM in the CSA 2001 may be removed. 
Furthermore, the appointment of a manager may be made compulsory for co-
operatives of a certain size. Finally, regular skill gap analysis may be carried out by 
the proposed support unit of KM and either specific training given to fill the 
resulting gaps or co-option to the committee of one or two professionals could be 
permitted by law to supplement such committee. 
 
9.2  Conflicts of interest between the committee of management and                   
.        professional management 
 
Findings indicated that COIs may arise when professional managers take over the 
management of the co-operative: they may abuse of their discretionary position to 
give priority to their financial and personal interest. Of course, this is not invariably 
so: ethical managers may bring innumerable advantages, with better informed 
decisions in the relevant field, whilst in the process contributing to a better informed 
and coherent committee. 
 
Chapter 12                                           Conflicts of Interest in the Governance of Maltese Cooperatives  
                                                                                     and their Financial  Implications  [CG-3]                  
367 
 In most situations, professional managers participate in COMMs but have 
no voting rights. One may consider the possibility of responsibilizing such 
managers by requiring them to form part of the COMM, with direct voting rights to 
exercise in the final decision-making process. In considering the statutory option to 
dilute the committee of management with non-co-operative members such as 
managers or, as previously suggested, with relevant professionals, the danger of 
there being too many non-members who may be detached  from the interests of 
members must also be kept in mind. For this reason, the majority of COMM seats 
probably still need to be retained for co-operative members. 
 
9.3  Conflicts of interest between the committee of management and           
.        members 
 
The principal COI in this area mainly emerged between the short and long- term 
interests of the members in deciding on fund distribution. The vision of well-
intentioned management may focus on securing the continued existence of the co-
operative, while members may press for the immediate distribution of surpluses. 
Energies are thus wasted in directing resources into areas that are not 
synchronized with the business, management and financial strategies of the co-
operative, this having clear negative consequences. In co-operatives, such a 
conflict is particularly prevalent in view of the statutory ineligibility of members to 
have prior-year surpluses distributed to them. The removal of this restriction, while 
controversial, would incentivise members to have co-operative surpluses invested 
for future growth. Of course other possible solutions may be studied. 
 
10.  Conclusion 
Overall, most COI's at all levels are subtle and discreet and the study revealed that 
they are not being easily identified or handled once they surface. Furthermore, 
both institutions and co-operatives generally perceive COIs limitedly in situations of 
direct pecuniary gain and insufficient emphasis is as yet given to other deeper 
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instances which may ultimately have  even  wider  financial  and  corporate  
governance implications. 
 
 It is also clear that conflicts of interest tend to be a clear symptom of 
inadequate corporate governance. Mitigating the existence of COIs will help 
develop the capacity and capability of the governing bodies to be more effective, 
minimise the substantial negative financial implications associated with them and 
enable the individual co-operatives to address better stakeholder expectations. 
 
 Institutions have an important role to play and their sole mission needs to be 
directed towards promoting co-operative principles and values. Once such 
inspirational values are seriously reinforced amongst members, the concern 
related to COIs will be substantially minimised. Such values should even inspire 
others to form part of the co-operative community and, as  Saint-Exupery (n.d.) 
stated: 
  "If you want to build a ship, don't drum up people  together  to  collect  wood   
  and don't assign them tasks and work, but rather teach them to long  for the 
  endless immensity of the sea." 
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The Corporate Governance Relationship between the Board and 
Management in Maltese Listed Companies 
 Bezzina, F.H.1, Baldacchino, P.J.1, and Azzopardi J.R.2 
1University of Malta and 2University of Malta Group of Companies 
This study focuses on the board/management relationship aspect of Corporate 
Governance (CG) in Maltese public listed companies. It examines the level of 
adherence to the CG regulatory framework, the role of management and its 
interaction with directors and shareholders, and the locus of corporate control by 
inspecting the Annual Reports of all companies (N = 20) with shares listed on the 
Malta Stock Exchange as at December 31, 2010. The findings reveal weak areas 
of governance relating to the performance evaluation of the board, the disclosure 
of director and senior executive remuneration, the level of explanations being 
provided for non-compliance with the Code and the attention being devoted to 
shareholder communication and corporate social responsibility. Recent 
amendments to the framework have diluted the impact of some measures that 
were introduced earlier, but this merely resulted in the accommodation of on-going 
practices, as highlighted by lengthy and multiple directorships and their negative 
implications on the board’s independence from management. Owner control is 
predominant with major shareholding blocks dominating boardrooms and 
management. Finally, the companies investigated bear the hallmarks of a small 
island economy, with their governance exacerbated by the reluctance or inability of 
shareholders to exercise their voting rights and powers of control, and by poor 
practices as yet left unchecked by the level of regulatory supervision. The study 
provides five recommendations on how incongruences within the CG framework 
could be addressed to improve the CG performance of Maltese public listed 
companies and concludes by providing some interesting suggestions for further 
research.  
 Keywords: corporate governance, CEO, directors, Maltese companies, 
                    management 
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1.  Introduction 
Corporate Governance (CG) has been defined as "the system by which business 
corporations are directed and controlled" (OECD, 1999). The CG structure 
specifies the distribution of rights and responsibilities among different participants 
in the corporation, and spells out the rules and procedures for making decisions on 
corporate affairs (OECD, 2004). It is mainly concerned with the mitigation of 
conflicts of interests (real, potential or apparent) between managers and 
stakeholders (Cadbury,1992) and in promoting corporate fairness, transparency 
and accountability (Wolfensohn, 1999). CG developed mostly in response to large-
scale financial meltdowns of powerful corporations such as Enron or WorldCom in 
the United States (U.S.) or the Guinness and Robert Maxwell scandals in the 
United Kingdom (U.K.), since CG weaknesses were a causal factor in, or at least 
aggravated the financial crisis (Ball, 2010). The consequences of poor CG have 
far-reaching effects and undermine the effectiveness of the global anticorruption 
campaign in an era of globalization (Wu, 2005). 
 
This study is based in Malta and focuses on the CG relationship between 
the board of directors and management of Maltese public listed companies. Malta 
is a small island state situated in the centre of the Mediterranean. It has a 
population of 412,970 and an area of just over 316 km2 (NSO, 2010). It is a full 
member of the European Union (EU) forms part of the Eurozone. Due to limited 
natural resources, Malta's economy is highly dependent on foreign trade, 
manufacturing, tourism and financial services (Falzon, 2011). The system of 
government resembles that of Great Britain, since Malta was a British Crown 
Colony between 1800 and 1964 and its CG system is generally one-tier. 
 
Since the European Commission in 2003 decided that it would leave CG 
issues to be dealt with by the member states at the national level and saw no need 
for a separate code of European CG, conducting studies at the national level has 
become essential in ensuring a strong CG across the various EU member states. 
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This study specifically delves into the CG implications of the board/management 
relationship of listed companies in Malta's economic, political and legal contest; a 
new angle of CG that has not yet been dealt with in previous studies conducted 
within the Maltese contest.  Although CG can be applied to any form of governance 
of companies, listed or otherwise, we restrict the term to the need for investor 
protection in public limited companies, since these represent the largest 
commercial entities and the most economically important. This study attempts to 
(a) assess the level of adherence of public listed companies to the current CG 
regulatory framework, (b) examine the role of management and its interaction with 
directors and stakeholders and (c) investigate the locus of corporate control in 
Maltese listed companies. In the light of the findings that emerge, the study will 
provide a series of recommendations aimed at addressing weak areas of the CG 
so that the regulatory framework becomes more effective in enabling Maltese 
public listed companies deliver their intended strategy, and to ensure that markets 
and consumers are further protected. 
 
2.  Literature review 
2.1   International development of corporate governance 
Historically, one can trace the origins of CG to the concerns about the separation 
of ownership and control with the advent of limited companies. Unlike smaller 
private companies, where directors often own the majority of shares, listed public 
companies are normally expected to have a clearer demarcation between directors 
and shareholders. Over time, the latter had come to be seen as a group 
unconcerned with controlling management and interested only in returns on their 
investments in the form of dividends and capital growth. Yet, this might be a 
mistaken view since different shareholders have different needs, interests and 
perspectives on corporate ethics and social responsibility (Stout, 2012). Gradually, 
the U.S. and the U.K. experienced an increase in the number of institutional 
investors such as insurance companies and pension funds, holding significant 
stakes in public listed companies (Mallin, 2007). However, despite their 
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considerable holdings/powers, fund managers were more likely to sell off their 
investment upon signs of any problems in the companies rather than attempt to 
control management. The corporate collapses prompted governments and 
regulators to realise that the effective control of directors/management was not 
being done by shareholders and that more effective control mechanisms were 
needed. The response varied across countries which adopted different approaches 
to enhance CG. In the U.S., the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed in July 2002 
seeking to protect investors by improving the accuracy of corporate disclosure and 
reporting procedures and increasing corporate openness. In the UK, a number of 
reports were prepared for the Stock Exchange in the 1990's. These include the 
1992 Cadbury Committee's report on the Financial Aspects of CG, which 
recommended that boards of public companies should comply with a code of best 
practice as a condition for continued listing and that listed companies include a 
Statement of Compliance with the Code in their Annual Reports. The report also 
recommended that independent non-executive directors should be appointed to the 
boards of listed companies and that the appointment of all executive directors 
should be vetted by a Nominations Committee made up of the non-executive 
directors. Unless approved by an Annual General Meeting, non-executive directors 
were not to be offered service contracts for more than three years and the 
remuneration packages were to be agreed by the Remuneration Committee made 
up mainly of non-executive directors. A similarly structured Audit Committee was to 
be established to oversee the company's finances and interact with external 
auditors. Finally, the same person could not act as Chairman and CEO. Other 
reports followed which built on the recommendations of the Cadbury Report 
(Cadbury,1992).  These include: 
 
a) The Greenbury Committee report (Greenbury,1995), which recommended that a 
Remuneration Committee takes into consideration the interests of both 
shareholders and directors when determining directors' remuneration. Executive 
directors' service contacts were not to provide notice periods exceeding one year 
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and the Remuneration Committee was to include a report in the annual accounts 
and placed before shareholders. Today, compliance with this report is a 
prerequisite for companies to be listed since it has been incorporated in the Stock 
Exchange Listing Rules (Listing Authority - Malta, 2012).  
 
b) The Hampel Committee report (Hampel,1998), which concluded that directors 
should be provided with more information and trained as to their responsibilities. At 
least one-third of the board should be made up of non-executive directors, the 
majority of which should be independent. All companies should have a 
Nominations Committee for recommending new board appointments with directors 
obliged to seek re-election every three years. Directors' contacts were not to 
exceed 12 months. The Hampel Report led to "The Combined Code", published in 
June 1998 by the London Stock Exchange as a general code of good practice. It 
did not have the force of law but non-compliance could lead to fines and non-listing 
 
c) The Turnbull report (ICAEW, 1999) concluded that the board should be 
responsible for the evaluation of likely risks facing the company, putting into place 
safeguards and controls to reduce likelihood of these risks and making a 
transparent annual assessment of risk.  
 
d) The main thrust of the Higgs report (Higgs, 2003), which led to a revised 
Combined Code (FRC, 2003), was collective board responsibility with a preference 
towards the UK unitary system of board structure and a greater role for the non-
executive directors. 
 
e) Sir Robert Smith's report on audit committees (Smith, 2003) dealt with the role 
and responsibilities of Audit Committees and reinforced the independence of the 
auditor and raised the standard of CG in British Companies. 
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Today, the governance regulatory framework for companies around the 
world is a combination of legislation, case laws and codes of practice. Whilst 
company law provides for a number of statutory duties of directors, the bulk of what 
is regarded as CG is contained in codes of best practice, which Gower and Davies 
(2003) describe as "soft law" in that they constitute "only a disclosure obligation" 
(pp. 322-323). 
 
In 2003, the European Commission decided that it would leave CG issues to 
be dealt with by the member states at the national level and saw no need for a 
separate code of European CG. However, fundamental issues were dealt with 
through Directives and the "European Union Corporate Governance Forum" was 
set up in 2004 to co-ordinate CG efforts across member states. In July 2011, the 
mandate of the Forum expired and the Commission had to consider how best to 
involve experts in future developments in CG, in the light of responses to the April 
2011 Green Paper (COM, 2011). On 12 December, 2012, the European 
Commission communicated an action plan entitled "European company law and 
corporate governance" outlining how to modernise and enhance the current 
framework (COM, 2012a). The scope was to enhance transparency between 
companies and investors, to encourage long-term shareholder engagement and to 
improve the framework or cross-border operation of companies. A process of 
codification of most company law directives is also included with the action plan. 
 
2.2  The Companies Act  -  Malta (1995): directors' duties 
The Companies Act - Malta (1995) sets out the general duties of directors. 
Directors are bound to act honestly and in good faith in the best interest of the 
company. They are obliged to promote the well-being of the company, to be 
responsible for the general governance of the company, the proper administration 
and management of the company, and the supervision of officers. They also have 
the duty to exercise the powers they have for the purpose for which the powers 
were conferred and shall not misuse such powers. The Companies Act also places 
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a duty of competence on any director (Article 316 [4]), since s/he director is obliged 
to exercise the degree of care, diligence and skill and must be a "reasonably 
diligent person" having "knowledge, skill and experience". This is in line with the 
argument that there is no such thing as a passive director who leaves all 
management functions to others without question (Keay, 2007). Although the 
Companies Act (1995) allows for corporate directors, the Listing Rules (Listing 
Authority - Malta, 2012) only allow individual persons to be appointed directors in 
listed companies. This makes sense in view of the notion of personal liability. The 
Act gives the Board of Directors broad discretionary powers (Article 137[3]) but 
requires them to place before shareholders the financial statements which must be 
audited and reported by external auditors appointed by the general meeting and by 
having the directors' performance scrutinized in the annual general meeting. 
Shareholders have also the power to remove and appoint directors, to pass 
resolutions and to intervene directly in the management of the company. 
 
2.3  The development of corporate governance in Malta 
In Malta, the development of CG was influenced mainly by its development in other 
countries, mainly the U.K., and by OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 
(OECD, 1999, 2004). In 2001, a working group set up by the Malta Stock 
Exchange, which was made up of a mixture of local Exchange officials and industry 
experts, produced a report containing a draft entitled "Code of Principles of Good 
Corporate Governance". This Code aimed at giving directors a guide to effective 
CG through a number of basic principles. The Code was suggested for adherence 
by listed companies but it was emphasized that the principles were equally 
advisable and advantageous for any other company. Although the proposed Code 
was not mandatory, listed companies would be obliged to make a Statement of 
Compliance at least once a year and to include it in the Annual Report. Auditors 
were requested to comment on the disclosure made by the company in this regard. 
With some modifications, the Code was included in the Listing Rules as             
non-mandatory (Listing Authority - Malta, 2012). However, the Statement of 
Chapter 13                The Corporate Governance Relationship between the Board and Management 
                                                                    in Maltese Listed Companies  [CG-4]                  
378 
Compliance and the auditors' verification thereof were made mandatory. The Code 
was revised in 2005 by the Malta Financial Services Authority (MFSA). The Audit 
Committee was made obligatory and companies had to comply with the Code or 
else they had to explain why they did not comply with it in the Annual Report. 
Further revisions followed, after guidelines were laid down by the OECD. Today, 
the Code (as revised on 16 November, 2010) is also annexed to the Listing Rules 
(MFSA, 2010; Listing Authority - Malta , 2012).  
 
The non-mandatory principles of the Code are aimed at enhancing the legal, 
institutional and regulatory framework for good governance in the local corporate 
sector and are meant to complement the provisions in the Companies Act (1995). 
The revised Code, however, turned down the requirements for a minimum number 
of Board meetings, the disclosure of individual directors' remuneration and the 
performance appraisal of individual directors. We believe that the diluted measures 
in the revised Code are more in line with on-going practices and although this will 
result in better adherence to the revised Code, it also implies a lowering of CG 
standards. A number of inconsistencies and contradictions between corporate law 
and the various CG instruments in force have also been highlighted by Muscat 
(2007). These include: (a) allowing the roles of Chairman and CEO to be combined 
provided an explanation is provided to the market and company stakeholders; (b) 
empowering the Board to award executive contracts to non-executive directors 
when under Maltese law the  power  to  appoint  directors  rests with the 
shareholders; and (c) the Code addresses shareholders directly and urges their 
participation in the Annual General Meeting and in the election of directors, and 
further urges them to continue to hold directors accountable – despite the fact that 
the Code mainly addresses directors and management. 
 
The Corporate Governance Guidelines for Public Interest Companies 
(MFSA, 2006) are generally referred to as "The Guidelines". A public interest 
company is defined as one whose operations affect a substantial sector of society 
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and which acts in communal interest.  Since public interest companies may include 
regulated companies, Muscat (2007) argued that the Guidelines could apply to a 
listed company. However, it is unlikely that this was the intention of the MFSA 
since listed companies are already expected to comply with their Code. The 
Guidelines are non-mandatory and very closely based on the principles of the 
Code but no Statement of Compliance and auditors' verification thereon is 
required. However, public interest companies are urged to adopt them and to 
highlight this fact in their Annual Reports. 
 
Predating both the Code and the Guidelines is the Code of Ethics for Board 
Directors in the Public Sector (Cabinet Office - Malta, 1994) and generally referred 
to as the "Code of Ethics". It applies, amongst others, to Government-appointed 
directors of companies in which the Government has a shareholding interest as 
well as to those persons appointed by the Government to the governing bodies of 
other organisations. The Code of Ethics sets out the following values as the 
fundamental pillars for the ethical conduct of directors: integrity, honesty, loyalty to 
the public interest, fairness, conscientiousness, and compassion. It states that 
directors are to ensure that they are fully aware of the provisions of the said Code 
and that they practise full adherence to it without fail. 
 
2.4  Corporate board structure in Malta 
In Malta, the corporate board structure follows the Anglo-American model of the 
unitary board. This  model emphasises the interests of shareholders and relies on 
a single tier of board of directors generally composed of non-executive directors 
selected by shareholders. The role of the non-executive director needs to be 
clearly defined and distinguished from that of the executive. In the U.K., the CEO 
does not serve as chairman of the board while in the U.S. this dual role is the norm 
even though many have reservations on this owing to the negative impact on CG             
(Bowen, 2008). The Anglo-American model contrasts with the Continental model 
which also recognises the interests of stakeholders (Douma and Schreuder, 2013) 
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and relies on a two-tier of Board of Directors. The Executive (or Management) 
Board is composed of company executives who are responsible for running the 
day-to-day operations and providing the general direction of the company. The 
non-executive directors (or Supervisory Board) represent shareholders and 
employees and have the authority to appoint and dismiss executive board 
members, to determine their remuneration and to approve major business 
decisions. In Malta, although the corporate  board structure follows the Anglo-
American model, the majority of corporate funding is provided by banks, a 
characteristic of the continental two-tier Board of Directors. Moreover, the 
incidence of the majority shareholdings in Maltese listed companies is very high. 
 
2.5  Roles of the CEO and the Chairman –  dual or separate? 
The CEO's job responsibilities can vary from organization to organization, 
depending on the needs of the organization and the corporate board structure. 
Russell (2009) argues that the relationship between a Board and the CEO can 
make or break an organization. She adds that the distinct roles within the 
organizational structure need to be respected. The Board is mainly responsible for 
'governing' while the CEO is mainly responsible for 'managing'; yet they must work 
in partnership to fulfil the management needs and goals of the organization. 
 
In the CG literature, there is an increased insistence that the role of 
Chairman and CEO should be separate, although this is less pronounced in the 
US. According to the stewardship theory, the dual role can establish strong, 
unambiguous leadership, and shareholder interests are maximized by the shared 
incumbency; however according to the agency theory, duality results in the 
promotion of CEO entrenchment by reducing board monitoring effectiveness 
(Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Finkelstein and D'Aveni, 1994). Using a contingency 
framework, Filkenstein and D'Aveni (1994) found that "board vigilance was 
positively associated with CEO duality"; however duality was less common when 
"CEOs had high informal power and when firm performance was high" (p. 1079). 
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Desai et al. (2003) found that CEO duality affects performance negatively and that 
there is an important interaction effect between outside board monitoring and CEO 
duality. In a study with family-controlled public firms, Braun and Sharma (2007) 
found that duality did not affect firm performance; however, when family ownership 
is low, separating the roles is beneficial in terms of shareholder returns and a 
useful governance control as the risk of family entrenchment increases. 
 
2.6  Corporate control in corporations 
A common notion that prevails in all definitions of CG is that of control of the 
company and corporate management in particular (Hofstetter, 2005). Shareholders 
are expected to lose effective control with the total delegation of the management 
of the business to a specialised management team (or Board of Directors). 
Moreover, with larger corporate size comes a greater share of ownership, a 
reduction in the power of the shareholders and the strengthening of managerial 
authority (legally meaning the Board of Directors). However, according to Berle and 
Means (1991), this is not always so clear since control can take different forms: 
majority control, complete ownership, control through legal device, minority control 
and management control. Control may not rest wholly on considerations of 
quantitative levels of shareholding as it may also be exercised even with a small 
number of shares. In large public companies with widely dispersed shareholding, 
no shareholder is in a position to exercise effective control through the formal 
decision-making process of the Annual General Meeting. Shareholders find no 
worth in evaluating proposals presented at the Annual General Meeting as they 
generally lack capability, incentive and power to monitor the actions of 
management. The institutional investors are more likely to have these resources 
and to exercise a semblance of control. The "Report on the Working Group on 
Corporate Governance" (Malta Stock Exchange, 2001) recognised the importance 
of institutional investors and stated that "their actions or inactions with respect to 
companies in which they invest can influence small shareholders' attitudes, and 
therefore the attitude of the market, towards those companies". 
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In his ground-breaking book, Herman (1981) reassessed the phenomenon 
of managerialism and criticized Berle and Means (1932) that their position on 
control was unsophisticated. He contrasted the power of managers with those of 
other interest groups and argued that the ultimate corporate power of large 
corporations lies with the managers, with shareholders, bankers and government 
having limited effect on the autonomy of management.  Management's "strategic 
position" within the company (high executive office, directorship, high committee 
positions) is the basis of its control over the company. Herman (1981) argued that 
even in the presence of significant management power, the  Board will still have its 
latent legal powers which only come to the forefront and are enforced on 
management when things go terribly wrong, financially and operationally. The 
Board, as well as shareholders in the general meeting, have the power to intervene 
and remove the management.  However, even in such circumstances, it will not be 
easy to displace the management given its control over the information with regard 
to non-executive directors, its influence over Board members and the general fear 
of disruption and conflict by the directors themselves. An obvious threat to 
management control would be a strong and truly independent Board of Directors. 
Most of the inquisitiveness and challenging of management is expected to come 
from independently-minded, non-executive directors. However, Herman (1981) 
argued that it is widely accepted that (a) outside directors are not invited to join the 
boards of major corporations to "run" the firms or to decide on basic policy, (b) 
outside directors are usually passive and do what management wants them to do; 
and (c) management wants boards to carry out limited functions, principally 
advising in areas of competence, solidifying relationships with important external 
constituencies, assuring the outside world by their presence that the organisation is 
in good hands, and providing a standby facility for emergency use in times of crisis. 
 
Although Herman's empirical and thoughtful thinking increased our 
understanding of the phenomenon of managerialism, Pettet (2005) argued that the 
"agency problem", which arises from the separation of ownership from control, 
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within the corporate environment raises questions on the legitimacy of corporate 
power. As a result, the fundamental question that arises in CG is whether there are 
sufficient controls, legal or otherwise, on the Board to ensure that managerial 
powers are exercised not only for the benefit of shareholders (a CG debate) but 
also for a wider range of people beyond these and creditors (a social responsibility 
debate). Perhaps, the most plausible solution to date to the question, "What should 
be the objective of public corporations?" is found in Keay's entity maximisation and 
sustainability model (Keay, 2008, 2011). In this theory, Keay urges directors to 
maximise the market value of the corporation (an independent legal entity), to 
sustain it in the long term, and to pursue the development of the corporation's 
position, whilst taking into account the investments made by various shareholders 
and other stakeholders. 
 
3.  Method 
The main aim of this study is to assess the relationship between the board of 
directors and management and the implications of this relationship on the CG of 
Maltese listed companies. More specifically, the objectives of this study are: 
 
a) to evaluate the general level of adherence to the codes of CG; 
b) to assess the role of the CEO and management vis-a-vis that of the board of 
directors; 
c)  to investigate the locus of corporate control in Malta and its impact on CG. 
 
 It was decided to limit the study specifically to companies having equity 
listed on the Malta Stock Exchange and to exclude any collective investment 
schemes. This resulted in 20 companies which are listed in the Appendix  
together with the company websites from which the Annual Reports and 
financial statements as at December 31, 2010, were retrieved. 
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 Empirical data collection came mainly from the Annual Reports of these 20 
companies with listed equity, including their compliance statements on the 
adherence to the Code and explanations for non-compliance. This source was 
chosen because it reflects the official position and statement of the company 
concerned with regards to the CG strategy. This approach obviated the need of 
sending a survey to the various companies with an uncertain response outcome. 
The data analysis consisted of summarising the information obtained from the 
review of the Annual Reports of these listed companies. The findings are 
presented and discussed later in the paper. Moreover, the authors drew from these 
findings and from personal experiences in top management and/or director roles 
within listed companies to provide suggestions on how the current Maltese CG 
framework may be enhanced.  
 
4.  Results and discussion 
4.1 Adherence to the Code 
The analysis of adherence to the Code focused on various aspects of the Code 
which were grouped into the following 10 categories: 
 
1) The position of the Chairman and the CEO should be occupied by different 
individuals and, in exceptional circumstances, the company should provide an 
explanation to the market and to its shareholders through a company 
announcement (MFSA, 2010, Section 2.1). After reviewing the Annual 
Reports of 2010 for the 20 listed companies, we found that 18 companies (or 
90%) abide with the Code. In one company, the same individual occupied the 
positions of a Chairman and CEO simultaneously and the explanation given 
was "in view of the particular circumstances of the company", which is clearly 
an insufficient explanation. In another company, the Chairman was also an 
executive director and both the Chairman and the CEO were significant 
shareholders; this is not in accordance with the  Code which emphasizes that 
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the Chairman should meet certain independence criteria from the executive 
(MFSA, 2010, Section 2.3) 
 
2) The Board should appoint a committee that is chaired by a non-executive 
director in order to carry out a performance evaluation of its role, committees 
and individual directors (MFSA, 2010, Section 7.1). Only three of the 20 listed 
companies (15%) perform an evaluation exercise of the Board as requested 
by the Code. From the remaining 17 companies, six (30%) do some sort of 
evaluation but do not have a specific committee for this purpose and the 
remaining 11 (55%) do not conduct an evaluation. Recently, the Maltese 
Government's response to the EU Green Paper (COM, 2011) stated that 
public listed companies should be encouraged to conduct a regular external 
independent assessment (e.g. every three years) and such an assessment 
should not be made by auditors. Given that the evaluation of the Board's 
performance emerges as one of the weakest aspects of governance in listed 
companies, we suggest that this requirement is made mandatory in the Code. 
We believe that it would also give shareholders a basis for better decision-
making. 
 
3) The Remuneration Committee composed of non-executive directors (with 
no financial interest other than shareholders in the company, one of whom is 
independent and acts as chairman) devises the appropriate packages 
needed to attract, retain and motivate directors as well as senior executives 
with the right qualities and skills to manage the company (MFSA, 2010, 
Section 8.2). Out of the 20 companies investigated, 11 (55%) perform the 
function of the Remuneration Committee as required by the Code. As to the 
remaining 9 companies, four (20%) perform the function with some 
divergence and the other five companies (25%) neither have a Remuneration 
Committee nor do they perform the required functions; with only one 
company providing sufficient justification for non-adherence. 
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4) The Code requires the Remuneration Committee to disclose the total 
emoluments of directors and senior executives, and to split this total into the 
following four sections: 'fixed remuneration', 'variable remuneration', 'share 
options' and 'others' (MFSA, 2010, Section 8.6.4).  All the 20 companies 
reviewed (100%) disclose the directors' emoluments and 16 of these (80%) 
split this aggregate into separate components. However, only five companies 
(25%) disclose the aggregate emoluments of senior executives, with only one 
(5%) splitting the components by type of emolument, as required by the  
Code. 
 
5) The Board should account fully to shareholders and ensure that the 
company communicates effectively with the market. It should also engage 
institutional investors and market intermediaries in meaningful dialogue 
(Principle 9). Our study revealed that all 20 companies (100%) utilise the 
normal official channels for communicating with shareholders. These include 
the Annual General Meeting (AGM), Annual Report and Financial 
Statements, the published interim results, company announcements to the 
market and the investor section on their website. However, only seven 
companies (35%) claim to hold direct meetings with institutional investors and 
stockbrokers (mostly to coincide with the AGM or other events that materially 
affect the company) and only three (15%)  report having an official internal 
structure or officer specifically responsible for shareholder relations. 
 
6) listed companies are expected to act as corporate citizens in the 
community and to conduct specific corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
initiatives (Section 12.3). In the Annual Reports, only 12 companies (60%) 
mentioned specific CSR initiatives which they conducted (philantropic causes, 
environmental protection, heritage, health, arts, culture and sports) while the 
other eight companies (40%) only reiterated their commitment without going 
into specifics or else did not acknowledge any CSR obligations. It is clear that 
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the CSR concept is still in its infancy in Malta and remains an unfamiliar 
notion to a relatively large segment of Maltese public listed companies. 
 
7) The responsibilities of the Board include the setting up of an Audit 
Committee in terms of the Listing Rules – a mandatory requirement (Listing 
Authority - Malta, 2012, S5.117). In all companies, the Audit Committee was 
exclusively made up of directors, with the majority being non-executive, and 
chaired by a non - executive director. All companies except one (95%) met at 
least four times a year. Although all companies had an independent member 
whom they deemed as competent in accounting/auditing, this competence 
was not necessarily backed up by a qualification, with seven companies 
(35%) basing competence on experience rather than a professional 
qualification in the discipline. The analysis of reports provided evidence of 
long-term directorships and this brings up questions on the effective 
independence of such non-executive directors from management when 
serving on such an important governance committee. Two companies (10%) 
had their Chairman also occupying the role of Chairman of the Audit 
Committee. Although this is not prohibited by the Code, it is not allowed in the 
U.S. and maybe it is time to consider adopting the U.S. position the Code. 
 
8) As regards the attendance of directors in Board meetings, the Code 
requires listed companies to report to the Annual General Meeting on the 
attendance to the Board meetings by directors (Section 5.4). One particular 
company failed to report on individual attendances to Board meetings, giving 
only an overall attendance of 83% for 2010 and stating that "the quality of 
contributions was more relevant than physical attendance". Is this an excuse 
to camouflage unsatisfactory attendance of some directors – especially 
directors representing important equity holdings? 
 
Chapter 13                The Corporate Governance Relationship between the Board and Management 
                                                                    in Maltese Listed Companies  [CG-4]                  
388 
9) The majority of divergences from the Code were not supported by valid or 
sufficient explanations. For instance, most listed companies which failed to 
conduct a performance evaluation of their Board simply claimed that their 
Board's performance was already under scrutiny of the shareholders. It is 
common knowledge that shareholders do not exercise effective control of 
Boards; this reasoning does not distinguish listed companies, where the need 
for stronger CG is mostly felt, from the rest. When individual emoluments of 
directors were not disclosed, either the explanations provided were vague 
(e.g. "we opted for aggregate disclosure") or else no explanation was 
attempted. It is clear that the level of explanations provided by Maltese listed 
companies in cases of non-compliance is insufficient and this could be 
attributed to the fact that there is no particular regulatory or auditing 
supervision on this aspect. This does not mean, however, that there is no 
effective regulatory role on CG since the MFSA does intervene in listed 
companies albeit discreetly, and more resolutely so, possibly even exercising 
sanctions in the case of licensed listed entities. In response to an EU Green 
paper (COM, 2011), the Maltese government agreed that monitoring bodies 
should be authorised to check the informative quality of explanations in the 
CG statements and to require companies to complete the explanations where 
necessary. It also recommended independent reports to be issued on the 
findings of these bodies. 
 
10) As regards tenure, independence, multi-directorships and conflicts of 
interest, the Annual Reports provide evidence of directors who have been in 
office for 12,15, 18 and 19 years, and who form part or even chair the Audit 
Committee or the Remuneration Committee, and yet they continue to be 
considered as independent. Four companies have directors holding an 
appreciable amount of other mandates (concurrent directorships). It is 
doubtful how much time and effort such directors can dedicate to Board 
meetings and participate in various Board sub-committees. One company has 
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been noted to allow directors appointed by shareholders not to disclose an 
existing or potential conflict of interest, arising from a conflict between the 
company and the appointing shareholder, and even to participate in related 
discussions in the Board "provided they act honesty, in good faith, and always 
in the best interests of the company". However, the Code demands full 
disclosure of any conflict of interest and only then should the Board decide 
whether the director may participate or otherwise in the relevant discussion 
(Section 11.2). 
 
4.2  The role of CEO and the management team in a governance                  
.         relationship with the Board 
 
In our analysis, only one company (5%) had a person occupying the dual role of 
Chairman and CEO. In 11 companies (55%), the CEO was part of the Board as an 
executive director, and of these, only one CEO was not a significant shareholder or 
did not previously work for a major shareholder. Out of the remaining 8 CEO 
directorships (40%), four CEOs were personally material shareholders, with three 
of these (15%) having a de facto controlling interest. These different scenarios 
present different shades of CEO and management influence of the Board, 
shareholders and stakeholders. 
  
  The Code recommends a mixed Board with an emphasis on independent 
non-executive directors to safeguard the independence of the Board from 
management influence and capture (MFSA, 2010, Section 3.2). Such influence will 
also depend on the dynamism or otherwise of the Board, on whether there exists 
an Executive Committee or even more, on whether the Executive Committee 
includes Board member participation.  The combination of a small Board, no 
Executive Committee and a dominant CEO is bound to raise serious CG issues. In 
fact, 67% of the smaller Boards not exceeding six members, amongst which were 
three of the four information technology companies, did not have an Executive 
Committee. Such companies have been found to share the following common 
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characteristics: CEOs who were at the same time executive directors, significant 
shareholders as well as technical experts whom the business did not afford to do 
without, this rendering them with unfettered powers of discretion in the company. 
Common symptoms of this situation are depressed share prices, no dividends and 
the non-disclosure of managerial remuneration packages. On the other hand, 75% 
of the larger companies and Boards typically had an Executive Committee which 
would invariably include executive directors and senior management. Questions 
arise when the Executive Committee is active and the Board relatively dormant. Is 
the Board being kept informed of the business progress? Is there 
disenfranchisement of the non-executive directors not forming part of the Executive 
Committee? It was found that some listed companies, amongst which some of the 
largest, had a functioning Executive Committee yet only held a few Board meetings 
during the year. A Board reduced to mere formality presents the danger of an 
increase in managerial control and/or majority shareholder dominance and 
interference. 
 
4.3 The locus of corporate control 
Major or substantial shareholders dominated most boards and management teams 
in Maltese listed companies with equity listed on the Malta Stock Exchange. In fact, 
out of the 20 companies investigated, nine (45%) had major shareholders with an 
excess of 50% interest and six other companies (30%) had smaller substantial 
shareholders owning between 30% and 50% of the company's share capital.  Out 
of a total number of 146 board directors, 49 (33.5%) were directly appointed by 
significant shareholders and these were found in 13 different companies (65%). 
Notably also, while the other directors were elected at the Annual General Meeting 
(AGM), only 23 of them (15.8%) were found to be non-executive directors. 
 
 Another aspect reflecting corporate control relates to the proxy forms and 
their use in the AGM. In three of the largest companies quoted on the Malta Stock 
Exchange, the format of this form for use at the AGM differs significantly from the 
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specimen proxy form in the Companies Act (1995) as well as that shown in the 
Companies' Articles of Association. It is often evident from such format that 
management has an interest in influencing as much as possible the outcome of 
shareholder voting – and this not only with respect to the election of directors. One 
particular company was quite forthright in this sense with the first option presented 
on the form being to appoint the Chairman of the AGM as the proxy and onus 
being placed on the shareholder to cross out this option for the other options to be 
considered.  As a result, the protection of minority shareholders may be perceived 
as a material CG concern in these companies: in most cases, such Chairman 
preference results in undue managerial influence on the Board – and ultimately to 
the effective control of the major or substantial shareholder. Moreover, the proxy 
voting procedure itself may in various ways be open to manipulation by the listed 
companies such that major/substantial shareholders, or alternatively management, 
are easily placed in the unfairly privileged position to obtain control beyond their 
respective proportional holding or mandate. This is particularly relevant given also 
the commonly known inertia of small shareholders in participating in the AGM, this 
resulting in many such shareholders not exercising their voting rights. In addition to 
this, while the Code seeks to responsibilize institutional investors to act as a 
guiding light for other shareholders by making considered use of their votes, 
nothing prevents the institutional investors themselves from occasionally passing 
over proxy votes without specific voting instructions to the company Chairman 
particularly if so requested by him/her –  this sealing the unfair domination of major 
shareholder and management. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
5.1  Summary of major findings and limitations of the study 
This study has identified various aspects of non-adherence by Maltese public listed 
companies to the current CG regulatory framework. The weakest aspects relate to 
a lack of professional evaluation of the Board's performance, the restricted 
disclosure of senior executives' remuneration packages, and a general 
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insufficiency in the reasons disclosed for non-adherence to the Code. Other 
governance areas of concern are the low priority given by companies to 
shareholder relations and to CSR.  In Malta, any influence of the management 
team mostly emanates from the direct link to the major shareholders (in some 
cases being the CEO's themselves). This may be due to the relatively small size of 
the island, the predominance of majority shareholders in public listed companies 
and the high percentage of directly appointed directors and management officials. 
The study determined that the dominant form of corporate control is exercised by 
the majority shareholders and this control is sometimes extended even beyond 
their proportional shareholding held through such means as manipulation of proxy 
measures exercised by listed companies before and during AGM's (particularly 
with respect to the election of directors). 
 
However, some limitations to the above findings must be noted Firstly, there 
are some aspects in the Code that came into effect in 2011 (e.g., the establishment 
of a Nominations Committee) that could not be incorporated in this study when 
analysing the adherence to the Code based on the 2010 Annual Reports. 
Secondly, the findings and implications of this study, which is based in Malta, might 
not necessarily lend themselves to generalisation over other contexts, since 
different countries have unique economic, political and legal contexts. 
 
5.2  Recommendations 
In the light of the findings that emerged, recommendations are proposed as 
follows. 
 
5.2.1 The need for harmonisation and integration 
There are incongruendes and conflicts within the CG framework which need to be 
addressed. A harmonised and integration process of the various elements of the 
CG framework needs to be embarked upon. Moreover, the non-mandatory nature 
of the Code allows too much flexibility and options for the market players. We 
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suggest that the framework is revised to increase the shareholders' confidence in 
the governance and control systems within Maltese listed companies. 
 
5.2.2  Proposed changes to the CG framework 
The proper disclosure of reasons for non-adherence with the CG framework calls 
for more involvement by the Regulator. Although adherence to the Code is 
discretionary, careful and comprehensive explanations for its non-adherence are to 
be made mandatory. Certain other measures recommended in the Code need to 
be made mandatory, given their importance and the fact that they are seldom 
being implemented. These include the following: (a) the Board's performance 
evaluation was not included in the revised Code and should be reinstated; to 
counteract for the sensitivity and difficulty of such an exercise, we recommend that 
companies are urged by the Code to involve external expert evaluators when 
deemed necessary to facilitate the process, (b) the current recommendation for 
aggregate disclosure of remuneration packages of directors and senior executives 
should be made mandatory so that shareholders benefit from improved 
transparency, particularly when their investments are not yielding the expected 
return; (c) in line with many countries around the world, including the U.S., when 
Maltese companies are listed, Company Chairman / CEO duality as well as 
Company Chairman / Audit Committee Chairman duality should not be permitted; 
(d) the independence criteria for tenure of directorships in listed companies should 
be shortened from 12 years, or, at least, a reduced time threshold could be applied 
to non-executive directors serving on Audit or Remuneration Committees; (e) the 
concurrent mandates held by directors of listed companies need to be limited to 
reflect the required amount of time and effort (in hours) depending on the size and 
complexity of the company; (f) the Board should acknowledge the importance of 
having diversity within it including gender; in this regard, the European Commission 
(COM, 2012b) has recently adopted gender quotas which would see women 
represent 40 per cent of non-executive Board member positions in public 
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companies by 2018, with countries having the power to impose sanctions on firms 
that do not abide to this directive at the national level (Robinson, 2012). 
 
5.2.3  Board activity minimum threshold 
 The Code proposes a minimum annual threshold of Board meetings for listed 
companies and that larger companies consider setting up an Executive Committee 
to help in the task of monitoring management.  Where such a committee is set up, 
it would be appropriate to include adequate Board representation in the form of 
non-executive directors. The Code should urge the Board representatives to help 
in the setting up of clear terms of reference for the Executive Committee and to 
establish definite and periodic reporting lines to the whole Board. 
 
5.2.4  Responsibilizing shareholder voting 
The CG regulatory framework needs to introduce incentives to encourage 
shareholders to exercise their voting rights.  In particular, the institutional investors 
are to be incentivised to make considered use of their votes for other shareholders 
to note and possibly follow. We recommend that institutional investors are obliged 
to disclose their voting strategy with proxies entrusted to them while shareholders 
of listed companies are not to be allowed to give their proxy vote without specific 
voting instructions. 
 
5.2.5 More effective directors 
 Apart from induction training for directors of listed companies, we recommend that 
directors also undergo continuous personal development programmes throughout 
their tenure. Ideally, the training should include both technical and ethical modules. 
We also recommend that listed companies develop internal codes of conduct in 
line with CG principles for their directors and executives. 
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5.3  Suggestions for further research 
During the course of this study, some interesting avenues for further research 
emerged. We suggest that an assessment of the strength of CG in different 
corporate scenarios is conducted particularly in (a) subsidiary companies with 
group executive management officials forming part of the Board of Directors; and 
(b) public listed companies with residual government interest and listed companies 
with foreign interest.  It would be interesting to: (a) analyse how institutional 
investors may better live up to the expectations of the Code in serving as a guiding 
light to all shareholders; (b) to evaluate the effectiveness of the competent 
authorities in monitoring CG in listed companies; and (c) to investigate the role of 
auditors in reviewing CG in listed companies and their reporting scope. Finally, 
since Maltese companies are considered to be small by international standards, 
the question remains whether the CG framework is too draconian for compliance 
by Maltese companies. In fact, the Green paper on the EU CG Framework (COM, 
2011) acknowledges that codes in some member states reflect company size and 
structure or contain provisions tailored to smaller companies. However, while the 
Maltese Government agreed that measures should take into account the size of 
listed companies on the basis of capitalisation, it did not approve for the 
establishment of a differentiated regime for SMEs as proposed in the Green paper. 
We believe that the possibility of introducing a differentiated CG regime for SMEs 
needs to be investigated further before any strong conclusions may be drawn. 
 
5.4  Concluding note 
Companies must understand the importance of adapting, strengthening and 
innovating their CG practices if they intend to remain competitive and to prosper in 
a changing world. Adherence to the CG regulatory framework should not be seen 
as the price for listing but rather as the means for achieving higher quality levels of 
performance for the benefit of all stakeholders. Furthermore, whilst CG is meant to 
become a corporate culture, this is hardly ever achieved solely through self-
regulation and conviction. Changes therefore need to be made by the public 
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authorities concerned to render CG more effective – an exercise which as 
Baldacchino (2007) emphasised will best be promoted by enhancing the quality 
rather than increasing the quantity of regulation. 
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APPENDIX  
List of Maltese Companies with Listed Equity (Excluding Collective 
Schemes) and Website from where the Annual Statements and Financial 
Reports 2010 were retrieved. 
6pm Holdings p.l.c. Available at www.6pmplc.com.    
Bank of Valletta plc. Available at www.bov.com. 
Crimsonwing, p.l.c. Available at www.crimsonwing.com. 
FIMBank p.l.c. Available at www.fimbank.com.  
Global Capital, p.l.c. Available at www.globalcapital.com.mt 
GO p.l.c. Available at www.go.com.mt  
Grand Harbour Marina p.l.c. Available at: www.ghm.com.mt 
HSBC Bank Malta p.l.c. Available at www.hsbc.com.mt. 
International Hotel Investments p.l.c Available at www.ihiplc.com. 
Island Hotels Group Holdings p.l.c . Available at www.islandhotels.com. 
Lombard Bank Malta p.l.c. Available at wwwlombardmalta.com. 
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Loqus Holdings p.l.c . Available at: www.datatrak.it. 
Malta International Airport p.l.c. Available at www.maltairportcom. 
MaltaPost p.l.c . Available at www.maltapostcom. 
Medserv p.l.c . Available at wuw.medservmaita.com. 
Middlesea Insurance p.l.c . Available at www.middlesea.com. 
MIDI p.l.c Available at www.midimalta.com. 
Plaza Centres p.l.c . Available at www.plaza-shopping.com. 
RS2 Software p.l.c . Available at www.rs2.com. 
Simonds Farsons Cisk p.l.c Available at www.farsons.com. 
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Assessing the applicability of a corporate governance index 
 in Maltese listed entities 
 
Baldacchino, P.J.1, Baldacchino, J.2, Bezzina, F.L.1 and Tipurić, D.3 
 
1University of Malta, 2 Ernst & Young (Malta) and 3University of Zagreb 
 
This paper sets out to establish to what extent, if any, a corporate governance 
index (CGI) is suitable and applicable to Maltese listed entities (MLEs). Two sets of 
semi-structured interviews were held with seven financial analysts and 13 MLEs. 
This was followed by a CGI survey sent to the same MLEs previously interviewed 
and an analysis of their Annual Reports for the three-year period 2011-2013. A CGI 
model purposely designed for the present study was then tested on two MLEs. 
Findings show that corporate governance in Malta is not given appropriate 
importance by MLEs. Yet respondents agreed to CGI introduction in order to 
improve current CG practices. The study goes on to assess the impact, benefits 
and limitations of such a CGI in Malta and provides feasible recommendations 
which may help towards the consolidation of corporate governance in MLEs. 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: corporate governance, corporate governance index, CGI, attributes, 
listed entities, financial analysts, Malta 
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1.  Introduction 
Several recent corporate collapses, such as Arthur Andersen and Parmalat, were 
the result of bad corporate governance (CG) and one direct consequence of this is 
that, as time went by, CG has become increasingly important (Khanchel, 2007). 
Various CG definitions exist but they usually refer to "the system by which 
companies are directed and controlled" (Cadbury,1992, p.15). CG has been 
promoted with the aid of codes that encouraged public companies to have a proper 
CG structure (ECGI, 2006). The Maltese Code of Good Corporate Governance for 
Listed Entities (the Code) was introduced in 2001, with revisions in 2005 and 2011 
(MFSA, 2011). In its latest revision, the "comply or explain" type of code together 
with the "non-compliance section" became mandatory. Since then, Maltese listed 
entities (MLEs) have had to provide reasonable explanations for non-compliance 
with any particular principle or provision in the Code (Bezzina et al., 2012). 
Notably, in the case of Malta, there is no legal obligation for listed entities to 
disclose in their Annual Report the assurance that reflects CG quality. This is 
clarified by the auditors themselves as in the report they explicitly state that they 
are not required to perform any additional work as regards CG effectiveness. 
However, such a position has certain limitations, as it is a very simplistic 
requirement based on simple disclosures (Gower and Davies, 2003). CG codes 
have been looking too generous for companies in just answering 'yes' or 'no' and 
giving explanations, where such explanations frequently lack certain details 
(Medland, 2013). 
 
As a result, various countries have felt the need to depart from the code of 
best practice by taking "a quantitative evaluation approach" (Strenger, 2004, p.11) 
and providing a measurement capable of showing the quality level of CG whilst 
simultaneously reflecting its efficiency and effectiveness. This is usually referred to 
as a corporate governance index (CGI), being an independent opinion based on 
transparent measures and a standardised analytical process assisting interested 
parties in clearly analysing relevant characteristics of good CG (Standard and 
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Poor's, 2004; Strenger, 2004). Bhagat et al. (2008) referred to the CGI as a 
standard with the aim to benchmark an entity's governance characteristics against 
what is considered to be best practice by its provider. In response to this, a number 
of organisations have been offering CGIs so as to reflect governance quality and 
performance of listed companies (Schnyder, 2012). 
 
Every country has its own approach to constructing the CGI by tackling 
different governance areas that include particular governance attributes. Given that 
in Malta there is as yet no such index, this study examines whether such an index 
is applicable and useful to Maltese investors. Malta is a small island state situated 
in the centre of the Mediterranean and has only 21 companies with listed equity 
(excluding collective schemes). A Maltese CGI may equip investors to answer 
questions concerning governance performance through a more efficient and 
effective process. Thus, the objective of this paper is to establish the extent to 
which, if in any way, a CGI is suitable and applicable to Maltese listed companies 
(MLEs). For this purpose, it will:                                                                          .                                                                                         
1 assess the needs and attitudes towards CG measurement in MLEs and 
determine the entity that may be responsible for providing and assessing the CGI 
in Malta.  
2  ascertain the construction of an MLE index including its attributes and its 
benchmarking. 
3    test our constructed CGI on two MLEs by assessing its impact, benefits and 
limitations. 
 The paper will conclude by providing particular recommendations, 
particularly which of the CGI models being proposed  may help towards the 
consolidation of CG in MLEs. 
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2.  Literature review 
2.1   The CGI provision 
CGIs were introduced by parties interested in the field of CG. Normally, such CGIs 
were specifically built to cater for the needs of a particular market. Two examples 
of academically constructed CGIs are the LLSV index which caters for 49 countries 
and the G-index, both built to be used in the USA (La Porta et al., 1998; Gompers 
et al., 2003). As time went by, commercial CGIs were becoming an established 
product of most credit-rating agencies while new specific governance-rating 
agencies were then purposely born for providing this service (Balling et al., 2005). 
Unlike academic providers, commercial CGI providers had the ability to look 
beyond country borders and thus derive more meaningful comparisons in 
governance practice (Aguilera and Desender, 2012). Moreover, such providers 
were better equipped in the market especially owing to their ability to easily access 
company records (Schnyder, 2012). 
 
Yet, a study conducted by the Stanford Law and Business Faculty in 
California showed that commercial CGI's are not as credible as they seem (Snyder, 
2009). Daines et al. (2010, p.46) also argued that such CGIs "have either limited or 
no success in predicting firm performance or other outcomes to shareholders". 
Although usually based on the same publicly disclosed information, differently 
constructed CGIs were found to be little correlated and differing considerably 
(Daines et al. 2010). Moreover, Snyder (2009) found serious negative correlations 
in CGI results provided by rating agencies, with better performance being achieved 
by weak CG. Such conflicting results were due to either different CGI construction 
methods being used or to measurement errors being incurred (Daines et al., 2010; 
Snyder, 2009). Furthermore, Schnyder (2012, p.5) argued that rating agencies 
usually use "the kitchen-sink-approach to index construction" by including many 
index elements of limited use rather than focusing on the important ones, this 
resulting in a score misrepresenting the entity's governance performance. 
Additionally, conflicts of interest and independence between CGI providers and 
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assessors required high attention so as not to get results compromised (IOSCO, 
2004). 
 
Three world-renowned CGI providers are Institutional Shareholder Services 
(ISS), Governance Metrics International (GMI) and S&P's. The former two are 
governance rating agencies founded in 2002 and 2000 respectively and the latter 
was founded in 2002 with a new CGI department. 
 
2.2  The CGI model 
In their CG Score paper, Standard and Poor's (2004) argued that different 
countries and companies require specific CGI models owing to market need 
differentials. Various studies also acknowledged the fact that a number of 
constructed CGIs are based entirely on their respective national CG codes 
(Grimminger and Di Benedetta, 2013; Khiari et al., 2007; Spanos et al., 2006). If a 
CGI is based exclusively on the CG code, the index strength will be equal to the 
strength of the code itself, implying that if such code is being deficient in certain 
criteria, so will the CGI (Grimminger and Di Benedetta, 2013). Additionally, 
Khanchel (2007) as well as Martynova and Renneboog (2010) highlighted that 
CGIs based on national codes might quickly turn obsolete because CG codes are 
usually left outdated with respect to current market changes. It was thus 
determined that the elements of the index should go beyond this, leaving the CGI 
open to adjustments – reflecting, say, more international aspects rendering it more 
globally convergent (Martynova and Renneboog, 2010; Grimminger and Di 
Benedetta, 2013). A case in point was the initiative taken by the ISS (2014) to 
construct a new CGI with the aim "to compare companies within global portfolios 
using a single index" [Brown, (2004), p.3]. 
  
 Six most common governance areas emerging from various academic and 
commercial CGIs are board of director structure, director remuneration, ownership 
structure, shareholder rights, audit committee and process and transparency and 
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disclosure. We note below a selection of attributes under each area indicating why 
each is so important for the construction of the CGI. 
a. Board structure: a bigger board reduces likelihood of inactivity and 
delays (Kim et al., 2010); the higher the presence of non-executive 
directors, the better the results (Khanchel, 2007); the presence of a non-
executive majority with a non-executive chairman ensures higher 
independence (Bezzina et al., 2012); frequency of meetings is an 
important determinant of effectiveness (Albert-Roulhac, 2008; ISS, 
2014); the more experienced the board, the more effective (Kim et al. 
2010); CEO/Chairman duality might lead to abuse of power (Sarkar et 
al., 2012); and a CEO serving more than one company could dedicate 
less attention (Piatt and Piatt, 2012). 
b. Director remuneration: the more appropriate the remuneration 
committee and its policies, the more probable the attractiveness and 
adequacy of remuneration (Listing Authority - Malta, 2013); 
performance-based remuneration could promote higher director's 
incentives (Mallin, 2004); and fixed/variable segregation of remuneration 
could result in more verifiability (Bezzina et al., 2012; Barrett et al., 
2004). 
c. Ownership structure: institutional shareholders lead to agency cost 
minimisation and pressure for better director decisions (Bezzina et al., 
2012; Sarkar et al., 2012); minority shareholder safeguards could 
minimise expropriation problems (Guedes and Loureiro, 2007; Standard 
and Poor's, 2004); and director or employee shareholding could 
promote goal congruence (Noamene and Hassairi, 2012). 
d. Shareholder rights: fairness requires one-share-one-vote adoption 
(Martynova and Renneboog, 2010); proxy rights could lead to higher 
AGM participation (Listing Authority - Malta, 2013); adequate AGM 
attendance could depend on timely notification (Listing Authority - Malta 
2013); an appropriate shareholding threshold to call an AGM 
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encourages shareholder activism (Listing Authority-Malta, 2013); 
shareholder representation could highlight shareholder's say (Listing 
Authority – Malta, 2013); and dividend policy disclosure would help 
regularise returns and diminish problems (Standard and Poor's, 2004). 
e. Audit committee (AC) and process: non-executive directors on the AC 
are a means towards more independence (Mallin, 2004); adequacy of 
meeting frequency and attendance is important for the proper function of 
the AC (Listing Authority  Malta 2013); the shorter the lifespan, the more 
independent is the AC (Mallin, 2004); internal auditing could improve 
internal controls (Spencer Pickett, 2011); predetermined auditor rotation 
could enhance audit independence (Sarkar et al., 2012); and non-audit 
services by the statutory auditor could compromise independence 
(Sarkar et al., 2012). 
f. Transparency and disclosure: International Financial Reporting 
Standard (IFRS) adherence and timeliness would ensure true and fair 
financial statements (Standard and Poor's, 2004); proper board 
remuneration disclosure could lead to higher transparency (Bezzina et 
al., 2012); sufficient non-financial information promotes information on 
company's prospects (Standard and Poor's, 2004); up-to-date online 
information enhances understanding (Listing Authority - Malta, 2013); 
the risk of excessive information could be minimised with proper data 
safeguards (Choi and Sami, 2012); and access to relevant company 
data including trends and targets reflects higher transparency (Standard 
and Poor's, 2004). 
 
2.3  CGI construction and presentation considerations 
When selecting attributes, one has to be careful not to omit important ones (Balling 
et al. 2005) as this would contribute to an index bias (Schnyder, 2012). Selection is 
not easy to perform as the choice of areas and attributes is highly subjective, 
resulting in a common construction limitation (Mostafa, 2012). 
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Furthermore, Balling et al. (2005) attributed the considerable variation in the 
selection of attributes from one CGI to another to the lack of theoretical basis in the 
identification of the governance criteria. Indeed, Schnyder (2012) concluded that a 
simpler index has more predictive power, being less complex and subjective. 
Another debate in this respect concerned the use of weightings. In a weighted CGI, 
the selection of weightings was found to be crucial as it was very subjective and 
difficult where such selection depended on the judgment of the rating provider 
(Spanos et al., 2006). Balling et al. (2005) stated that when weightings are applied, 
information is used better. Indeed, the use of weightings seems to be more 
beneficial, reflecting the importance of certain governance areas in the light of 
"public accountability and transparency" (Mostafa, 2012, p.11). Conversely, Sarkar 
et al. (2012) argued that equal weightings have the advantage of avoiding 
complexity and bias as all attributes are treated equally. Both the selection of 
attributes and the choice of weightings could therefore hinder CGI comparability 
between countries and companies (Khiari et al., 2007).  
 
Nonetheless, an appropriate CGI benchmark should be constructed for a 
selected number of companies through various information sources (Mostafa, 
2012). This should be a guide for companies to target for and operate around 
(Khanchel, 2007). Typically, benchmark information would be that publicly 
available, mainly from Annual Reports, company websites, stock exchanges, press 
releases and company prospectuses (Barrett et al., 2004; Grimminger and Di 
Benedetta, 2013). The advantage of using such information was more 
transparency and comparability among entities  in view of its easier verifiability 
(Spanos et al., 2006). In contrast, Ramlal (2009) highlighted those studies using 
surveys with company personnel as a source of information. Indeed, Hodgson et 
al. (2011) found that both questionnaires and public information were in use. 
However, according to Ananchotikul (2008), the survey method on its own is 
unreliable as there is a higher risk of having biased or poor responses.  
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As for presentation, the CGI is either a percentage score – with 100% 
indicating sublime governance practice (Strenger, 2004) – or in a ranking scale 
ranging between 'X' and 'Y' representing very poor and excellent governance 
performance in their extremes. As for location of disclosure, Mostafa (2012) stated 
that the Annual Report should be the ideal place because it was the most suitable 
medium to contain all relevant information in one place – rendering its use highly 
reliable. 
 
 However, some prefer to disclose only up to a certain level of detail 
regarding CGI criteria and methodologies used (Grimminger and Di Benedetta, 
2013). Moreover, it was found that when the index criteria and methodology are 
disclosed by the rating provider, accessibility was very limited. Companies were 
also found to avoid disclosing low rating scores in order to avoid a bad press 
(Brown, 2004). Such avoidance was found to affect the degree of usage of the CGI 
(Stren ger, 2004). The more information is disclosed, the more meaning could be 
attained from the CGI (Grimminger and Di Benedetta, 2013). 
 
2.4  The perception and influence of a CGI 
A CGI affects the way directors and stakeholders look at CG. On the one hand, if it 
indicates problems, such an index will quickly lead to director action (Hermanson, 
2004), and so it incentivises them to perform better (Khanchel, 2007), making the 
organization more attractive (Daines et al., 2010). On the other hand, a CGI 
promotes transparency and stakeholder awareness about the expected director 
performance (Hermanson, 2004), enhancing confidence that "the business is well 
managed and will continue to be profitable" (Mallin, 2004, p.1). Consequently, an 
index would be convenient for investors in picking the best governed entities 
(Sarkar et al., 2012), helping in manoeuvring investment decisions in promising 
markets, and avoiding high risk companies (Grimminger and Di Benedetta, 2013; 
Khanchel, 2007). 
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Durnev and Kim (2005) verified that company valuation is sensitive to its 
CGI: companies that achieved a higher governance score tended to be valued 
higher, particularly in large dynamic markets or in those with a poor legal 
framework. A slight increase in the CGI score would reflect into a short-run positive 
share price effect (Durnev and Kim, 2005; Walker, 2013). Additionally, within a 
weak legal system, there is more investor appreciation of the CGI as clearly not 
everyone would be on equal footing and a higher CGI would possibly enable better 
access to capital and growth opportunities (Grimminger and Di Benedetta, 2013).  
 
Yet, a company's CGI should not be used on its own but complemented by 
other factors, including the verification of the corporate strengths and weaknesses 
to help it develop the ideal network within which to operate (Khanchel, 2007). 
Additionally, Sarkar et al. (2012) claimed that the market should be left alone in 
dictating the pace for companies to carry out governance improvements at the 
appropriate time, this implying that a CGI should not be legally imposed. 
 
3.  Method 
As stated earlier, the main objectives of this paper are to construct a CGI for Malta 
and to establish the extent to which, if in any way, our CGI is suitable and 
applicable to MLEs. The MLEs targeted were 21 and included only those entities 
capable of issuing share capital on the stock exchange and hence those entities 
that provided only debt securities were excluded. The major Maltese financial 
services firms involved in dealing and advising on local securities were approached 
to give their views on the subject.  
 
Empirical data came from three sources: semi-structured interviews, the 
Annual Reports of listed companies and the CGI survey. For the semi-structured 
interviews, we targeted all 21 MLEs but eight of them did not grant us permission 
to interview one member of the Board of Directors (the Board), resulting in 13 
interviews. Similar interviews were also conducted with seven financial 
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advisors/analysts in different financial services firms in Malta. The questionnaire 
comprised six sections and 25 questions; Section 1 focused on the needs and 
attitudes towards CG measurements, Section 2 on the CGI provider and assessor, 
Section 3 on the CGI model. Section 4 on the CGI presentation and disclosure, 
Section 5 on the impact of the CGI and Section 6 on concluding considerations. 
This source was chosen as it provided more opportunities for flexible and informal 
interactions and probing was used to provide more detailed explanations in the 
responses. The second source was the 2011-2013 Annual Reports, where we 
conducted an analysis of the 13 MLEs, including online company data of the MSE 
listed entities, with specific reference to the "CG Statement of Compliance". This 
information was necessary to test current adherence to the Code. The 2013 
Annual Reports were also used for both the construction of the CGI benchmark 
and CGI test. Finally, the third source involved a CGI survey that required MLE 
representatives (MLE reps) to react to 33 CG attributes in the four selected areas. 
 
The data recording and analysis consisted of first transcribing and 
summarising each interview. For the selection of attributes, a reduction process 
identified by Mostafa (2012) was used as to verify their importance. This consisted 
of an ascending rating scale of 1 to 3 where '1' represented low importance, '2' fair 
importance and '3' high importance. Then the data obtained through Annual 
Reports and CGI survey was analysed through the use of "retained measures" 
being: numerical measurements (absolute or percentage numbers 0-100); 'yes' or 
'no' measurements (1 = positive , 0.5 = both and 0 = negative); and Likert-type 
measurements ranging from 1 = lowest to 10 = highest.  
 
For setting the CGI benchmark, measures of central tendency (median) and 
spread (minimum and maximum) were calculated for each attribute. The median 
attribute scores were then normalised using the following formula: (median - 
minimum) / (maximum - minimum), thus bringing the resulting scores between 0 
and 1. Furthermore, CG area weightings were applied to the total attribute score of 
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each area by the multiplication of the average applicable CGI weightings for Malta 
as found in Appendix 1. This contributed to a weighted sub-index for each CG 
area. The CGI final benchmark score for each MLE was then determined by adding 
all the weighted sub-indices to attain a final CGI of 100%. The CGI as compiled 
above was applied for Company X (CoX) and Company Y (CoY) using the actual 
company data for 2013, then compared with the CGI benchmark to determine the 
CG position of each company. 
 
4.   Findings and discussion 
4.1  Needs and attitudes towards CG measures in Malta 
The analysis revealed different views between MLE reps and analysts towards CG 
practices. MLE reps foresaw no added benefit in such reporting - they may be 
adhering to the Code simply because they are forced to do so by the listing rules. 
Reconfirming this was the lack of detail and soundness of certain non-compliance 
explanations observed in the CG Statement of Compliance of the participating 13 
MLEs. These mainly related to shareholder conflicts, the absence of the 
Nominations Committee and the lack of board performance evaluation. On the 
contrary, analysts found proper CG reporting as an indication of better 
accountability and transparency, highlighting the impending need to address the 
several CG defaults of MLEs. These included the lack of transparency of board 
members, a lack of communication on board meeting outcomes and conflicts of 
interest. 
 
MLE rep attitude therefore indicated resistance to CG progress. Going for 
better disclosures was not a priority for nine of them, who referred to the need for 
simpler statements or for competition issues as the grounds for their stance. 
Nonetheless, both groups declared that they were not against a CGI as such as 
they saw it as an opportunity to improve CG. The main concern of MLE reps was 
that the effectiveness of such a CGI could be easily hampered by the inadequate 
size of the Maltese Stock Exchange, with companies in varying industries, this 
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implying that no standard CGI could be suitable to all companies. Moreover, three 
MLE reps pointed out that, prior to CGI application, the market needed to be made 
aware and knowledgeable about the index, particularly because stakeholder 
acceptance to it was as yet questionable. Some MLE reps also feared that a CGI 
might be overrated by their investors, to the detriment of other factors such as 
future financial prospects. 
 
Respondents indicated the need for the CGI to be constructed in Malta but 
to be modelled on international practices. In this respect, 7 MLE reps and all 
analysts believed that Malta should opt for an index which has already been tried 
and tested abroad, but tweaked to fit the Maltese environment. 
 
4.2   The CGI provider and assessor in Malta 
The MFSA, as regulator, was seen as the body best placed to be involved in the 
different steps of the CGI implementation: for constructing or appointing the body 
responsible for constructing, and also for assessing,  the index. Two financial 
analysts pointed out that, as a body already experienced in the local sector, the 
MFSA would not only fit such a role but also be cost efficient; also that for such a 
structure to succeed, it is to be composed of separate in-house committees or 
segregated departments within the MFSA, each being independently responsible 
for the different CGI stages so as to keep each stage autonomous. However, most 
interviewees indicated the need to consider also the alternative of appointing a 
private CGI provider, subject to the continuous monitoring of the regulator. A 
dilemma in fact remained as to whether to opt for a foreign credit-rating agency 
rather than the MFSA in the provision and assessment of the CGI. While credit-
rating agencies may be more reputable in providing rating, the MFSA benefits from 
its specialised expertise in CG. Three analysts emphasised that the assessor 
needed to be free from any fear of potential liability resulting from any consequent 
adverse effect on company share performance, and that, as a government agency, 
the MFSA would therefore be stronger for this function. Additionally, three other 
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financial analysts referred to the possible risk of manipulation in the case of a 
foreign-rating agency being appointed: other rating agencies may try to enter the 
market to compete, with fees being possibly manipulated for the sake of client 
engagement.  
 
Furthermore, six MLE representatives and one analyst favoured the 
possibility of making the CGI a self-assessment exercise as is done with the 
current Statement of Compliance. However, with self-assessment, both real and 
apparent independence are threatened unless this exercise is also reliably 
reviewed. Indeed, index review is considered by respondents to be beneficial in 
any case, even if the MFSA is chosen to perform the functions of the CGI: in the 
latter situation, the dilemma only remains whether one should opt for the statutory 
auditor or else for another reviewer, perhaps a CG specialist.  
 
However, independently of which bodies are ultimately involved, the MFSA 
as regulator is to remain a watchdog over the entire CGI framework as this will 
facilitate any required sanctions for misconduct. 
 
4.3  The Maltese CGI playing field 
The Code could be the departing point of the CGI. If this option is taken up, initial 
costs are minimised. Yet, respondents preferred a CGI to be based on an 
international model like the OECD (2004) one as this is a more comprehensive 
model benefitting from a harmonised CGI – one capable of including most 
international developments and minimising the number of unaddressed issues. 
Nonetheless, index modifications were still considered necessary in order to make 
the CGI more flexible to meet current changes. Yet, those opting for the adoption 
of the Maltese Code pointed out that such adjustments may be costly and 
confusing to the local market.  
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The next step in construction concerns the selection of governance areas 
and attributes. Such selection was left to the respondents and it emerged that the 
four most important CG areas to be included in the CGI for Malta were: board of 
director structure, transparency and disclosure, audit committee and process, and 
shareholder rights. With respect to such areas, the respective attributes were then 
selected with the aid of the ascending l-to-3 rating scale referred to earlier. The 
least-rated attributes were then eliminated so that that only 65% of the original 
ones were retained. Appendix 2 lists these selected attributes under the respective 
governance area. Thus, with the inclusion of four governance areas and the limited 
number of attributes in each area, the CGI was meant to be easier to adopt. 
Governance areas were also weighted according to respondent preferences 
(Appendix 1) so that the relative importance of each selected area would be taken 
into account. However, in order to retain index simplicity, the selected attributes 
were retained with equal weighting (Sarkar et al., 2012). 
 
Some interviewees (two MLE reps and one analyst) highlighted that most 
information should be obtained from the public domain for the sake of 
transparency, thus also facilitating its verification. Accordingly, wherever possible, 
in the construction of the CGI benchmark for MLEs from derived sources, 
referencing was only made to non-public information when such information was 
not available. Yet, using such mixed sources of information had its clear 
advantages, providing the necessary insights and explanations.  
 
The relevance of the CGI probably depends mostly on the CGI benchmark. 
The mathematical reliability of such a benchmark and its capacity to distinguish 
between acceptable and inacceptable practices are crucial. In this case, simple 
descriptive statistics was used based on three types of retained measures, as 
already referred to in Section 3. The absolute benchmark and the normalised 
benchmark figures are shown near each attribute in Appendix 2. Each normalised 
attribute was assigned a score of 1 reflecting  best practice that is expected from 
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each attribute. In this respect, an argument relates to the relevance of the average 
benchmark figures in reflecting best practice. The average may be a clear pointer 
to the norms in those particular attributes, though not necessarily to best practice. 
However, the law may allow a different value to the attribute. A relevant example 
here is the "time to file financial statements with the regulatory body". The law 
(Listing Authority - Malta, 2013) allows 120 days as maximum while the benchmark 
being adopted is 87 days. Probably, the law is materially out of sync with current 
practice rather than the benchmarks not being in themselves best practice. 
 
4.4   The CGI preview 
Most respondents (9 MLE reps and 7 analysts) were in favour of the disclosure of a 
sub-index score for each CG area. This was found to contribute to the support of 
the final CGI result by the specification of the different areas. Final scores in 
isolation may easily be misleading and will make sense provided that investors do 
actually note sub-index scores. Furthermore, CGI users are probably not so 
sensitive to the type of CGI scores selected – whether a percentage or a scale           
– as, irrespective of the type, the major question remains whether such scores are 
high or low. Response was in fact inconclusive in this regard. Therefore, while 
percentage scores were adopted in this study, the parties involved with the CGI 
might still need to delve more into the matter. 
 
CGI criteria and methodology were found to depend on the market size, the 
market need for this information and the scope of the CGI itself. Six MLE reps and 
six analysts agreed to disclose both CGI criteria and methodology as this may help 
improve CGI analysis. Yet, as two MLE reps emphasised, when taking into account 
the size of the Maltese market, it may be unnecessary for MLEs to disclose the 
CGI methodology as this would probably be common to all listed companies. 
Nonetheless, this possibility may not eliminate particular disclosures owing to, say, 
changes in the size and nature of companies. 
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Regarding CGI access, respondents agreed that a CGI should be publicly 
disclosed given that such companies are PIEs and most information sources are 
public. Yet, it is shareholders and their analysts who are probably most interested 
in the CGI. This clearly makes the Annual Report a possible medium in which CGI 
results are disclosed, with the advantage of information being easily retrievable. 
However, the online disclosure of the CGI on its own or in an alternative location 
was also agreed to so as to attract more attention to it. Moreover, most 
respondents (9 MLE reps and 6 analysts) were after a compulsory CGI so as to 
ensure universal MLE adoption. 
 
4.5   The possible CGI influences in Malta 
With the exception of one MLE rep, all respondents agreed that the CGI would 
leave great impact on the CG Statement of Compliance as it will boost shareholder 
interest in it. Yet, the CGI remains mostly relevant for the majority shareholders, 
who are probably following developments in this area in any case. Moreover, the 
CGI was seen to be positively correlated with both company reputation and 
gearing. Better CGI scores are seen as an indication of good directorship, 
rendering suppliers of capital increasingly confident in doing business with an MLE. 
Regarding the CGI impact on MLE share prices,  most respondents  commented 
that the  CGI  level reflects investment soundness – thus affecting share price 
changes and probably also the cost of capital. However, two analysts claimed that 
such price impact is not that possible in Malta given the slow trading activity in 
most listed shares. 
  
Yet, irrespective of such impacts, 10 MLE reps agreed that cost would be a 
major issue for MLEs in adopting the CGI. They already have enough compliance 
obligations, and the CGI obligations may be seen as comparable to those of 
another audit. Conversely, the others argued that costs will not be an issue if the 
CGI is simple and compliance to it remains very similar to that of the Maltese 
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Code. Nonetheless, doubt clearly lingered, particularly among most MLE's, as to 
whether it was worthwhile investing in a CGI involving new compliance costs. 
 
Furthermore, as for index applicability, analysts indicated that the CGI could 
prove to be useful also to entities listing in debt securities only. At a later stage, 
one may therefore consider introducing the CGI for adoption by such companies. 
 
4.6  CGI test application on two MLEs 
The CGI was then tested on two approximately equally-sized listed companies 
within the same industry. Table C1 in Appendix 3 illustrates such testing on two 
MLEs with respect to the Board Structure area. The following summarises the 
results found per area. 
 
4.6.1 Board structure index 
Both companies were rewarded with benchmark scores for separating the roles of 
the Chairman and CEO. However, none received any scores as the CEOs and the 
Chairpersons served on other boards. 
 
For the other attributes in this area, different scores were attained. In both 
companies, Board size composition exceeded the benchmark and as a result the 
CGI gave an excess credit. Company Y (CoY) was abiding with the accepted mix 
of directors and achieved the benchmark scores. However, Company X (CoX) was 
entirely composed of non-executive directors. For this attribute, the CGI awarded 
CoX a score greater than "1", reflecting the incentive to have a totally independent 
board. Furthermore, both companies were penalised for the lack of directors' 
experience – in both cases this was below the benchmark (six and ten years 
respectively). 
 
More significant differences were observed in the number of board meetings 
and the percentage attendance. CoX was rewarded for holding 24 meetings while 
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CoY was penalised for holding only four meetings. Moreover, CoX board members 
attended 79% of such meetings whereas CoY's registered attendance stood at 
92%, results indicating that both companies needed improvement. 
 
4.6.2 Transparency and disclosure index 
Full benchmark scores were assigned to both entities in disclosing proper 
accounting standards and policies, in presenting remuneration disclosures 
including a remuneration report and for handling sensitive information. Conversely, 
no scores were received by either company as they did not permit shareholder 
access to company records.  
 
The CGI of both companies were equally affected  by their disclosure 
efficiency, tested through the time they usually take (120 days each) to file financial 
statements with the regulator.  CoY was assigned full benchmark scores for 
sufficiently disclosing non-financial information and for the frequent update of its 
website. On the other hand, CoX received a lower score as it was less forthcoming 
about such disclosures and updating its website. Furthermore, CoY was disclosing 
performance benchmarks together with trends and targets to stakeholders, while 
CoX was not doing so. As a result, CoY was accredited with twice the score of 
CoX, the sub-index indicating that CoY was stronger in its transparency and 
disclosures. 
 
4.6.3 Audit committee and process index 
The structure of both audit committees was as required by the listing rules (Listing 
Authority - Malta, 2013), consisting of three members, all non-executive directors. 
Such Audit Committee members attended all 2013 meetings. Moreover, the audit 
reports of both companies in the previous 10 years were unqualified and both had 
an internal auditor. For such attributes, both companies received the benchmark 
scores. However, they had not performed auditor rotation in the previous ten years 
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and therefore lost the relevant scores. They also lost further scores for engaging 
the statutory auditor for non-audit services. 
 
CoY received the benchmark scores for conducting the monthly monitoring 
and review of internal procedures, while CoX was awarded twice the standard 
credits for performing such functions twice monthly. Furthermore, CoY determined 
the life span of an Audit Committee cycle which was that of one year. CoX did not 
establish this and was therefore not awarded with any score for such attribute. As 
for Audit Committee meetings, CoX had held nine meetings as against the four 
meetings held by CoY. This was the main attribute that inflated this sub-index for 
CoX. 
 
4.6.4 Shareholder rights index 
Both entities achieved almost similar sub-index results in this area where most 
attributes received full scores. Indeed, both companies attained benchmark scores 
for four attributes, namely: "Adoption of the one-share-one-vote principle", "AGM 
shareholder attending records kept", "dividend policy in place and disclosed" and 
"proxy arrangements in place and disclosed". Moreover, unlike CoX, CoY also 
gained the full scores by having an internal shareholder representative. Differences 
from the benchmark were noted in the other attributes. Both entities notify 
shareholders 21 days before an AGM in accordance with the law. Moreover, 
shareholders may call an AGM if they possess a 10% threshold, which is lower 
than the 19% legally required. Both companies varied in their scores from the 
benchmark for these two attributes.  
 
These results were then weighted with the average applicable CGI 
weightings presented in Appendix 1 to achieve the sub-index results which 
ultimately contributed to the final CGIs. Such CGIs were of 91.87% for CoX and 
80.12% for CoY (see Table C2 in Appendix 3. CoX outperforms CoY in the Board 
Structure and Audit Committee and Process, while CoY outperforms CoX in 
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Transparency and Disclosure and Shareholder Rights, Thus, the CGI user may not 
only conclude that, as per the overall index, CoX is somewhat superior to CoY in 
CG practice, but perhaps even more significantly that, as per the sub-indices, while 
CoX tends to be more compliance-oriented, CoY tends to be more shareholder-
oriented.  
 
4.7  CGI benefits and limitations 
Benefits and limitations of adopting a CGI in Malta emerged as follows. 
 
4.7.1 Benefits 
One benefit is that the CGI challenges the Board towards improving CG practices. 
In this connection, four MLE reps noted that this challenge would probably lead to 
enhanced Boardroom professionalism. Furthermore, with the CGI, directors will 
probably become more accountable to the annual general meeting. More 
transparency and responsiveness to shareholder queries will be expected, this 
rendering the general meetings more meaningful, with proceedings going seriously 
beyond bottom-line figures. In other words, the CGI could help minimise the 
prevailing asymmetry of information in this fundamental principal/agent 
relationship. Additionally, the CGI is cost-beneficial. Its construction exercise is 
simple enough, and also relatively inexpensive. Furthermore, quantifying a CG 
deficiency against a benchmark renders it easier and quicker to notice, monitor and 
correct. 
 
4.7.2 Limitations 
A limitation in the application of the CGI, as pointed out by three analysts, is the 
attitude towards change in Maltese businesses: given their small-island state 
culture, businesses have a strong tendency to resist change at initiation stage. In 
referring to the resistance to change with respect to CG, Baldacchino (2011) 
highlighted the "cold-hot phenomenon", a stronger resistance at initiation stage 
though a much weaker resistance at later stages. Resistance may be even more 
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pronounced in this case of a new measure to be presented to an already 
overcrowded regulatory regime. In applying CGI, another issue which may arise 
when companies differ in size and industry is that such companies may have 
different needs. The proposed CGI benchmarks assume that companies are circa 
the same size and industry and such benchmarks are somewhat ineffective if this 
is not so. This implies that these benchmarks are most reliable either in intrafirm 
comparisons or limitedly in interfirm comparisons with companies of the same size 
and industry. 
 
A further limitation relates to the relevance of the selected attributes and the 
weightings being applied. The perceptions of what is important may change both 
by person and over time and are often difficult to substantiate objectively. This 
leads to a somewhat subjective selection where certain companies may be judged 
on not-so-relevant attributes, with more useful others being ignored. Related to 
this, the interpretation of CGI scores may easily be misleading. A higher score may 
reflect superlative practice in that attribute, meaning extra credits for the company. 
Yet, excessive attribute scores may not necessarily reflect proper practices. 
Indeed, companies may be tempted to improve their index position by overdoing in 
attributes which do not result in extra corporate benefits and even to the detriment 
of significant priorities. This might actually result in a disservice to CGI users. 
Moreover, index reliability is hard to check if the score is based on information that 
is not all publicly available. The less transparency in the information being 
transmitted, the greater will be the possibility of manipulation, particularly by those 
responsible for the CG of the company, themselves already used to the mechanics 
of the index.  
 
5.  Conclusions 
The findings of this study suggest that a simple and cost-effective CGI may be 
implemented that is suitable and applicable for MLEs. The need for simplicity calls 
for few yet highly significant areas and attributes, relevant area weightings and an 
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unsophisticated but reliable mathematical model as a benchmark. In addition, for 
the CGI to be cost effective, its provider and assessor will probably best be a 
centralised and experienced body such as the MFSA, provided that proper 
safeguards are taken for the complete segregation of CGI provision and 
assessment even within the same body and for the MLE assessments to be 
reviewed by a specialist in CG. Such CGI is an initiative towards higher director 
accountability. Yet, before its introduction, a promotion drive needs to be 
undertaken to increase shareholder CG awareness, possibly led by the financial 
services regulator itself so as to minimise market misinterpretations and counter 
the expected initial resistance. Additionally, the following recommendations need to 
be considered to consolidate the adoption of such as CGI: 
- Developing a menu of CGIs applicable  to entities both listing in equity and 
debt securities: the one-size-fits-all assumption is to be ultimately addressed 
by having industry-specific CGIs possibly taking into account also the 
varying sizes and  complexities of companies. This could be achieved by 
having a menu of CGI standards based on the same structure but 
containing different measurement criteria in line with the characteristics of 
specific companies. The scope of the CGI can be further enlarged in the 
future by including also entities listing only in debt securities. As more 
companies adopt CGIs, their use becomes increasingly useful for 
comparative purposes. 
- Adopting the Code of Good Corporate Governance as a basis for the CGI: 
by adopting the Code as the basis of best current CG practices, the CGI 
benchmark for score rewards and penalties may be quickly understood and 
become more easily acceptable to all parties. 
- Tying up CGI benchmarking to the regulatory framework:   the CGI 
benchmark needs to be kept in line with the regulatory framework. Regular 
revisions to both will be essential in order to ensure that they remain 
appropriately consistent with each other, thus preventing any unnecessary 
confusion. 
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- Incentivising the market to adopt the CGI by promoting more CG awareness 
and education:  MLE stakeholders need to be made more aware of CG 
issues. Therefore, the relevant bodies have to work harder on the education 
of market players to render them more knowledgeable of CG developments. 
 
 Following this study, further research could examine the CGI from the 
shareholders' perspective in order to extract their needs and preferences in the 
construction of the Index. Given that this study highlights the possibility of making 
the CGI a self-assessment exercise, it would be also relevant to investigate the 
feasibility of such an option. Finally, a related interesting area relates to the CGI 
review. While this has already been somewhat referred to earlier, further research 
may, for example, help to identify and assess the nature and role of the reviewers 
suitable for such an exercise.  
 
 To conclude, we believe that the CGI is a significant CG practice that, once 
introduced, calls for continuous attention and reflection as it may easily become a 
powerful means for aligning corporate stakeholders towards a major common goal: 
that of improving the CG performance of the company. 
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Appendix 1 
Table A1 shows the relative CGI reapportioned weightings in four CG areas  
across each type of respondent and overall. Such weightings were based on the 
proportion of ticks for each area after eliminating the three least weighted areas. 
 
Table A1   Average applicable CGI weighting per area 
 
Respondents 
Structure of 
board of directors 
Transparency 
and disclosure 
Audit committee 
and audit process 
Shareholder 
Rights 
MLEs 28.31% 23.66% 27.30% 20.73% 
Financial analysts 28.13% 28.95% 21.97% 20.95% 
 Average applicable     
CGI weighting 
 
 
28.22% 
 
26.31% 
 
24.64% 
 
20.84% 
 
 
 
Appendix 2 
Tables B1 to B4 list the attributes selected under each corresponding governance 
area. For benchmark calculations, the following steps were used: 
a data was collected from Annual Reports of MLEs and interviews 
b attributes were quantified 
c descriptive statistics comprising the median, minimum and maximum scores 
were computed 
d the median was used as the attribute benchmark 
e the median attribute score was normalised using the following formula:                        
.         (median - minimum)/(maximum - minimum) 
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Table B1   The selected attributes for the CGI in MLEs including their benchmark:                 
.                 governance area  – BOARD STRUCTURE 
Attributes Benchmark scores Normalised benchmark 
Board size 7 0.50 
Percentage of non-executive directors on 
board 
  
80 
 
0.60 
Number of board meetings held annually 9 0.24 
Percentage of board meetings attended 
by non-executive directors 
 
100 
 
1.00 
Average years of experience as directors 
at this or in another company 
 
15 
 
0.47 
Avoidance of Chairman and CEO duality 1 1.00 
Chairman and/or CEO not serving on 
another board 
1 1.00 
 
 
Table B2  The selected attributes for the CGI in MLEs including their benchmark:                
.                    governance area –TRANPARENCY AND DISCLOSURE 
Attributes Benchmark scores Normalised benchmark 
Sufficient disclosure of accounting 
standards and policies used 
 
1 
 
1.00 
Time to file financial statements with the 
regulatory body 
 
87 
 
0.56 
Board remuneration disclosure including 
Remuneration report 
 
1 
 
1.00 
Disclosure of specific performance 
benchmarks 
 
1 
 
1.00 
Updated company website 10 1.00 
Sufficient level of non-financial 
information disclosed 
 
10 
 
1.00 
Access to company records for 
shareholders 
 
1 
 
1.00 
Procedures for the handling of sensitive 
Information 
 
1 
 
1.00 
Disclosure of trends and targets to 
stakeholders 
 
1 
 
1.00 
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Table B3  The selected attributes for the CGI in MLEs including their benchmark:                 
.                    governance area – AUDIT COMMITTEES AND PROCESS 
Attributes Benchmark scores Normalised benchmark 
Audit committee size 3 0.50 
Percentage of non-executive directors on 
audit committee 
 
90 
 
0.67 
Number of audit committee meetings held 
annually 
 
5 
 
0.33 
Percentage of audit committee meetings 
attended by its members 
 
100 
 
1.00 
Life span of an audit committee cycle (in 
years) 
 
1.6 
 
0.27 
Internal auditor availability 1 1.00 
Non-audit services not currently provided 
by the current statutory auditor 
 
1 
 
1.00 
Auditor changes in the past ten years 1 1.00 
Annual frequency of monitoring and 
review of internal procedures 
 
12 
 
0.48 
Unqualified audit opinion in the last ten 
years 
 
1 
 
1.00 
 
 
Table B4  The selected attributes for the CGI in MLEs including their benchmark:                 
.                    governance area –  SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS 
Attributes Benchmark scores 
Normalised 
benchmark 
Availability of shareholder director or 
officer 
 
1 
 
1.00 
Adoption of the one-share-one-vote 
 principle  
 
1 
 
1.00 
Days of notice before AGM 25 0.15 
AGM shareholder attending records kept 1 1.00 
Dividend policy in place and disclosed 1 1.00 
Proxy arrangements in place and disclosed 1 1.00 
Current threshold of shareholding to call an 
AGM                                  
 
 
19 
 
0.20 
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Appendix 3 
Table C1 illustrates the application of part of the CGI model on two MLEs while 
Table C2 shows the sub-indices and overall CGIs for the two MLEs. 
 
 
 
Table C1  Testing the CGI for Company X and Company Y in the one governance area 
Structure of board of directors 
Benchmark CoX CoY 
N S ND SS* ND SS* 
Board size 0.50 1.00 0.83 1.66 0.83 1.66 
Percentage of non-executive directors 
onboard 
 
0.60 
 
1.00 
 
1.00 
 
1.67 
 
0.60 
 
1.00 
Number of board meetings held 
annually 
 
0.24 
 
1.00 
 
1.00 
 
4.20 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
Percentage of board meetings 
attended by non-executive directors 
 
1.00 
 
1.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.62 
 
0.62 
Average years of experience as 
directors at this or in another 
company 
 
 
0.47 
 
 
1.00 
 
 
0.00 
 
 
0.00 
 
 
0.21 
 
 
0.44 
Avoidance of Chairman and CEO 
duality 
 
1.00 
 
1.00 
 
1.00 
 
1.00 
 
1.00 
 
1.00 
Chairman and/or CEO not serving on 
another board 
 
1.00 
 
1.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
Total score for area  7.00  8.54  4.73 
Total score as a percentage of 
benchmark 
  
100 
  
121.93 
  
67.57 
Area Weight  28.22  28.22  28.22 
Structure of board sub index {%) 
 
 28.22  34.43  19.07 
Notes: N = normalised benchmark, S = score awarded for benchmark: ND = normalized data for 
company; SS = score awarded to company = ND/N; *Some discrepancies are present in 
decimal numbers as original data were rounded to 2 d.p. to avoid clutter. 
 
Table C2  Sub-indices and overall CGIs for Company X and Company Y 
Sub-index Benchmark (%) CoX (%) CoY (%) 
Structure of board of directors 28.22 34.43 19.07 
Transparency and disclosure 26.31 16.46 24.40 
Audit committee and audit process 24.64 26.09 18.79 
Shareholder rights 20.84 14.89 17.86 
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The Participation of the Small Shareholder in the Annual General 
Meeting:  
A Reflection of Good Corporate Governance? 
Baldacchino, P.J., Camilleri, A., Cutajar, I., Grima, S., Bezzina, F.H. 
University of Malta, Malta 
This paper analyses the level of small shareholder (SS) participation in the Annual 
General Meeting (AGM), assessing how this reflects upon the corporate 
governance of listed entities. It focuses on SS attendance, voting and proposals 
(excluding those of institutional and majority shareholders), improving SS 
participation and the significance of such AGM proceedings to listed company 
corporate governance. Empirical mixed methodology research is carried out in a 
Maltese listed company (MLC) setting by means of semi-structured interviews with 
seventeen MLC secretaries, five stockbrokers, an online questionnaire responded 
by fifty-four shareholders in different MLCs, as well as the analysis of company 
notices and documentation relating to the AGM. Results indicate that SS 
participation is weak. Attendance is poor, and is often spurred both by legitimate 
factors such as information on current financial performance and by questionable 
ones such as refreshments served and venue. Shareholders seem uncomfortable 
in asking management formal questions and even in voting by show of hands, and 
therefore opt for informal interaction with management and for voting by poll, the 
latter often rendering attendance fruitless and even unnecessary by permitting 
proxies.  As for proposals, they could induce management’s later action despite 
seldom, if ever, being approved, but their submission is rare and mostly frivolous, 
commonly hampered by a lack of financial knowledge. The study concludes that 
the current level of SS participation does not render the AGM a tool reflecting good 
corporate governance, as it does not keep in balance the interests of this 
shareholder with those of other stakeholders.   For the sake of better direction and 
control, and, in particular, for more transparency and accountability, the AGM has 
to be less stage-managed, as well as more interactive and engaging towards such 
shareholder. This calls for increased management commitment, particularly 
towards more investor education and guidance.  
Keywords: annual general meeting, corporate governance, small shareholder,           
.                   shareholder participation, Maltese listed companies. 
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1.  Introduction  
The term "corporate governance" has been defined as the system by which 
companies are directed and controlled (Cadbury,1992). Corporate governance is 
mainly concerned with providing structures through which objectives are set, 
performance is monitored and rights and responsibilities are adequately allocated 
among different participants in the corporation (OECD, 1999; OECD, 2004).  
 From a narrow perspective, corporate governance is limited to the 
relationship between the company and its shareholders (Solomon, 2010). In a 
wider context, corporate governance may be considered as a set of relationships 
between a company’s management, its board, its shareholders and other 
stakeholders (OECD, 1999). While academics have defined corporate governance 
from varying perspectives, the existence of conflicts arising from the separation of 
ownership and control is a predominant feature. Discussions on corporate 
governance have concentrated on the relations between the directors and 
managers of companies and other parties, in particular focusing on the role of 
corporate governance to protect and advance the interest of shareholders through 
appointing and monitoring capable management (Walker, 2009).  
 The Annual General Meeting (AGM) represents one of the corporate 
governance instruments intended to assist shareholders in holding the directors of 
a company accountable, thus limiting the possibility of expropriation of 
shareholders by managers (La Porta et al., 2003). It has been the interest of 
various scholars to evaluate the importance of the physical meeting of 
shareholders on entities’ corporate governance. While AGMs aim to serve as a 
means of overseeing the actions and decisions of companies (OECD, 2004), 
studies have shown that AGMs can be seen as redundant in terms of effectively 
exercising the agent-principal relationships (Apostolides and Boden, 2005).  
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 Proponents of proposals that AGMs contribute little to effective corporate 
governance have justified their conclusions by arguing that due to little or no 
opportunity to influence the company’s strategy, private shareholders prefer to exit 
rather than use their voice in AGMs (Apostolides and Boden, 2005). Nonetheless, 
while dominant investors have alternative routes by which to exercise governance 
(Strätling, 2003), small shareholders largely depend on AGMs to exercise their 
shareholder rights (Van der Elst, 2013). 
 The market instability brought about by corporate scandals such as Enron, 
WorldCom and Parmalat, followed by the financial crises in 2008, have led 
shareholders to demand more information and become more active (Ertimur et al., 
2010; Gillan and Starks, 2000; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The primary focus of 
activist shareholders is to put pressure on companies to continue enhancing their 
corporate governance practices, this with the aim of improving the companies’ 
performance and achieving higher returns on investment. In April 2014, the 
European Commission submitted a proposal on tackling corporate governance 
shortcomings relating to European listed companies with the aim of enhancing 
shareholders’ rights where necessary to ensure that shareholders are more 
engaged (COM, 2014).  
 This empirical study is based in Malta, a small member state of the 
European Union (EU). In view of the AGM’s importance to small shareholders, this 
paper analyses the level of small shareholder participation in the AGM of Maltese 
listed companies. This paper aims to analyse small shareholder attendance at 
AGMs, evaluate their voting rights, including their strength and effectiveness as 
well as examine and assess shareholder proposals put as resolutions on the 
agenda of the AGM. In the light of the emerged results, the paper will provide 
recommendations addressing the weaknesses identified among AGMs of listed 
companies, particularly identifying means by which small shareholders’ 
participation at the AGM could be increased. 
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2.  Literature review 
The AGM is an integral part of a company’s corporate governance system as it 
provides the opportunity to shareholders to exercise their ownership rights, 
including the opportunity to direct any questions to the Board (The Association of 
British Insurers, 2013). Strätling (2003) identified that AGMs serve to provide three 
principal functions. Firstly, AGMs aim at informing shareholders about the 
company’s financial performance and important management decisions. Secondly, 
AGMs enable companies to obtain the shareholders’ consent for decisions that the 
board of directors has no discretion to take. Thirdly, AGMs support a forum for 
discussion between directors and shareholders about past performances and 
future business policies. 
 Similar to other jurisdictions, Maltese company law grants rights to 
shareholders at the AGM. In particular, Maltese listing rules provide each 
shareholder, including a proxy holder, with the right to attend the AGM and ask 
questions related to the items on the agenda and to have such questions answered 
by directors or by a competent person as the directors may delegate (Laws of 
Malta, 1995 and Listing Authority - Malta, 2014). Moreover, such listing rules allow 
shareholders, holding a minimum of 5% of the issued share capital, to table 
resolutions at the AGM. 
 
2.1  Small shareholders’ attendance at the AGM 
Shareholder democracy can be achieved through increased participation by 
investors at the AGM (Van der Schee, 2011). Various scholars have determined 
that there may be a number of factors influencing shareholder participation. 
Empirical research by Strätling (2003) and Apostolides and Boden (2005: 61) 
showed that participation tends to increase when the company is in financial 
difficulties, with the latter stating, “the more salient the current issues, the greater 
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the AGM attendance”. Similarly, Kathurima (2011) claimed that the main 
determinants for shareholders’ attendance at meetings depend on the agenda of 
the meeting and the need to enquire on the company’s performance.  
 Numerous researchers have analysed in great detail the real significance of 
the AGM, particularly to different classes of investors. Van der Elst (2013) and 
Bottomley (2003) maintained that the AGM has become less important to large 
shareholders as, in practice, the company often communicates with institutional 
shareholders outside the AGM, for example through conferences or one-on-ones. 
While one-on-ones and other activism behind closed doors are targeted towards 
large and often institutional investors, the AGM is aimed at all shareholders, 
including individual and small shareholders (Van der Elst, 2013). This implies that 
small shareholders largely rely on AGMs to exercise their shareholder rights 
(Lafarre, 2014). 
 Recently, participation at AGMs has been increasing through technological 
breakthroughs (Weil, Gotshal and Manges LLP, 2002). As a measure to increase 
participation at AGMs, the EU Commission advocates that Member States should 
focus more on reducing participation barriers so that shareholders could engage in 
cross-border voting more easily (COM, 2014). 
 
2.2  Minority shareholder voting 
Voting is an important tool, as up to a certain extent, it enables shareholders to 
influence corporate governance (Yermack, 2010). According to Macey (2008), it is 
presumed that more and better voting rights to shareholders would further improve 
corporate performance and accountability. Shareholders commonly vote on 
directors’ elections, executive compensation, fundamental corporate changes, 
amendments and the sale of most or all corporate assets. These rights are subject 
to change by contractual provisions.  Furthermore, they are subject to legal 
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precincts in various aspects. Notwithstanding the importance of shareholder voting 
at the AGM, various scholars have discussed whether voting indeed serves the 
purposes assigned to it by corporate law (Lafarre, 2014).                                                       
 Low attendance rates and absenteeism of shareholders at the AGM is a 
widely debated  topic in corporate governance literature (Van der Schee, 2011). As 
proclaimed by economic theory, the ownership structure of the company highly 
influences voting turnouts (Van der Elst, 2011). In a widely dispersed ownership 
structure, the voting outcome will be the same irrespective of whether a small 
(individual) shareholder participates in the AGM (Lafarre, 2014). In this respect, by 
holding large voting blocks and being able to influence voting results, large 
shareholders tend to have more motives to participate in AGMs than small 
shareholders (Van der Elst, 2011).  
  The voting procedure can have an effect on the nature and quality of the 
general meeting (Apostolides, 2010). Shareholder voting models have evolved 
over time from one-share-one vote to a variety of voting structures, some favouring 
small or individual shareholders and others enhancing the control of large 
shareholders (Dunlavy, 2006; Pistor et al., 2003). According to Apostolides (2010), 
a poll by ballot is one of the safest methods for directors, as the majority of proxy 
votes on resolutions would be carried in favour of the Board. This view supports 
Hampel (1998) who argued that a show of hand is riskier and more transparent, as 
small shareholders can still register an interesting majority against the Board.                   
 Maltese company law provides that a resolution put to vote shall be decided 
“on a show of hands unless a poll is demanded” (Companies Act, 1995, First 
Schedule, Reg 41). Such voting is “a method of dealing with non-contentious 
matters expeditiously and inexpensively” (Companies and Securities Advisory 
Committee, 2010, Para 4.108). The study of Bottomley (2003) analysed the voting 
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tool adopted for approval of agenda items, whereby most of which were decided by 
show of hands, except for the election of directors and the fixing of their 
remuneration. 
2.3  Minority shareholder proposals  
Shareholder-initiated proposals have become an integral part of corporate 
governance and performance control. Shareholder proposals are a means of 
mitigating agency problems and thus, advocating shareholder participation 
(Bebchuk, 2005).  
 Shareholder proposals are powerful and beneficial to both investors and 
companies. Investors are able to communicate their concerns to the Board of 
Directors, while companies get an opportunity to gain insights of shareholders’ 
interests and concerns over particular matters (British Columbia Investment 
Management Corporation, 2010). Nevertheless, various scholars such as Bebchuk 
(2005) and De Jong et al. (2006) have generally considered shareholder proposals 
to be a relatively weak disciplinary mechanism whereby activist small shareholders 
exert little influence on management.  
 A recent study conducted on Maltese listed companies by Bezzina et al. 
(2014) revealed that the ownership concentration of such companies influenced 
the effectiveness of the exercise of rights in controlling decisions. In companies 
with a widely dispersed shareholding, shareholders were regarded as less powerful 
and hence were unable to exercise effective control through their participation at 
the AGM (Bezzina et al., 2014). 
 Empirical literature shows that proposal submissions do not really act as an 
agency control device as often management and institutional activists negotiate 
between themselves behind the scenes or pursue their own serving agendas 
(Bainbridge, 2006; Anabtawi, 2006; Crespi and Renneboog, 2010). Similarly, 
Ertimur et al. (2010) argued that as shareholder proposals are presented well 
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ahead of the AGM, the Board could evaluate them, obtain management’s opinion, 
hear from large shareholders and eventually determine whether to implement them 
or put them for shareholders’ vote. Some scholars claimed that the non-binding 
nature of shareholder proposals yield no control benefits (Prevost and Rao, 2000; 
Gillan and Starks, 2000). However, various others scholars asserted that albeit 
their non-binding nature, submitted proposals can exert pressure on the firm being 
subject to the proposal. Studies show that proposals attaining the majority vote are 
likely to be implemented (Bizjak and Marquette, 1998; Martin and Thomas, 1999; 
Ertimur et al., 2010; Thomas and Cotter, 2007). Evidently, shareholders target 
proposals to certain companies more than others, and there may be various 
contributing factors for this.  Shareholders tend to become aware and more active 
especially when the company does not operate up to their expectations. Early 
studies proclaimed that proposals submitted tend to be substantially targeted to 
underperforming companies (Karpoff et al., 1996; Martin and Thomas, 1999). 
According to Cziraki et al. (2010), voting outcomes were strongest for proposals 
seeking changes to the Board, thereby indicating major governance concerns.  
 Findings by Gordon and Pound (1993) showed that shareholder proposals 
are likely to gain more votes during the firm’s worsening economic performance 
period, this similarly indicating a potential quality problem with present 
management. Maug and Rydqyst (2001) explained that investors are wary in 
respect of governance issues where the benevolence of managers’ judgement is 
less plausible. Nonetheless, the pass rates of investors’ proposals are low while 
approvals of managements’ proposals are high (Maug and Rydqyst, 2001). The 
study of Gillan and Starks (2000) showed that proposals sponsored by active 
individual investors receive significantly fewer votes than proposals sponsored by 
institutional investors or coordinated groups of investors.  
 
 
Chapter 15     The Participation of the Small Shareholder in the Annual General Meeting: 
                                           A Reflection of Good Corporate Governance?  [CG-6]  
444 
 
2.4  Improving participation  
The increasing desire to improve participation at AGMs has led various 
researchers to identify ways how regulations can be improved. Common proposals 
were to allow for technology advances, with the aim of making AGM practices 
more effective. One of the recommendations put forward by the Australian CAMAC 
(2012), was to embrace technology in the conduct of meetings and thereby, doing 
away with proxy voting and mandating direct voting without having to attend in 
person. Amey and Mozley (2012) stated that such an Internet voting system 
represents a highly efficient way of increasing participation in shareholders’ 
meetings, doing away with physical presence and thereby saving time, costs and 
inconvenience of travelling while assuring effective communication. Similarly, 
Gonzalez et al. (2014) highlighted the importance of innovative voting procedures 
by enabling foreign and other shareholders to vote in real time without having to 
travel. Gonzalez et al. (2014) further advocated a public counting, this allowing for 
more transparency.   
 Good governance is achieved through continuous improvement. As 
circumstances change, companies have to seek ways to keep advancing in the 
worldwide corporate governance and implement the best practices for the benefit 
of the company, its shareholders and all other stakeholders (IFC, 2009). 
 
3.  Methodology 
The findings and analysis of this study were supported by both secondary and 
primary data sources. Secondary data sources consisted of company notices in 
relation to notices of the AGM, Annual Reports and other documents published by 
company secretaries. This data was used to substantiate primary data sources. 
  A mixed methodology was adopted. Data was mainly collected through 
twenty-two semi-structured interviews. Seventeen interviews were held with 
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company secretaries, aimed at ascertaining the level of shareholders’ participation 
in their respective companies. The other five interviews were held with 
stockbrokers dealing with shares of the same companies. The latter’s views were 
found relevant in view of interactions with small shareholders and their 
independence.   
 Therefore, two semi-structured interview schedules were designed: one for 
company secretaries and another for Maltese stockbrokers. The interview 
schedules consisted of both open-and close-ended questions, with the latter 
involving either categorical questions or five-point Likert-type items, signifying the 
respondents’ level of agreement to a number of statements (from 1 = "strongly 
agree" to 5 = "strongly disagree").  
  Obtaining small shareholders’ views was also essential to the study. Since 
the online address details of such shareholders were unavailable, the Malta 
Association of Small Shareholders was contacted and an on-line questionnaire 
was sent through their intermediation to those members of whom they had on-line 
details.  Fifty-four shareholders, being the majority of such members, responded to 
this questionnaire. Descriptive statistics were used to summarise the item 
responses. To determine whether the responses differed across the three groups 
(MLCs, shareholders and stockbrokers), the Chi-squared test was used with 
nominal scales while the Kruskal Wallis test was used for ordinal scales. 
 
4.  Analysis of results     
4.1  Small shareholders’ participation at the AGM 
In evaluating small shareholder participation in Malta, it was first essential to obtain 
an understanding of the shareholding structure of listed companies. As per Maltese 
Listing Rules (Listing Authority - Malta, 2014), shareholders in such companies are 
allowed to raise resolutions at the AGM when having a minimum of 5% of the 
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company’s issued share capital. An analysis of the shareholding structure of the 
listed companies interviewed showed that, on average, 72.41% of the companies’ 
issued share capital was held by shareholders holding more than 5% of the issued 
share capital.  
 While not all shareholders may table resolution at the AGM, they have the 
right to ask questions. When the 17 Maltese listed company representatives 
(MLCs) were asked about the level of shareholder participation, 64.7% claimed that 
it was quite low. Furthermore, 23.5% added that shareholders tend to feel more 
comfortable approaching the Board informally before, during and after the AGM 
rather than raising questions at the formal meeting.   
  As for the shareholders (N = 54), only 37.0% reported that they were active 
at least to some extent. Most shareholders (57.4%) also indicated that they did not 
feel comfortable asking questions at the AGM, the majority of these (51.6%) 
preferring to ask questions before/after the meeting, with the remaining 
respondents feeling uncomfortable to ask any questions.   
 The three respondent groups were provided with two statements that, as 
revealed by the literature, show the reality of AGMs. These two statements were: 
(i) "AGMs are truly an occasion where small shareholders exercise their rights"; 
and (ii) "Large shareholders tend to have more motives to participate in AGMs as 
they are more able to influence the voting turnout". With regards to the first 
statement, the Kruskal Wallis test revealed that the three groups varied 
significantly with respect to mean ranks (p = 0.03); MLCs agreed to the statement 
(Median (Md) = 4), while small shareholders and stockbrokers were undecided (Md 
= 3). However, with respect to the second statement, there was no significant 
difference in mean ranks (p = 0.46); all groups agreed (Md = 4) that large 
shareholders tend to have more motives to participate as they can have a greater 
influence on the voting turnout. 
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 Shareholder participation in the AGM will now be assessed in more detail in 
the next four sections: small shareholder attendance, their voting, their proposals 
and how to improve their participation. The analysis will then delve into the 
significance of the AGM to the corporate governance of listed companies.       
 
4.2  Small shareholder attendance at the AGM 
The number of shareholders eligible to attend the most recent AGM and the actual 
attendance figures for each listed company were obtained from the 17 MLC’s. The 
attendance of the shareholders was found poor: 13 companies had an average 
attendance below 20%, with two between 20-40%, and only the remaining two 
beyond 80%.  
 The shareholders were asked to indicate and justify their attendance levels 
at AGMs during the last five years. Results showed that the majority of the 54 
respondents (38.9%) indicated that they had attended from four to six AGMs. Most 
respondents (94.4%) also stated that when attending they had done so to get 
informed about their company’s performance and to exercise their voting rights. A 
few (13.0%) had not attended AGMs at all because they were unable to influence 
the voting result. 
  The important determinants of shareholders’ attendance that emerged 
among all 76 respondents were "current financial performance" (Md = 4) and 
"refreshments served" (Md = 4). The agenda, venue and duration of the AGM were 
neither important not unimportant (Md =3). Kruskal Wallis tests revealed that only 
"agenda of the meeting" differed significantly in mean ranks across groups (p = 
0.05), with brokers seeing this factor as important (Md = 4) and shareholders and 
MLC’s as neither important nor unimportant (Md = 3). 
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4.3  Small shareholder voting  
4.3.1 Voting rights emanating from local laws and EU directives                              .                               
Each and every shareholder has various rights emanating from the regulatory 
framework. The three independent respondent groups were asked to rate the 
strength of such shareholders’ rights. The level of agreement differed considerably 
across mean ranks (p < 0.01), whereby companies rated shareholders’ rights as 
strong (Md = 4), while small shareholders and stockbrokers considered rights to be 
rather weak to moderate (Md = 2). One of the five independent local stockbrokers 
commented that MLCs tend to adopt a “box-ticking exercise”, whereas another 
claimed that the revision of the existing Shareholder Rights Directive (COM, 2014) 
would continue to improve such rights. 
 Whether institutional shareholders are privileged and have more power over 
minority shareholders is debatable. Out of the five stockbrokers interviewed, two 
agreed that institutional shareholders are more powerful than the minority 
shareholders because they have a greater say owing to the weighting of their 
shares. The remaining three stockbrokers stated that institutional and majority 
shareholders are more privileged because they have access to more information 
and are in a better position to analyse that information. 
 Greater shareholder participation may be achieved by encouraging 
investors to exercise their voting rights. In order to achieve this, two out of five 
stockbrokers emphasised the importance of increasing education among investors, 
claiming that “Maltese investors lack investment knowledge”. Three stockbrokers 
agreed that the corporate governance framework should introduce incentives that 
encourage investors to exercise their voting rights. 
4.3.2 Shareholder voting method                                                                              .                                                                                     
Voting at Maltese AGMs takes place either by show of hands or by poll. Evidently, 
the 17 listed companies investigated tend to adopt the show of hands method for 
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most of the resolutions (58.8%) rather than the poll because it is easier and less 
costly. 
 When the MLCs were asked to give their opinion on the level of 
transparency of the two methods, over half of them (52.9%) stated that voting by 
poll is more transparent because it accurately provides the exact number of 
shareholder votes. They added that when voting takes place by show of hands, the 
votes of the investors could still not be easily determined and their respective 
amounts of shares are also disregarded.  However, some other MLCs (17.6%) 
stated that the show of hands is more transparent because resolutions are 
approved visibly and publicly. The rest of MLCs (29.4%) claimed that both voting 
methods may be regarded as transparent.  
  Given that  MLCs indicated that voting by show of hands is a common 
voting method by most listed companies, small shareholders were asked to 
indicate their preferred voting method. Interestingly, the majority of the 54 small 
shareholders indicated that they prefer to vote by ballot for resolutions (57.4%).. 
Others indicated that they favour show of hands (24.1%) or they have no 
preference for any particular voting method (18.5%).  
 
4.4  Proposals from small shareholders  
Shareholder participation can be analysed further from the aspect of the proposals 
put forward by shareholders. Most of the 17 MLCs (88.2%) found it difficult to recall 
any shareholder proposals made, this being indicative of the lack of shareholder 
participation. Nearly all MLCs (94.1%) stated that their companies mostly receive 
enquiries rather than proposals. Most (88.2%) commented that shareholders are 
interested in dividends or offers given by the company. 
 For certain MLCs (29.4%), an appreciable number of proposals emanate 
from substantial and majority shareholders, often also forming part of the Board, 
Chapter 15     The Participation of the Small Shareholder in the Annual General Meeting: 
                                           A Reflection of Good Corporate Governance?  [CG-6]  
450 
 
rather than small ones. According to the majority of MLCs (58.8%), proposals 
made by such majority shareholders are always discussed at Board level and 
implemented. However, most MLC’s (58.8%) also claimed that once any proposal 
is received from minority shareholders, it is invariably evaluated by management 
and, if deemed “valid”, it is forwarded to the Board for further consideration.  Yet, 
only one of the 17 MLCs stated that the Board had referred such proposals by 
small shareholders to the AGM, and this over the preceding five years’ period.  
Furthermore, no such referred proposal originating from small shareholders had in 
fact resulted in acceptance at the AGM. Notwithstanding this, the MLC noted that 
such proposals had resulted in the company holding further discussions with the 
representatives of the small shareholders in question in an effort to take the 
proposals on board in managing the company. On their part, all five stockbrokers 
also confirmed that, notwithstanding the fact that shareholders’ proposals may not 
be approved and thus not influence the outcome of the AGM, they might still have 
an impact on future decisions. However, they added that the reluctance of small 
shareholders to put forward such proposals could be due to the fact that they did 
not wish to be or to be seen to be “frivolous”. Most of the stockbrokers (60.0%) 
pointed out that the major determinant of such proposals was the level of investor 
education in financial matters. They emphasised that, in fact, at present small 
shareholders are not adequately equipped to support or otherwise the Board in its 
decision making. In their view, the participation of small shareholders is still 
primarily held back by the latter’s common lack of financial knowledge. One of the 
stockbrokers even highlighted the free-rider problem, whereby individual small 
shareholders do not bother to know more, and simply decide to rely rather on the 
initiatives of a few other investors for any proposals to be made.     
 Both MLCs and stockbrokers were also asked whether proposals from small 
shareholders can be considered as weak owing to the lack of influence that such 
shareholders can exert on management. Only 3 out of 17 MLCs (17.6%) agreed 
that shareholder proposals are weak because of this. In contrast, three out of five 
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(60.0%) of stockbrokers agreed that, besides the question of influence of the lack 
of financial knowledge referred to earlier, small shareholder proposals are also 
weak because of their minimal or no influence which they could exert on 
management. Yet, the two stockbrokers in disagreement stated that the 
weaknesses in shareholder proposals were little related to the influence which 
shareholders could exert.  
 
4.5  Improving participation 
As for matters that may improve shareholder participation, the majority of the 17 
MLCs (64.7%) agreed that an e-voting system would facilitate the counting 
process. However, they were concerned about the ability of shareholders to use 
electronic systems. The rest of the MLCs stated that they did not feel it necessary 
to adopt an e-voting system. 
 A similar question asked stockbrokers to give their opinion about the 
adequacy of the voting system currently adopted by MLCs. All five stockbrokers 
stated that the voting system was adequate. However, most (80.0%) added that 
the voting system could be improved by technology as this renders the system less 
costly and also leads to more precise results than the show of hands. 
  When asked about the adequacy of the voting process for approval of 
resolutions, MLCs agreed more strongly than brokers and shareholders (p < 0.01). 
Yet, when respondents were required to rate whether technology can aid in the 
voting process at AGMs to improve transparency, all three groups agreed (Md = 4) 
and the difference across groups was not statistically significant (p = 0.66).  
 Despite such consensus, both stockbrokers and MLCs agreed more 
strongly than shareholders that a virtual meeting is not a full substitute for a 
physical meeting (p = 0.04).   
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4.6  The significance of the AGM in the corporate governance of MLCs 
The AGM is a tool reflecting good corporate governance and thus, transparency 
and accountability. MLCs, stockbrokers and shareholders indicated the extent to 
which these two principles are reflected at AGMs. As for transparency, MLCs 
reported this to a higher extent (Md = 5) than stockbrokers and shareholders (Md = 
3), and this difference was statistically significant (p<0.01). As for accountability, 
again MLCs reported this to a higher extent (Md = 5) than stockbrokers (Md = 4) 
and shareholders (Md = 3), and this difference was statistically significant (p<0.01).  
  Two stockbrokers raised several comments about the importance of the 
AGM in providing information and regular updates to shareholders, particularly in 
view of the separation of control that exists between management and 
shareholders. A broker claimed that “a strong forum addresses information 
asymmetry”. Similarly, one stockbroker commented that the presentation of 
information at the AGM as well as disclosures should be clear and useful to 
shareholders in making their investment decisions.  
  When asked whether directors are accountable to shareholders at the AGM, 
stockbrokers disagreed that the AGM is effective with respect to such 
accountability (Md = 2). One broker commented that the Chairman of a few of the 
listed companies in Malta is as yet also the CEO, with a duality that in practice 
“runs the show”. He further argued that directors are less likely to be accountable 
to shareholders given that normally they do not even address shareholders at the 
AGM.  
  Stockbrokers and MLCs strongly agreed (Md = 5) that the AGM allows 
shareholders sufficient time to ask questions to the Board, while shareholders 
agreed to a lower extent (Md = 4), with this difference reaching statistical 
significance (p<0.01). As regards to the statements presented to respondents that 
(i) the AGM provides information to shareholders on the company’s operation and 
(ii) generates a discussion between directors and shareholders, stockbrokers and 
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MLCs strongly agreed (Md = 5) while shareholders agreed (Md = 4), with the 
Kruskal Wallis tests reaching statistical significance at p <0.01. 
 MLCs and small shareholders were also asked whether the main purposes 
of the AGM are being attained in Maltese AGMs.  A significantly higher proportion 
(p < 0.01 using exact test, since some cells had expected counts less than 5) of 
MLCs (76.5%) and stock brokers (80.0%) than shareholders (22.2%) stated that 
these purposes are being attained, this again pointing to the relatively more 
positive attitude towards the AGM being taken by MLCs as in contrast to the small 
shareholders.   
 
5.  Discussion 
Given the weak participation of small shareholders in the AGM, two moot points 
emerge:  firstly, what makes it so weak and secondly, given such weakness, 
whether the meeting is an adequate reflection of good corporate governance.  
5.1  Participation by small shareholders – What makes it weak?  
Results showed that the majority of small shareholders did not consider 
themselves as active participants in the AGM. Research findings identified various 
factors contributing to weak small shareholder participation. 
5.1.1 Poor attendance                                                                                 .                                                                                                   
Results showed that the attendance of shareholders at AGMs of the interviewed 
MLCs was poor when compared with the total number of shareholders in their 
respective listed companies. This was also apparent in international AGMs as 
research by Strätling (2003) and Hodges et al.(2004) also showed poor attendance 
at the AGM. Results revealed that small shareholders were passive investors who 
felt demotivated to attend AGMs owing to their inability to influence the voting 
turnout.  
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 In conformity with the view of Apostolides and Boden (2005) and Kathurima 
(2011), research findings showed that prominent agenda issues as well as the 
company’s performance tend to be the factors that mostly motivate shareholders to 
attend. Results also indicated that refreshments offered by companies could have 
a significant impact on shareholders’ attendance at AGMs. The provision of 
refreshments seems to be highly valued by small investors, for whom such events 
serve as an outing. Findings showed that small shareholders regard these as an 
informal setting in which to ask and discuss questions with the directors – 
questions which they lack the confidence to place in the formal meeting.    
5.1.2  A box-ticking exercise                                                                                      . 
In contrast to MLCs responses, stockbrokers and small shareholders regarded 
shareholder’s rights to be rather weak. Results have shown that small 
shareholders prefer to vote by ballot as they feel uncomfortable showing hands, 
especially where they are investors in more than one company and directors may 
be up for election in different companies. Much of this may be attributable to the 
fact that, in the context of a small country, shareholders and directors are more 
likely to know each other.  
 Results have also shown that small shareholders were reluctant to ask 
questions during the AGM and therefore, when attending the AGM they would only 
participate by ticking the boxes on the ballot. Like all other shareholders, small 
shareholders have the right to vote and ask questions at the AGM. However, 
brokers acknowledged that institutional and majority shareholders have access to 
more information than small shareholders, giving them better ability to raise 
queries and analyse information. This leads one to question whether the rights of 
small shareholders are in fact strong enough to address their participation passivity 
at AGMs. Both stockbrokers and small shareholders argued that shareholders’ 
rights could be improved in this regard. The new European-wide directive (COM, 
2007) which addresses the key principles of accountability and transparency, is 
another milestone in shareholders’ rights. As proclaimed by ACCA (2015:5), 
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“Recent global developments in corporate governance include a new focus on the 
implementation and the quality of response rather than simple box ticking”. 
5.1.3 Rare and weak proposals hampered by a lack of financial knowledge            .            
.Proposals forwarded by shareholders at the AGM are both rare and weak, and 
there may be a number of factors contributing to this. One clearly emerging factor 
is the poor financial background of small investors rendering them unaware of the 
risks which they are exposed to and hardly capable of making informed financial 
decisions, even hindering them to the extent that they do not understand the AGM 
agenda. The strong indications, particularly as given by stockbrokers, are that this 
directly contributes to shareholders being less likely to put forward AGM proposals 
and also to the probability that even when they do so, these are in fact not taken 
seriously. For shareholder proposals to make any impact, they commonly have to 
be backed by sound financial knowledge. More education to this effect is therefore 
imperative if one is to have valid and increased shareholder proposals. As 
perceived to date, it is as yet justifiable to consider proposals as a weak 
disciplinary mechanism, as claimed by Bebchuk (2006). Yet, while there are 
diverging views on the power of such proposals, for the small shareholder these 
clearly have the potential of being a main participation ingredient facilitating a 
better balance among the corporate players.   
 MLCs do currently endeavour to increase investors’ financial skills through a 
few investor education programmes and conferences held jointly with the Malta 
Association of Small Shareholders. Additionally, media and stockbrokers do 
provide educational investment material on their website. Yet, evidently, more 
needs to be done with the specific aim to overcome shareholder apathy towards 
reading and learning such skills.  Furthermore, for the longer term, new investor 
generations may be introduced earlier to the fundamental aspects of finance and 
stock market dynamics. As ultimate aim, the necessary background is to be 
provided, rendering it more difficult for small shareholders to have their resolutions 
by-passed, as such, proposals will then have the real potential of sending 
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significant messages to their company, even if not approved at the AGM itself. 
After all, it is in the interest of the company itself that the small shareholders do not 
continue to rely on institutional investors or a few active retail shareholders to 
speak up and try to bring change on their behalf.  
 Of course, the lower the level of investor knowledge, the greater the need 
for the MLCs also to ensure that general communication with them is clear and 
effective. Therefore, on their part, directors and others in contact with investors are 
also to ensure that their communication skills are sharp and may themselves have 
to undergo regular training, including induction courses and professional 
development programmes.  
 
5.2  The AGM: enough for good corporate governance? 
5.2.1 A forum for director/shareholder interaction?                                                    . 
In the light of the weak participation by small shareholders at the AGM, one asks 
whether the functions of the AGM as defined by Strätling  (2003) are being applied 
for the sake of good corporate governance, particularly in supporting a forum for 
discussion between directors and shareholders both about past performance and 
future business prospects. 
 Directors are to hold themselves accountable to shareholders, and this is 
hardly, if at all, possible without shareholder participation and involvement. 
Accountability cannot be served merely with the CEO's  or Chairman’s speech, and 
the rest of the directors being uninvolved and silent for most of the meeting. As this 
seems to be commonly occurring, the inference is that AGMs are stage-managed 
and not serving as a platform for shareholders to exercise their ownership rights, 
including that of deriving from the directors the appropriate information concerning 
their stewardship. For this climate to be dispelled, time is to be allowed not only for 
genuine questions but also for the transmission of all needed information, such as 
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the profile of all candidates, old and new, presenting themselves for director 
election. As for the transfer of information on the company’s financial performance, 
it is important that the information provided during the AGM is not too technical for 
investors to understand. Such transmission has to be clear, simple and concise 
and, insofar as is possible, complete. This would help to transform the AGM from 
mostly being, as at present, a set of procedures for having management-backed 
resolutions rubber-stamped, focusing on the fulfilment of the financial reporting 
legal requirements to one with meaningful and potentially far-reaching interactive 
discussions. Such transformation is a sine qua non if the small shareholders’ 
interest to attend and participate in the AGM is to be rekindled and for the AGM to 
become a more significant reflection of corporate governance than at present.     
5.2.2 Exploiting technology – A way forward?                                                          .                                                       
.The study points to a general need to exploit technology further to improve the 
AGM. This includes the use of electronic voting as long as shareholders are adept 
at using the new systems.  In addition, more webcasting of the AGMs would permit 
those shareholders unable to attend to follow the meeting and thus with the 
opportunity of being kept informed as well.  Technological devices could be used to 
increase shareholder engagement in decision-making. Listed companies could 
invest in an electronic polling system whereby the shareholder can select a simple 
‘yes’ or ‘no’. Such a polling system can become a simple and effective means for 
shareholders to convey their opinion, and for management to take more account of 
shareholders’ opinions. This again brings to the fore the importance of shareholder 
education in bringing about change. 
 
6.  Conclusion    
In summary, this study indicates that the level of small shareholder participation at 
AGMs of listed companies is low, with poor shareholder attendance being a major 
factor leading to this.  Yet, even when attending, small shareholders do not feel 
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confident in raising questions or bringing forth proposals during the AGM, and this 
is mainly due to limited meaningful information being transmitted to them, this 
being commonly aggravated by their lack of financial knowledge. The resulting 
inability of the AGM to create an effective forum for discussion between directors 
and shareholders casts serious doubt on whether the AGM actually reflects good 
corporate governance, as it does not keep in balance the interests of the small 
shareholder with those of the other stakeholders, including themselves, 
management and major shareholders.  
 For the sake of better direction and control, and, in particular, for more 
transparency and accountability, the study recommends that directors strive more 
towards ensuring that AGMs  are not  stage-managed,  going beyond  the simple 
routines of gathering votes and formal approval of resolutions towards serious 
interaction between themselves, management and  all shareholders, possibly 
involving  better use of technology.  On their part, in order to effect fruitfully such 
interaction, small shareholders have to combat their passivity and attain a stronger 
sense of ownership in their company. For most of them, a main way towards 
effecting this is to stop relying on institutional or main shareholders to speak up 
and bring change. As a pre-requisite for this, they need to commit themselves 
towards acquiring the minimum level of financial knowledge. For this purpose, the 
study recommends that they participate much more in educational activities, 
particularly, though not only, those that may be tailor-made for them by company 
management.  
 The study has its limitations. In their response to what occurs at the AGM, 
MLCs may have been somewhat influenced by what their company expects to be 
occurring. Furthermore, the proportion of small shareholders responding to the 
questionnaire was relatively low, being largely limited by on–line accessibility. 
Following this study, further research may therefore attempt to place added focus 
on the perspectives of small shareholders themselves, such as by securing direct 
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listed company support, such as listed company authorisations to attend the 
various AGMs and thus establishing face-to-face contact with such shareholders.   
 To conclude, Baldacchino et al. (2015) envisage the creation of a corporate 
governance index as a powerful means to align all corporate stakeholders towards 
a major common goal – that of improving the corporate governance performance of 
the company. Clearly, enabling a more meaningful participation for the small 
shareholder in the AGM should be an important preliminary step in the process 
ofachieving such stakeholder alignment towards corporate governance 
improvement.     
 
References 
Regulatory 
Companies Act - Malta, 1995. Chapter 386 of the laws of Malta. 
European Commission (COM)  (2007).   Directive   2007/36/EC  of   the   European 
 Parliament  and  of  the   Council   on   the   exercise   of   certain   rights   of 
 shareholders in listed companies. 
European Commission  (COM)  (2014).  Proposal for a Directive  of  the  European 
 Parliament and of the Council amending  Directive  2007/36/EC  as  regards 
 the  encouragement  of  long-term  shareholder  engagement  and  Directive 
 2013/34/EU  as  regards  certain  elements  of   the   corporate   governance 
 statement, COM(2014) 213 final. 
Listing  Authority - Malta (2014).  Listing Rules: 
 https://www.mfsa.com.mt/pages/viewcontent.aspx?id=267 [24 September, 
 2014]. 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)  (1999).  OECD 
 Principles of Corporate Governance. Paris: OECD Publishing. 
Chapter 15     The Participation of the Small Shareholder in the Annual General Meeting: 
                                           A Reflection of Good Corporate Governance?  [CG-6]  
460 
 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)  (2004).  OECD 
 Principles of Corporate Governance. Paris: OECD Publishing. 
 
Other 
 Association    of    Chartered   Certified   Accountants  (ACCA)  (2015).      ACCA's    
 position on the European Commission’s proposal for a revised shareholder 
 rights directive. London, Feb: 
 http://www.accaglobal.com/content/dam/acca/global/PDF [12 March 2015] .                  
Amey, J.H. and Mozley E.D. (2012).  Online  shareholder  participation   in   AGMs. 
 HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation: 
 http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2012/07/19/online-shareholder-
 participation-in-annual-meetings [15 November, 2104].                            
Anabtawi, I. (2006).   Some   skepticism   about   increasing    shareholder    power 
  UCLA Law Review, 53(3): 561-600.                                                     
Apostolides, N. (2010).  Exercising  corporate  governance  at  the  annual  general 
 meeting . Corporate Governance: The International  Journal  of  Business  in 
 Society , 10 (2): 140-149.                                                                    
Apostolides, N. and Boden, R. (2005).  Cedric  the  pig:  Annual  general  meetings 
 and corporate governance in  the  UK .  Social  Responsibility  Journal, 1(1): 
 53-62.                                                                                                              
Association of British Insurers (2013).    Improving    corporate    governance    and 
 shareholder engagement: 
 https://www.abi.org.uk/~/media/Files/Documents/Publications [1 November, 
 2013].                                                                          
Australian  Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee (CAMAC) (2012) .The 
 AGM and Shareholder Engagement. Australian Government  Discussion 
 Paper : 
 http://www.camac.gov.au/camac/camac.nsf/byheadline/pdfdiscussion+pape
 rs/$file/agm.pdf [15 October,2015].                                                                 
Chapter 15     The Participation of the Small Shareholder in the Annual General Meeting: 
                                           A Reflection of Good Corporate Governance?  [CG-6]  
461 
 
Bainbridge, S. (2006). The case for limited shareholder voting rights. UCLA Law 
 Review:  53: 601-636.                                                                          
Baldacchino, P.J.,  Baldacchino, J.,  Bezzina, F.  and Tipurić, D. (2015).  Assessing  
 the  applicability  of  a  corporate    governance    index    in   Maltese   listed 
 entities. International Journal of Transitions and Innovation Systems, 4 (1/2): 
 43-60.                                                                                                           
Bebchuk, L.A. (2005). The  case  for  increasing  shareholder  power. Harvard  Law 
 Review, 118 (3): 833-914.                                                                          
Bezzina,  F., Baldacchino,  P.J. and Azzopardi, J.R. (2014) [CG-4].  The  corporate    
 governance relationship between  the  board  and  management  in  Maltese  
 listed companies. In Rethinking Corporate  Governance. Tipurić, D.,  Raguž,  
 V. and Podrug, N. (eds).  Pearson, UK: 1-15.                                            
Bizjak, J.M. and Marquette, C.J. (1998). Are shareholder proposals all bark and no 
 bite? Evidence from shareholder resolutions to rescind poison pills. Journal 
 of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 33: 499-521.                               
Bottomley, S. (2003). The role of shareholders'  meetings  in  improving   corporate 
 governance.   Centre   for   Commercial  Law,   Faculty  of  Law,   Australian 
 National University, Canberra..                                                                   
British Columbia Investment Management Corporation (2010). Corporate 
 Governance Principles and Proxy Voting Guidelines:
 http://www.bcimc.com/publications/pdf/responsibleinvesting/corporategove
 rnanceprinciplesproxyvotingguidelines.pdf [20 September, 2014].                                   
Cadbury, A. (1992). The financial aspects of corporate governance: A report of the 
 committee on corporate  governance [Cadbury Report]. London: Gee & Co.                                                                                                        
Companies and Securities Advisory Committee. (2010). Shareholder Participation `
 in the Modern Listed Public Company: Final Report . Sydney: 
 Companies and Securities Advisory Committee.                                     
Crespi, R. and Renneboog, L., (2010). Is (institutional) shareholder  activism  new? 
 Evidence   from   UK   shareholder   coalitions   in    the   pre‐Cadbury    era. 
  Corporate Governance: An International Review, 18(4) : 274-295..           
Chapter 15     The Participation of the Small Shareholder in the Annual General Meeting: 
                                           A Reflection of Good Corporate Governance?  [CG-6]  
462 
 
Cziraki, P., Renneboog, L. and Szilagyi, P.G. (2010). Shareholder activism through 
 proxy    proposals:    The    European    perspective.    European     Financial 
 Management, 16(5): 738-777.                                                                                         
De Jong, A., Mertens, G., and Roosenboom, P. (2006).   Shareholders’   voting   at 
 general meetings: Evidence from the Netherlands. Journal  of  Management 
 and Governance, 10(4): 353–380.                                                       
Dunlavy, C.A. (2006). Social  conceptions  of  the  corporation:  Insights  from   the 
 history of shareholder voting rights. Washington  and  Lee Law  Review,  63: 
 1347-1388.                                                                                             
Ertimur, Y., Ferri, F. and Stubben, S.R. (2010). Board of  directors'  responsiveness 
 to shareholders: Evidence from shareholder proposals. Journal of Corporate 
 Finance, 16(1): 53-72.                                                                                  .                                                          
Gillan, S.L. and Starks, L.T. (2000).  Corporate     governance    proposals     and 
 shareholder activism: The  role   of   institutional   investors.    Journal    of  
 Financial  Economics, 57(2): 275-305.                                                             
González, G.P., Guzman, A., Prada, F. and Trujillo, M. (2014).      Annual    general 
 meetings: A waste of time or effective corporate governance bodies?:  
 http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2395053 [15 Oct, 2014].                                                                                                              
Gordon, L.A. and Pound, J. (1993).     Information,     ownership     structure,     and 
 shareholder  voting:    Evidence    from   shareholder-sponsored    corporate 
 governance proposals. Journal of Finance, 48(2): 697-718.                    
Hampel, R. (1998). Committee on Corporate Governance: Final   Report.   London: 
 Gee Publishing.                                                                                         
Hodges, R., Macniven, L. and Mellett, H. (2004). Governance of UK NHS trusts:the 
 the  annual  general  meeting.   Corporate   Governance:   An    International 
 Review, 12(3): 343-52.                                                                                                  
International Finance Corporation (IFC) (2009). Stakeholder engagement and the 
 Board: Integrating best governance practices: 
 http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/19017b8048a7e667a667e76060ad591
 1/FINAL%2Bfocus8_5.pdf?MOD=AJPERES[22 September,2014].                   
Chapter 15     The Participation of the Small Shareholder in the Annual General Meeting: 
                                           A Reflection of Good Corporate Governance?  [CG-6]  
463 
 
Jensen, M.C. and Meckling, W.H. (1976).    Theory    of    the     firm:     Managerial 
 behaviour, agency costs and ownership  structure.    Journal    of    Financial 
 Economics, 3(4): 305-360.                                                                                           
Karpoff, J.M., Malatesta, P.H. and Walkling, R.A. (1996).   Corporate    governance 
 and   shareholder   initiatives:   Empirical   evidence.   Journal   of   Financial 
 Economics, 42: 365–395.                                                                                    
Kathurima, K. (2011). The   Effectiveness of    Annual     General     Meetings     for 
 Retirement Benefits Schemes. Retirement Benefits Authority:  
 http://www.rba.go.ke/publications/research-papers/category/1-research-
 reports-2010-2011?download=161%3Athe-effectiveness-of-annual-general-
 meetings-for-retirement-benefits-schemes [29 August, 2014].                     
Lafarre, A. (2014). Shareholder activism at  European  AGMs:  Voting  turnout  and 
 behaviour  of  (small)  shareholders.  Master’s   thesis   Ondernemingsrecht, 
 Tilburg University.                                                                                                                    
La  Porta, R.L., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. (2000).    Investor  
 protection and corporate governance. Journal  of  Financial  Economics,  58: 
 3-27.                                                                                                                            
Macey, J.R. (2008).  Corporate  Governance:  Promises  Kept,  Promises   Broken. 
 Princeton: Princeton University Press.                                                                         
Martin, K.J. and Thomas, R.S. (1999). The  effect   of   shareholder   proposals   on 
 executive compensation. University of Cincinnati Law Review, 67:1021-081.                         
Maug, E. and Rydqvist, K. (2001). What is the function of the shareholder meeting? 
 Evidence from the U.S. proxy voting process.   Working   Paper,    Humboldt 
 University.                                                                                                   
Pistor, K., Keinan, Y., Kleinheisterkamp, J. and West, M.D. (2003).   The   evolution 
 of corporate law:  A  cross-country  comparison.    Journal   of   International 
 Economic Law, 23(4): 791-871.                                                                     
Prevost, A.K. and Rao, R.P. (2000).  Of  what  value   are   shareholder   proposals 
 sponsored by public pension funds? Journal of Business, 73(2): 177–204.                                                                                                                           
Chapter 15     The Participation of the Small Shareholder in the Annual General Meeting: 
                                           A Reflection of Good Corporate Governance?  [CG-6]  
464 
 
Solomon, J. (2010). Corporate Governance  and  Accountability.  Chichester:  John 
 Wiley & Sons Ltd.                                                                                              
Strätling, R. (2003).    General    Meetings:    A   dispensable    tool   for    corporate 
 governance  of listed companies? Corporate Governance:   An International 
 Review, 11(1): 74-82.                                                                                    
Thomas, R.S. and Cotter, J.F.(2007).    Shareholder    proposals     in     the     new 
 millennium:  Shareholder  support,  board  response,  and  market   reaction.  
  Journal of Corporate Finance, 13(2): 368-391.                     .                             
Van der Elst, C.F. (2011).   Revisiting   Shareholder   Activism   at   AGMs:   Voting 
 determinants   of   large   and   small   shareholders.    European   Corporate 
 Governance Institute (ECGI), Finance Working Paper 311: 2.                                 
Van der Elst, C.F. (2013). Shareholders  as  stewards:    Evidence    from    Belgian  
 General Meetings. Working Paper, Tilburg Law School:   
 http://ssrn.com/abstract=2270938[22 September,2014].                                       
Van der Schee, P.A. (2011). Regulation of Issuers  and  Investor  protection  in  the 
 US and Malta. Boom Juridische Uitgevers: The Hague: 137-138.                      
Walker, D. (2009).  A review  of  corporate  governance in  UK   banks   and   other 
 financial industry entities: Final recommendations.
 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.hmtreasury.gov.uk/d/
 walker_review_261109.pdf [6 November, 2015].                                             
Weil, Gotshal and Manges LLP (2002).     Comparative      study      of      corporate 
 governance codes relevant to the European Union  and  its  member  states, 
 on behalf of the European Commission. Internal Market Directorate General, 
 Brussels: 
 http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/corpgov/corp-gov-codes-
 rpt-part1_en.pdf [3 October,2014].                                                          
Yermack, D. (2010). Shareholder voting and corporate governance. Annual Review 
 of Financial Economics,  2(1): 103-125. 
 
